Matter of DeLorenzo — Reinstatement from Interim Suspension Turns on Actual Duration (MPRE and Long-Form Affidavit After Six Months)

1. Introduction

Matter of DeLorenzo (2026 NY Slip Op 03354 [3d Dept May 28, 2026]) arises from an attorney-discipline proceeding in the Appellate Division, Third Department, involving Paul Edward DeLorenzo, admitted in 1993 and formerly affiliated with DeLorenzo, Grasso & Dalmata, LLP (DGD). The Attorney Grievance Committee for the Third Judicial Department (AGC) investigated respondent for the unauthorized use of funds held in the firm’s escrow accounts.

During the investigation, respondent attempted to resign from the bar; AGC cross-moved for interim suspension. In March 2023, the Third Department granted AGC’s cross-motion and interimly suspended respondent, citing his admissions of misconduct relating to the escrow account and his failure to address misappropriation allegations (214 AD3d 1253 [3d Dept 2023]).

The 2026 decision addresses (i) whether respondent met the substantive burden for reinstatement and (ii) a broader procedural issue raised by AGC: what reinstatement procedure applies to an attorney suspended “indefinitely” on an interim basis under 22 NYCRR 1240.9(a).

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Third Department denied respondent’s motion for reinstatement. The Court held that respondent failed to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that he complied with the suspension order and rules governing suspended attorneys, failed to demonstrate the character and fitness to practice, and failed to show that reinstatement would serve the public interest.

Although denying reinstatement on substantive grounds, the Court also announced an important procedural clarification for future applications: for attorneys suspended indefinitely on an interim basis, the reinstatement procedure is guided by the “actual duration” of the suspension at the time of the application. Thus, where an interim suspension has actually lasted more than six months, the attorney must use the long-form reinstatement process (including the Appendix C affidavit) and provide proof of passing the MPRE within the specified timeframe.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

(a) Burden and substantive reinstatement factors

  • Matter of Del Boccio, 241 AD3d 1615 (3d Dept 2025)
    The Court relied on Del Boccio for the governing reinstatement standard: a suspended attorney must prove by clear and convincing evidence compliance with the suspension order and court rules, possession of requisite character and fitness, and that reinstatement is in the public interest. DeLorenzo applies this framework to deny reinstatement.
  • Matter of Matthews, 187 AD3d 1482 (3d Dept 2020)
    Cited by “compare,” Matthews is used as a reference point for what a sufficient showing of character and fitness can look like. The implication is that DeLorenzo’s submissions fell materially short of the type of record that supported reinstatement (or otherwise satisfied the court) in Matthews.
  • Matter of Sullivan, 153 AD3d 1484 (3d Dept 2017)
    Sullivan is cited as an example framing the public-interest inquiry. DeLorenzo uses it to reinforce that reinstatement is not automatic upon passage of time; it requires an affirmative showing that the public will be protected and confidence in the bar maintained.

(b) “Term controls” and the evolution of reinstatement procedure

  • Matter of Jing Tan, 164 AD3d 1515 (3d Dept 2018)
    Jing Tan is central to the Court’s procedural discussion. It is cited for the proposition that, since 2016, Third Department rules have provided that the “term of the order of suspension controls” which reinstatement procedure applies, and for the policy rationale that time away from practice affects proficiency and familiarity with current ethical/legal requirements.
  • Matter of Bruhn, 206 AD3d 1225 (3d Dept 2022)
    Bruhn reinforces Jing Tan’s policy rationale: reinstatement procedures reflect a considered judgment about the relationship between time suspended and the need for safeguards (e.g., more detailed disclosures, testing) to ensure competence and public protection.

(c) Limits on “actual duration” outside interim suspensions

  • Matter of Edelstein, 203 AD3d 1378 (3d Dept 2022)
    Mentioned in Footnote 3 as an example where Jing Tan’s “actual duration” concept may have been applied to certain term suspensions that extended beyond the set term.
  • Matter of Fisher, 233 AD3d 1347 (3d Dept 2024)
    Also in Footnote 3, Fisher is cited for the proposition that current rules no longer permit applying Jing Tan to the circumstance of a term suspension exceeding its stated term. This matters because DeLorenzo’s new holding targets interim suspensions, not a general return to “actual duration” for all suspension types.

(d) Registration suspensions treated separately

  • Matter of Attorneys in Violation of Judiciary Law § 468-a, 230 AD3d 1498 (3d Dept 2024)
    Cited in Footnote 3 to clarify that reinstatement from suspensions tied to registration noncompliance is governed by separate rules (22 NYCRR 806.16[c]) and is not addressed by the DeLorenzo procedural holding.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(a) Substantive denial: failure of proof on compliance, fitness, and public interest

The Court begins with the established reinstatement framework (as articulated in Matter of Del Boccio) and concludes respondent did not meet it. The decision highlights three deficiencies:

  • Noncompliance showing: Respondent did not carry his burden to prove compliance with the suspension order and rules governing suspended attorneys, citing 22 NYCRR 1240.15(f), 22 NYCRR part 1240, appendix B, and 22 NYCRR 806.16(b)(5)(i).
  • Character and fitness: The Court found respondent did not establish he possesses the requisite character and fitness to resume practice, emphasizing that his submissions did not grapple with the Court’s prior findings underlying the interim suspension, including his “admission of professional misconduct as to the firm's escrow account” (214 AD3d at 1254).
  • Public interest: Reinstatement is framed as a protective, public-centered inquiry (see Matter of Sullivan), and respondent failed to show reinstatement would serve that interest. The Court also noted respondent failed to articulate plans to resume practice, a practical detail often relevant to assessing readiness, supervision, and risk.

(b) Procedural clarification: interim suspensions measured by actual duration

The Court then addresses AGC’s procedural objections and uses the occasion to “clarify” procedures for future applications by respondent and similarly situated attorneys suspended on an interim basis under 22 NYCRR 1240.9(a).

The opinion contrasts two established pathways:

  • Suspension “for more than six months” (by the order’s term): requires the long-form process under 22 NYCRR 1240.16(b), including the Appendix C 38-paragraph affidavit and MPRE proof, and also corresponds to broader dispositional options.
  • Suspension “six months or less” (by the order’s term): permits the abbreviated short-form process under 22 NYCRR 1240.16(d), and limits the Court’s options largely to granting or denying reinstatement (after hearing from AGC and the Lawyers’ Fund for Client Protection).

The key problem identified is that an interim suspension is frequently indefinite and not “measured by a set term,” yet may last for years. The Court resolves this gap by adopting a bright-line rule rooted in the policy rationale expressed in Matter of Jing Tan and Matter of Bruhn—namely, that the length of time away from practice is a sensible proxy for the need for heightened safeguards.

Accordingly, the Court holds: “the procedures applicable to reinstatement from interim suspension shall be guided by the actual duration of the suspension at the time that the application for reinstatement is made.”

Applying that rule, because respondent’s interim suspension had actually exceeded six months, any future application must proceed under 22 NYCRR 1240.16(b) with:

  • the Appendix C 38-paragraph affidavit; and
  • proof of passing the MPRE no more than one year prior to filing (citing 22 NYCRR 1240.16(b) and 22 NYCRR 806.16(a)(2)).

3.3. Impact

  • Fills a procedural gap for interim suspensions: The decision supplies a clear, administrable pathway where the rules “do not explicitly chart a procedural course” for reinstatement from indefinite interim suspensions.
  • Creates a bright-line compliance expectation: Attorneys under interim suspension in the Third Department can no longer reasonably assume that “indefinite” status permits a short-form approach; once the suspension has actually exceeded six months, the long-form affidavit and MPRE requirement attach.
  • Encourages fuller disclosure and demonstrated rehabilitation: Appendix C’s detailed affidavit format tends to elicit comprehensive information about misconduct, restitution, financial responsibility, candor, and current fitness—topics particularly salient in escrow/misappropriation matters.
  • Signals heightened scrutiny in escrow-related misconduct: Substantively, the Court’s emphasis on respondent’s failure to address prior findings—especially admissions regarding escrow misuse—underscores that reinstatement requires forthright engagement with the misconduct and its implications for trustworthiness.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Interim suspension (22 NYCRR 1240.9[a]): A temporary, often immediate suspension imposed while an investigation or proceeding continues, intended to protect the public from “conduct immediately threatening the public interest.” It is not necessarily for a fixed period.
  • Clear and convincing evidence: A heightened standard of proof. The attorney must present highly persuasive evidence—more than “more likely than not,” though less than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
  • Character and fitness: An evaluation of whether the attorney is trustworthy, honest, and capable of complying with ethical duties. It can include candor, remorse, restitution, rehabilitation, and current professional reliability.
  • Public interest (in reinstatement): The court’s forward-looking assessment of whether reinstatement protects clients and courts, maintains confidence in the legal profession, and prevents recurrence of harmful conduct.
  • Short-form vs. long-form reinstatement applications: The “short-form” (Appendix D) is a streamlined application generally reserved for short suspensions (six months or less by term). The “long-form” (Appendix C) is substantially more detailed and is required for longer separations from practice.
  • MPRE: The Multistate Professional Responsibility Exam—an ethics exam used as a competency checkpoint in professional responsibility, here required as a condition for certain reinstatement applications.

5. Conclusion

Matter of DeLorenzo both (1) denies reinstatement on the traditional substantive grounds of noncompliance, insufficient character-and-fitness showing, and failure to demonstrate public-interest benefit, and (2) establishes a significant procedural rule for the Third Department: reinstatement from an interim suspension is governed by the suspension’s actual duration at the time of application.

Practically, the opinion places attorneys who have remained on interim suspension beyond six months on notice that future reinstatement efforts must satisfy the more rigorous 22 NYCRR 1240.16(b) pathway—most notably the Appendix C long-form affidavit and timely MPRE passage—aligning interim-suspension reinstatement with the policy that longer time away from practice warrants heightened safeguards to protect the public and the integrity of the bar.