“Majority Vote” in CNMI Attorney-Discipline Elections Means Majority of Votes Cast (Not Majority of All Active Members)

I. Introduction

In re Myers, 2026 MP 6 (NMI Sup. Ct. July 15, 2026), resolves a focused but consequential interpretive dispute under the NMI Rules of Attorney Discipline and Procedure: what Rule 7(a)(2) means when it states that Disciplinary Committee members must be “elected by a majority vote of active members of the Bar Association.”

The Respondent-Appellee, attorney Robert H. Myers, Jr., faced a disciplinary complaint alleging he engaged in the practice of law while suspended for nonpayment of bar dues (including giving a legal opinion to the Rota Casino Gaming Commission and identifying himself as counsel). Myers moved to dismiss, contending the Disciplinary Committee was not properly elected and therefore lacked authority to investigate and refer the complaint. The Superior Court agreed and dismissed the disciplinary action.

On appeal by prosecuting counsel (Cong Nie), the Supreme Court addressed two issues: (1) the correct interpretation of Rule 7(a)(2)’s “majority vote” requirement; and (2) whether alleged defects in service of Myers’s suspension order provided an alternative basis to affirm dismissal.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal and remanded. It held:

  • Rule 7(a)(2)’s phrase “majority vote of active members” requires only a majority of the votes cast by eligible active members—not affirmative votes from a majority of the entire active membership.
  • The Superior Court erred by effectively counting nonvoters as “no” votes and by treating “active members” as the denominator for the majority.
  • The Court declined to decide the alternative “service” argument because it involved unresolved factual issues not determined below.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Decision)

1. Standard of review for rule interpretation

  • DS Corp v. Long Feng Corp., 2025 MP 8: Cited for the proposition that interpretation of court rules is reviewed de novo. This anchored the Supreme Court’s authority to independently interpret Rule 7(a)(2) without deference to the Superior Court’s reading.

2. “Majority vote” ordinarily means majority of votes cast

  • Lake County Sheriff's Merit Board v. Buncich, 869 N.E.2d 482: The Court relied on this closely analogous grammatical dispute. There, “majority vote of the members” was construed as majority of votes cast by eligible voters, not majority of all members. The CNMI Court used Buncich as persuasive confirmation that “majority” modifies “vote,” while the “of [members]” phrase identifies the eligible electorate.
  • Virginian R. Co. v. Sys. Fed'n, 300 U.S. 515: Cited for the broader election-law principle that provisions requiring approval by a specified majority of an electorate are “generally construed” to mean a majority of those participating (unless the text clearly indicates otherwise).
  • Carroll Cty. v. Smith, 111 U.S. 556: Used to reinforce a key interpretive distinction: language describing who is qualified to vote does not automatically set the denominator for what constitutes the required majority. The Court quoted the principle that “qualified voters” in such contexts refers to those “qualified and actually voting,” not all eligible voters.

3. Grammar/canons and the “don’t read words out” principle

  • United States v. Gaines, 154 F.4th 1317: Cited for the basic grammatical placement rule: adjectives generally modify the noun they precede. This supported reading “majority” as modifying “vote,” not “members.”
  • United States ex rel. Cent. S. Constr. Corp. v. Gulf Bldg., 568 F. Supp. 3d 1395: Invoked as a caution that grammar/canons must be applied with sensitivity to context—an admonition the Court nevertheless found consistent with its textual reading here.
  • Palacios v. Yumul, 2012 MP 12: Used to reject the Superior Court’s construction because it effectively erased the word “vote” (treating the provision as if it read “majority of active members”). Palacios supplied the interpretive rule that every word is presumed meaningful and that redundant/meaningless constructions are disfavored.

4. Nonvoting is not the same as voting “no”

  • Underwood v. Guam Election Comm'n, 2006 Guam 17 (citing County of Cass v. Johnston, 95 U.S. 360): Cited for the longstanding approach that nonparticipation is generally treated as assent to the expressed will of those who vote, rather than as affirmative opposition.
  • State ex rel Walker v. LaRose, 174 N.E.3d 735: Cited similarly to support the proposition that nonvoters are not automatically counted as “no” votes unless the text explicitly says so.

5. Distinguishing “all members/entire body” authorities

The Court carefully distinguished the cases Myers relied on (and the Superior Court’s reasoning) because those authorities contained textual markers like “all” or “entire” that expressly change the denominator from “votes cast” to “total membership.”

  • State ex rel. Peterson v. Hoppe, 260 N.W. 215 (“majority of all members”)
  • Ross v. Miller, 178 A. 771 (“majority of all the members”)
  • Ezell v. City of Pascagoula, 240 So. 2d 700 (“majority of all of the members”)
  • Chandler v. Bullitt County Joint Planning Commission, 125 S.W.3d 851 (“majority of the entire legislative body”)

These cases, in the CNMI Court’s view, demonstrate that when a rule intends “majority of the entire membership,” it typically says so. Rule 7(a)(2) does not.

6. Distinguishing statutes that require “support” of a majority of the whole group

  • State Local Gov't Employee-Management Rels. Bd. v. Educ. Support Emps. Ass'n, 429 P.3d 658: Distinguished because it turned on explicit language requiring the union be “supported by a majority” of employees in the unit. That wording measures affirmative support against the whole unit, not merely votes cast.
  • Peak Inv. v. S. Peak Homeowners Ass'n, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 892: Distinguished because the controlling texts required approval by owners holding more than 50% of votes and required they “voted in favor.” Again, explicit language made “votes cast” insufficient.
  • Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, LLC, 506 P.3d 18: Cited for policy context on why certain regimes (like covenant amendments binding all owners) may reasonably demand stronger participation/notice. The CNMI Court used this to contrast with the Disciplinary Committee’s more limited, investigatory role.

7. Legislative inaction is unreliable

  • Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (quoting Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164): Used to reject the Superior Court’s reliance on the Legislature’s rejection of a proposed amendment that would have clarified “majority of votes cast.” The Court emphasized failed proposals are a “particularly dangerous” basis for interpretation.
  • Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 590 U.S. 644: Cited to underscore that later legislative inaction can reflect countless motivations and says little about the meaning of earlier-enacted text. The Court also used Bostock to reinforce that silence does not justify inserting unwritten exceptions or thresholds.

8. Appellate restraint on fact-bound issues; service of process

  • Marine Revitalization Corp. v. Dep't of Land & Natural Res., 2011 MP 2: Cited for the general rule that issues not raised/decided below are typically not addressed on appeal, and that appellate review does not extend to unresolved factual disputes.
  • Rio Props. v. Rio Int'l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007: Cited for the standard that sufficiency of service determinations are reviewed for abuse of discretion—highlighting why the Supreme Court should not make first-instance service findings.
  • In re Woodruff, 2013 MP 1: Noted as an example where a service defect from the Disciplinary Committee was deemed “cured” by narrow, fact-specific circumstances, illustrating why factual development matters.
  • In re Est. of Ayuyu, 2 NMI 243: Cited for remanding where the record is inadequate for appellate resolution—supporting the remand approach on the service question.

B. Legal Reasoning

  1. Text controls. The Court treated Rule 7(a)(2) as an electoral phrase with an ordinary meaning: “majority vote” ordinarily refers to votes actually cast.
  2. Grammar clarifies the denominator. Because “majority” modifies “vote,” and “of active members” identifies eligible voters, the rule does not require a majority of all active members.
  3. Nonvoting is not rewritten into “no” voting. The rule does not instruct that abstentions count against candidates; the Superior Court’s approach improperly equated nonparticipation with opposition.
  4. Comparative drafting matters. The Court treated “all”/“entire” language in other authorities as proof that when a rule intends a total-membership majority, it typically says so (and CNMI texts do so explicitly, e.g., impeachment’s “affirmative vote of two-thirds of members”).
  5. Structural/policy arguments cannot override absent text. While the Court acknowledged concerns about low turnout, it rejected judicially creating a turnout threshold. Any such change must come through amendment, not interpretation.
  6. Bylaws as contextual support. The Bar Association’s bylaws permit a quorum “regardless of number” for duly noticed meetings, undermining the notion that the rules silently imposed a uniquely stringent election threshold for Disciplinary Committee seats.
  7. Legislative rejection of an amendment is weak evidence. The Court refused to infer meaning from the Legislature’s rejection of proposed clarifying text.
  8. Service issue reserved for fact-finding. Because the Superior Court made no findings on service, the Supreme Court declined to decide it and left it for remand if properly raised.

C. Impact

  • Stabilizes attorney-discipline administration. The holding prevents routine disciplinary proceedings from being derailed by arguments that committee elections are invalid absent majority-of-membership turnout—an interpretation that, in practice, could paralyze committee formation in low-participation elections.
  • Clarifies drafting signals for supermajorities/whole-body majorities. CNMI actors (courts, bar, legislature) now have a clear interpretive baseline: absent “all,” “entire,” or comparable terms, “majority vote of [eligible class]” will be read as majority of votes cast.
  • Limits “legislative inaction” arguments in CNMI statutory/rule interpretation. The decision strengthens the skepticism toward using failed amendments as proof of intent—an approach likely to recur in future interpretation disputes.
  • Preserves fact-finding boundaries on service/jurisdiction claims. By refusing to decide the service dispute without findings, the Court signals that labeling an issue “jurisdictional” will not substitute for an adequate record.
  • Practical consequences for Bar governance. Bar elections conducted under Rule 7(a)(2) can proceed under a familiar “votes cast” framework unless and until the rule is amended to impose turnout or total-membership thresholds.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

“Majority vote” vs. “majority of members”
A “majority vote” typically means more than half of the votes actually cast. A “majority of all members” means more than half of the entire eligible group, whether or not they voted. The Court held Rule 7(a)(2) uses the first concept.
Denominator problem
Any majority calculation needs a denominator: votes cast, or total eligible voters. The Court held Rule 7(a)(2) uses “votes cast” as the denominator.
Textualism / ordinary meaning
The Court prioritized the ordinary meaning of the written rule over policy concerns about turnout, emphasizing that courts interpret text rather than rewrite it.
Legislative inaction
The Legislature’s rejection of a proposed amendment does not reliably prove what the existing text means; bills fail for many reasons unrelated to “intent.”
Remand
A remand sends the case back to the trial court to continue proceedings and, where needed, to develop facts (here, potentially on the service question).
Service of process / service of an order
“Service” concerns whether a person was properly given legal notice. The Court declined to decide this issue because the trial court did not make factual findings about what service was attempted, completed, or cured by later events.

V. Conclusion

In re Myers establishes a clear rule for CNMI attorney-discipline governance: under Rule 7(a)(2), a Disciplinary Committee member is elected by obtaining a majority of the votes cast by active members who participate in the election, not by receiving affirmative votes from a majority of the Bar’s entire active membership. The Court reinforced core interpretive commitments—giving effect to every word, respecting grammatical structure, and rejecting speculative inferences from legislative inaction—while maintaining appellate discipline by leaving fact-intensive service disputes for trial-court development on remand.