Mandamus Fee Denials Must Be Explained and Evaluated Under Highlands (Rule 52(a) Findings Required)

1. Introduction

In Michael Shawn Steffen v. Scott Caserta, as Clerk of the County Commission of Cabell County, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed a narrow post-mandamus issue: whether the circuit court, after compelling the Cabell County Clerk to accept a will for probate, could summarily deny the prevailing mandamus petitioner’s request for attorney’s fees without explanation.

The dispute arose from probate procedure for a decedent who died in Texas but allegedly owned only one asset: real property located in Cabell County, West Virginia. Petitioner Michael Shawn Steffen sought to probate his brother Daniel Barry Steffen’s 2016 will in Cabell County under West Virginia Code § 41-5-4. Respondent Clerk Scott Caserta refused, asserting that Steffen must first probate the will in Texas and then proceed in West Virginia through ancillary probate under West Virginia Code § 41-5-13.

The circuit court granted mandamus and ordered the clerk to accept the will for probate, but it summarily denied Steffen’s request for attorney’s fees. On appeal, Steffen challenged only the fee denial.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court held that, although a circuit court has discretion whether to award attorney’s fees after granting mandamus, the circuit court’s order here contained no findings of fact or conclusions of law explaining the fee denial and gave no indication it applied the governing framework from State of West Virginia ex rel. West Virginia Highlands Conservancy, Inc. v. West Virginia Division of Environmental Protection, 193 W. Va. 650, 458 S.E.2d 88 (1995) (“Highlands”).

Because the lack of findings prevented meaningful appellate review, the Court vacated the portion of the April 15, 2024 order denying attorney’s fees and remanded for the circuit court to consider the request under Highlands. The Court left the remainder of the circuit court’s mandamus ruling undisturbed.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

A. Beto v. Stewart — Discretionary Standard of Review for Fees

The Court began by reaffirming the standard that “[t]he decision to award or not to award attorney’s fees rests in the sound discretion of the circuit court,” reversible only for abuse of discretion: Beto v. Stewart, 213 W. Va. 355, 359, 582 S.E.2d 802, 806 (2003).

Steffen does not dilute that discretion; instead, it clarifies that discretion must be exercised through an articulated analysis that can be reviewed on appeal.

B. Reilley v. Bd. of Educ. of Cnty. of Marshall, Commonwealth Tire Co. v. Tri-State Tire Co., and Clark Apartments ex rel. Hood v. Walaszczyk — Rule 52(a) Requires Findings

The Court relied on Syl. Pt. 5, Reilley v. Bd. of Educ. of Cnty. of Marshall, 246 W. Va. 531, 874 S.E.2d 333 (2022), which quotes the Rule 52(a) principle that trial courts must “find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law,” and that failure may require remand. As reproduced in the opinion, Reilley traces the rule through:

  • Syllabus Point 1, Commonwealth Tire Co. v. Tri-State Tire Co., 156 W. Va. 351, 193 S.E.2d 544 (1972)
  • Syllabus, Clark Apartments ex rel. Hood v. Walaszczyk, 213 W. Va. 369, 582 S.E.2d 816 (2003)

These authorities framed the core procedural defect: the circuit court’s fee denial contained no factual or legal explanation, despite being a decision reached “upon the facts without a jury” within the meaning of the Rule 52(a) requirement discussed in those cases.

C. State of West Virginia ex rel. West Virginia Highlands Conservancy, Inc. v. West Virginia Division of Environmental Protection — The Mandamus Attorney-Fee Framework

Highlands supplies the substantive test for when attorney’s fees may be awarded to a prevailing mandamus petitioner, especially in litigation compelling public officials to perform nondiscretionary duties. The Court emphasized that the circuit court’s order gave no indication it applied Highlands, including:

  • Syl. Pt. 1 (fees/costs rationale in mandamus: citizens should not have to sue to force performance of nondiscretionary duties)
  • Syl. Pt. 2 (two general contexts for awarding fees)
  • Syl. Pt. 3 (presumption of fees when refusal is “deliberate and knowing,” absent extraordinary circumstances)
  • Syl. Pt. 4 (no presumption when failure is not knowing; fairness factors govern)
  • Syl. Pt. 5 (apportionment where some efforts/claims were unsuccessful)

In short, Highlands is the mandatory analytical lens for fees in mandamus against public officials; the circuit court’s silence created reversible opacity.

D. Nelson v. W. Va. Pub. Emps. Ins. Bd. — Fees for Willful Disobedience

The Court cited Syl. Pt. 4, Nelson v. W. Va. Pub. Emps. Ins. Bd., 171 W. Va. 445, 300 S.E.2d 86 (1982), for the principle that in mandamus proceedings where a public officer “willfully fails to obey the law,” attorney fees will be awarded. It also referenced Syl. Pt. 3 of Nelson (costs awarded for willful failure).

Nelson supports the “knowing refusal” category in Highlands and underscores why the circuit court must make findings: willfulness (or lack of it) is a factual/legal determination that directly affects whether a presumption of fees applies.

E. Province v. Province — Orders Must Permit Meaningful Appellate Review

Finally, the Court invoked Province v. Province, 196 W. Va. 473, 483, 473 S.E.2d 894, 904 (1996), for the proposition that an order must reveal a sufficient factual and legal basis to facilitate meaningful review, and that conclusory findings warrant vacatur and remand.

This case supplied the appellate-remedy logic: without an explanation, the Supreme Court could not determine whether discretion was properly exercised or abused.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning is best understood as a two-step requirement for attorney-fee adjudication after mandamus:

  1. Substantive framework is required: Once mandamus is granted against a public official, any fee request must be evaluated under the structured categories and factors of Highlands (and related authority like Nelson).
  2. Procedural transparency is required: The trial court must state findings and conclusions sufficient to show which Highlands context applies (knowing refusal vs. non-knowing failure), whether any presumption applies, and how any balancing factors or apportionment principles were weighed.

The Court did not decide whether Steffen is entitled to fees. Instead, it held that the circuit court’s summary denial—without factual findings, legal conclusions, or any Highlands analysis—prevented appellate review and thus required vacatur and remand.

3.3. Impact

  • Trial-court practice in mandamus cases: Circuit courts are effectively directed to build a reviewable record when granting mandamus and resolving fee requests—identifying the nature of the official’s failure and applying the appropriate Highlands presumption/factors.
  • Public-official accountability: The decision reinforces that fee exposure is a real consequence in mandamus litigation, particularly if an official’s refusal is found deliberate and knowing, and that courts must expressly confront that question.
  • Probate-administration disputes: While the merits of probate venue/ancillary probate were not revisited on appeal, the case signals that when citizens must sue to compel clerks or other officials to perform ministerial duties, attorney’s fees are not an afterthought; they require structured adjudication.
  • Appellate review quality-control: The decision strengthens the principle that “discretion” does not mean “unexplained.” Even where outcomes may vary, reasoning must be stated.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Mandamus: A court order commanding a public official to perform a clear, nondiscretionary legal duty. In this case, the duty found by the circuit court was to accept the will for probate.
  • Attorney’s fees in mandamus: Fees are not automatic. Under Highlands, the court asks why the official failed to act. If the official knowingly refused a clear duty, fees are presumed; if the failure was not knowing, the court balances fairness factors.
  • “Knowing refusal” vs. “non-knowing failure”: This distinction matters because it determines whether a presumption of fees applies (Highlands, Syl. Pt. 3) or whether the court weighs fairness considerations (Highlands, Syl. Pt. 4).
  • Rule 52(a) findings: When a judge decides factual/legal issues without a jury, the judge must explain the factual findings and legal conclusions. Without that explanation, appellate courts cannot effectively review the decision.
  • Ancillary probate: A secondary probate process in another state for property located there, typically after an initial probate in the decedent’s home state. Here, the clerk treated West Virginia as requiring ancillary probate after Texas probate; the circuit court disagreed on the mandamus merits (not challenged on appeal).
  • Vacated in part and remanded: The Supreme Court erased only the fee-denial portion of the order and sent the case back for a proper fee analysis; the mandamus relief itself remains intact.

5. Conclusion

This memorandum decision’s practical rule is clear: when a court grants mandamus against a public official and the prevailing petitioner seeks attorney’s fees, the trial court must do more than announce “denied.” It must make findings and apply the structured framework of State of West Virginia ex rel. West Virginia Highlands Conservancy, Inc. v. West Virginia Division of Environmental Protection.

By vacating the unexplained fee denial and remanding, the Court reinforced two complementary principles: (1) attorney’s fees in mandamus are governed by a specific doctrinal test; and (2) discretionary rulings must be reasoned rulings, capable of meaningful appellate review.