Marriage of DeCock: Rule 60(b)(6) Cannot Relitigate Unconscionability; “Blamelessness” Extends to Post-Settlement Affidavits Seeking Entry of Decree

In re the Marriage of DeCock, 2026 MT 145 (Mont. Jul. 7, 2026) (Gustafson, J.).

1. Introduction

Marriage of DeCock arose from the dissolution of a fifteen-year marriage between Taralyn DeCock (petitioner/appellant) and Dean DeCock (respondent/appellee). The parties participated in mediation and executed a “Marital and Property Distribution Agreement” (MPSA) that allocated, among other assets, multiple retirement accounts. After the District Court later entered a final decree incorporating the MPSA, Taralyn sought post-judgment relief under M. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6), alleging her prior attorney’s “gross neglect” (including alleged misadvice and failure to provide disclosures) caused her to agree to an inequitable division that “shocks the conscience.”

The Supreme Court’s central task was narrow due to appellate timing. Taralyn’s notice of appeal was filed 185 days after the final decree, making any direct challenge to the decree (including the earlier refusal to rescind the MPSA or claimed violations of equitable distribution duties under § 40-4-202, MCA) untimely under M. R. App. P. Rule 4(5)(a)(i). The only timely issue was whether the District Court abused its discretion when it (by inaction) deemed denied her Rule 60(b)(6) motion.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court affirmed. It held that Taralyn’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion improperly functioned as a substitute for a direct appeal because it repackaged arguments already raised in her prior rescission motion—namely, that attorney conduct led to an unconscionable MPSA. Independently, the Court held Taralyn did not satisfy Rule 60(b)(6)’s “blamelessness” requirement because she signed the MPSA acknowledging disclosures and fairness and, crucially, later executed a Joint Affidavit (after losing rescission) expressly attesting the MPSA was not unconscionable and requesting the court adopt it into the final decree.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

  • In re Marriage of Orcutt, 2011 MT 107: The Court used Orcutt for (i) the abuse-of-discretion standard governing Rule 60(b) denials generally, and (ii) the controlling framework for Rule 60(b)(6): it requires “extraordinary circumstances” beyond subsections (1)–(5), is not a rehearing tool, and demands a showing that something prevented a full presentation or accurate merits determination. Orcutt also supplied a contrast case for “blamelessness”: relief may be available where counsel fails to present evidence despite the client supplying it.
  • In re Marriage of Remitz, 2018 MT 298: Cited for the foundational purpose of Rule 60—to balance finality of judgments with substantial justice—framing why Rule 60(b)(6) is exceptional and not an alternate appellate track.
  • Wagenman v. Wagenman, 2016 MT 176 (quoting In re Marriage of Hopper, 1999 MT 310): Provided the key doctrinal formulation that Rule 60(b)(6) is “designed to be applied primarily as an exception to the finality of a judgment where a party was wronged through no fault of its own,” and that, beyond extraordinary circumstances, the movant must be blameless and act within a reasonable time. The Court relied on this to deny relief because Taralyn was not blameless.
  • Lussy v. Dye, 215 Mont. 91, 695 P.2d 465 (1985): This was the Court’s principal authority for the “not a substitute for appeal” rule. Lussy stands for finality: once appeal time elapses, Rule 60(b)(6) cannot be used merely because the underlying order is allegedly erroneous.
  • Estate of Kinnaman v. Mt. W. Bank, N.A., 2016 MT 25: Reinforced that a Rule 60(b)(6) motion is improper when it is essentially a request that the district court “change its mind,” particularly where the party already argued the issue below and offers only “mere allegations” rather than extraordinary circumstances.
  • Miller v. Miller, 189 Mont. 356, 616 P.2d 313 (1980): Cited to emphasize Montana’s policy favoring amicable marital settlements and limiting judicial interference absent “compelling injustice,” supporting a restrained approach to unwinding negotiated divisions.
  • Tanascu v. Tanascu, 2014 MT 293: Used alongside § 40-4-101(2), MCA, to underscore the public policy of promoting amicable settlement of marital disputes and the broader statutory scheme encouraging separation agreements.
  • Matthews v. Don K Chevrolet, 2005 MT 164, and Griffin v. Scott, 218 Mont. 410, 710 P.2d 1337 (1985): Deployed to define “blamelessness” as a practical, record-based inquiry into the party’s own role in the circumstances producing the judgment. These cases support denying Rule 60 relief even when counsel errs if the client’s conduct or strategy contributes to the result or if the client fails to act prudently.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(A) Narrowing the appeal to Rule 60(b)(6). Because Taralyn did not appeal within 30 days of the February 25, 2025 final decree (M. R. App. P. Rule 4(5)(a)(i)), the Court treated any arguments attacking the decree’s substance—including the denial of rescission and asserted statutory distribution errors—as outside the appeal. That procedural posture mattered: Rule 60(b)(6) could not be used to accomplish what a timely appeal would have addressed.

(B) Rule 60(b)(6) requires more than “the court got it wrong.” The Court applied the Orcutt/Lussy line: subsection (6) is reserved for extraordinary circumstances and cannot be a vehicle to re-argue or re-label previously rejected merits contentions. The opinion treated Taralyn’s “gross neglect” framing as substantively indistinguishable from her earlier rescission theory: both depended on the same factual premise (insufficient understanding of retirement assets) and sought the same practical outcome (undoing the MPSA as unconscionable).

(C) Unconscionability remained the operative gatekeeper. The Court anchored the analysis in § 40-4-201(2), MCA: separation agreement property terms are binding unless unconscionable. On the Court’s view, Taralyn’s Rule 60(b)(6) request still required a finding that the MPSA was unconscionable—meaning the motion necessarily revisited the rescission dispute, which belonged on direct appeal.

(D) “Blamelessness” is broader than being misled at mediation. Even assuming Rule 60(b)(6) was not being used to relitigate rescission, the Court held Taralyn failed the independent requirement that she be “wronged through no fault of its own” (Wagenman v. Wagenman). The record showed:

  • Dean’s retirement assets were listed in initial disclosures served in February 2024.
  • Hard copies of disclosures and account statements were available at mediation, and Taralyn did not dispute their availability.
  • The MPSA expressly listed multiple retirement assets and contained acknowledgments that assets were disclosed, values accepted, final disclosures waived, and the division was “fair and equitable.”
  • After the court denied rescission, Taralyn executed a Joint Affidavit attesting (under penalty of perjury) that the MPSA was not unconscionable and requesting its adoption into the final decree.

The Joint Affidavit became pivotal. The final decree followed immediately and was “premised on the averments” Taralyn supplied. Thus, even if prior counsel’s conduct contributed to the mediation outcome, Taralyn’s later informed, affirmative request for entry of a decree on the same terms broke the claim that she was blameless as to the circumstances of the judgment.

3.3 Impact

(1) Tightening the boundary between appeal and Rule 60(b)(6) in dissolution cases. The opinion reinforces that once a party has litigated (and lost) a pre-decree attack on a settlement agreement, the post-decree remedy is a timely appeal—not a Rule 60(b)(6) motion that repackages the same core dispute. This encourages procedural discipline and protects finality of dissolution decrees.

(2) Expanding practical consequences of “blamelessness” where a party later ratifies the settlement. By focusing on Taralyn’s post-denial Joint Affidavit and request that the court adopt the MPSA, the Court signals that Rule 60(b)(6) “blamelessness” is assessed across the full sequence culminating in judgment, not solely at the moment the agreement is signed. Parties who later affirm a settlement (especially under oath) face a steep barrier to extraordinary relief.

(3) Settlement reliability and mediation finality. The decision bolsters the enforceability of mediated property divisions—particularly those with explicit disclosures/waivers and non-modification language—by reducing incentives for post-judgment “do-overs” based on attorney-performance narratives that do not introduce genuinely new facts or post-judgment events.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Rule 60(b)(6) (“catch-all” relief): A narrow, last-resort provision allowing a court to reopen a final judgment for rare, exceptional reasons not covered by the other Rule 60 categories. It is not meant to correct ordinary legal errors that should be addressed by appeal.
  • “Extraordinary circumstances”: Something unusual that undermined the fairness of the process—e.g., a barrier to presenting the case or a fundamental defect not otherwise addressable— not simply dissatisfaction with the outcome.
  • “Blamelessness”: The party seeking Rule 60(b)(6) relief must show the judgment happened through no meaningful fault of their own. Here, signing sworn statements endorsing the settlement and requesting its adoption weighed heavily against blamelessness.
  • Unconscionability (§ 40-4-201(2), MCA): A very high threshold of unfairness. Property terms of a separation agreement are binding unless the court finds the agreement unconscionable after considering economic circumstances and relevant evidence.
  • Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO): A court order used to divide certain retirement plan benefits in a divorce without triggering immediate tax penalties that would apply to ordinary withdrawals.
  • “Deemed denial”: A procedural outcome where a motion is treated as denied by operation of law when the court does not rule within a required timeframe.
  • Timely appeal: A strict deadline (here, 30 days) to challenge a final judgment. Missing it typically makes the judgment final for issues that could have been appealed.

5. Conclusion

Marriage of DeCock solidifies two practical rules for Montana litigants in dissolution proceedings: (1) Rule 60(b)(6) cannot be used as a substitute for a missed appeal, particularly where the motion merely re-labels a previously litigated challenge to a marital settlement agreement; and (2) the “blamelessness” prerequisite for Rule 60(b)(6) is evaluated against the circumstances producing the final judgment—including a party’s later sworn ratification and request that the court enter a decree on the settlement’s terms. The decision strengthens finality and predictability of mediated property settlements while clarifying the narrow lane in which extraordinary post-judgment relief remains available.