Matter of Johnson v. McManus: Election Law § 14-126(2) Targets Excess “Acceptance,” Not Excess “Making,” and Requires Proof of Intent

1. Introduction

In Matter of Johnson v McManus (2026 NY Slip Op 02187 [3d Dept Apr. 9, 2026]), the Appellate Division, Third Department reversed a Supreme Court judgment that had confirmed a New York State Board of Elections (BOE) determination imposing civil penalties on a multi-candidate political committee and its treasurer.

The respondent political committee, DSA For the Many (DSA), was organized to support candidates endorsed by the Democratic Socialists of America in the New York City area. The BOE’s Division of Election Law Enforcement investigated whether DSA was properly “authorized” to act for certain candidates and whether it exceeded campaign contribution limits in supporting them. A BOE Hearing Officer found violations, recommended penalties totaling $312,068.95, and Supreme Court confirmed the determination but reduced the penalty to $212,068.95.

The central appellate issues were purely statutory: whether Election Law § 14-126(2)—a civil penalty provision for unlawfully “accept[ing]” excess contributions with intent—can be applied to a committee’s alleged conduct in making contributions (including in-kind contributions through expenditures) that purportedly exceeded the limits applicable under the Election Law, and whether the requisite “intent to violate” was established.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Third Department held that Election Law § 14-126(2) did not fit the alleged misconduct. By its plain terms, § 14-126(2) penalizes a person who unlawfully accepts an excess contribution under circumstances evincing an intent to violate the law. The BOE’s theory, however, focused on DSA’s making of expenditures that allegedly resulted in in-kind contributions exceeding contribution limits—not on DSA’s acceptance of excessive contributions from donors.

The court further explained that even if the BOE’s characterization could be stretched to argue “acceptance,” the record did not support the statute’s additional requirement: circumstances evincing an intent to violate the Election Law.

The judgment was reversed, and the petition to confirm the BOE determination and impose penalties was dismissed.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

The decision is rooted in New York’s familiar framework for statutory interpretation—especially strict textualism in the Election Law context—supported by the following cited authorities:

  • Matter of City of Long Beach v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 39 NY3d 17 (2022): Cited for the principle that “pure statutory construction” turns on accurate apprehension of legislative intent. The Third Department used this to frame the case as text-driven, not discretionary.
  • Matter of Fleetwood Drywall Inc. [Commissioner of Labor], 201 AD3d 1059 (3d Dept 2022): Reinforces the same interpretive posture—statutory meaning resolves the dispute.
  • Matter of Brennan Ctr. for Justice at NYU Sch. of Law v New York State Bd. of Elections, 159 AD3d 1301 (3d Dept 2018, Egan Jr., J., concurring), lv denied 32 NY3d 912 (2019): Supports close statutory parsing in election administration disputes.
  • Rodriguez v City of New York, 31 NY3d 312 (2018), and Matter of Marzullo v DelConte, 165 AD3d 1466 (3d Dept 2018): Cited for the “best evidence” rule—legislative intent is best shown by the statute’s plain language.
  • Matter of Kosmider v Whitney, 34 NY3d 48 (2019): Cited both for contextual/harmonizing construction within a broader statutory scheme and for the proposition that statutory words matter across related provisions; the Third Department invoked it to emphasize that the Election Law uses distinct verbs (“make” vs “accept”) intentionally.
  • Matter of Gross v Albany County Bd. of Elections, 3 NY3d 251 (2004), and Matter of Seawright v Board of Elections in the City of N.Y., 35 NY3d 227 (2020): These cases underscore a recurring theme in election cases: given the Election Law’s detailed procedural framework, courts are not invited to exercise interpretive “flexibility.” The Third Department used these precedents to resist expanding § 14-126(2) beyond its text.
  • Matter of Lauder v Pellegrino, 153 AD3d 1114 (3d Dept 2017), lv dismissed 29 NY3d 1099 (2017): Cited “generally” to support the court’s observation that the statute’s refund remedy is directed at actors who receive and possess excess funds—consistent with “acceptance,” not “making.”
  • Commonwealth of the N. Mariana Is. v Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 21 NY3d 55 (2013); Matter of Perkins v Town of Dryden Planning Bd., 172 AD3d 1695 (3d Dept 2019); People v Elmer, 19 NY3d 501 (2012): These authorities supply the canon that different terms used in a statute are presumed to have different meanings, and the Legislature is presumed aware of the distinction. This canon is central to the court’s refusal to equate “accepts” with “makes.”
  • Matter of Peyton v New York City Bd. of Stds. & Appeals, 36 NY3d 271 (2020); Matter of Town of Southampton v New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 194 AD3d 1310 (3d Dept 2021), affd 39 NY3d 201 (2023); Matter of Independence Party State Comm. v New York State Bd. of Elections, 297 AD2d 459 (3d Dept 2002): These cases were cited to reinforce adherence to “plain meaning” and straightforward application of statutory language.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. The statutory scheme the court relied on

The court placed § 14-126(2) within Election Law article 14’s reporting and authorization framework:

  • Political committees may “aid or take part in the election or defeat of a candidate” (Election Law § 14-100[1]) and may support more than one candidate (Election Law § 14-114[4]).
  • Committees and candidates have sworn reporting duties (Election Law §§ 14-102[1], 14-104[1]).
  • A candidate may, instead of filing their own disclosure, file a sworn statement that they will act only through an “authorized” committee (Election Law § 14-104[1]), and an aiding committee must file a sworn authorization statement (Election Law § 14-112). An authorized committee may fulfill filing requirements on behalf of the candidate (Election Law § 14-104[1]).
  • For multi-candidate committees, contributions to the committee are “deemed contributed” to every supported candidate, allocated by a reasonable formula, with required reporting of totals and candidate-by-candidate allocations (Election Law § 14-114[4]).

B. The BOE’s enforcement theory vs. the statutory trigger

The BOE’s penalty vehicle was Election Law § 14-126(2), which applies to a person who, acting as or on behalf of a candidate or committee, and under circumstances evincing intent to violate the law, unlawfully accepts an excess contribution. The Third Department concluded that the BOE’s allegations did not match that trigger.

Critically, the opinion notes there was no allegation that DSA’s donors exceeded limits when giving to DSA; the asserted excess arose from DSA’s downstream support of candidates (through expenditures and alleged in-kind contributions) and, alternatively, from disputed authorization/allocations. The court treated that as conduct centered on making contributions, not accepting them.

C. Textual distinction: “accepts” is not “makes”

The court’s core holding is textual: § 14-126(2) penalizes “accept[ing]” excess contributions, not making them. The court emphasized that Election Law § 14-114(1) itself distinguishes between “mak[ing]” and “accept[ing]” a contribution, reinforcing that the Legislature uses the verbs deliberately. Applying canons from Commonwealth of the N. Mariana Is. v Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce and People v Elmer, the court presumed the difference was intended.

D. Remedy structure: “refund” aligns with the recipient/acceptor

The statute’s remedy further confirmed its target: § 14-126(2) requires refund of the excess amount. The court reasoned that this restorative remedy naturally fits the person who received and holds the funds (the acceptor), not the party who spent money to support a candidate. This is where the court cited Matter of Lauder v Pellegrino “generally” as consistent with refund-focused logic.

E. Independent barrier: the “intent to violate” element

Even assuming arguendo that the BOE could characterize the conduct as acceptance, § 14-126(2) still requires “circumstances evincing an intent to violate.” The court found that element unsupported:

  • Respondents attempted to obtain authorization forms before concerns were raised.
  • A campaign treasurer raised concerns and confirmed with the BOE an understanding that additional forms were not required.
  • One candidate openly promoted her inclusion on DSA’s slate, and others later indicated they had authorized DSA.
  • Respondents submitted expenditure/allocation tabulations shortly after the election (though not per-candidate detail).

On this record, the court did not see circumstances evincing an intent to violate the statute.

F. The footnote’s significance: the Legislature knows how to criminalize “contributing”

The opinion’s footnote points to Election Law § 14-126(5), which (though not the basis for the penalties imposed) criminalizes not only “accept[ing]” an excess contribution but also “contribut[ing],” and “aid[ing] or participat[ing] in the acceptance of” an excess contribution. The juxtaposition strengthens the court’s inference that when the Legislature wants to reach contributors, it says so explicitly—supporting the narrow reading of § 14-126(2).

3.3. Impact

The decision’s practical effect is to constrain the BOE’s use of Election Law § 14-126(2) in campaign-finance enforcement where the theory is that a committee’s spending (in-kind support) or contribution-making exceeded limits. After Matter of Johnson v McManus:

  • Charge-selection matters more: Regulators must align the alleged conduct (accepting vs making) with the statutory provision invoked, rather than relying on broad policy arguments about contribution limits.
  • Textual limits are reinforced in Election Law litigation: Echoing Matter of Gross v Albany County Bd. of Elections and Matter of Seawright v Board of Elections in the City of N.Y., courts are likely to resist “flexible” interpretations aimed at plugging perceived enforcement gaps.
  • The intent requirement has bite: § 14-126(2) is not merely a strict-liability excess-funds mechanism; evidence must support “circumstances evincing an intent to violate.”
  • Multi-candidate committee disputes may shift to other provisions: Where the alleged wrong is improper contribution-making, misallocation, or reporting/authorization failures, enforcement may need to proceed under different statutory hooks (potentially including provisions that expressly cover “contributing” or other reporting-based remedies), rather than § 14-126(2).

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Authorized” political committee: A committee becomes “authorized” for a candidate when the statutory sworn statements are filed such that the committee may satisfy certain filing/reporting requirements on the candidate’s behalf (Election Law §§ 14-104[1], 14-112).
  • Multi-candidate committee allocation: When contributors give to a multi-candidate committee, the law “deems” the contribution to be given to each supported candidate in allocated shares, requiring the committee to report total receipts and candidate-specific allocations (Election Law § 14-114[4]).
  • In-kind contribution: Non-cash support of a campaign—often goods or services—treated as a contribution. Here, the BOE characterized certain committee expenditures as creating in-kind contributions.
  • “Acceptance” vs “making” a contribution: “Accepting” is receiving money (or value) into the possession/control of the recipient; “making” is giving/spending to support a candidate. This case holds that § 14-126(2) is aimed at the former.
  • “Circumstances evincing an intent to violate”: The statute requires indicia of purposeful or knowing noncompliance, not merely an arguable mistake about complex authorization/reporting requirements.

5. Conclusion

Matter of Johnson v McManus establishes a clear, text-based boundary for civil penalties under Election Law § 14-126(2): the provision applies to intentional unlawful acceptance of excess contributions—not to allegations that a committee made excess contributions through expenditures or in-kind support. The decision also underscores that § 14-126(2)’s “intent to violate” requirement is substantive and must be supported by the record. In the broader election-law landscape, the opinion signals that enforcement creativity cannot substitute for statutory fit, particularly in New York’s highly codified election framework.