Mandatory Resentencing When an Inaccurate Guidelines Calculation Produces an Out-of-Range Sentence (Despite a “Same Sentence” Statement)

I. Introduction

Case: People of Michigan v. Evan Taylor Armogeda, Michigan Supreme Court (Decided July 29, 2026).
Posture: Defendant was convicted of assault with intent to commit murder (AWIM), carrying a dangerous weapon with unlawful intent, and third-degree fleeing and eluding. The sentencing court imposed a within-guidelines minimum term of 360 months based on an initial guidelines range of 270 to 450 months.

After sentencing, defendant moved to correct an invalid sentence, arguing two guidelines variables were mis-scored: PRV 2 and OV 12. The prosecution conceded an error but disputed the corrected range. The trial court refused to resolve the scoring dispute or compute the correct range, instead stating it would impose the same 360-month minimum “regardless” of the applicable range. The Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence as not requiring resentencing, yet remanded to correct the PSIR and clarify scoring. On remand, the parties stipulated PRV 2 and OV 12 were both zero and the correct range was 171 to 285 months, leaving defendant’s 360-month minimum outside the corrected range.

Core issue: Whether resentencing is required when (i) the sentence rests on an inaccurately calculated guidelines range and (ii) the corrected range places the sentence outside-guidelines, even though the trial court said it would impose the same sentence.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Michigan Supreme Court (CAVANAGH, C.J., joined by WELCH, BOLDEN, THOMAS, and HOOD) held that resentencing is required when a defendant’s sentence is based on inaccurate information and exceeds the corrected guidelines range, even if the trial court stated it would impose the same sentence.

The Court reaffirmed People v Francisco, 474 Mich 82; 711 NW2d 44 (2006), concluding it does not conflict with People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358; 870 NW2d 502 (2015) (which made the legislative guidelines advisory). Advisory guidelines still require accurate scoring and genuine consideration of the correct range. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals in part and remanded for resentencing.

Remedy clarified: On remand, the trial court must (1) score using accurate information, (2) correctly calculate the minimum range, and (3) consider that corrected range when imposing a new sentence. The trial court may impose the same sentence, but if it departs it must justify the departure (including under MCR 6.425(D)(1)(e)), and any departure remains subject to reasonableness review under Lockridge.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. People v Francisco, 474 Mich 82; 711 NW2d 44 (2006)

Francisco is the decision the Court reaffirmed and operationalized. It established that when a trial court sentences in reliance on an incorrectly scored guidelines range, it sentences on “inaccurate information,” entitling the defendant to resentencing. Importantly, the majority emphasized Francisco’s narrow exception: resentencing is not required only when (i) the trial court clearly indicates it would impose the same sentence and (ii) the sentence falls within the corrected range. Here, because 360 months exceeded 171–285, the exception could not apply.

2. People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358; 870 NW2d 502 (2015)

Lockridge rendered the legislative guidelines advisory to cure Sixth Amendment concerns, but preserved a mandatory process requirement: judges “must consult the applicable guidelines range and take it into account when imposing a sentence.” The majority relied on that “must” to reject the premise that “advisory” permits indifference to the correct range. The Court treated accurate calculation as a prerequisite for meaningful consultation.

3. People v Posey, 512 Mich ___; 1 NW3d 101 (2023) (opinion by BOLDEN, J.)

Posey severed the portion of MCL 769.34(10) requiring appellate affirmance of within-guidelines sentences absent error, because that requirement would reintroduce mandatory-guidelines pressure. The majority used Posey to explain why Francisco remains compatible with modern law: Francisco was concerned with the permissive aspect—correcting sentences based on inaccurate information—not with insulating within-guidelines sentences from review.

4. People v Steanhouse, 500 Mich 453; 902 NW2d 327 (2017) and People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630; 461 NW2d 1 (1990)

These cases supply the operative post-Lockridge review framework: reasonableness is assessed through the “principle of proportionality,” requiring sentences to be proportionate to the seriousness of the offense and the offender. The majority underscored that even if the same sentence is reimposed, it must be justifiable as proportionate (and, if outside the range, as a reasonable departure).

5. People v Geddert, 500 Mich 859 (2016)

The Court quoted Geddert to sharpen the doctrinal point: even though the range is advisory, “the scoring of the guidelines themselves is mandatory.” That proposition is central to rejecting “I’d impose the same sentence anyway” as a substitute for correct calculation.

6. Additional authorities reinforcing accurate-guidelines norms

  • Rosales-Mireles v United States, 585 US 129; 138 S Ct 1897; 201 L Ed 2d 376 (2018) and Gall v United States, 552 US 38; 128 S Ct 586; 169 L Ed 2d 445 (2007): federal guidance treating the guidelines range as the “starting point and initial benchmark,” and emphasizing error-correction legitimacy.
  • United States v Booker, 543 US 220; 125 S Ct 738; 160 L Ed 2d 621 (2005), Apprendi v New Jersey, 530 US 466; 120 S Ct 2348; 147 L Ed 2d 435 (2000), Alleyne v United States, 570 US 99; 133 S Ct 2151; 186 L Ed 2d 314 (2013): Sixth Amendment lineage motivating advisory-guidelines regimes yet preserving guideline calculation as a required step.
  • People v Davis, 468 Mich 77; 658 NW2d 800 (2003) and People v Mutchie, 468 Mich 50; 658 NW2d 154 (2005): invoked within Francisco’s framework to distinguish when resentencing is or is not required.
  • People v Coles, 417 Mich 523; 339 NW2d 440 (1983), quoting People v Pulley, 411 Mich 523; 309 NW2d 170 (1981); plus People v Eason, 435 Mich 228; 458 NW2d 17 (1990) and People v Miles, 454 Mich 90; 559 NW2d 299 (1997): Michigan’s longstanding commitment to individualized sentencing based on reliable, accurate information and opportunities to challenge inaccuracies.
  • Concurring references: People v Owens, 508 Mich 1021 (2022) (CLEMENT, J., concurring) and People v Hernandez, 508 Mich 971 (2021) (VIVIANO, J., concurring), reinforcing the importance of accuracy in sentencing records.

B. Legal Reasoning

  1. Accurate guidelines calculation is not optional in an advisory system. The majority’s core move is to separate (a) the binding force of the range (advisory after Lockridge) from (b) the required process of correctly calculating and considering the range. “Advisory” changes the judge’s freedom to depart, not the obligation to know the correct benchmark.
  2. A “same sentence regardless” statement cannot cure an unperformed obligation when the imposed sentence becomes an out-of-range sentence. The Court treated the corrected range as legally consequential because it changes the sentence’s “relationship to the correct guidelines range” and therefore affects both the sentencing decision and appellate review. Without a correct range, the trial court cannot meaningfully “take it into account,” and the appellate court cannot assess whether the sentencing choice was reasoned and reasonable.
  3. Departure procedures require knowing whether the sentence is a departure. The Court relied on MCR 6.425(D)(1)(e), which requires articulation of reasons justifying a “specific departure.” If the trial court refuses to determine the correct range, it cannot reliably know whether it is departing and cannot comply with the rule in a disciplined way.
  4. Fundamental fairness and legitimacy rationales. The Court framed resentencing as protecting (i) the defendant’s right not to be sentenced on inaccurate information and (ii) public confidence in neutral, consistent procedures—echoing the legitimacy concerns emphasized in Rosales-Mireles.

C. Separate Opinions and the Debate Over Remedy

Justice BERNSTEIN (concurring in part and dissenting in part) agreed resentencing was required but criticized the majority for reaching the broader doctrinal question of Francisco’s continued validity post-Lockridge. He would have resolved the case more narrowly: the trial court’s refusal to determine the correct range undermined appellate review standards (particularly after People v Posey, where within-guidelines sentences can carry a presumption of proportionality).

Justice ZAHRA (dissenting) would have used a United States v Crosby, 397 F3d 103 (CA 2, 2005)-type remand (which Lockridge adopted for certain constitutional errors) rather than “full-blown resentencing.” In his view, because the trial judge stated it would impose at least 30 years even if outside the range, resentencing is unnecessary; the trial court should first decide if it would change the sentence and only resentence if it would.

The majority rejected that approach as insufficiently anchored to accurate information: it required the trial court’s decision to be made after correctly rescoring and calculating the range, not based on hypotheticals or unresolved scoring disputes.

D. Impact

  • Bright-line resentencing rule for out-of-range outcomes. After Armogeda, a sentencing court’s “I’d impose the same sentence” statement will not prevent resentencing when the corrected guidelines place the sentence outside the range.
  • Procedural discipline in scoring disputes. Trial courts must resolve contested guideline scoring issues and state the correct range; refusal to do so risks reversal because it frustrates both compliance with Lockridge’s consultation requirement and appellate review.
  • More consequential articulation obligations for departures. Judges who reimpose the same sentence after correction must be prepared to justify it as a proportionate, reasonable departure, with reasons stated on the record under court rule.
  • Appellate sequencing matters. The Court criticized the Court of Appeals for “prematurely affirming” before the correct range was determined. Future appellate panels may be expected to avoid affirmance where the range is unsettled or being corrected.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Indeterminate sentencing: The judge sets a minimum and maximum (e.g., 360 to 600 months). The minimum often determines when parole eligibility begins; the maximum sets the outside limit.
  • Sentencing guidelines range (minimum range): A recommended minimum-term range calculated from offense severity and criminal history variables. Post-Lockridge, it is advisory—but still must be calculated and considered.
  • PRVs and OVs: “Prior Record Variables” reflect criminal history; “Offense Variables” reflect features of the current offense. Scoring errors can change the recommended range.
  • Within-guidelines vs. departure: A sentence is “within-guidelines” if its minimum term falls inside the recommended range. If it is outside, it is a “departure,” requiring on-record reasons and reasonableness review.
  • Crosby remand: A limited remand procedure (from United States v Crosby) where the trial court first decides whether it would have imposed a materially different sentence; resentencing happens only if the answer is yes. The majority rejected using that approach here as a substitute for resentencing when the sentence becomes out-of-range after correcting inaccurate scoring.

V. Conclusion

People v Armogeda establishes a clear Michigan rule: when inaccurate guideline scoring leads to a corrected range that places the imposed sentence outside the guidelines, resentencing is required—even if the sentencing judge previously said the same sentence would be imposed. The Court grounded that rule in (1) the continuing mandatory duty to correctly score and consult the guidelines under People v Lockridge, (2) the accuracy-and-fairness principle reaffirmed through People v Francisco, and (3) the need for a record that permits meaningful appellate review and lawful departure reasoning.