Magistrate-Conducted Supervised-Release Revocation Hearings: No Automatic Second District-Judge Allocution Absent Rule 59 Objections

I. Introduction

In United States v. Erik D. Zahursky (7th Cir. Apr. 8, 2026) (nonprecedential disposition), the Seventh Circuit addressed an uncommon revocation workflow: a magistrate judge conducted a contested supervised-release revocation hearing under 18 U.S.C. § 3401(i), issued a report and recommendation (“R&R”) with a proposed revocation disposition and sentence, and the district judge later adopted that R&R—without holding a second hearing at which the defendant could appear and allocute directly to the district judge.

The parties were the United States (appellee) and Erik D. Zahursky (appellant), who was on supervised release following a 2007 federal conviction for attempting to coerce or entice a minor. The contested revocation arose from an incident in which Zahursky attempted to cash a fraudulent check. Zahursky’s appeal did not challenge the magistrate judge’s conduct of the hearing or the merits of the R&R; instead, he argued that the district court could not revoke supervised release and impose imprisonment without a second, in-person proceeding before the district judge that included allocution.

The core legal questions were: (1) whether Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2) and due process require allocution to the district judge (as opposed to a magistrate judge) when revocation is handled via § 3401(i); and (2) whether Zahursky’s failure to object to the R&R within Rule 59(b)(2) affected appellate review.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The panel held that the “uncommon procedure” used by the district court is permitted by 18 U.S.C. § 3401(i) and Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1: Rule 32.1(b)(2) requires a revocation hearing with specified procedural protections (including an opportunity to make a statement), but it does not require that those protections be provided by a district judge rather than a magistrate judge. The Federal Rules’ definition of “court” includes a magistrate judge performing authorized functions, and the Rule 32.1 advisory committee notes contemplate the § 3401(i) referral mechanism.

Critically, the panel emphasized that a defendant is entitled to de novo review by the district judge if the defendant timely objects under Rule 59(b)—and that such review may require a second hearing in some cases. But because Zahursky did not object within 14 days, he waived his right to that review under Rule 59(b)(2).

Judge Maldonado dissented, arguing (among other points) that (i) waiver was inappropriate on these facts, (ii) no judge actually provided Rule 32.1(b)(2)(E) allocution, (iii) the record did not reflect consideration of the relevant § 3553(a) factors as required by § 3583(e), and (iv) the majority’s reading risks conflict with other circuits (particularly the Ninth Circuit’s approach in United States v. Gray).

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Due process baseline for revocation proceedings

  • United States v. Boultinghouse, 784 F.3d 1163 (7th Cir. 2015): Cited for the proposition that revocation modifies an already-imposed sentence and concerns “conditional” liberty, shaping the panel’s view that revocation carries reduced procedural formality compared to initial sentencing.
  • United States v. Pratt, 52 F.3d 671 (7th Cir. 1995), citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972): Used to underscore that only “minimum requirements of due process” apply and revocation hearings are informal by design—supporting the conclusion that due process does not mandate allocution to a particular type of judge.

2. Allocution’s constitutional status

  • Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424 (1962): The majority relied on Hill to reject the claim that allocution is constitutionally required even at initial sentencing, thus a fortiori it is not constitutionally required to be delivered to a district judge at revocation.
  • The dissent invoked Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301 (1961), emphasizing historical importance of allocution and arguing that denial of Rule 32.1(b)(2)(E) requires vacatur.

3. Rule 32.1 interpretation and “appearance before the court”

  • United States v. Thompson, 599 F.3d 595 (7th Cir. 2010): The majority distinguished Thompson (videoconference revocation issue) while drawing from its methodology: look to Rule 32.1 for the scope of revocation procedural rights. The dissent relied heavily on Thompson’s language about face-to-face allocution before “the judge who will decide” revocation.
  • Sister-circuit decisions cited by the majority: United States v. Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 919 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Waters, 158 F.3d 933 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Gray, 905 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2018). The majority discounted Rodriguez and Waters as predating the 2005 addition of Rule 32.1(b)(2)(E) (allocution) and as relying on an analogy to Rule 43 that Seventh Circuit law deems inapplicable to revocations (per Thompson). It treated Gray’s discussion as dicta and factually distinct because the district judge in Gray increased the sentence based on new information.

4. De novo review of magistrate findings and the need for hearings

  • Jackson v. United States, 859 F.3d 495 (7th Cir. 2017): Cited to illustrate that de novo review can necessitate a new evidentiary hearing—particularly where credibility findings from live testimony are at issue—supporting the panel’s point that a second hearing may be required if objections are made.

5. Waiver doctrine and district court discretion to review anyway

  • United States v. Walton, 255 F.3d 437 (7th Cir. 2001): Used by the dissent to frame “waiver” as intentional relinquishment of a known right, arguing Zahursky’s situation did not fit that model.
  • United States v. Street, 917 F.3d 586 (7th Cir. 2019), and Schur v. L.A. Weight Loss Ctrs., Inc., 577 F.3d 752 (7th Cir. 2009): Cited in dissent for the proposition that failure to object under Rule 59(b)(2) does not strip the district judge of authority to review an R&R sua sponte.

6. Sentencing factors and revocation purposes

  • The dissent cited Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S. 185 (2025), to emphasize that revocation sentencing must consider forward-looking sentencing ends (deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation) through the subset of § 3553(a) factors incorporated by § 3583(e).

7. Equity, integrity, and allocution at revocation

  • United States v. Jordan, 765 F.3d 785 (7th Cir. 2014): Invoked by the dissent to stress the high stakes of revocation and the need not to “lose sight” of those stakes when applying procedural rules.
  • United States v. Abney, 957 F.3d 241 (D.C. Cir. 2020): Quoted in dissent to frame allocution as a “significant human encounter” that protects against “assembly-line justice.”
  • Del Piano v. United States, 575 F.2d 1066 (3d Cir. 1978): Quoted (through Thompson in the dissent) for allocution’s role in assessing credibility and “moral fiber.”
  • Rico v. United States, 607 U.S. ___, 2026 WL 815786 (2026): Used in dissent as a caution against procedural shortcuts in supervised release that “blow past” statutory and rule constraints.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Statutory architecture: who may revoke vs. who may conduct the hearing

The majority began with the division of authority in 18 U.S.C. § 3401: a magistrate judge cannot ultimately revoke supervised release for a felony conviction, but under § 3401(i) the district judge may designate a magistrate judge to conduct the revocation hearing and submit proposed findings and a recommended disposition under § 3583(e). This statutory scheme, on the majority’s view, expressly contemplates that the core hearing functions (including factfinding) can be performed by a magistrate judge, with the district judge retaining final authority through adoption or modification.

2. Rule 32.1(b)(2): “the court” and where allocution must occur

The opinion treated the text and structure of Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2) as decisive. The Rule requires that “the court” hold the revocation hearing and provide listed protections (notice, disclosure, ability to present evidence and question adverse witnesses, counsel, and allocution/mitigation). It does not specify that these rights must be exercised before a district judge. Further, the Federal Rules define “court” to include a magistrate judge when authorized by law (Fed. R. Crim. P. 1(b)(2)-(3)), and the advisory committee notes to the 2002 amendments to Rule 32.1 reference § 3401(i), reinforcing the compatibility of the Rule with magistrate-led hearings.

The majority also rejected Zahursky’s attempt to isolate allocution under Rule 32.1(b)(2)(E) as uniquely requiring a district judge, reasoning there was “no textual basis” to treat subsection (E) differently from subsections (A) through (D).

3. Constitutional argument rejected

Zahursky argued due process required allocution to the district judge. The panel rejected that claim using: (i) revocation’s reduced due process baseline (Pratt citing Morrissey v. Brewer, and Boultinghouse), and (ii) the Supreme Court’s statement that allocution is not a constitutional requirement even at original sentencing (Hill v. United States). Thus, even if allocution is required by rule in revocation proceedings, the Constitution does not dictate the identity of the judicial officer to whom it must be delivered.

4. The “safety valve”: Rule 59(b) objections and de novo review

The majority’s limiting principle is procedural: the district judge may adopt an R&R without a second hearing unless the defendant invokes Rule 59(b) by timely objecting. If objections are filed, the district judge must conduct de novo review; depending on the objections, that review may require a second hearing (the panel cited Jackson v. United States for the point that rejecting credibility findings based on live testimony can require a new evidentiary hearing).

Applying this framework, the panel held Zahursky waived de novo review because he filed no objections within the 14-day window under Rule 59(b)(2), which states: “Failure to object in accordance with this rule waives a party’s right to review.”

5. Tension with the dissent’s framing of what “the error” was

The dissent argued that waiver analysis misses the point because, on this record, no one provided allocution compliant with Rule 32.1(b)(2)(E), and neither the R&R nor the district judge’s order reflected the § 3583(e) duty to consider relevant § 3553(a) factors (citing Esteras v. United States). It also argued that it was “temporally impossible” to object to the district judge’s decision to proceed on the papers (relying on United States v. Waters and United States v. Gray to resist waiver). The majority, however, treated the absence of objections as dispositive and characterized many of these procedural concerns as challenges to the magistrate-stage proceedings that Zahursky had conceded were waived.

C. Impact

  • Operational significance for districts using § 3401(i): The disposition endorses an efficient path for revocation adjudication: a magistrate judge may conduct the full Rule 32.1 revocation hearing and issue an R&R, and the district judge may adopt it without a second hearing—if no timely Rule 59 objections are filed.
  • Litigation strategy: The decision sharply elevates the practical importance of filing Rule 59(b) objections in revocation matters handled via R&R. Defendants who want district-judge allocution, or who contend that Rule 32.1(b)(2)(E) was not meaningfully provided, will need to preserve the issue through timely objections.
  • Potential circuit friction: Although the panel distinguished United States v. Gray, the dissent viewed the majority’s reading as moving toward a conflict with the Ninth Circuit and as taking a strong position in a nonprecedential order. The opinion’s reasoning may nonetheless be cited for persuasive value under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, shaping arguments in future published cases.
  • Procedural regularity concerns: The dissent’s emphasis on allocution and § 3553(a) consideration signals a fault line: future cases may focus less on “district-judge-only allocution” and more on whether any judge actually afforded allocution and articulated (or at least demonstrated) § 3583(e) factor consideration—issues that can trigger vacatur even within the majority’s de novo-review framework when properly preserved.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Supervised release revocation: A post-prison monitoring term can be revoked if the defendant violates conditions. Revocation can result in additional imprisonment and a new supervised-release term.
  • 18 U.S.C. § 3401(i) referral: A district judge may assign a magistrate judge to run the revocation hearing and produce an R&R (findings and recommended sentence). The district judge keeps final power to revoke and impose sentence for felony convictions.
  • Allocution: The defendant’s opportunity to address the court personally and present mitigating information before sentencing. In revocations, it is guaranteed by Rule 32.1(b)(2)(E).
  • Rule 59(b) objections and “de novo” review: If a party objects to a magistrate judge’s R&R within 14 days, the district judge must reconsider the disputed issues fresh (“de novo”). Some objections require a new hearing (e.g., if the district judge would reject credibility findings based on live testimony).
  • Waiver vs. forfeiture (as debated here): “Waiver” typically means intentionally giving up a right; “forfeiture” is failing to assert it in time. The majority treated failure to object under Rule 59(b)(2) as waiver of review; the dissent argued that waiver was ill-fitting because the complained-of district-court procedure occurred after the objection window and because the record suggested confusion and lack of allocution.

V. Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit’s disposition in United States v. Erik D. Zahursky approves, as a matter of statutory-and-rule compatibility, a two-step revocation process under 18 U.S.C. § 3401(i) in which a magistrate judge conducts the Rule 32.1(b)(2) revocation hearing and the district judge later adopts the R&R without a second hearing—so long as the defendant does not invoke Rule 59(b) to obtain de novo district-judge review.

At the same time, the opinion underscores that a second hearing may be required when objections are filed, and the dissent highlights substantial procedural-risk areas (allocution and § 3553(a) factor consideration under § 3583(e)) that can drive vacatur when preserved. Practically, the decision makes timely Rule 59 objections the key mechanism for defendants seeking district-judge engagement at revocation sentencing in § 3401(i) referral cases.