Massachusetts Carjacking Is Not Categorically a Career-Offender “Crime of Violence” Under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1)

I. Introduction

In United States v. Pimental (1st Cir. May 20, 2026), the First Circuit vacated a 120-month sentence after holding that a prior Massachusetts carjacking conviction under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 21A is not categorically a “crime of violence” under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”) career offender framework.

The defendant, Richard Pimental, pleaded guilty to federal bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). At sentencing, the district court treated him as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, relying on two prior felony convictions it deemed “crime[s] of violence” under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a): (i) a prior federal bank robbery conviction (conceded by Pimental) and (ii) a 2000 Massachusetts carjacking conviction (disputed).

The key issue on appeal was narrow but consequential: whether Massachusetts carjacking—defined to include commission by “assault[ing], confin[ing], maim[ing] or put[ting] any person in fear”—necessarily requires “violent force” as required by the Guidelines’ force clause, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1). The First Circuit held it does not.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The First Circuit held that Massachusetts carjacking is overbroad relative to the Guidelines’ force clause because at least one statutory means of committing carjacking—“assault”—can be satisfied by conduct that does not involve “violent force” (i.e., force capable of causing physical pain or injury).

Applying the categorical approach, the court concluded that because the “assault” alternative can be met by attempted or threatened offensive touching under Massachusetts law (as recognized in United States v. Martinez), a conviction under the carjacking statute does not necessarily require “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force” as federal law defines it. The court therefore vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing without the career offender enhancement.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Framework: Categorical Approach and Force Clause

  • United States v. Menéndez-Montalvo: Reaffirmed use of the categorical approach for crime-of-violence determinations under the Guidelines.
  • United States v. Frates: Explained the force clause analysis under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1) and the parallel to ACCA force-clause jurisprudence.
  • Johnson v. United States: Supplied the controlling definition of “physical force” as “violent force”—force capable of causing physical pain or injury. The court treated this as the benchmark for the Guidelines’ force clause. (The opinion also notes Flores v. Ashcroft as the cited source within Johnson.)
  • Moncrieffe v. Holder: Provided the “least serious conduct” framing for categorical analysis (the minimum conduct criminalized).
  • United States v. García-Cartagena and United States v. Faust: Clarified overbreadth—i.e., where a statute covers both conduct that qualifies under the federal definition and conduct that does not.
  • Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, Da Graca v. Garland, and Swaby v. Yates: Addressed the “realistic probability” concept and when case examples are or are not required to show overbreadth. The panel ultimately did not need to resolve that dispute because it found facial overbreadth.

2. State-Law Deference vs. Federal Meaning of “Force”

  • Commonwealth v. Anderson: The government argued Anderson “controlled” because it said carjacking “has as an element the use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force” and would be a “violent crime” under the Massachusetts ACCA if committed by an adult. The First Circuit declined to treat Anderson as determinative for the federal question at hand.
  • United States v. Holloway: Cited for the principle that federal courts are bound by a state high court’s construction of state law (i.e., what the elements are). But the First Circuit distinguished “elements” from the federal meaning of “physical force.”
  • United States v. Starks: Critical bridge case: courts use state law to identify the elements and what conduct satisfies them, but interpret the federal enhancement’s requirements (including “violent force”) as a matter of federal law without deference to state courts.
  • United States v. Willings: Noted the interpretive cross-pollination between “crime of violence” under the Guidelines and “violent felony” under ACCA, while still treating federal meaning as controlling.
  • Commonwealth v. Eberhart: Referenced as part of the government’s argument that Massachusetts ACCA “physical force” aligns with federal ACCA’s meaning, though the First Circuit emphasized that alignment does not displace the federal court’s independent duty to apply federal law.

3. Dicta and “Considered Dicta” (and why it did not decide the appeal)

  • Arcam Pharm. Corp. v. Faria and Rossiter v. Potter: Used to define dicta versus holding—only what is essential to resolving the issues is binding.
  • Rosa v. Garland: Cited for the idea that “passing reference without substantive reasoning” is classic dicta.
  • Posadas de P.R. Assocs., Inc. v. Asociacion de Empleados de Casino de P.R.: Introduced the concept of “considered dicta” that may receive deference when “clear and explicit in its import.” The panel expressed “serious doubts” that Anderson’s conclusory statement met that standard, but ultimately did not need to decide.

4. Massachusetts “Assault” and Why It Drives Overbreadth

  • United States v. Martinez: Found that Massachusetts assault can be committed via threatened or attempted “offensive touching” and therefore is not necessarily “violent force.” This precedent was the linchpin: if carjacking can be committed by “assault,” and assault includes offensive touching, then carjacking does not necessarily require violent force.
  • United States v. Edwards and United States v. Whindleton: The government invoked Edwards for reading elements in context, but the court distinguished it. In Edwards, a “specific intent to kill” made an offensive-touching theory “implausible.” In Whindleton, the “dangerous weapon” element imported violent force into an otherwise overbroad assault concept. Carjacking’s “intent to steal a motor vehicle” does not similarly import violent force.
  • Commonwealth v. Tevlin: Cited within Whindleton for the meaning of “dangerous weapon,” underscoring why weapon-based statutes differ from carjacking’s elements.
  • Commonwealth v. Furr: Used to show that Massachusetts carjacking’s intent element is satisfied by intent to permanently deprive and even “indifference” to recovery, not an intent to harm—again distinguishing Edwards.
  • Commonwealth v. Furr (Mass. App. Ct. 2003) and United States v. Taylor: Offered by the government to characterize carjacking as “inherently violent,” but the panel emphasized that categorical analysis turns on elements, not general beliefs about typical violence.
  • Commonwealth v. Pena: Raised by Pimental as an example for “realistic probability,” but the court did not need to rely on it after finding facial overbreadth.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The court’s two-step discipline: state elements, federal meaning

The opinion cleanly separates (i) identifying the elements of Massachusetts carjacking (a state-law question) from (ii) determining whether those elements satisfy the Guidelines’ force clause (a federal question). Relying on Johnson v. United States and United States v. Starks, the panel held that even if a state court has construed a similar “force clause” in state sentencing law, federal courts must independently apply the federal standard for “physical force.”

2. Why Anderson did not “control”

The district court had accepted the government’s reliance on Commonwealth v. Anderson, which stated carjacking “has as an element” the use/attempted/threatened use of physical force. The First Circuit explained that even if Anderson’s statement were not dicta (or were “considered dicta”), it did not govern the federal meaning of “physical force” under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1). Under Johnson v. United States, the meaning of “physical force” in the federal enhancement is a matter of federal law, and federal courts are “not bound by a state court’s interpretation of a similar—or even identical—state statute.”

3. The decisive categorical mismatch: “assault” in § 21A can be non-violent

The Massachusetts carjacking statute is satisfied when, with intent to steal a motor vehicle, a person “assaults, confines, maims or puts any person in fear” for that purpose. Because those are alternative means of commission, a categorical match requires that each alternative necessarily includes “violent force.” The panel found overbreadth as soon as it concluded that “assault” can be committed without violent force.

United States v. Martinez supplied the essential premise: Massachusetts assault can be threatened or attempted “offensive touching.” Offensive touching is not “violent force” under Johnson v. United States. The government did not meaningfully contest Martinez’s description of Massachusetts assault or argue that Massachusetts law had changed.

4. Contextual reading did not save the statute

The government’s best argument was that “assault” should be read in context with the carjacking statute’s intent-to-steal elements, citing United States v. Edwards. The panel accepted the general principle but found it did not change the result: carjacking’s intent is to steal a vehicle, not a “murderous intent” (Edwards) nor an assault “by means of” a dangerous weapon (Whindleton), so nothing in § 21A’s remaining elements “imports” violent force into the assault alternative.

5. Divisibility and the government’s concession

The opinion notes that even an overbroad statute can sometimes serve as a predicate if it is divisible (allowing a modified categorical approach), but the government conceded it had not carried its burden to show divisibility as applied here. The panel therefore treated § 21A as overbroad for purposes of this appeal.

C. Impact

  • Career-offender exposure in Massachusetts federal cases narrows: Defendants with prior Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 21A carjacking convictions may now have a strong basis to contest career-offender predicates under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1), at least where the government cannot prove divisibility and a qualifying alternative.
  • Limits reliance on state ACCA-style characterizations: The decision reinforces that federal sentencing enhancements cannot be short-circuited by citing state-court descriptions of “force” in analogous state sentencing regimes (here, the Massachusetts ACCA discussion in Commonwealth v. Anderson).
  • Element-by-element rigor over “inherent violence” narratives: Prosecutors often argue that certain crimes are “inherently violent.” The panel’s analysis underscores that categorical review turns on the minimum conduct criminalized by statutory elements, not typical fact patterns or policy intuitions.
  • Future litigation likely shifts to divisibility and record documents: Because the panel found overbreadth via the “assault” alternative and flagged divisibility as unresolved (given the government’s concession), future cases may focus on whether § 21A is divisible among “assaults/confines/maims/puts in fear” and whether Shepard documents identify the prong of conviction.
  • Potential ripple effects beyond career offender: Given the parallel wording between the Guidelines’ force clause and ACCA’s force clause, the reasoning may influence other federal enhancement contexts that ask whether a predicate offense requires “violent force.”

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Career offender (U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1)
A Guidelines designation that substantially increases the advisory sentencing range when a defendant has (typically) two qualifying prior convictions for “crimes of violence” or controlled substance offenses.
Force clause (U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1))
The definition that limits “crime of violence” to offenses that have, as an element, the use/attempted use/threatened use of “physical force” against another person. Under Johnson v. United States, “physical force” means “violent force.”
Categorical approach
A method that looks only to the statute’s elements (what must be proven for conviction), not the defendant’s real-world conduct. If the statute covers any non-qualifying conduct, it is overbroad and does not categorically match the federal definition.
Overbroad statute
A statute that criminalizes both conduct that would qualify as a “crime of violence” and conduct that would not. Overbreadth defeats a categorical match.
Divisible statute / modified categorical approach
If a statute lists alternative elements (effectively separate crimes), a court may sometimes consult a limited set of records to determine which alternative formed the basis of conviction. The government did not establish this route here.
Dicta / considered dicta
Dicta are statements not necessary to decide the case. “Considered dicta” may be given weight when clear and deliberate, but even then, it cannot override federal-law meaning where federal law controls (as with “violent force” under Johnson).

V. Conclusion

United States v. Pimental establishes (at least on the record and concessions presented) that Massachusetts carjacking under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 21A is not categorically a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1), because one means of commission—“assault”—can be satisfied by conduct (offensive touching) that does not require “violent force” as defined by Johnson v. United States.

The opinion is also a methodological reminder: federal sentencing courts may consult state law to identify statutory elements, but they must apply the federal definition of “physical force” independently—even when a state high court has spoken in analogous state sentencing contexts. The result meaningfully limits career-offender enhancements premised on Massachusetts carjacking and sets the stage for future disputes about divisibility and proof of the particular statutory alternative of conviction.