Date: Jan 23, 2026

Majersky v. City and County of Denver: No Tenth Amendment “Workaround” to Heck, Judicial Immunity, or Prosecutorial Immunity in § 1983 Attacks on an Unvacated Conviction

Introduction

In Majersky v. City and County of Denver, Colorado (10th Cir. Jan. 21, 2026) (unpublished order and judgment), the Tenth Circuit affirmed dismissal of a pro se plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit arising out of Denver Municipal Court proceedings in which he pleaded guilty to disturbing the peace. Majersky sued the City and County of Denver, a city attorney (Ashley Hinds), and two judicial officers (Magistrate Michelle Kline and Judge Beth Faragher), alleging constitutional violations spanning arrest, prosecution, and adjudication, and expressly requesting that his conviction be overturned plus damages.

The core issues on appeal were whether Majersky’s claims were barred by Heck v. Humphrey, and whether the judicial and prosecutorial defendants were protected by absolute immunity. Majersky also argued that the Tenth Amendment somehow prevented application of those federal doctrines.

Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit affirmed across the board:

Claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of Majersky’s still-valid conviction were barred by Heck v. Humphrey, so dismissal without prejudice was proper as to those claims.
The municipal court judicial officers were dismissed with prejudice under absolute judicial immunity, because the alleged conduct consisted of normal judicial acts within at least a colorable jurisdiction.
The city attorney was dismissed with prejudice under absolute prosecutorial immunity, because the alleged conduct concerned initiating and pursuing the prosecution (core advocacy functions).
The court rejected Majersky’s contention that the Tenth Amendment creates an exception to Heck, judicial immunity, or prosecutorial immunity.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Pleading and Rule 12(b)(6) framework

Alvarado v. KOB-TV, L.L.C., 493 F.3d 1210 (10th Cir. 2007): supplied the de novo standard of review for Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals.
Est. of Burgaz, ex. rel. Zommer v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 30 F.4th 1181 (10th Cir. 2022): reiterated that, at the motion-to-dismiss stage, well-pleaded facts are accepted as true and viewed favorably to the plaintiff, but must still state a plausible claim.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009): provided the “facial plausibility” benchmark.
Luo v. Wang, 71 F.4th 1289 (10th Cir. 2023): emphasized liberal construction for pro se pleadings without converting the court into an advocate.

The Heck bar and “necessarily implies invalidity”

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994): the controlling doctrine—§ 1983 damages claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction are barred unless the conviction has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question by habeas.
Torres v. Madrid, 60 F.4th 596 (10th Cir. 2023): cited for the “necessarily imply the invalidity” formulation and the practical test for Heck’s application.

Absolute judicial immunity

Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673 (10th Cir. 1990): framed the scope—immunity applies unless the judge acts “clearly without any colorable claim of jurisdiction.”
Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991): reiterated the two recognized exceptions (nonjudicial acts; judicial acts taken in complete absence of all jurisdiction) and that bad faith/malice allegations do not defeat immunity.
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978): provided the functional test for whether conduct is “judicial” (a function normally performed by a judge; parties dealing with the judge in a judicial capacity).

Absolute prosecutorial immunity

Pfeiffer v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 929 F.2d 1484 (10th Cir. 1991): set the rule that prosecutors are absolutely immune for activities “intimately associated with the judicial process,” particularly initiating and pursuing prosecutions, with a limited exception for investigative/administrative functions.

Effect of a without-prejudice dismissal

Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001): cited to underscore that a dismissal “without prejudice” does not necessarily bar refiling within the limitations period (important because Heck dismissals typically await favorable termination).

Legal Reasoning

Heck controlled because Majersky sought to undo a still-valid conviction. The panel treated Majersky’s requested relief—vacatur of his municipal conviction and damages for alleged constitutional defects in the arrest/prosecution/adjudication—as an impermissible collateral attack in a § 1983 posture. Under Heck v. Humphrey, a plaintiff cannot obtain § 1983 relief when success would necessarily imply a conviction’s invalidity unless the conviction has already been invalidated through recognized channels.
No “Tenth Amendment” carve-out exists. Majersky argued that federal doctrines (Heck and absolute immunities) conflicted with the Tenth Amendment. The court rejected that premise categorically: there is “no Tenth Amendment exception” to these doctrines, and the case fell squarely within Heck’s purpose—preventing § 1983 from functioning as a substitute for direct appeal or habeas-type relief.
Judicial immunity applied because the acts were judicial and within at least colorable jurisdiction. Majersky tried to defeat immunity by claiming an illegal arrest or Miranda failures “defeated” the municipal judges’ jurisdiction. The court applied Stump v. Sparkman and Mireles v. Waco to hold that presiding over criminal proceedings is quintessentially judicial, and allegations of error (even serious error) do not show actions taken in the complete absence of jurisdiction.
Prosecutorial immunity applied because the challenged conduct was prosecution advocacy. Under Pfeiffer v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., the city attorney’s alleged wrongdoing—pursuing the prosecution—was “intimately associated with the judicial process,” not investigative/administrative work. The panel also rejected a jurisdictional argument by citing federal-question jurisdiction and removal statutes (28 U.S.C. § 1331, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)).
Municipal liability was not reached because Heck was dispositive. The panel declined to address the district court’s separate municipal-liability pleading analysis, explaining that the without-prejudice Heck dismissal sufficed (with Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. supporting the procedural consequence of “without prejudice”).

Impact

Although the disposition is expressly nonprecedential (binding only under law-of-the-case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel), it is a useful, practice-oriented synthesis of three recurring principles in § 1983 litigation:

Heck remains a threshold barrier when a plaintiff’s theory or requested relief would undercut an outstanding criminal judgment—even when framed as “illegal arrest,” “malicious prosecution,” or constitutional defects in proceedings.
Absolute immunities operate independently of Heck. Even if a plaintiff could someday overcome Heck by obtaining favorable termination, judges and prosecutors may still be permanently insulated for core judicial/prosecutorial acts. The court’s with-prejudice treatment of immunity claims highlights that these defendants are often removed from the case early and finally.
Federal constitutional doctrines are not optional based on state sovereignty rhetoric; the opinion rejects “Tenth Amendment” arguments as a basis to disregard Heck or absolute immunity.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Heck v. Humphrey bar: If winning your § 1983 case would effectively mean “my conviction was invalid,” you generally must first get that conviction set aside through appeal, state post-conviction relief, or habeas-like proceedings. Until then, the civil case is blocked.
Dismissal “without prejudice” vs. “with prejudice”: “Without prejudice” means the claim is dismissed for now but could be refiled later (for example, if the conviction is later invalidated). “With prejudice” means the claim is over permanently—here, because absolute immunity makes amendment or refiling futile against those defendants.
Judicial immunity: Judges are protected from being sued for damages for actions taken as judges (e.g., rulings, case management), unless they acted outside any jurisdiction at all or did something that was not a judicial act.
Prosecutorial immunity: Prosecutors (including municipal prosecutors/city attorneys acting as such) are protected from damages suits for decisions to file, maintain, and present criminal cases. They can lose that absolute protection only for non-advocacy functions (like certain investigative or administrative acts).

Conclusion

Majersky reaffirms that a § 1983 plaintiff cannot use a civil-rights action to invalidate an outstanding conviction, and that absolute judicial and prosecutorial immunities foreclose damages suits against judges and prosecutors for core courtroom functions. The court also rejects the attempted constitutional end-run: the Tenth Amendment does not create exceptions to Heck v. Humphrey or to absolute immunity doctrines.