Mandamus to Require Statutory Findings Before Granting Post-Adjudicatory Improvement Periods

Introduction

In State of West Virginia ex rel. H.C., P.C., M.C., Z.C. and West Virginia Department of Human Services v. The Honorable Ryan J. Flanigan, Judge of the Circuit Court of Mercer County, West Virginia, A.S. and K.C. (Aug. 25, 2026), the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia exercised its original jurisdiction after the Circuit Court of Mercer County entered a May 4, 2026 order granting both parents post-adjudicatory improvement periods in an abuse and neglect case. The petitioners—the children’s guardian ad litem and the West Virginia Department of Human Services (“DHS”)—contended the circuit court granted improvement periods without the evidence, statutory findings, or legal analysis required by West Virginia law, especially given the children’s extended time in foster care and the severe allegations (unsafe living conditions, physical abuse, substance-related concerns, and domestic violence).

The core issue was not whether the parents could ever receive improvement periods in the abstract, but whether the circuit court could grant them without making findings of fact and conclusions of law that demonstrate compliance with the governing statutes and best-interests principles and that allow meaningful appellate review.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court concluded the circuit court’s order was legally insufficient because it contained virtually no findings supporting the required statutory determinations for post-adjudicatory improvement periods and did not address the foster-care time-limit statute or best interests. Although the petitioners requested a writ of prohibition to stop enforcement of the improvement periods, the Court granted relief “as moulded” by issuing a writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to promptly enter an order that contains sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

State ex rel. S.W. v. Wilson, 243 W. Va. 515, 845 S.E.2d 290 (2020)

This decision anchors two points the Court relied upon: (1) improvement-period decisions are generally discretionary, but (2) discretion does not immunize a circuit court from extraordinary relief. The Court invoked State ex rel. S.W. v. Wilson to justify reaching a discretionary improvement-period ruling through an original-jurisdiction writ when the ruling is infected by legal error or procedural insufficiency.

Syl. Pt. 4, State ex rel. Hoover v. Berger, 199 W. Va. 12, 483 S.E.2d 12 (1996)

The Court recited the five-factor framework governing prohibition when a tribunal allegedly exceeds its legitimate powers. While the present case ultimately resulted in mandamus rather than prohibition, Hoover supplied the Court’s analytical gateway: the inability to meaningfully test “clear error as a matter of law” (the heavily weighted third factor) becomes acute when an order contains no analysis.

Province v. Province, 196 W. Va. 473, 473 S.E.2d 894 (1996)

Province provided the controlling articulation of the “meaningful review” requirement: findings must be sufficient to show the factual and legal basis for the trial court’s conclusion. The Court applied this principle directly—holding that the circuit court’s improvement-period order, lacking required findings, obstructed appellate review.

Hively v. Merrifield, 212 W. Va. 804, 575 S.E.2d 414 (2002)

Quoted for the practical point that appellate review requires knowing the trial court’s reasons. In this case, the circuit court’s stated rationale—essentially a desire to “see if the relationship can be restored”—did not substitute for statutory findings and best-interests analysis.

P.T.P., IV by P.T.P, III v. Bd. of Educ. of the Cty. of Jefferson, 200 W. Va. 61, 488 S.E.2d 61 (1997)

The Court relied on P.T.P. to emphasize the institutional importance of comprehensive trial-court orders: detailed reasoning not only facilitates review but can “rebut allegations” on appeal and provides a path to affirmance when appropriate. Here, the absence of detail did the opposite—it made review effectively impossible.

State ex rel. Navient Sols., LLC v. Wilson, No. 19-0874, 2020 WL 2765857 (W. Va. May 27, 2020) (memorandum decision)

Navient was pivotal to the remedy selected. The Court analogized this case to situations where an order’s lack of analysis “inhibit[ed]—if not preclude[ed]—” review and made it “impossible” to determine clear legal error. Navient also supplied a procedural blueprint: when the record is unreviewable due to inadequate findings, the Court may “mould” the requested relief into mandamus directing entry of a compliant order.

Syl. Pt. 3, in part, State ex rel. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs. v. Dyer, 242 W. Va. 505, 836 S.E.2d 472 (2019)

Dyer framed the child-centered constraint on improvement periods: they should be granted only where they do not jeopardize the child’s best interests, and the order should include findings showing lack of prejudice or harm to the child. The Court found the circuit court’s order critically deficient because it did not make best-interests findings at all—especially significant given the reported severity of abuse/neglect and the children’s fearful responses.

State ex rel. Justice Holdings, L.L.C. v. Kirby, No. 25-401, 2026 WL 1459858 (W. Va. May 22, 2026) (memorandum decision)

This recent mandamus precedent reinforced the Court’s willingness to require trial courts to issue detailed orders that enable meaningful appellate review. The Court used Justice Holdings to validate its chosen remedy: extraordinary relief “as moulded” through mandamus compelling entry of adequate findings and conclusions.

Legal Reasoning

  1. Original jurisdiction and “limited circumstances.” The Court invoked the “limited circumstances” exception in Rule 21(d) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure to intervene midstream. The opinion reflects a pragmatic concern: children’s cases move on compressed timelines; waiting for a later appeal may be impractical where the order itself is legally noncompliant and unreviewable.
  2. Statutory prerequisites for a post-adjudicatory improvement period were not addressed. The Court focused on West Virginia Code § 49-4-610(2)(B), which requires: (a) the parent to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that he or she is likely to fully participate; and (b) the court to make a finding on the record of the terms of the improvement period. The circuit court’s order did not find (or analyze) whether either parent met the “clear and convincing” participation requirement, nor did it set forth the terms.
  3. The foster-care time-limit statute demanded express findings the court did not make. The children had been in foster care for “fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months” when the improvement periods were granted. Under W. Va. Code § 49-4-610(9), an extension beyond that benchmark requires the court to find compelling circumstances by clear and convincing evidence that the extension is in the child’s best interests. The circuit court made no such findings, leaving a gap at the heart of the statutory scheme designed to prevent drift in foster care.
  4. Best interests findings were absent despite heightened concern in the record. The Court treated the best-interests inquiry—reinforced by Syl. Pt. 3, in part, Dyer—as indispensable, not optional. Given evidence of severe conditions, alleged physical abuse, domestic violence, and the mother’s testimony that she would remain with the father, the absence of any best-interests analysis was particularly consequential.
  5. Why mandamus (not prohibition): an unreviewable order required a do-over with analysis. The Court’s key move was remedial. Because the order lacked sufficient findings, the Court could not reliably determine whether the decision was “clearly erroneous as a matter of law” under the prohibition framework. Consistent with Navient and Justice Holdings, the Court “moulded” the relief and issued mandamus directing the circuit court to enter an order with adequate findings and conclusions.

Impact

This decision reinforces a strict procedural discipline in abuse and neglect cases: granting a post-adjudicatory improvement period requires an order that does more than announce a hope for reunification. Trial courts must demonstrate statutory compliance (participation likelihood by clear and convincing evidence, stated terms, and—when applicable—time-limit and compelling-circumstances findings), and must separately articulate why the improvement period does not jeopardize the children’s best interests.

Practically, the opinion will likely:

  • Increase the frequency with which litigants (DHS/guardians/parents) demand explicit, record-based findings at the improvement-period stage.
  • Encourage circuit courts to issue longer, structured orders to avoid original-jurisdiction intervention and to preserve their discretionary choices on review.
  • Strengthen enforcement of W. Va. Code § 49-4-610(9)’s foster-care time limits by requiring explicit compelling-circumstances findings when the 15-of-22-month threshold has been reached.
  • Clarify that extraordinary relief may be “moulded” into mandamus where the defect is not necessarily the outcome, but the absence of the analysis necessary to evaluate the outcome.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Post-adjudicatory improvement period
A court-supervised opportunity, after a parent has been adjudicated as abusing/neglecting, to complete services and demonstrate remediation so the case may move toward reunification if safe and appropriate.
Clear and convincing evidence
A heightened standard of proof requiring a firm belief or conviction in the truth of the asserted facts—more than “more likely than not,” less than “beyond a reasonable doubt.” Here, it applies to whether a parent is likely to fully participate and (for time-limit extensions) whether compelling circumstances exist and extension is in the child’s best interests.
Writ of prohibition vs. writ of mandamus
Prohibition stops a lower court from acting outside its legitimate powers. Mandamus compels a public official/court to perform a clear legal duty. The Court used mandamus because the immediate legal failure was the circuit court’s failure to issue a legally sufficient order with required findings.
“As moulded” relief
The Court may grant a different form of extraordinary relief than what was requested when necessary to address the legal defect presented (here: converting a request to prohibit enforcement into an order compelling entry of adequate findings).
15 of the most recent 22 months in foster care
A statutory trigger designed to prevent children from lingering in foster care without permanency. Extending improvement periods beyond this point requires explicit findings of compelling circumstances and best interests under W. Va. Code § 49-4-610(9).
Best interests of the child
The controlling principle in abuse and neglect proceedings: the child’s safety, stability, and welfare govern. Under Dyer, improvement periods should be granted only when they do not jeopardize best interests, and orders should explain why.

Conclusion

The Court’s memorandum decision establishes and reinforces a practical but consequential rule: an order granting post-adjudicatory improvement periods must contain sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to show compliance with W. Va. Code § 49-4-610 and to permit meaningful appellate review, including explicit attention to participation likelihood, the terms of the improvement period, best interests, and—when the 15-of-22-month foster-care threshold is implicated—compelling circumstances.

By issuing mandamus “as moulded,” the Court signaled that, in child welfare cases, procedural completeness is not a mere formality; it is the mechanism that ensures discretionary decisions are lawful, reviewable, and aligned with statutory permanency protections and the children’s best interests.