Mass-Shooting Negligence Claims Trigger Assault-and-Battery Sublimits; Settlement Paying the Sublimit Exhausts Coverage and Ends the Insurer’s Defense Duty

Precedents Cited

The decision is best understood as a synthesis of (i) federal procedural doctrines governing post-judgment motions, discovery management, and admissible summary-judgment proof, and (ii) Florida insurance-contract principles (interpretation as a question of law; illusory coverage).

1) Standards of review and trial-court discretion

• EEOC v. St. Joseph's Hosp., Inc., 842 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2016): Cited for the abuse-of-discretion standard applicable to Rule 59(e) denials where the motion does not turn on a pure question of law. This framed Ventura’s post-judgment effort as an uphill battle.
• Savoia-McHugh v. Glass, 95 F.4th 1337 (11th Cir. 2024): Provided the articulation of “abuse of discretion” (incorrect standard, unreasonable application, improper procedures, clearly erroneous factfinding). This guided the panel’s deferential posture toward the district court’s case-management and evidentiary rulings.
• Hall v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 367 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2004) and Josendis v. Wall to Wall Residence Repairs, Inc., 662 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2011): Cited for reviewing discovery and evidentiary rulings under abuse of discretion and requiring “substantial prejudice” for reversal. These cases supported affirmance because Ventura could not show the denied discovery or stricken statements meaningfully changed the summary-judgment outcome.

2) Summary judgment and contract interpretation

• Rich v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 716 F.3d 525 (11th Cir. 2013): Reiterated the de novo standard for summary judgment and the “no genuine issues of material fact” requirement.
• Dahl-Eimers v. Mut. of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 986 F.2d 1379 (11th Cir. 1993): Cited for de novo review of Florida insurance-contract interpretation. It also undercut Ventura’s attempt to portray “illusory coverage” as fact-bound discovery territory—because the court treated the issue as legal.

3) Rule 59(e) limits: no new arguments after judgment

• In re Kellogg, 197 F.3d 1116 (11th Cir. 1999): Quoted for the narrow grounds of Rule 59(e) relief (newly discovered evidence or manifest error). This set the doctrinal boundary against Ventura’s new hearsay objection.
• Michael Linet, Inc. v. Village of Wellington, Fla., 408 F.3d 757 (11th Cir. 2005): Used to emphasize that Rule 59(e) is not a vehicle to relitigate matters or raise arguments that could have been raised earlier.
• Lussier v. Dugger, 904 F.2d 661 (11th Cir. 1990): Supported the proposition that denying Rule 59(e) motions raising new arguments is “especially” sound absent a justified reason for the earlier omission. The court relied on this to reject Ventura’s post-judgment challenge to the Korner declaration.

4) Scheduling orders and reopening discovery: diligence and “Pioneer factors”

• Oravec v. Sunny Isles Luxury Ventures, L.C., 527 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir. 2008): Cited for the Rule 16(b)(4) “good cause” requirement—diligence is central, and the moving party must show the schedule could not be met despite diligence.
• Advanced Estimating Sys. v. Riney, 77 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 1996) and Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 507 U.S. 380 (1993): Cited for the “excusable neglect” analysis and the relevant “Pioneer factors” (prejudice, delay length/impact, reason for delay/control, good faith), with emphasis on prejudice and efficient judicial administration. These authorities justified the district court’s refusal to extend discovery after summary judgment was already in motion.
• Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210 (11th Cir. 1992): Distinguished. There the district court erred by granting summary judgment while ignoring a pending motion to compel. Here, no discovery motion was pending when summary judgment was decided.

5) Affidavits and legal conclusions on contract interpretation

• Horizons A Far, LLC v. Plaza N. 15, LLC, 114 So. 3d 992 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012): Cited for the Florida principle that contract interpretation is a question of law.
• Palm Beach Cnty. v. Town of Palm Beach, 426 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983): Cited for the proposition that testimony—even expert testimony—opining on contract interpretation is improper.
• Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ortho. Specialists, 212 So. 3d 973 (Fla. 2017): Reinforced that courts interpret insurance policies. The panel used this to reject the notion that reading the policy creates “direct perception” of legal meaning suitable for affidavit testimony.

6) Illusory coverage doctrine (Florida)

• Travelers Indem. Co. of Connecticut v. Richard Mckenzie & Sons, Inc., 10 F.4th 1255 (11th Cir. 2021): Supplied the controlling definition: coverage is illusory only if the policy grants coverage with one hand and completely takes away that same coverage with the other.
• Warwick Corp. v. Turetsky, 227 So. 3d 621 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017): Confirmed that a limitation is not illusory where it does not “completely swallow” the insuring provision. This supported upholding an assault-and-battery sublimit as a permissible narrowing rather than a negation of coverage.

Legal Reasoning

1) Post-judgment evidentiary attacks are tightly constrained

Ventura attempted—only after losing on summary judgment—to strike the insurer’s claims-examiner declaration (Korner) as “inadmissible hearsay” and lacking personal knowledge. The court treated this as a classic Rule 59(e) misuse. Under In re Kellogg and Michael Linet, Inc. v. Village of Wellington, Fla., Rule 59(e) is limited to newly discovered evidence or manifest error; it is not an opportunity to raise arguments that were available earlier. Under Lussier v. Dugger, the absence of any explanation for the delay was itself a strong reason to deny relief.

The panel also added an alternative merits rationale: Korner did not need to be the first adjuster on the claim to have personal knowledge of later claim handling, including settlement payment, especially where the district court relied on the declaration for the fact of payment.

2) Reopening discovery required diligence and a concrete showing of relevance

Ventura’s request to reopen discovery came after the deadline and after discovery closed. Applying Rules 6(b)(1) and 16(b)(4) through Oravec v. Sunny Isles Luxury Ventures, L.C. (diligence/good cause) and Advanced Estimating Sys. v. Riney / Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P'ship (excusable neglect), the court found: (i) the Korner declaration did not inject new issues because it tracked the complaint; (ii) Ventura offered no adequate reason for delay; (iii) additional discovery would prejudice the insurer after it filed summary judgment; and (iv) judicial economy favored enforcing the schedule.

The court further rejected Ventura’s reliance on Dean v. Barber because there was no pending motion to compel at the time summary judgment was granted. And her stated goal—uncovering “claims expenses” and deductible application—was not shown to be material to the legal question of illusory coverage, and was not adequately tied to a specific, non-speculative need to oppose summary judgment.

3) Affidavits cannot substitute for legal briefing on policy interpretation

Ventura and her attorney submitted affidavits asserting, in substance, that the policy was illusory and that damages for “pain and suffering” were not excluded. The court held these statements were impermissible legal conclusions. Under Florida law (as cited through Horizons A Far, LLC v. Plaza N. 15, LLC, Palm Beach Cnty. v. Town of Palm Beach, and Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ortho. Specialists), interpreting an insurance contract is the court’s job. Reading a policy does not create “personal knowledge” of its legal effect; it creates only knowledge of its text.

4) The assault-and-battery sublimit was enforceable and not illusory

The policy broadly covered bodily injury but contained an assault-and-battery sublimit applying to bodily injury “arising out of, resulting from, or in connection with” assault or battery, including negligence actions. Applying Travelers Indem. Co. of Connecticut v. Richard Mckenzie & Sons, Inc. and Warwick Corp. v. Turetsky, the court concluded the sublimit did not “completely swallow” the coverage grant: it limited recovery for a subset of harms (assault/battery-related injuries) but did not eliminate coverage altogether. The insured still received some coverage (up to the sublimit), defeating the illusory-coverage theory.

5) Exhaustion was established; no genuine fact dispute was shown

The insurer presented evidence (Korner’s declaration) that it paid a state-court plaintiff (Peterson) the full $50,000 assault-and-battery sublimit to settle her claim. Because the sublimit stated that once exhausted the insurer had no further duty to defend or pay settlements/judgments/defense costs, the payment was dispositive. Ventura offered no evidence contradicting that the $50,000 was paid or that additional payments (e.g., expenses or deductible mechanics) satisfied or altered the sublimit calculus. With no evidence of another payment meeting or exceeding the sublimit, summary judgment was affirmed.

Impact

• Strengthening sublimit enforcement in mass-violence premises litigation: The opinion reinforces that negligence suits against property owners arising from shootings can fall within assault-and-battery provisions where the policy’s wording reaches claims “arising out of” or “in connection with” assault/battery and expressly includes negligence. This can substantially reduce available limits compared to the general bodily-injury limits, a recurring high-stakes issue in premises security cases.
• Policy exhaustion as a coverage “off switch” when drafted expressly: The court gave effect to language cutting off defense/indemnity once the sublimit is exhausted, and it treated a settlement payment equal to the aggregate sublimit as sufficient to terminate obligations. Insurers and insureds should expect courts to enforce such exhaustion clauses when unambiguous and supported by competent evidence of payment.
• Procedural discipline in declaratory actions: The case is a cautionary precedent on litigation conduct: evidentiary objections must be timely; discovery extensions require diligence and a tailored showing of need; and affidavits cannot be used to inject legal conclusions into the factual record to resist summary judgment.
• Limits of “illusory coverage” challenges in Florida: By applying the Eleventh Circuit’s and Florida DCA’s formulations, the court confirms that “illusory” is a narrow doctrine. A sharp limitation (even to a modest sublimit) is not illusory if some coverage remains for the targeted risk category.

Although labeled “Not for Publication,” the opinion is still informative for litigants in the Eleventh Circuit: it signals how similar policy language and procedural postures are likely to be analyzed, especially in time-sensitive declaratory-judgment coverage litigation running parallel to underlying state tort suits.