Lucero-Rocano v. Bondi: Evidentiary Specificity Required for Gender-Based “Viewed as Property” Particular Social Groups; Gang Recruitment Refusal Alone Is Not Political Opinion

Introduction

In Lucero-Rocano v. Bondi (2d Cir. Feb. 17, 2026) (summary order, nonprecedential), the Second Circuit denied a petition for review filed by Karina Alexandra Lucero-Rocano and her two minor children, natives and citizens of Ecuador, challenging the denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the Immigration Judge (IJ) without opinion, making the IJ’s decision the operative agency decision on review.

The central issues were (1) whether Lucero-Rocano established persecution “on account of” a protected ground—particularly membership in a cognizable “particular social group” (PSG) or an (imputed) political opinion—and (2) whether the record compelled a finding that a protected ground was “one central reason” for gang harm, rather than ordinary criminal motives.

Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit held that the agency did not err in rejecting Lucero-Rocano’s proposed protected grounds. The court concluded:

  • The proposed PSG “Ecuadorian women viewed as property” was not cognizable on this record because it lacked particularity and social distinction.
  • Substantial evidence supported the agency’s conclusion that Lucero-Rocano failed to establish membership in her proposed group of indigenous women (or women with imputed indigenous status), and the issue was not properly raised before the court.
  • Her refusal to transport drugs for a gang did not, without more, establish an (imputed) anti-gang political opinion; there was no showing that her conduct “transcend[ed] mere self-protection” or that the gang perceived it as political.
  • Even assuming a protected ground, the record supported the finding that the gang’s motivation was ordinary criminal recruitment for drug transport, defeating the required nexus (“one central reason”).
  • The CAT claim was deemed abandoned because it was not argued in the opening brief.

The court also admonished counsel for inaccurately quoting vacated authority and for significant briefing deficiencies, warning that noncompliance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a) can lead to dismissal and disciplinary proceedings.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The panel’s reasoning is anchored in established Second Circuit and BIA doctrine governing standards of review, PSG cognizability, nexus, political opinion, and waiver/abandonment:

  • Shunfu Li v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2008)
    Cited for the proposition that when the BIA affirms without opinion, the court reviews the IJ’s decision as the final agency determination. This frames the appellate posture and focuses scrutiny on the IJ’s factfinding and legal conclusions.
  • Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 2018)
    Supplies the standards of review: factfinding under the “substantial evidence” standard and questions of law (and application of law to fact) reviewed de novo. This division matters because PSG cognizability is treated as a legal question while motive/nexus often turns on record-driven inference.
  • Quituizaca v. Garland, 52 F.4th 103 (2d Cir. 2022)
    Plays two key roles. First, it applies asylum’s “one central reason” nexus standard to withholding of removal. Second, it illustrates that gang violence frequently reflects “ordinary criminal incentives,” and a record does not compel a protected-ground motive simply because the applicant experiences serious harm. The panel relied on this logic to uphold the agency’s motive finding regarding drug-transport recruitment.
  • Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540 (2d Cir. 2005)
    Cited for the requirement that an applicant show—by direct or circumstantial evidence—that the persecutor’s motive to persecute arises from a protected ground. This underscores that credible harm alone is insufficient; the key is why the persecutor acted.
  • Paloka v. Holder, 762 F.3d 191 (2d Cir. 2014) and Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227 (B.I.A. 2014)
    These authorities provide the PSG framework: (1) common immutable characteristic, (2) particularity, and (3) social distinction. The panel used Paloka v. Holder to emphasize that particularity requires a “clear benchmark” for group membership and that groups cannot be “amorphous” or “subjective.” Applying that standard, the court found “Ecuadorian women viewed as property” inadequately defined and unsupported by evidence of social recognition or definitional clarity.
  • Zelaya-Moreno v. Wilkinson, 989 F.3d 190 (2d Cir. 2021)
    Reinforces that disapproval of gang activity, or refusal to cooperate, does not automatically equate to a political opinion. The panel invoked this to reject the notion that refusing to transport drugs is inherently political.
  • Hernandez-Chacon v. Barr, 948 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2020)
    Provides the key nuance on political opinion: opposition must “take on a political dimension by transcending mere self-protection,” and there must be evidence that the persecutor perceived and targeted the applicant on that political basis. The panel found Lucero-Rocano did not show either the political dimension or the gang’s perception.
  • INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24 (1976)
    Cited for the principle that agencies and courts need not decide issues unnecessary to the result. After finding the nexus/protected-ground defects dispositive, the panel declined to address additional asylum/withholding elements.
  • Debique v. Garland, 58 F.4th 676 (2d Cir. 2023)
    Used to hold that the CAT claim was abandoned because it was not addressed in the petitioner’s brief—an application of appellate waiver principles.
  • Keisler v. Hong Yin Gao, 552 U.S. 801 (2 007) and Hong Ying Gao v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 62 (2d Cir. 2006)
    The court addressed counsel’s misquotation: the quoted language came from Hong Ying Gao v. Gonzales, which was vacated by Keisler v. Hong Yin Gao. The panel reminded counsel of the duty to accurately describe authorities—an important procedural/legal-professional dimension of the decision.
  • Pulig v. Bondi, No. 24-2359, Dkt. 25
    Cited not for immigration doctrine but to show counsel had made the same misstatement in another case, reinforcing the admonition and the seriousness of the briefing warning.

Legal Reasoning

  1. Standard of review and decision under review
    The court began by identifying the IJ decision as the final agency determination due to the BIA’s affirmance without opinion (Shunfu Li v. Mukasey), then applied substantial evidence review to factual findings and de novo review to legal questions (Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions).
  2. PSG cognizability: “Ecuadorian women viewed as property” fails particularity/social distinction
    Under the PSG test articulated in Paloka v. Holder (quoting Matter of M-E-V-G-), the court focused on:
    • Particularity: whether there is a “clear benchmark” determining who is in the group. The panel held the group lacked a workable benchmark because the record did not show a consensus in Ecuador distinguishing “women viewed as property” from women generally. Without defining criteria, membership turns on subjective characterization.
    • Social distinction: whether Ecuadorian society views the group as distinct. The court emphasized the absence of evidence demonstrating social recognition of the proposed group as a distinct social class.
    The analytic move is notable: the court did not reject a gender-inflected PSG categorically; it rejected this articulation for evidentiary and definitional deficiency.
  3. PSG membership/issue preservation: “indigenous women” (or imputed indigenous status)
    The panel stated the issue was “not properly raised” before the court and, in any event, substantial evidence supported the agency’s conclusion that Lucero-Rocano lacked membership in that proposed group. This reflects a dual barrier common in petitions for review: failure to preserve/develop the argument and failure to marshal record evidence.
  4. Imputed political opinion: refusal to assist a gang is not enough
    Relying on Zelaya-Moreno v. Wilkinson and Hernandez-Chacon v. Barr, the court rejected the claim that refusing to transport drugs inherently communicates an anti-gang political opinion. The court required evidence that:
    • the refusal “transcend[ed] mere self-protection” (i.e., conveyed a broader political stance), and
    • the gang perceived and targeted her because of that political meaning.
    The panel found neither showing in the record.
  5. Nexus and motive: ordinary criminal recruitment defeats “one central reason”
    Even if a protected ground were assumed, the panel concluded the record supported the agency’s finding that the gang acted from ordinary criminal motivations— recruiting a drug courier—rather than targeting her because of PSG membership or political opinion. This is consistent with Quituizaca v. Garland and the statutory “one central reason” requirement (8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i), applied to withholding via Quituizaca v. Garland). The court treated motive as an inference from circumstances and found the evidence did not compel the contrary inference.
  6. Issue avoidance, abandonment, and briefing compliance
    Having found nexus/ground defects dispositive, the panel declined to reach other asylum/withholding issues (INS v. Bagamasbad). It then held the CAT claim abandoned for failure to brief it (Debique v. Garland). Finally, it cautioned counsel that inaccurate authority and conclusory, citation-free briefing violates Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a) and may trigger dismissal or discipline.

Impact

Although the decision is a “SUMMARY ORDER” and expressly “DO[ES] NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT,” it is practically significant in at least four ways:

  • PSG litigation discipline: The order underscores that gender-based or gender-adjacent PSG formulations still require rigorous definitional boundaries and record evidence of social recognition. Labels like “viewed as property,” without objective benchmarks and country-specific proof of social distinction, are vulnerable.
  • Gang cases and nexus: The court continues a line of reasoning (illustrated here via Quituizaca v. Garland) that gang coercion, recruitment, and retaliation often reflect criminal incentives rather than protected-ground persecution—placing a premium on evidence linking motive to a protected characteristic.
  • Political opinion narrowing in gang contexts: The order reiterates that mere refusal to cooperate with criminal actors does not automatically become political; applicants must show the refusal was understood as political by the persecutor.
  • Appellate practice consequences: The court’s explicit warning about misquoting vacated authority and failing to provide record citations signals increased intolerance for defective immigration briefing and foreshadows procedural dismissals or disciplinary referrals where deficiencies persist.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Substantial evidence” review: The court must uphold the agency’s factual findings unless the record would compel any reasonable adjudicator to reach the opposite conclusion (8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)). It is not enough that another conclusion is possible.
  • “De novo” review: The court decides legal questions independently (e.g., whether a proposed PSG is legally cognizable).
  • “Particular social group” (PSG): A protected category in asylum law. To qualify, the group must be defined by (1) an immutable trait (or one fundamental to identity), (2) particularity (clear boundaries), and (3) social distinction (recognized as distinct in the relevant society).
  • “Particularity”: The definition must allow a clear yes/no determination of who is in the group; it cannot be amorphous, subjective, or overly broad.
  • “Social distinction”: The society in question must generally perceive the group as a distinct class, not merely that the persecutor notices the person.
  • “Nexus” / “one central reason”: The protected ground must be a central motivating reason for the harm, not incidental. If the main motive is criminal (e.g., recruiting a courier), nexus can fail even if the victim belongs to a vulnerable population.
  • “Imputed political opinion”: The persecutor targets the victim because it believes the victim holds a political view—even if the victim does not. The focus is on the persecutor’s perception and motive.
  • “Abandonment” on appeal: If a party does not argue an issue in its brief, the court treats it as waived/abandoned and will not decide it.
  • BIA “affirming without opinion”: The BIA does not write its own reasoning; the IJ’s decision becomes the agency’s final reasoning for judicial review.

Conclusion

Lucero-Rocano v. Bondi denies relief because the petitioner failed to connect gang coercion to a legally cognizable protected ground and failed to show the required nexus. The decision emphasizes two durable lessons for asylum practice in gang-related claims: (1) PSG formulations—especially those framed in broad, value-laden terms—must be supported by objective definitional benchmarks and country-specific evidence of social distinction; and (2) refusal to assist a gang is not inherently political without proof that the refusal was perceived and punished as political rather than as interference with criminal aims. The order also serves as a pointed reminder that accurate citation and record-supported briefing are not optional, and deficiencies can carry procedural and professional consequences.