Vacatur of Default Custody/Family-Offense Orders Where Participation Was Intended and Best-Interests Facts Remain Disputed

1. Introduction

This appeal arose from custody and family-offense proceedings between married parents who live separately and share one child (born 2013). The mother filed for sole legal and physical custody and also pursued a family offense petition. On March 23, 2022, the trial court treated the father as having defaulted after he exited the courtroom, then (i) granted the mother sole custody and suspended all parenting time and (ii) entered a final order of protection based on findings of harassment in the second degree, criminal mischief, and attempted assault.

The father later moved to vacate both the custody order and the order of protection. After procedural confusion involving a “ministerial correction” under CPLR 5019(a), the Supreme Court ultimately denied vacatur. The Second Department reversed: it held the default-based custody and family-offense determinations should be vacated and remitted for a hearing and new determination.

Key issues included: (1) whether the father could appeal an order that granted him the relief he sought (aggrievement), (2) whether the appeal became moot once the order of protection expired, (3) the standard for vacating a default under CPLR 5015(a)(1), and (4) whether a custody determination may be made on default without a full best-interests hearing where factual disputes remain.

2. Summary of the Opinion

• Appeal dismissed (in part): The father’s appeal from the December 10, 2024 order granting his CPLR 5019(a) motion was dismissed because he was not “aggrieved” by a favorable order.
• Corrected order reversed: The corrected December 10, 2024 order denying vacatur was reversed as a matter of law.
• Vacatur granted: The father’s motion to vacate both the March 23, 2022 custody order and the March 23, 2022 order of protection was granted.
• Remittal for merits adjudication: The matter was remitted for a hearing and a new determination of the mother’s custody and family offense petitions.
• Mootness rejected: Even though the order of protection expired on March 22, 2024, the appeal was not academic due to potential enduring consequences of the family-offense findings.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

Aggrievement and appellate jurisdiction

• T.D. v New York State Off. of Mental Health, 91 NY2d 860, 862 and Parochial Bus Sys., Inc. v Bd. of Educ. of City of New York, 60 NY2d 539, 546: These cases supply the controlling rule that a party who obtained the full relief requested is not “aggrieved” and therefore lacks grounds to appeal under CPLR 5511. The Second Department used them to dismiss the appeal from the order that granted the father’s CPLR 5019(a) request.
• Mixon v TBV, Inc., 76 AD3d 144, 157: Cited to reinforce dismissal where the appellant is not aggrieved.

Mootness (academicness) and enduring consequences of orders of protection

• Matter of Samida v Samida, 116 AD3d 779, 780; Matter of Saldivar v Cabrera, 109 AD3d 831, 831; and Matter of Hohn v Guirand, 97 AD3d 578, 578: These authorities support the rule that an appeal from an expired order of protection may remain justiciable because a family-offense finding can carry collateral, enduring consequences. The court relied on this line to reach the merits despite the order’s expiration.

Vacating defaults under CPLR 5015(a)(1) and liberal approach in custody matters

• Matter of Lemon v Faison, 150 AD3d 1003, 1004-1005: Provides the two-part test for vacatur—reasonable excuse plus potentially meritorious claim/defense—and expressly notes the Second Department’s “liberal policy” favoring vacatur of defaults in custody proceedings. This case forms the backbone of the panel’s vacatur analysis.
• Matter of Cheung v Kinsey, 234 AD3d 958, 960; Matter of Dublin v Morris, 224 AD3d 901, 901; and Matter of McCall v Gonzalez, 207 AD3d 548, 549: Cited for the standard that vacatur is committed to the trial court’s discretion—yet remains reviewable for improvident exercise, particularly in custody contexts.
• Matter of Brice v Lee, 134 AD3d 1106, 1107: Reinforces the liberal vacatur policy in custody proceedings.

Limits on default dispositions in custody/family offense contexts

• Matter of Dos Santos v Dos Santos, 76 AD3d 1013, 1014 and Matter of Bey v Perez, 39 AD3d 631, 632: Cited for the proposition that the court “should not have issued” custody and order-of-protection determinations upon the father’s default in the circumstances presented—particularly where meaningful participation was intended and counsel remained and attempted to participate.

What constitutes a “reasonable excuse” and absence of willfulness

• Matter of Lee v Morgan, 67 AD3d 681, 682; Matter of Dellagatta v McGillicuddy, 31 AD3d 549, 550; and Matter of Cohen v Seletsky, 142 AD2d 111, 117: These cases support treating misunderstandings about adjournments or courtroom procedure as potential reasonable excuses, especially absent indicia of willfulness.
• Matter of Gastaldi v Gastaldi, 125 AD3d 657, 658: Cited, along with Matter of Lemon v Faison, to emphasize the lack of willfulness and the relevance of prompt motion practice after the purported default.

Best-interests adjudication and the necessity of a hearing

• Matter of Sims v Boykin, 130 AD3d 835, 835-836: Quoted for the principle that even where a court proceeds by default, it retains a primary duty to ensure custody is decided on best interests after a full and comprehensive hearing and careful analysis of relevant factors.
• S.L. v J.R., 27 NY3d 558, 563-564: The Court of Appeals authority setting the modern framework: while a hearing is not invariably required, it is required when material facts relevant to the best-interests analysis remain in dispute.
• Matter of Riera v Ayabaca, 235 AD3d 643, 644-645 and Palazzola v Palazzola, 188 AD3d 1081, 1082: Applied to underscore that disputed best-interests facts trigger a hearing requirement.
• Matter of Corcoran v Liebowitz, 204 AD3d 910, 912 and Matter of Merchant v Caldwell, 198 AD3d 782, 784: Cited against the mother’s argument that no hearing was necessary; the record did not eliminate unresolved factual issues.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The “not aggrieved” dismissal (procedural discipline in appeals)

The Second Department first separated what could be appealed from what could not. Because the December 10, 2024 order granted the father’s CPLR 5019(a) motion in full (a ministerial correction to remove an erroneous denial language from a prior temporary order), he was not “aggrieved” under CPLR 5511. That made appellate review unavailable for that order—regardless of the broader dispute.

2. The appeal was not moot despite expiration of the order of protection

The court treated expiration as insufficient to end the case because family-offense findings can carry collateral consequences (e.g., reputational, future custody implications, potential effects in subsequent proceedings). This ensures appellate oversight remains available where the practical and legal aftermath persists.

3. Why vacatur was required: no true default and, even if default, a reasonable excuse plus meritorious defenses

The panel’s reasoning has two reinforcing layers:

• Threshold concern: The trial court “should not have issued” the custody order or order of protection upon the purported default. The father appeared with counsel intending to participate; counsel stayed and attempted to participate after the father left. That factual posture undermined the premise that the matter could fairly be resolved as an uncontested default.
• CPLR 5015(a)(1) analysis (even assuming default): The father’s affidavit claimed he left believing the matter had been adjourned; he had no willful intent to default; he attended prior appearances; there was no indication that final determinations would be made that day; and he moved to vacate within roughly three months. These facts supported a “reasonable excuse.” As to merit, the court emphasized the custody court’s independent obligation to decide best interests on a developed record; the absence of a full hearing and absence of specific best-interests findings meant the father’s opposition was potentially meritorious in the only sense that ultimately matters in custody: there remained disputed, material facts requiring adjudication.

4. Hearing requirement: best interests cannot be short-circuited by default where facts remain disputed

The opinion’s doctrinal center is its insistence—grounded in S.L. v J.R. and applied through Matter of Sims v Boykin—that default procedure does not displace the court’s core duty to assess best interests on an adequate record. Here, the Supreme Court made a final custody determination without a “full hearing” and without “specific findings of fact.” Because the record did not establish that no factual disputes existed, the court held a hearing was required and remitted for that purpose.

C. Impact

• Stronger guardrails against “default finality” in custody/IDV settings: The decision signals that trial courts should exercise extreme caution before entering final custody and family-offense determinations by default, particularly when a represented party appears but a participation breakdown occurs (e.g., leaving the courtroom).
• Litigation strategy—vacatur motions: For practitioners, the case underscores what facts help establish “reasonable excuse” (non-willfulness, prior appearance history, prompt motion timing, misunderstanding about adjournment) and “merit” (unresolved best-interests disputes; lack of full hearing; insufficient findings).
• Mootness doctrine in family-offense appeals: It reinforces that expiration of an order of protection is not a safe harbor from appellate review where family-offense findings may have continuing consequences.
• Appellate housekeeping matters: The “aggrievement” dismissal portion is a reminder that appellate rights track adverse effect, not mere dissatisfaction with related rulings.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Aggrieved party (CPLR 5511): You can generally appeal only if the order hurt you. If you won exactly what you asked for, you are not “aggrieved,” so your appeal is dismissed.
• Academic/moot appeal: A case can still be reviewed after an order expires if the finding can continue to affect the party (collateral consequences).
• Default and vacatur (CPLR 5015[a][1]): To undo an order entered on default, the movant must show (1) a reasonable excuse for missing/“defaulting” and (2) a potentially meritorious claim or defense.
• CPLR 5019(a) “ministerial error”: A mechanism to correct clerical/ministerial mistakes in an order (e.g., an incorrect line included), not to re-decide the merits.
• Best interests of the child: The governing custody standard; courts must base custody outcomes on a holistic assessment of the child’s welfare, usually requiring a developed evidentiary record when material facts are contested.
• Remittal: The appellate court sends the case back to the trial court to conduct a hearing and issue a new decision consistent with the appellate ruling.

5. Conclusion

Matter of Figaro v. White reinforces that custody and family-offense outcomes—especially those severing parenting time or imposing stay-away protections—should not be finalized through a brittle default process when a represented parent appeared intending to participate and when best-interests facts remain disputed. The Second Department coupled a procedural reminder (no appeal without aggrievement) with a substantive insistence on merits-based adjudication: where the record lacks a full hearing and specific best-interests findings, vacatur and remittal are warranted to protect the child-centered integrity of custody determinations.