Matter of Lemoine: Reciprocal Disbarment and “Venal Intent” for Misuse of Escrowed Client/Third-Party Funds

1. Introduction

In Matter of Lemoine, the First Department imposed reciprocal discipline and disbarred a New York-admitted attorney after the Supreme Court of Georgia disbarred him for intentional conversion and mishandling of escrowed funds in two matters. The petitioner was the Attorney Grievance Committee for the First Judicial Department (AGC); the respondent, Dominique Marc Henri Lemoine, appeared pro se.

The central issues were (i) whether any of the limited defenses to reciprocal discipline under 22 NYCRR 1240.13(b) applied, (ii) whether the Georgia misconduct would constitute misconduct in New York, and (iii) whether New York should defer to Georgia’s sanction of disbarment.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The court emphasized that the Georgia record established intentional conversion and escrow-rule violations, and reiterated that “venal intent” for intentional conversion is shown where a lawyer knowingly uses client/third-party funds without authority—even if the lawyer claims an intent to repay.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

• Matter of Milara, 194 AD3d 108, 110 [1st Dept 2021]
  Role in this case: The court relied on Milara to state the three exclusive defenses available in reciprocal discipline under 22 NYCRR 1240.13(b): (1) lack of notice/opportunity to be heard (due process), (2) infirmity of proof, or (3) the foreign misconduct would not be misconduct in New York. The court used Milara both to frame respondent’s burden and to underscore that reciprocal discipline is not a re-trial of the foreign case.
• Matter of Blau, 50 AD3d 240, 243 [1st Dept 2008]
  Role in this case: The court quoted Blau for the definition of the scienter/mental-state element (“venal intent”) necessary for intentional conversion: it is satisfied by proof that an attorney, knowing he lacked permission or authority, used escrowed funds for his own purposes. This directly answered respondent’s claimed lack of intent to “permanently” deprive others of funds.
• Matter of Kirschenbaum, 29 AD3d 96, 100 [1st Dept 2006]
  Role in this case: The court invoked Kirschenbaum to reinforce that repayment (or an intent to repay) does not negate venal intent. This foreclosed a common mitigation argument in conversion cases: “I was going to replace the money.”
• Matter of Tabacco, 171 AD3d 163, 165 [1st Dept 2019]
  Role in this case: Cited for the principle that New York generally defers to the sanction imposed by the originating jurisdiction because that jurisdiction has the greatest interest in fashioning discipline for misconduct proven there.
• Matter of Karambelas, 203 AD3d 75, 80-81 [1st Dept 2022]
  Role in this case: Used to characterize departure from the foreign sanction as “rare.” By citing Karambelas, the court signaled that respondent needed an exceptional showing to justify a lesser sanction than Georgia’s disbarment.
• Matter of Carlos, 192 AD3d 170, 172-173 [1st Dept 2021]
  Role in this case: Cited as an example supporting disbarment as an appropriate sanction where intentional conversion is established.
• Matter of Brown (319 GA 465 [2024])
  Role in this case: This Georgia case appeared as part of respondent’s argument to the Supreme Court of Georgia (asserting the formal complaints should have been dismissed under Matter of Brown). New York did not apply Brown as controlling; rather, it noted Georgia rejected that argument and proceeded to evaluate the New York reciprocal-discipline defenses, not the merits of Georgia procedure.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. The foreign discipline triggered New York’s reciprocal framework

Because respondent was disbarred by the Supreme Court of Georgia, AGC proceeded under Judiciary Law § 90(2) and 22 NYCRR 1240.13. New York’s task was not to re-litigate the underlying facts, but to determine whether any 1240.13(b) defenses applied and, absent a defense, the appropriate reciprocal sanction.

B. No 22 NYCRR 1240.13(b) defense applied

• Due process (notice/opportunity to be heard): The court found the record showed full participation by respondent—answering charges, defending at a hearing before a Special Master, seeking review by the Georgia State Disciplinary Review Board, and filing exceptions with the Supreme Court of Georgia.
• Infirmity of proof: The court concluded the record “firmly supports” intentional conversion findings, including respondent’s admissions that escrowed funds were used to pay other clients/third parties and personal expenses.
• No New York analogue: The court held the Georgia misconduct would also violate New York’s Rules of Professional Conduct, specifically 22 NYCRR 1200.00 rules 1.3(a) (diligence), 1.4(a) (communication), 1.15(a), (b), (c) (safekeeping and handling of client/third-party funds), and 8.4(c) (dishonesty, fraud, deceit, misrepresentation).

C. “Venal intent” was satisfied notwithstanding claimed intent to repay

Respondent’s principal theme—that he did not intend permanent deprivation—did not matter under First Department law. The court applied:

• Matter of Blau to define the intent element as knowing unauthorized use of entrusted funds; and
• Matter of Kirschenbaum to reject repayment as a defense to venal intent.

On that framework, the Special Master’s finding that respondent was “acutely aware” he was converting funds supported intentional conversion for reciprocal purposes.

D. Sanction: deference to Georgia and disbarment

Relying on Matter of Milara and Matter of Tabacco, the court reiterated its general deference to the originating jurisdiction’s sanction, departing only rarely (Matter of Karambelas). With intentional conversion established and no exceptional circumstances shown, the court imposed reciprocal disbarment, consistent with analogous outcomes such as Matter of Carlos.

3.3 Impact

• Reinforcement of a strict reciprocal-discipline posture: The decision underscores that New York’s reciprocal process is narrow and defense-driven; robust participation in the foreign case makes due-process challenges difficult.
• Clear signal on escrow misuse and “intent” arguments: The opinion reaffirms that claiming an intent to repay is not a meaningful shield where a lawyer knowingly uses entrusted funds without authority.
• Continued deference to foreign sanctions: By emphasizing that departures are rare, the decision encourages uniformity and predictability across jurisdictions where the underlying misconduct is substantively congruent with New York’s rules.
• Practical compliance consequences: The order’s directives under 22 NYCRR 1240.15 highlight the post-disbarment obligations (cessation of practice, holding out, and administrative requirements), which often become enforcement flashpoints.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Reciprocal discipline: A streamlined New York procedure that imposes discipline based on another jurisdiction’s discipline, unless the lawyer proves one of the limited defenses in 22 NYCRR 1240.13(b).
• IOLTA / escrow account: A special lawyer trust account used to hold client or third-party money separate from the lawyer’s own funds. “Improperly constituted escrow account” and “commingling” generally mean the account setup or handling failed to keep entrusted funds properly segregated and tracked.
• Intentional conversion: Using money held in trust for someone else as if it were your own, without authorization.
• Venal intent (scienter): In this context, the knowing, unauthorized use of entrusted funds. Under Matter of Blau and Matter of Kirschenbaum, an intent to repay does not erase venal intent.
• Clear and convincing evidence: A heightened civil standard of proof, requiring a high degree of certainty (more than “preponderance,” less than “beyond a reasonable doubt”).

5. Conclusion

Matter of Lemoine applies New York’s reciprocal-discipline framework to impose disbarment where a foreign jurisdiction (Georgia) found intentional conversion and escrow violations. The First Department’s analysis is anchored in two durable propositions: (1) reciprocal discipline is defeated only by the narrow defenses in 22 NYCRR 1240.13(b), and (2) “venal intent” is established by knowing unauthorized use of entrusted funds, regardless of repayment intentions. The decision therefore strengthens predictability in multi-jurisdiction lawyer discipline and reaffirms New York’s stringent treatment of escrow misuse.