Mandatory-Minimum-Controlled Sentencing: No Plain Error for Not Orally Stating a Supplanted Guideline Range; Upward Variance Sustained

Introduction

In United States v. Rickey Lee Miller, Jr. (11th Cir. Apr. 17, 2026) (per curiam) (unpublished), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a 180-month prison sentence imposed after Miller pleaded guilty to attempted coercion and enticement of a minor to engage in sexual activity. The appeal raised two sentencing challenges:

  1. Procedural reasonableness: whether the district court erred by failing to expressly acknowledge on the record the Guidelines range that would have applied absent the statutory minimum.
  2. Substantive reasonableness: whether an upward variance to 180 months—exceeding the government’s 168-month recommendation—gave insufficient weight to the Guidelines and was otherwise unreasonable.

The sentencing posture mattered: the presentence materials reflected an initial advisory range of 87 to 108 months, but a 120-month statutory minimum applied, making 120 months the effective Guidelines sentence. The district court then varied upward by 60 months.

Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed on both grounds:

  • No procedural plain error: Because Miller did not object on this procedural ground at sentencing, review was for plain error. The court found no authority requiring the district court to orally pronounce a “supplanted” (i.e., overridden) Guidelines range when a statutory minimum controls. In any event, the initial range appeared in the PSI and defense counsel’s statements, the district court referenced considering the PSI and arguments, and the Statement of Reasons reflected the correct Guidelines range.
  • Substantive reasonableness upheld: The court held the upward variance was justified by the district court’s view of the offense’s egregiousness and the need to protect the public. The sentence remained well below the statutory maximum (life), which the court treated as an indicator of reasonableness. The panel also concluded the district court could consider uncharged conduct (including alleged child molestation) based on testimony and undisputed PSI facts under a preponderance standard.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The opinion is largely an application of established sentencing review doctrine rather than a doctrinal expansion. Still, its practical significance lies in how it applies those doctrines to a record where a mandatory minimum displaced the otherwise applicable advisory range.

1) Framework for appellate sentencing review

  • Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007): Supplies the overarching abuse-of-discretion standard for both procedural and substantive reasonableness and the canonical list of procedural errors (failure to calculate Guidelines, treating them as mandatory, inadequate explanation, etc.). The panel uses Gall as the baseline for what counts as procedural error and how variances are reviewed.
  • United States v. Isaac, 987 F.3d 980 (11th Cir. 2021): Recites ordinary standards (de novo for Guidelines application; clear error for factfinding), which are then displaced here by plain-error review on the procedural claim.
  • United States v. McNair, 605 F.3d 1152 (11th Cir. 2010) and United States v. Turner, 474 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 2007): Provide the plain error test—error, plainness, effect on substantial rights, and the discretionary “fairness/integrity” step. The panel’s procedural holding turns on the “plainness” and “substantial rights” prongs.

2) What a sentencing court must say (and need not say) on the record

  • United States v. Sarras, 575 F.3d 1191 (11th Cir. 2009): Establishes that a court need not tick through each § 3553(a) factor explicitly; an acknowledgement of considering factors and arguments generally suffices. The panel uses this to reject the idea that the judge’s failure to explicitly articulate the displaced range is automatically procedural error.
  • United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2015): Emphasizes sentencing discretion—courts should consider the guideline range and facts, but may give heavier weight to particular § 3553(a) factors than to the range. The panel uses this to validate the district court’s emphasis on public protection and offense seriousness.
  • Molina-Martinez v. United States, 578 U.S. 189 (2016) and Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007): Reinforce that the Guidelines are the starting point and a “rough approximation” of sentences achieving § 3553(a)’s objectives. The panel cites these to underscore that Guidelines matter—but then concludes the record showed the district court remained cognizant of them even without an explicit oral recitation of the displaced range.

3) Substantive reasonableness and variance justification

  • United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc): Supplies the Eleventh Circuit’s formulation for when a sentence is substantively unreasonable (a “definite and firm conviction” of a clear error of judgment) and the three principal abuse-of-discretion pathways (ignoring relevant factors, weighing improper factors, clear judgment error). The panel treats Irey as the controlling lens for the variance challenge.
  • United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371 (11th Cir. 2010): Places the burden on the challenger to show unreasonableness based on § 3553(a) and case facts. The panel uses it to frame Miller’s failure to carry that burden.
  • United States v. McQueen, 727 F.3d 1144 (11th Cir. 2013): Notes that while no proportionality principle governs, a major variance requires a more significant justification. The panel relies on this to explain why the district court’s statements about danger to the public and seriousness can justify the degree of upward variance.
  • United States v. Thomas, 108 F.4th 1351 (11th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1102 (2025): Treats a sentence well below the statutory maximum as an indicator of reasonableness. The panel uses this to support the 180-month sentence’s reasonableness in light of a life maximum.
  • United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179 (11th Cir. 2008): Serves as a contrast case where the district court gave no “real weight” to the guideline range. Here, the panel distinguishes implicitly by finding the district court was aware of and operated against the correct guideline baseline (the statutory minimum as the guideline sentence).

4) Use of uncharged conduct and evidentiary standards at sentencing

  • United States v. Owens, 96 F.4th 1316 (11th Cir. 2024): Confirms that uncharged conduct may be considered because it can be germane to § 3553(a) factors. The panel cites this to support potential reliance on alleged molestation allegations.
  • United States v. Wilson, 788 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2015) and United States v. Trainor, 376 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 2004): Establish and define the preponderance of the evidence standard for sentencing facts. The panel uses this to conclude the district court could find the uncharged conduct more likely than not occurred.
  • United States v. Rodriguez, 732 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2013), U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3, and United States v. Ghertler, 605 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 2010): Address reliance on reliable hearsay at sentencing and place on the defendant the burden to show the information is materially false or unreliable. The panel uses these to credit the testimony and PSI details where Miller did not substantively rebut reliability.

5) Mandatory minimums and the Guidelines

  • U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b): The doctrinal anchor for the procedural dispute—when a statutorily required minimum exceeds the guideline maximum, the statutory minimum becomes the “guideline sentence.” The panel treats this as resolving what the operative guideline range is (here, 120 months), while rejecting that the court had to orally announce the displaced 87–108 month range as a matter of plain error.

Legal Reasoning

1) Procedural reasonableness: no plain error from non-recitation of a supplanted range

The panel’s procedural holding follows a structured plain-error path:

  • Standard of review choice is decisive: Because Miller did not object on this specific procedural ground, plain error applied (United States v. McNair).
  • No “plain” rule requiring oral pronouncement of the displaced range: The panel stresses Miller identified no authority “requiring that a court pronounce a supplanted guideline range.” That is a quintessential “plainness” failure: without clear legal requirement, any error cannot be “plain.”
  • Record-based awareness defeats prejudice: Even assuming arguendo a shortcoming, Miller could not show it affected substantial rights. The initial range was before the court through the PSI and counsel; the court said it considered those materials; and the Statement of Reasons reflected the correct guideline range (120 months as the guideline sentence). Without a reasonable probability of a different result, the “substantial rights” prong fails (United States v. Turner).

In practical terms, the decision signals that, at least on plain-error review, the Eleventh Circuit will look for functional consideration of the Guidelines (through the PSI, arguments, and written Statement of Reasons), rather than require a formal oral incantation of both (i) the initial advisory range and (ii) the mandatory-minimum adjusted guideline sentence.

2) Substantive reasonableness: variance justified by protection of the public and offense seriousness

On substantive reasonableness, the panel emphasizes three points:

  1. Deference to district court weighing: Under Gall and United States v. Irey, appellate courts do not reweigh § 3553(a) factors; they ask whether the district court made a clear judgment error. Here, the district court explicitly grounded the sentence in public protection and seriousness.
  2. Justification for the magnitude of the variance: Citing United States v. McQueen, the panel recognizes a major variance demands more compelling reasons. It concludes the judge provided sufficiently compelling reasons: the court labeled Miller “a child molester,” emphasized illegality awareness, and stressed the need to protect the public “for a substantial amount of time.”
  3. Statutory maximum as a reasonableness indicator: The sentence (180 months) was “well below” the life maximum, which under United States v. Thomas supports reasonableness.

3) Uncharged conduct: permissible consideration if reliably supported

The opinion further validates upward sentencing considerations based on uncharged conduct:

  • Under United States v. Owens, uncharged conduct can be “directly germane” to § 3553(a) factors.
  • Factfinding requires only a preponderance of the evidence (United States v. Wilson; United States v. Trainor).
  • The court may consider reliable hearsay (United States v. Rodriguez; U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3), and the defendant bears the burden to show the information was materially false or unreliable (United States v. Ghertler).

Applying those principles, the panel highlights the combination of (i) an undisputed PSI description of a prior arrest, (ii) live testimony from the stepdaughter’s grandmother (claiming firsthand knowledge of the child’s report and describing what was allegedly reported), and (iii) Miller’s lack of evidence undermining the testimony’s truthfulness. That evidentiary mix, in the panel’s view, could support a finding that the uncharged conduct occurred and could be weighed at sentencing.

Impact

  • Sentencing records in mandatory-minimum cases: The decision suggests that in the Eleventh Circuit, a district court’s failure to orally state the initial (displaced) advisory range is unlikely to warrant reversal—particularly under plain-error review—if the range appears in the PSI and the court indicates it considered the PSI and arguments, and if the written Statement of Reasons reflects the correct operative guideline sentence.
  • Upward variances above mandatory minimums remain viable: Even where the statutory minimum becomes the guideline sentence under U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b), courts retain discretion to vary upward when § 3553(a) factors—especially public protection and offense seriousness—are credibly invoked and explained.
  • Uncharged conduct continues to play a significant role: The opinion reinforces that uncharged allegations, including serious sexual misconduct, can materially affect sentencing if supported by testimony/PSI information meeting minimal reliability and preponderance thresholds, and if not effectively rebutted.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Procedural vs. substantive reasonableness
Procedural reasonableness asks whether the court used the right process (correct guideline baseline, considered § 3553(a), explained the sentence). Substantive reasonableness asks whether the sentence length is within the range of reasonable outcomes given the facts and § 3553(a).
Plain error review
When a defendant fails to object in the district court, the appeal is harder to win. The defendant must show a clear legal error, that the error is obvious (“plain”), and that it likely changed the outcome.
Statutory minimum becomes the “guideline sentence” (U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b))
If Congress sets a mandatory minimum that is higher than the top of the otherwise applicable guideline range, the Guidelines treat the mandatory minimum as the effective guideline sentence.
Upward variance
A variance is a sentence outside the guideline range based on § 3553(a) factors. An upward variance goes above the range (here, above 120 months).
Uncharged conduct at sentencing
Conduct not resulting in a conviction can still be considered at sentencing if the judge finds it more likely than not occurred (preponderance standard) and the information is sufficiently reliable.
Reliable hearsay at sentencing
Sentencing hearings are not governed by trial-level evidence rules in the same way; judges may consider hearsay if it has sufficient indicia of reliability, and the defendant must show it is materially false or unreliable to prevent reliance on it.

Conclusion

United States v. Rickey Lee Miller, Jr. affirms a substantial upward variance above a mandatory-minimum-controlled guideline sentence and rejects—at least on plain-error review—the claim that the district court had to orally acknowledge a supplanted advisory guideline range. The decision underscores three practical lessons for federal sentencing in the Eleventh Circuit: (1) a robust record showing awareness of the Guidelines can defeat procedural challenges even without explicit oral recitations; (2) upward variances above mandatory minimums can be sustained when justified by public protection and offense gravity; and (3) uncharged conduct may significantly affect sentencing if supported by reliable information and not meaningfully rebutted.