Mailing to a Property Owner’s Last Known Address “Provides” the § 12-63c Income-and-Expense Form; Actual Receipt Not Required

1. Introduction

Case: Greenwich Retail, LLC v. Town of Greenwich (Supreme Court of Connecticut, Aug. 18, 2026).
Parties: Greenwich Retail, LLC (property owner) vs. Town of Greenwich (municipality, acting through its assessor and Board of Assessment Appeals).
Statute at issue: General Statutes (Rev. to 2019) § 12-63c (a) and (d), governing an assessor’s authority to request rental-income and expense information and imposing a 10% assessment penalty for noncompliance.

The dispute arose after the Town’s assessor bulk-mailed a demand and the § 12-63c form to the owner’s last known address in April 2020. The mailing was not actually received because the owner’s manager (Empire) had relocated years earlier without direct notice to the assessor. A later reminder notice (without a form, directing owners to the Town’s website) was opened after the extended COVID-era deadline, and the assessor imposed the statutory 10% penalty. The owner argued that § 12-63c requires actual receipt of the form because the statute says the owner must submit information “on a form provided by the assessor.”

Key issue: Does § 12-63c (a) require the assessor to ensure actual receipt of the form, or is timely mailing to the owner’s last known address sufficient to satisfy the assessor’s obligation to “provide” the form?

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Court and held that § 12-63c (a) is satisfied when the assessor mails the form to the property owner’s last known address, regardless of whether the owner actually receives it. The Court construed “provided” to mean that the assessor must make the form available by reasonable means, and it rejected an actual-receipt requirement. The Court further emphasized that mailing to the last known address satisfies “fundamental fairness” notice considerations and that property owners bear the burden of keeping municipalities apprised of current mailing addresses.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

  • Rutter v. Janis, 334 Conn. 722 (2020)
    Cited for the standard of review: statutory interpretation presents a question of law subject to plenary review.
  • State v. Moore, 352 Conn. 912 (2025) and PPC Realty, LLC v. Hartford, 350 Conn. 347 (2024)
    Used to frame the Court’s interpretive methodology under § 1-2z: start with text and its relationship to other statutes; consult extratextual sources only if ambiguity remains.
  • Rubin v. Brodie, 228 Conn. App. 617 (2024)
    Quoted for the principle that statutes should be read as a whole, with subsections construed concurrently to reach a reasonable overall interpretation.
  • State v. Enrrique H., 353 Conn. 823 (2025)
    Invoked for the approach of using contemporaneous dictionaries to determine ordinary meaning when a statute does not define a term.
  • Baker Middletown, LLC v. Middletown, Docket No. HHB-CV-22-6073647-S, 2023 WL 6307074 (Conn. Super. September 22, 2023)
    Noted as contrary trial-level authority: it interpreted § 12-63c (a) to require actual receipt of the form. The Supreme Court cited it to underscore that the statutory text supports more than one reasonable reading—i.e., ambiguity exists.
  • Clark v. Waterford, Cohanzie Fire Dept., 346 Conn. 711 (2023)
    Central to the Court’s inference from statutory structure: where the legislature uses “receipt” expressly in related provisions, its omission in § 12-63c (a) is meaningful. Also cited for the principle that when ambiguous text is more specific than general legislative history, courts should give weight to the statutory scheme.
  • William W. Backus Hospital v. Stonington, 349 Conn. 713 (2024)
    Cited for the canon that omission of a provision in a similar, related statute suggests a different legislative intent; and for the presumption that the legislature knows existing statutes.
  • Seramonte Associates, LLC v. Hamden, 345 Conn. 76 (2022)
    The owner relied on this decision to argue for symmetry: if “submit” requires receipt by the assessor, “provided” should require receipt by the owner. The Court distinguished it: Seramonte construed “submit” (later legislatively modified), while the legislature did not add a receipt requirement to “provided.”
  • Commissioner of Public Safety v. Freedom of Information Commission, 137 Conn. App. 307 (2012), aff’d, 312 Conn. 513 (2014)
    Used to support the presumption that when the legislature amends one part of a statute but leaves similar language untouched, the change is limited in scope—supporting the Court’s conclusion that the later amendment affecting “submit” does not transform “provided.”
  • Wilton Campus 1691, LLC v. Wilton, 339 Conn. 157 (2021)
    Cited for the proposition that when ambiguity persists after text-and-structure review, the Court may consult extratextual sources like legislative history.
  • Grimes v. Conservation Commission, 243 Conn. 266 (1997) and Megin v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 106 Conn. App. 602 (2008)
    Cited for the principle that municipal administrative proceedings are constrained by a common-law requirement of fundamental fairness (and related due-process concerns), informing what counts as adequate notice.
  • D'Occhio v. Connecticut Real Estate Commission, 189 Conn. 162 (1983)
    Cited to support that notice by mailing to a last known address can satisfy fairness-based notice requirements.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

  1. Textual focus and ambiguity. The Court started with § 12-63c (a), emphasizing the phrase “on a form provided by the assessor.” Looking to contemporaneous dictionaries, the Court found “provide” could plausibly mean either (a) “make available” (no receipt requirement) or (b) “cause to have possession” (suggesting receipt). Because both readings were reasonable—reinforced by the conflicting Superior Court interpretation in Baker Middletown, LLC v. Middletown—the Court treated the statute as ambiguous in this context.
  2. Statutory structure: the “receipt” canon. The Court then examined how related tax statutes specify methods of notice (e.g., certified mail) and explicitly require “receipt” or “delivery” when intended. It also highlighted that § 12-63c itself uses “receipt” in subsection (d) (waiver upon “receipt of such information”), showing the legislature knew how to impose receipt requirements. Applying the omission principle recognized in Clark v. Waterford, Cohanzie Fire Dept. and William W. Backus Hospital v. Stonington, the Court inferred that the absence of “receipt” language in § 12-63c (a) is intentional.
  3. Distinguishing Seramonte Associates, LLC v. Hamden and accounting for legislative response. The Court rejected the owner’s “symmetry” argument. After Seramonte held “submit” requires receipt by June 1, the legislature amended § 12-63c to add a postmark rule (now in subsection (e)), mitigating that receipt-by-deadline requirement. The Court treated that targeted amendment as evidence the legislature can and does correct perceived strictness—yet it did not add a receipt requirement to “provided,” indicating no intent to impose one.
  4. Legislative history: local control of form design, not a receipt regime. Consulting P.A. 00-215, the Court noted that the 2000 amendment replaced a form “prescribed” by OPM with one “provided by the assessor.” Testimony from OPM (Michael Cicchetti) indicated the change was meant to remove OPM from prescribing standardized forms and to allow local assessors to design forms suited to local needs. The history did not indicate an intent to require actual receipt; it supported an understanding of “provided” as allocating responsibility for the form’s creation and dissemination, not guaranteeing delivery.
  5. Notice and fundamental fairness: mailing to the last known address as “reasonable means.” The Court acknowledged a practical concern: assessors are not required every year to request the data, so mere passive availability (e.g., leaving a form on a counter) would not notify an owner that the duty is triggered that year. The Town conceded that some form of notice is inherent in “provide” in this setting. The Court reconciled its interpretation with fairness by holding that mailing the demand and form to the owner’s last known address satisfies both the statute’s “availability” concept and the common-law requirement of fundamental fairness (and any applicable due process concerns). The Court placed responsibility on the property owner—best positioned to know its address—to keep the municipality updated.

3.3 Impact

  • Clarified compliance trigger for penalties under § 12-63c (d). Municipalities may impose the 10% penalty when they timely mail the demand/form to the owner’s last known address, without litigating whether the owner actually received the mailing.
  • Reduced administrative and evidentiary burdens. Requiring actual receipt would incentivize disputes about mailroom practices, staffing disruptions, forwarding failures, or internal corporate delays; the Court’s rule makes the assessor’s obligation more objectively verifiable.
  • Heightened importance of address maintenance by owners and agents. Owners—particularly those using third-party managers—must adopt reliable procedures to update municipal records and to process municipal mail promptly, as internal delays (even if COVID-related) do not undo a properly addressed and mailed demand.
  • Guidance—but not a full catalog—of acceptable “provide” methods. The decision endorses mailing to the last known address as sufficient, and signals that purely passive availability may be insufficient; it leaves other delivery mechanisms (email, portals, posting-only, etc.) for future cases.
  • Due process/fairness framing may shape future disputes. By anchoring “provide” to “reasonable means” and “fundamental fairness,” future litigation may focus less on receipt and more on whether the municipality used a method reasonably calculated to inform the owner (with mailing to last known address identified as a safe harbor).

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

“Provided” vs. “Received”
“Provided” (as construed here) means the assessor must make the form available through reasonable steps (such as mailing it). It does not mean the assessor must prove the owner actually got it. By contrast, when the legislature wants “received,” it often says so explicitly.
“Last known address”
The address the municipality has on file from recorded ownership instruments or other official updates. If the owner moves and does not update the municipality, the risk of non-receipt generally falls on the owner under this decision.
Statutory interpretation under § 1-2z
Connecticut courts first look to statutory text and related statutes. If ambiguity remains, they may consult legislative history and other extratextual materials.
Fundamental fairness (administrative notice)
Even when a statute is silent on the mechanics of notice, municipal actions must be fundamentally fair. Mailing to a last known address is treated as a fair, reasonable way to give notice.
“Postmark rule” amendment (context from 2023)
After earlier litigation about what “submit” meant, the legislature provided that a timely postmark prevents delinquency (if the form is later received). This case addresses the assessor’s duty to provide the form, not the owner’s method of submission.

5. Conclusion

Greenwich Retail, LLC v. Town of Greenwich establishes that, for purposes of § 12-63c (a), an assessor “provides” the income-and-expense form by timely mailing it to the property owner’s last known address; the assessor need not prove actual receipt. The ruling rests on statutory structure (the legislature’s deliberate use of “receipt” elsewhere), modest legislative history showing an intent for local control of forms, and a fairness-based view that mailing to the last known address is a reasonable notice mechanism. Practically, the decision shifts the primary risk of missed mail to property owners and their agents and solidifies mailing-to-last-known-address as a reliable compliance benchmark for municipalities administering § 12-63c penalties.