Matter of M.F. (2026 MT 133): Post‑2023 “Reasonable Efforts” Are Not a Standalone Termination Element; No Trial Home Visit Required When Safety Conditions Persist

1. Introduction

Matter of M.F. is a Montana Supreme Court decision affirming the First Judicial District Court’s order terminating L.R.H.’s (Mother’s) parental rights to M.F., a youth adjudicated a Youth in Need of Care (YINC). The case arose after M.F.’s fourth removal, driven by recurring concerns that Mother’s home exposed the child to illegal drug activity, unsafe individuals, and educational neglect. Mother challenged termination primarily on two fronts: (1) whether the Department made statutorily required reasonable efforts under the Legislature’s 2023 amendments to Montana’s Child Abuse and Neglect Act, and (2) whether the court should have preferred guardianship rather than termination and adoption.

The Supreme Court used the case to clarify how the post‑2023 “reasonable efforts” provisions in § 41-3-423(1), MCA operate in termination litigation under § 41-3-609(1)(f), MCA, and to explain why certain enumerated “reasonable efforts” steps—such as trial home visits—are not mandatory when safety conditions remain unaddressed.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court affirmed termination. It held:

  • Although the 2023 amendments to § 41-3-423(1), MCA describe “reasonable efforts” in detailed, proactive terms, they do not create a separate statutory element that must be independently proven to terminate parental rights under § 41-3-609(1)(f), MCA.
  • The Department’s efforts remain relevant in termination proceedings because a lack of appropriate efforts may affect the determination whether the parent’s unfitness is unlikely to change within a reasonable time, consistent with In re R.J.F., 2019 MT 113.
  • On this record, the Department provided reasonable efforts to prevent removal and reunify, including assessments, referrals, repeated treatment opportunities, visitation supports, transportation assistance, diligent kin searches, and pursuit of an ICPC placement.
  • The Department was not required to provide a trial home visit under § 41-3-423(1)(b)(vii), MCA when Mother failed to address ongoing safety conditions and could not progress even to unsupervised visitation.
  • The District Court thoughtfully considered guardianship but reasonably concluded termination/adoption better served M.F.’s need for stability and safety, in light of the child’s expressed fear and Mother’s persistent relapses and non-engagement.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

The Court’s reasoning is rooted in established Montana termination jurisprudence while also addressing the 2023 statutory revisions. The cited cases fall into several functional categories.

1) Standard of review and evidentiary burdens

  • In re A.S., 2016 MT 156 and In re K.A., 2016 MT 27: Confirm termination decisions are reviewed for abuse of discretion, reinforcing deference to district court fact-finding and child-welfare judgments when supported by the record.
  • In re K.L., 2014 MT 28: Restates that the Department must prove statutory termination criteria by clear and convincing evidence, and defines that standard as evidence that is “definite, clear, and convincing.”
  • In re M.V.R., 2016 MT 309 and In re J.B., 2016 MT 68: Provide the “clear error” framework for reviewing findings of fact (substantial evidence, misapprehension of evidence, or firm conviction a mistake was made).
  • In re I.M., 2018 MT 61: Supplies the abuse-of-discretion test for evidentiary rulings (arbitrary action or exceeding bounds of reason causing substantial injustice), anchoring the appellate lens on procedural fairness.

2) Termination elements and the role of Department efforts

  • In re D.B., 2007 MT 246: Emphasizes parental rights as a fundamental liberty interest and recognizes the statutory structure that termination requires proof of an unsuccessful treatment plan and unfitness unlikely to change within a reasonable time. The Court used In re D.B. to frame why reunification efforts matter—principally as they bear on whether change is reasonably likely.
  • In re A.T., 2003 MT 154: Requires that the district court “adequately address each applicable statutory requirement” before termination—used here to situate Mother’s argument that specific “reasonable efforts” findings were required, even though the Court ultimately held reasonable efforts are not a separate termination element under § 41-3-609(1)(f), MCA.
  • In re R.J.F., 2019 MT 113: The central precedent for the Court’s reconciliation of “reasonable efforts” with termination. The Court quoted In re R.J.F. for the proposition that reasonable efforts are not a standalone termination requirement, but can be a predicate to deciding whether the parent’s condition is unlikely to change within a reasonable time. The Court also relied on In re R.J.F. for two enduring principles: (i) the Department must develop and implement treatment plans in good faith and assist completion, and (ii) the analysis is highly fact-dependent.
  • In re T.D.H., 2015 MT 244: Reinforces that the Department’s obligations include good-faith assistance in completing treatment plan tasks, supporting the Court’s conclusion that the Department’s repeated referrals, coordination with providers, and facilitation efforts satisfied its duty.

3) The parent’s reciprocal duty to engage; “not herculean efforts”

  • In re C.B., 2014 MT 4; In re D.F., 2007 MT 147; In re T.R., 2004 MT 388; and In re L.S., 2003 MT 12: Stand for the proposition that parents must avail themselves of services and engage with the Department. In this case, those precedents undergird the Court’s rejection of Mother’s attempt to transform her non-participation (missed treatment, disputed tests, relapse) into a Department failure.
  • In re A.G., 2016 MT 203: Restates Montana’s refrain: the Department must make reasonable efforts, not herculean efforts. The Court invoked this concept to explain why, despite extensive support offered, Mother’s persistent resistance and relapse did not convert the case into a “reasonable efforts” violation.

4) Best interests and permanency choice (guardianship vs termination)

  • In re A.B., 2020 MT 64: Cited in support of the District Court’s best-interests analysis and its discretion to reject guardianship where stability and the child’s needs point toward termination/adoption.

5) ICWA and “active efforts” as interpretive context

  • In re J.S., 2014 MT 79: Cited to describe how ICWA’s “active efforts” are heightened compared to non-ICWA reasonable efforts. The Court used it to contextualize the Legislature’s 2023 revisions (“ICWA for all”) and to explain why, after determining M.F. was not an Indian child, the governing standard became § 41-3-423(1), MCA (2023), not federal ICWA.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) The Court’s core doctrinal move: fitting 2023 “reasonable efforts” into § 41-3-609 termination

Mother argued that because the Legislature made “reasonable efforts” more “objectively and specifically defined” in 2023, pre-2023 precedent should be “not appropriately relevant,” and the District Court needed specific findings of good faith and statutory compliance at termination.

The Supreme Court rejected the premise that the 2023 amendments displaced its existing termination framework. It emphasized that termination proceeded under § 41-3-609(1)(f), MCA, whose elements are (1) an unsuccessful treatment plan and (2) unfitness unlikely to change within a reasonable time, proven by clear and convincing evidence. The Court then reaffirmed, consistent with In re R.J.F., 2019 MT 113, that reasonable efforts are relevant to the second element (likelihood of change), but are not an additional termination element.

2) Applying § 41-3-423(1), MCA to the facts: the Department checked the statute’s boxes in substance

The Court conducted a provision-by-provision, record-based analysis:

  • Comprehensive assessment (§ 41-3-423(1)(b)(i), MCA): prior CPS history review, investigation of current reports, and evaluation of M.F.’s educational development (Family Outreach).
  • Identify services and help overcome barriers (§ 41-3-423(1)(b)(ii), (viii), (x), MCA): repeated chemical dependency evaluations, mental health evaluations, inpatient bed dates, outpatient referrals, testing options, provider coordination, regular check-ins, and transportation assistance (gas cards).
  • Extended family involvement and diligent search (§ 41-3-423(1)(b)(iii), (iv), MCA): SENECA search, letters to relatives, kin-placement exploration, and an ICPC attempt for sister placement in Nevada.
  • Culturally appropriate strategies (§ 41-3-423(1)(b)(v), MCA): the Department investigated possible ICWA status and treated the case with ICWA-type “active efforts” until confirming M.F. was not an Indian child; the record did not show Mother asserted cultural-service needs.
  • Visits in the most natural setting possible / trial home visits (§ 41-3-423(1)(b)(vii), MCA): the Department provided extensive supervised visitation and a visitation specialist, but moved visits to the Department offices when Mother’s behavior became erratic.

3) The “trial home visit” holding: the statute is not self-defeating

A notable clarification is the Court’s interpretation of § 41-3-423(1)(b)(vii), MCA. Mother argued the Department failed because it did not provide a trial home visit. The Court held the provision “cannot be read to require a trial home visit when the parent has failed to address the conditions which make the parent unsafe to parent the child in her home.”

Practically, this is a safety-first construction: “reasonable efforts” cannot compel the Department to create an unsafe reunification experiment merely to satisfy a checklist. Instead, trial home visits are conditional tools—available when the parent’s progress supports safe escalation of contact.

4) Parental resistance as part of the “totality of the circumstances”

The Court placed substantial weight on Mother’s recurring pattern: delayed engagement, missed appointments, disputed tests without expert support, relapses soon after inpatient discharge, and failure to follow recommended outpatient services. It explicitly framed “reasonable efforts” as contextual and dynamic, assessed under the “totality of the circumstances,” including a parent’s resistance or inability to acknowledge and address unfitness conditions.

C. Impact

  • Post‑2023 “reasonable efforts” are enforceable but not a new termination element. The decision signals that litigants should treat § 41-3-423(1) as governing Department practice and informing the “reasonable time” analysis, rather than as an additional checklist the State must separately prove to terminate under § 41-3-609(1)(f).
  • Trial home visits are not mandatory where safety prerequisites are unmet. This limits arguments that the Department must “graduate” reunification steps despite ongoing relapse, instability, or unsafe conduct.
  • Guardianship remains a discretionary option, not a default. Even where a court “often prefers guardianship,” Matter of M.F. reinforces that a child’s expressed safety needs and persistent parental non-change can justify termination/adoption.
  • “ICWA for all” rhetoric does not collapse ICWA and non-ICWA standards. The opinion treats the 2023 amendments as more detailed and proactive, but still doctrinally distinct from federal “active efforts,” and still filtered through Montana’s termination elements and fact-specific analysis.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Youth in Need of Care (YINC)
A legal status determined by the court when a child has been abused, neglected, or is at risk, allowing court oversight and services.
Emergency Protective Services (EPS)
An urgent, temporary court-authorized intervention removing or protecting a child when immediate safety concerns exist.
Treatment Plan
A court-approved set of tasks (e.g., evaluations, treatment, testing, parenting skills, stable housing) designed to remedy the conditions that make the parent unsafe. Failure to complete or benefit from the plan is central to termination under § 41-3-609(1)(f), MCA.
Reasonable Efforts (post‑2023 § 41-3-423(1), MCA)
The Department’s good-faith obligation to assess family needs, identify services, help overcome barriers, involve extended family, support visitation, and monitor progress. It is proactive and documented, but does not require unsafe steps.
ICWA “Active Efforts” and QEW
Under the federal Indian Child Welfare Act, “active efforts” are heightened reunification duties; a qualified expert witness (QEW) may testify on whether continued custody by the parent is likely to result in serious harm. Here, ICWA ultimately did not apply because M.F. was determined not to be an Indian child.
ICPC (Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children)
A process required before a child can be placed across state lines, ensuring the receiving state approves the placement and home.
CASA
A Court Appointed Special Advocate who provides independent recommendations focused on the child’s best interests.
Clear and convincing evidence
A higher proof standard than “more likely than not,” requiring evidence that is definite and persuasive; it is commonly used in parental-rights termination cases due to the fundamental rights at stake.

5. Conclusion

Matter of M.F. confirms that Montana’s 2023 detailed definition of “reasonable efforts” strengthens what the Department must do in practice, but it does not rewrite the statutory elements for termination under § 41-3-609(1)(f), MCA. Reasonable efforts remain a fact-driven inquiry most relevant to whether parental unfitness is unlikely to change within a reasonable time. The Court further clarifies that statutory “reasonable efforts” do not compel unsafe reunification steps such as a trial home visit when the parent has not addressed the conditions that made removal necessary. Finally, the decision underscores that guardianship is not automatically preferable to termination when the child’s safety, stability, and permanency needs—especially expressed fear and anxiety—support adoption as the more protective outcome.