Date: Feb 6, 2026

Mandate Rule Limits Post-Remand Appeals to the New Sentence, with Plain-Error Review of Unobjected Supervised-Release Conditions

Introduction

United States v. Larry Pyos, Jr. (4th Cir. Feb. 4, 2026) is an unpublished per curiam decision arising from a long procedural history of convictions for Hobbs Act robbery offenses and multiple firearm counts under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), followed by successive remands for resentencing. The defendant, Larry Pyos, Jr., repeatedly sought to relitigate the validity of his remaining § 924(c) convictions and challenged aspects of his supervised release.

The central issues in this appeal were not the underlying guilt determinations, but (i) the scope of what could be reviewed after remand (i.e., whether Pyos could again attack convictions), and (ii) whether the district court committed reversible error in imposing the agreed custodial sentence and supervised-release terms and conditions, particularly given prior remands implicating pronouncement requirements for supervised release.

Summary of the Opinion

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the amended criminal judgment entered after Pyos’s second resentencing. The court held that, under the mandate rule, only the newly imposed sentence was properly before the court, not renewed attacks on the convictions (including the argument that completed Hobbs Act robbery is not a “crime of violence” under § 924(c)(3)).

Applying reasonableness review to the sentence and plain-error review to unobjected supervised-release conditions, the court concluded the district court acted within its discretion in adopting the parties’ agreed sentencing framework (one day on non-mandatory-minimum counts and the 34-year mandatory minimum on the four remaining § 924(c) counts), and that the supervised release term and conditions were adequately handled—especially because the district court expressly announced all discretionary conditions later included in the written judgment.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

United States v. Pyos, No. 17-4269, 2022 WL 17592130 (4th Cir. Dec. 13, 2022) ("Pyos I")
This earlier appeal framed the posture of the case. The Fourth Circuit previously affirmed most convictions and sentences but vacated one § 924(c) count and remanded for resentencing. In the present decision, the court relies on this procedural history to apply the mandate rule and to confine review to the post-remand sentence.
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)
Referenced as part of Pyos I, where Pyos claimed error in denying disclosure of a witness’s presentence report. While not litigated anew here, its mention underscores that prior conviction-related issues were already addressed and resolved (or at least disposed of) on the first appeal—supporting the mandate-rule limitation.
United States v. Taylor, 979 F.3d 203 (4th Cir. 2020)
The predicate for vacating Count 11 in Pyos I: attempted Hobbs Act robbery cannot support a § 924(c) “crime of violence” conviction under the elements clause framework. That vacatur triggered resentencing and set the chain of remands leading to this appeal.
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967)
The current appeal proceeds with an Anders brief, shaping the appellate court’s role: an independent review of the record for non-frivolous issues despite counsel’s assessment that none exist. The court’s affirmance follows its Anders review.
United States v. Rogers, 961 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2020)
In the prior round, the Fourth Circuit ordered supplemental briefing on Rogers compliance and ultimately vacated and remanded. Rogers is the Fourth Circuit’s key pronouncement rule: discretionary supervised-release conditions must be orally announced at sentencing (or clearly incorporated) and not first appear only in the written judgment. In this appeal, the court notes that the district court expressly announced all discretionary conditions later included, curing the Rogers concern.
Doe v. Chao, 511 F.3d 461 (4th Cir. 2007)
Cited for the mandate rule principle: issues conclusively decided in a prior appeal are not reopened on remand. This authority anchors the court’s refusal to entertain renewed conviction challenges.
United States v. McCain, 974 F.3d 506 (4th Cir. 2020)
Provides the “deferential abuse-of-discretion” standard for sentencing reasonableness review. The court uses McCain to frame its review of the post-remand sentence.
United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572 (4th Cir. 2010)
Cited for plain-error review of unpreserved, non-structural sentencing errors. This becomes relevant to supervised-release conditions where Pyos did not object.
United States v. Friend, 2 F.4th 369 (4th Cir. 2021)
Supplies the two-step framework: procedural reasonableness first, then substantive reasonableness. The court uses this structure to evaluate the resentencing.
United States v. Nance, 957 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2020)
Two uses: (i) explains substantive reasonableness under § 3553(a), and (ii) states the district court must show some indication it considered nonfrivolous arguments. The court accepts that, in context, the supervised-release dispute was considered and rejected.
United States v. Gillespie, 27 F.4th 934 (4th Cir. 2022) and United States v. Bennett, 986 F.3d 389 (4th Cir. 2021)
Together establish and describe the presumption of reasonableness for within/below-Guidelines sentences and the requirement that the defendant rebut the presumption by reference to § 3553(a). Although the sentence here is heavily driven by statutory mandatory minimums and party agreement, these cases support the court’s general reasonableness framework.
United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375 (4th Cir. 2006)
Supports the “context makes patently obvious” concept: a sentencing explanation need not be exhaustive if the reasoning is apparent from the record. The court uses this to infer adequate consideration of Pyos’s supervised-release term argument.
United States v. McMiller, 954 F.3d 670 (4th Cir. 2020)
Central to supervised-release conditions on plain-error review: the extent of explanation required varies by condition, and some conditions have “self-evident” justifications; plain error was found in McMiller because conditions were lifelong and onerous. Here, by contrast, the court stresses the conditions were not onerous/lengthy and notes defense counsel appeared to request them.

Legal Reasoning

Mandate rule constrained the appeal to the new sentence.
The court treated the case as a resentencing-only posture. By citing Doe v. Chao, the Fourth Circuit enforced the principle that issues conclusively decided in the first appeal (or not within the scope of remand) are not open for review. As a result, Pyos’s attempt—through counsel and pro se—to challenge the validity of § 924(c) predicates (including completed Hobbs Act robbery as a “crime of violence”) was effectively out of bounds in this sentencing appeal.
Reasonableness review favored affirmance given the agreed sentence and mandatory minimums.
Applying McCain, Friend, and Nance, the court found no procedural error and no abuse of discretion in adopting the parties’ agreement: one day on non-mandatory-minimum counts and the 34-year mandatory minimum on the remaining § 924(c) counts. The opinion emphasizes the district court acted “well within its discretion” to accept the parties’ joint view that this package served sentencing goals.
Supervised release term: adequate consideration can be inferred from context.
The only “minor disagreement” at resentencing concerned the supervised-release term. Although the district court’s explanation was not lengthy, the court invoked Montes-Pineda and Nance to conclude that, from the full context of multiple hearings and the parties’ prior positions, it was apparent the court considered and rejected Pyos’s request for a lesser term.
Supervised release conditions: no plain error where conditions were announced and not onerous.
Because Pyos did not object to the conditions, review was for plain error under Lynn and McMiller. The Fourth Circuit highlighted two points: (i) the district court expressly announced all discretionary conditions included in the written judgment (addressing the Rogers pronouncement concern that caused a prior remand), and (ii) the conditions were not “onerous or lengthy” in the sense that triggered reversal in McMiller. The court further noted defense counsel appeared to have requested these conditions, undercutting any claim of obvious error.

Impact

Although unpublished and “not binding precedent,” the decision is practically significant in three recurring resentencing contexts:

Post-remand litigation discipline: It reinforces that resentencing appeals are not a vehicle to relitigate the validity of underlying convictions when the remand is limited to sentencing—particularly after prior appellate decisions have already affirmed the convictions (mandate rule).
Rogers compliance roadmap: It illustrates the straightforward cure for Rogers problems: orally announce all discretionary supervised-release conditions that will appear in the written judgment.
Plain-error barrier for supervised-release conditions: It signals that where conditions are not extreme and were effectively accepted (or even requested) by defense counsel, reversal on plain-error review will be difficult absent a clear Rogers-type mismatch or demonstrably onerous, poorly justified restrictions.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Mandate rule: When an appellate court sends a case back (remands) for a specific purpose, the lower court—and later appeals—must follow that instruction. Issues already decided (or outside the remand) generally cannot be reopened.
§ 924(c) “crime of violence”: Section 924(c) adds penalties for using/brandishing/discharging a firearm during a qualifying “crime of violence.” After decisions like United States v. Taylor, some offenses (like attempted Hobbs Act robbery) cannot qualify under the required definition, which can invalidate a § 924(c) conviction dependent on that predicate.
Anders brief: If appellate counsel believes there are no non-frivolous issues to raise, counsel may file an Anders brief. The court then independently reviews the record to ensure no meritorious issue is overlooked.
Procedural vs. substantive reasonableness: Procedural reasonableness concerns the sentencing “process” (correct Guidelines calculation, consideration of § 3553(a), adequate explanation). Substantive reasonableness asks whether the final sentence is reasonable given the whole record and the § 3553(a) goals.
Plain error: If a defendant did not object in the district court, appellate review is stricter. The defendant must show a clear/obvious error that affected substantial rights and seriously affects the fairness or integrity of proceedings.
Rogers pronouncement requirement: Discretionary supervised-release conditions generally must be orally pronounced at sentencing (or clearly incorporated), not added for the first time in the written judgment.

Conclusion

The Fourth Circuit’s decision affirms a resentencing judgment by applying two powerful appellate constraints: the mandate rule (limiting the appeal to the sentence actually remanded) and plain-error review (limiting relief on unpreserved objections to supervised-release conditions). In doing so, the court underscores that once convictions have been affirmed and remand is for resentencing, appellate focus narrows to whether the new sentencing proceedings complied with governing procedure—particularly the oral pronouncement of supervised-release conditions under United States v. Rogers.