Mandatory Injunction to Remove Obstructions Impairing the Natural Flow of a Watercourse Requires Rule 52 Findings and Rule 65 Specificity

Case: Lisa Reilley-Koontz v. The Board of Education of the County of Marshall (No. 24-156)  |  Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia  |  Date: June 1, 2026

1. Introduction

This memorandum decision is the post-remand installment of long-running litigation between adjacent landowners in Marshall County: Lisa Reilley-Koontz (owner of a residential parcel) and the Marshall County Board of Education (owner of the parcel containing John Marshall High School and athletic facilities). Little Grave Creek forms the boundary between the properties.

The dispute arose from a bridge, embankment, and elevated roadway (“Duck Lane”) constructed across the Creek in 1985 on Ms. Reilley-Koontz’s side. The Board alleged these structures impeded the Creek’s flow and caused repeated flooding and damage to the high school baseball field (September 2004, February 2008, June 2009, and June 2010). The Board sued asserting continuing trespass, interference with riparian rights, nuisance at law, and private nuisance, seeking damages and an injunction requiring removal of the obstruction.

In Reilley v. Board of Education of County of Marshall, 246 W. Va. 531, 874 S.E.2d 333 (2022) (“Reilley I”), the Supreme Court: (i) affirmed on service-of-process timing and proximate cause, (ii) held the 2004 and 2008 events time-barred and remanded to recalculate damages, and (iii) reversed the injunction order because it lacked the findings and conclusions required by Rule 52 and the specificity required in injunction orders.

On remand, the circuit court entered a new order with detailed findings and conclusions and again granted a mandatory injunction requiring removal of the bridge, embankment, and related debris. Ms. Reilley-Koontz appealed, primarily arguing the bridge and roadway were necessary to access her property. The Supreme Court affirmed.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the Circuit Court of Marshall County’s January 22, 2024 order granting injunctive relief to the Board. The Court held that the circuit court complied with the remand instructions from Reilley I by issuing an injunction order supported by detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and that the circuit court did not clearly err in finding the bridge/embankment caused water to impound on the Board’s property during heavy flows. Applying established riparian-rights principles, the Court agreed that equity may require removal of an obstruction to restore natural flow and prevent recurring harm.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

The decision is less about announcing a new doctrine than about enforcing (1) the procedural discipline required for injunction orders and (2) longstanding West Virginia riparian-rights rules supporting mandatory abatement when a landowner obstructs a natural watercourse to another’s injury.

• Stuart v. Lake Washington Realty Corp., 141 W. Va. 627, 92 S.E.2d 891 (1956), modified on other grounds by Cobb v. Daugherty, 225 W. Va. 435, 693 S.E.2d 800 (2010).
  Role in the opinion: Supplies the foundational proposition that trial courts have “broad discretion” in granting injunctive relief. This frames the appellate posture: injunction decisions are reviewed deferentially, not as a fresh re-trial.
• Bansbach v. Harbin, 229 W. Va. 287, 728 S.E.2d 533 (2012) (Syl. Pt. 1).
  Role in the opinion: Provides the three-tier standard of review for injunctions: (i) ultimate decision—abuse of discretion, (ii) factual findings—clearly erroneous, and (iii) legal questions—de novo. The Court relied on this structure to uphold the remand order: it found the facts supported by the trial record and the legal conclusions consistent with riparian-rights law.
• United Maintenance and Manufacturing Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 157 W. Va. 788, 204 S.E.2d 76 (1974) (Syl. pt. 4, in part), quoted through West v. Nat'l Mines Corp., 175 W. Va. 543, 336 S.E.2d 190 (1985) (Syl. Pt. 2, in part).
  Role in the opinion: Establishes that after an evidentiary hearing on a permanent injunction, the trial court must make findings of fact and conclusions of law under Rule 52 to enable meaningful appellate review and confirm the legitimacy of regulation by injunction.
• Commonwealth Tire Co. v. Tri-State Tire Co., 156 W. Va. 351, 193 S.E.2d 544 (1972) (Syl. Pt. 1), as quoted in Clark Apartments ex rel. Hood v. Walaszczyk, 213 W. Va. 369, 582 S.E.2d 816 (2003) (Syl. Pt. 1).
  Role in the opinion: Reinforces that Rule 52(a) findings are mandatory in bench-tried factual matters and that noncompliance is a remandable error. This explains why the Court reversed the earlier injunction order in Reilley I and why the detailed remand order cured the defect.
• McCausland v. Jarrell, 136 W. Va. 569, 68 S.E.2d 729 (1951) (Syl. Pt. 2; Syl. Pt. 4).
  Role in the opinion: Supplies the substantive riparian-rights rules: (i) a landowner is entitled to the watercourse passing in its natural flow to and from the land, and (ii) equity can restrain obstructions and “require[] the removal of such obstruction” to vindicate that right. This is the doctrinal backbone for a mandatory injunction.
• Atkinson v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 74 W. Va. 633, 82 S.E. 502 (1914) (Syl. Pt. 1).
  Role in the opinion: Provides the liability premise: one may not negligently obstruct or divert a natural watercourse to another’s injury “without liability.” When coupled with McCausland, it supports not only damages but also abatement as an equitable remedy to prevent recurrence.
• Reilley v. Board of Education of County of Marshall, 246 W. Va. 531, 874 S.E.2d 333 (2022) (“Reilley I”).
  Role in the opinion: Serves as the procedural roadmap. The 2026 decision is chiefly an affirmance that the circuit court followed the remand directive: produce Rule 52-compliant findings and a proper injunction order.

B. Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in a straightforward sequence:

1. Identify the governing appellate lens. Under Bansbach v. Harbin, the Court defers to the circuit court’s decision absent abuse of discretion, while scrutinizing findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo.
2. Confirm procedural validity of the injunction order on remand. The Court revisits the injunction-order requirements described in Reilley I: Rule 65 requires specificity and stated reasons; Rule 52 requires findings of fact and conclusions of law to support a permanent injunction. The circuit court’s January 22, 2024 order was expressly drafted to satisfy these requirements, curing the defect that required reversal in Reilley I.
3. Accept the circuit court’s factual findings as not clearly erroneous. The remand order found that the bridge, roadway embankment, and related sedimentation caused water to impound on the Board’s property during heavy flows. The Supreme Court held these findings were adequately supported by the trial evidence the circuit court recounted. That conclusion is pivotal because injunctive relief here is aimed at preventing recurrence of the flooding mechanism established at trial.
4. Apply substantive riparian-rights law to the established facts. Once the obstruction and resulting impoundment/flooding were found as fact, the legal consequence followed from McCausland v. Jarrell and Atkinson v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co.: the Board is entitled to the Creek’s natural flow; Ms. Reilley-Koontz may not obstruct it to the Board’s injury; and equity may compel removal of the obstruction.
5. Reject the access-necessity argument as a basis to overturn the injunction. Although Ms. Reilley-Koontz argued the bridge/roadway were necessary for access, the Court’s analysis treats the controlling legal question as whether she may maintain an obstruction that impairs a neighbor’s riparian right and causes harm. The opinion affirms that the circuit court properly prioritized restoration of natural flow and abatement of the cause of flooding.

C. Impact

Although designated a memorandum decision, the Court’s affirmance has concrete, practice-facing implications in two recurring categories of disputes:

• Riparian-rights enforcement and abatement remedies: The decision underscores that when a landowner’s structure obstructs a natural watercourse and causes flooding, West Virginia courts may grant a mandatory injunction requiring removal—not merely award damages—where the factual record supports ongoing interference with natural flow.
• Injunction-order drafting and appellate durability: The case is a reminder that injunctions (especially permanent or mandatory injunctions) must be supported by Rule 52 findings and must satisfy Rule 65’s specificity requirements. Failure to do so invites reversal/remand even when the underlying merits support injunctive relief.

For future litigants, the decision signals that arguments rooted in convenience or private necessity (e.g., access) will not, without more, defeat an injunction when the established facts show an ongoing obstruction of a watercourse injuring a neighbor’s riparian rights. The proper battleground becomes (i) causation and (ii) whether the requested relief is appropriately tailored and supported by detailed findings.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Riparian rights: Rights associated with owning land along a natural watercourse, including the right to have the stream pass in its natural flow without being unlawfully blocked or diverted by others.
• Mandatory injunction: An injunction that orders a party to do something (here, remove a bridge/embankment/debris), as opposed to merely stopping conduct.
• Rule 52 findings of fact and conclusions of law: When a judge decides factual issues (often in equitable matters like injunctions), the judge must write out what facts were found and what legal rules were applied so an appellate court can review the decision coherently.
• Rule 65 specificity: An injunction must clearly state why it is issued and precisely describe what must be done or avoided; vague injunctions are improper.
• Standards of review (abuse of discretion / clearly erroneous / de novo): The appellate court gives different levels of deference depending on the issue: it defers most to the trial court’s ultimate remedy choice (abuse of discretion), gives substantial deference to factual findings (clearly erroneous), and decides legal questions independently (de novo).
• Statute of limitations (context from Reilley I): A time limit for bringing claims. Even where some events are time-barred (2004, 2008), equitable relief may still be available if current facts support ongoing interference and the injunction is properly justified and tailored.

5. Conclusion

The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed a mandatory injunction requiring removal of an obstruction in a creek after concluding the circuit court complied with Rule 52 and Rule 65 and did not clearly err in finding the obstruction caused impoundment and flooding on the neighboring property. Anchored in McCausland v. Jarrell and Atkinson v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., the decision reinforces that West Virginia law protects a landowner’s right to the natural flow of a watercourse and empowers courts of equity to order removal of structures that unlawfully impair that flow.