Marijuana Odor, Safety-Related Stop Measures, and Flight as Probable Cause for Vehicle-and-Container Searches; Sentencing Appeal Waivers Enforced Despite Judicial Encouragement

I. Introduction

In United States v. Brandyn Seabreeze (3d Cir. Mar. 9, 2026) (not precedential), the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed (1) the denial of a motion to suppress a firearm found in a backpack in a vehicle following a traffic stop and ensuing resistance, and (2) the enforcement of a plea-agreement appellate waiver barring a Guidelines challenge.

Parties. The United States prosecuted Brandyn Allen Seabreeze, a convicted felon, for possessing a firearm under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e). Key issues. (a) Whether the traffic stop was unlawfully prolonged and whether subsequent frisk and vehicle/backpack search violated the Fourth Amendment; (b) whether Seabreeze could appeal his sentencing base-offense-level calculation despite an appellate waiver—particularly where the sentencing judge encouraged an appeal.

Core facts. Officers observed Seabreeze smoking a marijuana cigar while driving and swerving lanes. They smelled marijuana, saw furtive movements toward the passenger side/backseat, observed a backpack in the backseat, and noted nervousness. After backup arrived, Seabreeze produced a jar appearing to contain marijuana, initially refused to exit, later exited, struggled during handcuffing, knocked an officer down, and attempted to flee. After he was handcuffed, an officer searched the car and opened the backpack, finding a loaded firearm and a medical marijuana card.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit held that the stop was not unlawfully extended because the officer’s actions remained within the traffic-stop “mission,” including license checks and safety-related measures (ordering the driver out, safety questions, and requesting backup). The court further held that reasonable suspicion justified frisking Seabreeze and that probable cause justified searching the vehicle and backpack, principally based on the odor of marijuana particularized to the car and Seabreeze’s conduct, including flight. Accordingly, the firearm was admissible.

On sentencing, the court enforced Seabreeze’s appellate waiver. His Guidelines argument fell within the waiver’s scope, the waiver was knowing and voluntary, and enforcing it did not create a miscarriage of justice. The court also held that the district judge’s encouragement to appeal could not negate an otherwise valid waiver.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

  • United States v. Ross, 151 F.4th 487 (3d Cir. 2025) (and Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015)): Provided the governing framework for “unlawful prolongation” of a traffic stop: diversion from the stop’s mission that meaningfully extends the stop must be supported by independent reasonable suspicion. The panel relied on this framework to classify license checks, warrant checks, and related tasks as mission-related, and to treat safety measures as mission-related as well.
  • United States v. Clark, 902 F.3d 404 (3d Cir. 2018): Reinforced that tasks tied to officer safety are part of the stop’s mission, supporting the reasonableness of measures taken to manage risk during roadside encounters.
  • Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997): Confirmed that officers may order occupants out of a vehicle during a lawful traffic stop, which the panel treated as a standard safety measure within the stop’s scope.
  • United States v. Green, 897 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2018): Supported the notion that requesting backup can be motivated by inherent traffic-stop safety concerns, relevant here given Seabreeze’s nervousness and movements toward the backseat.
  • United States v. Bonner, 363 F.3d 213 (3d Cir. 2004), and United States v. Moorefield, 111 F.3d 10 (3d Cir. 1997): Supplied the frisk doctrine in this setting—reasonable suspicion that a vehicle occupant is armed and dangerous permits a frisk and a protective search of the passenger compartment. Moorefield in particular was invoked for the proposition that furtive hand movements and refusal to obey orders can support reasonable suspicion.
  • Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000): Cited for the proposition that nervous and evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in evaluating reasonable suspicion.
  • United States v. Outlaw, 138 F.4th 725 (3d Cir. 2025): Central to the probable-cause analysis: the smell of marijuana alone can create probable cause to search a vehicle when the odor is “particularized to that space.” The panel applied this directly because the odor was tied to Seabreeze’s vehicle and he was alone inside it.
  • United States v. Ramos, 443 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2006): Used to bolster the notion that marijuana odor can supply probable cause to arrest and therefore to frisk, particularly when particularized to a vehicle with a single occupant.
  • United States v. Laville, 480 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007): Addressed the state-law/federal-law interaction. Even if certain marijuana possession may be lawful under Pennsylvania law, probable cause can still exist under the federal standard because federal law (21 U.S.C. § 844) criminalizes simple possession; thus state legalization does not necessarily defeat federal probable cause.
  • United States v. Navedo, 694 F.3d 463 (3d Cir. 2012): Explained how unprovoked flight can help elevate suspicion, and in appropriate circumstances contribute to probable cause, which the panel used to corroborate contraband-related inferences.
  • United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982): Provided the automobile-exception scope rule: with probable cause to search a vehicle, officers may search every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search—supporting the backpack search.
  • United States v. Grimes, 739 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 2014); United States v. Corso, 549 F.3d 921 (3d Cir. 2008); United States v. Gwinnett, 483 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 2007): These cases supplied the waiver-enforcement framework: strict construction of waiver language, confirmation the waiver was knowing and voluntary (including via the Rule 11 colloquy), and a limited “miscarriage of justice” safety valve.
  • United States v. Porter, 933 F.3d 226 (3d Cir. 2019): Crucial to rejecting Seabreeze’s implied argument that a judge’s statements encouraging an appeal could undo a valid waiver; Porter establishes such comments do not invalidate a knowing and voluntary waiver.
  • United States v. Castro, 704 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 2013): Supported the conclusion that even if there were a Guidelines error, it would be a “garden variety” claim typically encompassed by the waiver, not the kind of extraordinary error warranting non-enforcement.
  • United States v. Garner, 961 F.3d 264 (3d Cir. 2020), and United States v. Brothers, 75 F.3d 845 (3d Cir. 1996): Governed the standard of review (plenary for legal conclusions, clear error for facts) and emphasized deference to credibility determinations at suppression hearings.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. No unlawful prolongation of the traffic stop

Applying United States v. Ross (2025) and Rodriguez v. United States, the panel asked whether the officer (i) diverted from the stop’s traffic/safety mission, (ii) meaningfully prolonged the stop, and (iii) lacked independent reasonable suspicion for any detour. The court concluded the officer’s actions stayed within the mission: he checked Seabreeze’s license and took safety precautions in response to observed movements toward the backseat, nervousness, and an evolving roadside risk profile.

The opinion treated (a) calling for backup, (b) ordering Seabreeze out, and (c) asking safety-related questions as “mission”-consistent safety tasks under United States v. Clark, Maryland v. Wilson, and United States v. Green. On this view, the timeline—backup arriving in about two minutes and re-approach occurring roughly three minutes after initial contact—did not reflect a constitutionally significant detour, but rather a continuous, safety-managed traffic-stop sequence.

2. Reasonable suspicion justified the frisk

Once Seabreeze exited, the frisk turned on whether the officer reasonably suspected Seabreeze was armed and dangerous. The panel identified several factors: furtive reaching toward the backseat where a backpack was visible, nervous demeanor, and initial non-compliance with an order to exit. Under United States v. Bonner and United States v. Moorefield, those factors can support a protective frisk in the traffic-stop context; Illinois v. Wardlow reinforced that nervous/evasive behavior is relevant.

3. Probable cause supported searching the car and backpack

The panel’s probable-cause analysis relied heavily on marijuana odor and corroborating conduct. Under United States v. Outlaw, the “smell of marijuana alone can create probable cause to search a vehicle” when particularized to that vehicle. The court treated the odor emanating from the car—combined with Seabreeze’s production of apparent marijuana and later attempted flight—as sufficient to establish probable cause. United States v. Navedo supplied the link between flight and escalation of suspicion.

The court also confronted a modern complication: partial legalization under state law. It declared that any Pennsylvania-law permissibility was “immaterial” to federal probable cause because federal law still criminalizes marijuana possession (21 U.S.C. § 844), citing United States v. Laville for the proposition that probable cause is assessed under federal standards and can exist notwithstanding state or local law.

With probable cause to search the vehicle, the scope extended to containers capable of concealing the object of the search. Citing United States v. Ross (1982), the court held the backpack—partially open in the backseat— was within the permissible scope, making discovery of the firearm constitutionally valid under the automobile exception.

4. Sentencing issue barred by appellate waiver

Applying United States v. Grimes, the panel enforced the waiver because: (i) Seabreeze’s base-offense-level challenge did not fit the plea agreement’s enumerated exceptions (statutory maximum, upward departure/variance, ineffective assistance); (ii) the waiver was knowing and voluntary as shown by the written agreement and the Rule 11 colloquy, consistent with United States v. Gwinnett; and (iii) enforcement did not work a miscarriage of justice because even an error in Guidelines calculation would be an ordinary claim contemplated by the waiver (United States v. Castro).

Importantly, the panel rejected any argument that the district judge’s encouragement to appeal could revive appellate rights, citing United States v. Porter for the principle that judicial comments do not invalidate a valid waiver.

C. Impact

Although labeled “NOT PRECEDENTIAL,” the decision consolidates several themes likely to shape litigation positions in the Third Circuit:

  • Stop-mission elasticity through officer safety. By characterizing backup requests, occupant removal, and certain questions as mission-related safety tasks, the opinion illustrates how courts may treat short time increments devoted to risk management as non-prolonging under Rodriguez.
  • Marijuana odor remains a potent probable-cause fact in federal court. The decision, relying on United States v. Outlaw, underscores that marijuana odor— when particularized to a vehicle—can justify a full automobile-exception search, including containers, even amidst state-level legalization regimes.
  • Flight and resistance as corroboration. The opinion signals that attempted flight after suspicious movements can be treated as strengthening an inference of contraband, supporting probable cause when paired with other facts.
  • Durability of appellate waivers. On sentencing, the decision reinforces that appellate waivers will be enforced according to their text, and that even well-intentioned judicial remarks encouraging appeal do not undo a waiver (Porter).

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Reasonable suspicion vs. probable cause. Reasonable suspicion is a lower threshold requiring specific, articulable facts suggesting criminal activity or danger; it can justify brief investigative steps like a frisk. Probable cause is a higher standard requiring a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be found; it can justify a vehicle search under the automobile exception.
  • The “mission” of a traffic stop. Under Rodriguez v. United States, officers may do tasks tied to the traffic infraction and roadway safety (license checks, warrants, registration/insurance) and safety precautions. A stop becomes unlawful if officers add time to pursue unrelated investigations without independent reasonable suspicion.
  • Automobile exception and container searches. If officers have probable cause to search a vehicle, United States v. Ross (1982) permits searching compartments and containers (like backpacks) that could hold the suspected contraband.
  • Appeal waivers. A defendant can bargain away most sentencing appeals in a plea agreement. Courts enforce these waivers if they are clear, knowing, voluntary, and not extraordinarily unjust to apply. Typical Guidelines disputes are usually considered exactly what the waiver was meant to foreclose.
  • Conditional guilty plea. Seabreeze’s plea preserved only the suppression issue (with a right to withdraw if he won that appeal), but separately waived most sentencing appeals—illustrating how plea agreements can selectively preserve issues.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Brandyn Seabreeze affirms a common federal suppression pathway: mission-consistent safety measures do not unlawfully extend a stop; furtive movements and non-compliance can justify a protective frisk; and marijuana odor (particularized to the vehicle), reinforced by flight, can establish probable cause for an automobile-exception search reaching containers like backpacks. On sentencing, the case underscores the Third Circuit’s strong presumption in favor of enforcing appellate waivers as written, including when the district court later suggests an appeal.