Mandatory Criminal Forfeiture Under 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c) Cannot Be Withheld Due to Restitution or Equitable “Double Payment” Concerns

I. Introduction

In United States v. Rami Mahmod Mhana (4th Cir. May 12, 2026), the Fourth Circuit addressed (1) a defendant’s evidentiary challenge to convictions arising from an overseas export scheme involving fraudulently obtained electronics, and (2) the Government’s cross-appeal challenging the district court’s refusal to enter a forfeiture judgment.

The Government proved that Mhana operated “Wireless City Fashion,” later renamed “Protocol,” buying the latest-generation iPhones and other electronics for cash and below market price from suppliers who used stolen identities and fraud to obtain devices from carriers and retailers, then shipping bulk loads overseas. A jury convicted Mhana of: transporting stolen goods (18 U.S.C. § 2314), conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 371), and money laundering (18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i)).

On appeal, Mhana challenged only the district court’s admission of certain records and summaries under the Federal Rules of Evidence. Separately, although the district court initially entered a preliminary forfeiture order, it later refused at sentencing to enter a forfeiture judgment, citing concerns about “double payment” alongside restitution. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the convictions but reversed the forfeiture denial and remanded for entry of a forfeiture judgment.

II. Summary of the Opinion

  • Convictions affirmed: The Fourth Circuit rejected or deemed harmless Mhana’s objections to (a) wireless-carrier database exports admitted as business records (Fed. R. Evid. 803(6)), (b) certain invoices and unlocking-service emails, and (c) several summary exhibits admitted under Fed. R. Evid. 1006.
  • Forfeiture denial reversed: The Court held that when 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c) applies, forfeiture is mandatory and cannot be withheld for equitable reasons such as avoiding overlap with restitution or concerns about the defendant’s ability to pay.
  • Remand: The case was remanded with instructions to enter a forfeiture judgment.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Evidentiary rulings: abuse of discretion and harmless error

The Court framed review under United States v. Nsahlai, applying abuse-of-discretion review and affirming despite assumed error if harmless under Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a). It reiterated the “fair assurance” harmless-error formulation used in Nsahlai.

2. Business records, database exports, and “litigation-created” format

The opinion relied heavily on the principle—drawn from Gen. Ins. Co. of Am. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co.—that printing or exporting data from a database for litigation does not itself defeat Rule 803(6) admissibility if the underlying data are business records. It reinforced this with out-of-circuit authority, quoting United States v. May (which quoted United States v. Keck) for the proposition that “the business record is the datum itself, not the format in which it is printed.” U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. was cited via Gen. Ins. Co. of Am. for the same database-compilation concept.

3. Embedded information and verification

To address layered-hearsay concerns about carrier “fraud” determinations, the Court analogized to United States v. Pendergrass, emphasizing that third-party supplied information can be part of a business record where the business verifies it as part of regular practice.

4. Confrontation Clause and business records

The Court’s Confrontation Clause analysis followed United States v. Seward, which (quoting Smith v. Arizona) distinguishes hearsay from “testimonial” statements and emphasizes the “primary purpose” test. The Court then applied Fourth Circuit precedent United States v. Keita, which (quoting Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts) states that business records are generally non-testimonial because they are created to administer an entity’s affairs, not to prove facts at trial. Consistent with Gen. Ins. Co. of Am. and United States v. May, the Court treated the carrier spreadsheets as non-testimonial because the underlying data existed in carriers’ systems in the ordinary course.

5. Third-party records as a business’s records (invoices)

On invoices produced under a Rule 902(11) certification, the Court relied on Gen. Ins. Co. of Am. (citing United States v. Wein, quoting United States v. Duncan) for the point that Rule 803(6) does not require a record to be created by the business that keeps it—so long as it is integrated and relied upon in the business’s regular activity.

6. Emails as business records; harmless error

The Court cited United States v. Cone for skepticism that emails are automatically business records merely because a business receives them, but concluded that any error was harmless given cumulative evidence, also invoking United States v. Wood.

7. Rule 1006 summaries vs illustrative aids; selective summaries and harmlessness

The Court applied United States v. Oloyede (which quoted United States v. Janati) to distinguish true Rule 1006 summaries (admitted as evidence and serving as a “surrogate” for voluminous admissible records) from Rule 611(a) pedagogical aids. Importantly, it clarified that Oloyede condemns a “skewed selection” of transactions from the universe purportedly summarized—not the omission of every possible data field within each summarized transaction. Even assuming misclassification under Rule 1006, the Court relied on Oloyede to find harmlessness where (a) the underlying records were in evidence and (b) the same charts could have been shown as Rule 611(a) aids.

In evaluating harmlessness, the Court invoked United States v. Caldwell for “closeness” and “centrality” factors. It rejected a cumulative-error theory under United States v. Basham, concluding the trial was fundamentally fair under United States v. Lighty, and reiterated via United States v. Runyon that the Constitution guarantees a fair trial, not a perfect one.

8. Forfeiture: mandatory nature and restitution overlap

On forfeiture, the Court reviewed de novo under United States v. Morgan and held that the district court’s equitable concern was foreclosed by United States v. Blackman, which states that forfeiture is mandatory where § 2461(c) applies—even when restitution is also ordered—and is not avoided by inability to pay.

The Court also cited United States v. Jameel to reject any notion that a jury must determine the amount of a forfeiture money judgment. It cited United States v. Alamoudi for the proposition that Congress set “no statutory . . . maximum limit on forfeitures.” And it cited United States v. Sanders to place the burden on the defendant to show “gross disproportionality” for an Eighth Amendment excessive fines claim—a burden Mhana did not carry.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Wireless-carrier spreadsheets as Rule 803(6) business records

The Court treated the carrier spreadsheets as admissible business records because carrier witnesses testified that the relevant data were entered contemporaneously by knowledgeable personnel, maintained in ordinary course, and exported “as-is” from established templates used for years. The fact that the carriers produced the spreadsheets in response to subpoenas did not make them “litigation-created” in the Rule 803(6) sense, because the underlying records preexisted and were kept for business administration.

The Court also upheld admission of carrier “fraud” determinations as business records, noting the carriers’ investigative processes and verification; and it relied on limiting instructions telling the jury that the carriers’ determinations did not decide any issue in the case.

2. Confrontation Clause: non-testimonial character of business data

The Court rejected Mhana’s Confrontation Clause argument by focusing on whether the statements were “testimonial.” Because the relevant carrier data were created primarily for business operations (billing, fraud control, network access decisions), not to create evidence for trial, they were non-testimonial and thus outside the Confrontation Clause’s core concern—regardless of which employee physically entered each datum.

3. Invoices and emails from third parties

For invoices Mhana produced under a Rule 902(11) certification, the Court treated the certification as sufficient proof of the Rule 803(6) elements. For invoices seized from his computer without such certification, the Court assumed error arguendo but found harmlessness because they were cumulative and not central to the convictions.

For “unlocking service” advertisement emails, the Court indicated they were not properly admitted as business records and that the “effect on the listener” theory failed because the Government did not show Mhana read the particular emails. But the error was harmless given substantial other evidence (including Mhana’s own testimony and text messages) proving he used unlocking services.

4. Rule 1006 summaries and harmlessness

The Court acknowledged that some summary exhibits arguably resembled selective, advocacy-oriented compilations. Still, it found harmlessness because: (i) the underlying records were already admitted, (ii) the same presentation could have been used as Rule 611(a) illustrative aids, and (iii) the case against Mhana was overwhelming.

5. Forfeiture: the core holding

The decisive legal holding on the cross-appeal is that, once § 2461(c)’s prerequisites are met, the district court must order forfeiture as part of the sentence. Here, those prerequisites were satisfied because:

  • Civil forfeiture was authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) for proceeds traceable to a “specified unlawful activity,” and transportation of stolen goods under 18 U.S.C. § 2314 qualifies through the definitional chain in 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7) and 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).
  • The indictment included forfeiture notice as required by Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a).
  • Mhana was convicted of the offense giving rise to forfeiture, and the jury found the requisite nexus on a special verdict.

The district court’s concern about “double payment” (restitution plus forfeiture) and the defendant’s limited assets (“only so much blood in the turnip”) was legally irrelevant under United States v. Blackman. The Fourth Circuit therefore required entry of a forfeiture judgment on remand.

C. Impact

  • Sentencing practice in the Fourth Circuit: The decision reemphasizes that forfeiture is a mandatory component of sentencing when authorized and noticed—district courts may not decline forfeiture to avoid overlap with restitution or based on perceived equitable unfairness.
  • Prosecutorial leverage and defense counseling: Because forfeiture cannot be negotiated away by pointing to restitution alone, defendants and counsel must treat forfeiture exposure (including money judgments) as a separate, mandatory consequence that can materially affect plea and sentencing strategy.
  • Proof in fraud/tech trafficking cases: The opinion supports routine use of carrier database exports as business records and rejects Confrontation Clause attacks premised on the fact that a custodian did not personally enter each datum—so long as the data were created for business purposes and maintained in ordinary course.
  • Summary evidence discipline: While the Court found harmlessness here, its discussion signals that litigants should carefully label “summary” exhibits: true Rule 1006 surrogates must summarize the full universe they claim to summarize; advocacy-driven compilations are safer as Rule 611(a) (and, going forward, Rule 107) illustrative aids accompanied by limiting instructions.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Business records exception (Fed. R. Evid. 803(6)): Allows records kept as part of regular business activity—made contemporaneously and reliably—as evidence even though they are hearsay. Exporting data to a spreadsheet for production does not destroy admissibility if the underlying data are ordinary business records.
  • Rule 902(11) certification: A written custodian certification that substitutes for live testimony to establish the foundational requirements of Rule 803(6).
  • Confrontation Clause “testimonial” focus: Even if a document is hearsay, the Sixth Amendment is chiefly concerned with testimonial statements created for prosecution. Records created for ordinary business administration are typically non-testimonial.
  • Rule 1006 vs Rule 611(a): Rule 1006 summaries are admitted as evidence to replace voluminous admissible records; Rule 611(a) “pedagogical” charts are demonstrative aids to help the jury understand evidence already admitted (and should be accompanied by an instruction that the chart itself is not evidence).
  • Restitution vs forfeiture: Restitution compensates victims; forfeiture divests the defendant of proceeds or property connected to the crime. They can both be ordered; forfeiture is not optional merely because restitution is imposed.
  • Forfeiture money judgment: A personal monetary amount the defendant owes representing criminal proceeds, even if the proceeds are no longer in the defendant’s possession.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Rami Mahmod Mhana delivers two practical messages. First, in evidentiary disputes common to modern fraud prosecutions, database-derived business records and certain summary presentations will often survive appellate review—especially where underlying records are admitted and the Government’s proof is overwhelming. Second, and more doctrinally significant, the Fourth Circuit reaffirmed that criminal forfeiture under 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c) is mandatory once statutory prerequisites are met: a district court cannot refuse forfeiture because restitution is ordered, because assets are limited, or for general equitable reasons. The remand for entry of a forfeiture judgment underscores forfeiture’s status as an obligatory component of the sentencing package in eligible federal cases.