Matter of Borochov: Reciprocal Public Censure When Foreign Misconduct Constitutes New York Misconduct (22 NYCRR 1240.13[b][3])

1. Introduction

Matter of Borochov (2026 NY Slip Op 05305) is a reciprocal-discipline decision of the Appellate Division, Second Department, imposing New York discipline based on a foreign jurisdiction’s order. The respondent, Ilan Borochov, a New York-admitted attorney (admitted May 20, 2020), had been publicly censured by the Supreme Court of Illinois on September 20, 2024, “on consent,” for misconduct arising from: (i) a Texas animal-cruelty matter resolved by a plea of nolo contendere to a misdemeanor with supervision conditions, and (ii) failure to supplement his Illinois bar application to disclose his arrest prior to Illinois admission.

The New York Grievance Committee for the Second, Eleventh, and Thirteenth Judicial Districts sought reciprocal discipline under 22 NYCRR 1240.13. The core New York issue was whether the respondent could avoid reciprocal discipline (or obtain a lesser, private sanction) by arguing, in substance, that the foreign misconduct either did not occur as described or did not constitute misconduct in New York under 22 NYCRR 1240.13(b)(3).

2. Summary of the Opinion

The court imposed reciprocal discipline and ordered that the respondent be publicly censured pursuant to 22 NYCRR 1240.13. It rejected the respondent’s defense under 22 NYCRR 1240.13(b)(3), finding it “unpersuasive” because “the misconduct engaged in and admitted to by the respondent, and found by the Supreme Court of Illinois, is also misconduct in New York.”

The court also declined to follow Texas’s approach in a separate reciprocal matter (a “private reprimand” in Texas), instead aligning New York’s sanction with Illinois’s public censure.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited (Authorities Relied Upon)

The opinion is not precedent-heavy in the sense of citing prior New York case law; instead, it rests on the reciprocal-discipline framework and the foreign-jurisdiction authorities embedded in the Illinois proceeding. The cited authorities function as the “legal scaffolding” for (a) the Illinois discipline and (b) New York’s reciprocity analysis.

A. New York Reciprocal Discipline Rule: 22 NYCRR 1240.13

  • 22 NYCRR 1240.13 authorizes the Appellate Division to impose discipline in New York “for the misconduct underlying” discipline imposed in another jurisdiction.
  • The respondent invoked a defense “in effect, pursuant to 22 NYCRR 1240.13(b)(3),” i.e., that the foreign misconduct “does not constitute misconduct in New York.” The court’s holding squarely applies that subdivision: when the underlying conduct would be professional misconduct under New York standards, reciprocal discipline is warranted.

B. Illinois Bar Admission and Discipline Authorities

  • Illinois Compiled Statutes Annotated Supreme Court Rule 704(a) (application for admission) situates the respondent’s bar application within Illinois’s formal admissions framework.
  • Illinois Compiled Statutes Annotated Supreme Court Rule 708(e) supplies the key “continuing duty” principle: applicants must supplement and fully report required information “at all times prior to his or her admission.” This continuing-duty concept is central to the Illinois misconduct finding and, by extension, to New York’s conclusion that the underlying conduct is similarly sanctionable as attorney/character-and-fitness dishonesty or omission.
  • Illinois Compiled Statutes Annotated Supreme Court Rule 762(b) provides for “discipline on consent.” That procedural posture matters in New York because it underscores that Illinois’s censure was not merely alleged—it was accepted and imposed through a consent-based disciplinary mechanism.

C. Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010)

  • Rule 8.4(b) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010) (criminal act reflecting adversely on honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness). Illinois treated the animal-cruelty offense as a criminal act reflecting adversely on fitness.
  • Rule 8.1(b) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010) (failure to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension in a bar admission matter). Illinois treated the omission of the arrest from the bar application as a serious integrity-based breach.

D. Texas Criminal Statute Underlying Count I

  • Texas Penal Code Annotated section 42.092 (cruelty to non-livestock animals) supplied the substantive criminal-law basis for the conduct Illinois deemed reflective of unfitness. While New York did not adjudicate the Texas criminal issues, the statute and the respondent’s judicial confession/plea were part of the established foreign record.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning is compact but decisive, tracking the reciprocal-discipline logic of 22 NYCRR 1240.13:

  1. Triggering event: foreign discipline. The Supreme Court of Illinois imposed a censure, on consent, based on two misconduct counts (criminal conduct reflecting adversely on fitness; and failure to supplement a bar application).
  2. New York’s task: compare the underlying conduct to New York misconduct standards. The respondent attempted to re-characterize the underlying facts (denying abuse/intentional nondisclosure) and asserted the 22 NYCRR 1240.13(b)(3) defense (no New York misconduct). The court rejected that defense, emphasizing that the misconduct was “engaged in and admitted to” and “found” in Illinois—and that it “is also misconduct in New York.”
  3. Sanction selection: public censure is appropriate and consistent. Despite the respondent’s argument that Texas imposed a “private reprimand” in its own reciprocal matter, New York imposed a public censure, aligning with Illinois and concluding that public censure is consistent with New York’s treatment of similar misconduct.

Key doctrinal point

The decision reinforces that the 22 NYCRR 1240.13(b)(3) defense is narrowly focused: it is not a vehicle to re-litigate underlying facts resolved (or accepted) in a foreign disciplinary record; it is a comparability inquiry—whether the established conduct would be misconduct in New York. Where the conduct maps onto New York’s own professional norms (criminal conduct reflecting on fitness; lack of candor in admissions/fitness processes), reciprocal discipline follows.

3.3. Impact

  • Reaffirmation of comparability over re-litigation. Respondents facing reciprocal discipline should expect New York’s analysis to concentrate on whether the foreign-established conduct constitutes New York misconduct, rather than revisiting contested factual narratives—particularly where the foreign discipline was imposed “on consent.”
  • Public vs. private sanction is not dictated by another state’s reciprocal outcome. The respondent’s reliance on Texas’s “private reprimand” did not move the court. The practical takeaway is that a lawyer disciplined in multiple jurisdictions may face different sanction levels; New York will calibrate sanction to New York practice and its view of consistency, not to the most lenient jurisdiction.
  • Admissions-related nondisclosure is treated as professional misconduct with serious reputational consequences. The failure to supplement an admissions questionnaire—especially regarding an arrest—implicates core fitness and candor concerns. This decision signals that such conduct, once established elsewhere, is readily reciprocated in New York.
  • Criminal conduct reflecting on “fitness” supports professional discipline even where adjudication is withheld. The record included a plea of nolo contendere and supervision conditions, not a traditional conviction after trial. The decision’s reciprocal posture indicates that what matters is the foreign disciplinary finding and the underlying conduct’s relevance to fitness, not the respondent’s preferred characterization of the criminal disposition.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Reciprocal discipline (22 NYCRR 1240.13)
A process where New York imposes discipline based on discipline imposed in another jurisdiction, focusing on the underlying misconduct and whether it constitutes misconduct under New York standards.
22 NYCRR 1240.13(b)(3) defense
A respondent’s argument that the conduct punished elsewhere would not be professional misconduct in New York. In this case, the court found the defense unpersuasive because the conduct “is also misconduct in New York.”
Public censure vs. admonition vs. private reprimand
A public censure is a published public disciplinary sanction. An admonition is generally a lesser sanction. A private reprimand is non-public. The court selected public censure, matching the Illinois public sanction rather than Texas’s private outcome.
Plea of nolo contendere
A plea in which the defendant does not admit guilt but accepts punishment. Disciplinary authorities may still treat the conduct and resulting disposition as reflecting on fitness, especially where the record includes admissions (here, a “judicial confession”) and a foreign court/disciplinary body has made a misconduct finding.
Continuing duty to supplement a bar application
Under Illinois Compiled Statutes Annotated Supreme Court Rule 708(e), applicants must update admissions authorities with new required information before admission. Failure to do so can be treated as a serious integrity breach.

5. Conclusion

Matter of Borochov establishes, in practical terms, a clear reciprocal-discipline lesson in the Second Department: when a foreign jurisdiction has imposed discipline (even “on consent”) for conduct that would likewise be professional misconduct in New York, the court will reject a 22 NYCRR 1240.13(b)(3) “no New York misconduct” defense and impose reciprocal discipline. The decision also underscores that New York will not necessarily adopt another jurisdiction’s more private or lenient reciprocal sanction (here, Texas), and may instead impose a public censure to maintain consistency with New York’s disciplinary norms and the seriousness of criminal-fitness and admissions-candor violations.