Louisiana Armed Robbery Is a U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1) “Force-Clause” Crime of Violence Absent Louisiana Cases Showing Reckless Commission

I. Introduction

In United States v. Lanaute (5th Cir. Mar. 12, 2026), the Fifth Circuit affirmed a career-offender enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a) for a defendant who pled guilty to federal bank robbery. The enhancement turned on whether two prior Louisiana convictions—armed robbery under La. Rev. Stat. § 14:64 and attempted armed robbery under La. Rev. Stat. § 14:27, 64—qualify as “crimes of violence” under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a).

The key dispute was mens rea: Lanaute argued Louisiana armed robbery is a “general intent” offense and thus can be committed with mere recklessness—making it ineligible under the Guidelines’ force clause after Borden v. United States. The Fifth Circuit rejected that argument, holding Lanaute failed to show a realistic probability that Louisiana applies its armed robbery statute to reckless or negligent force/threat conduct.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Fifth Circuit held that Louisiana armed robbery categorically qualifies as a crime of violence under the force clause of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1). Although Louisiana armed robbery is a general-intent crime, that classification alone does not establish that the offense can be committed recklessly or negligently. Because Lanaute could not identify Louisiana cases sustaining armed robbery convictions based on merely reckless or unintentional force or intimidation, the court concluded the statute requires (at least) intentional or knowing force/threat conduct consistent with the force clause.

Having found the force clause satisfied, the court expressly declined to reach whether the convictions also qualify under the enumerated offense clause in § 4B1.2(a)(2) (which lists “robbery”), and likewise did not reach Lanaute’s separate challenge to Congress’s authority relating to that clause.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Holding)

  • United States v. Valle- Ramirez, 908 F.3d 981 (5th Cir. 2018)
    Role: Set the standard of review: whether an offense is a crime of violence under the Guidelines is reviewed de novo. This framed the panel’s task as an independent legal classification of Louisiana armed robbery’s elements.
  • United States v. Garner, 28 F.4th 678 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013))
    Role: Reinforced the categorical approach: courts examine statutory elements, not the defendant’s real-world conduct. Garner also served as a caution that some Louisiana “general intent” crimes may reach reckless conduct, preventing the court from assuming intent merely from the “general intent” label.
  • Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013)
    Role: Provided the Supreme Court foundation for element-based comparison. Lanaute was therefore required to show that § 14:64 is categorically broader than the force clause.
  • Borden v. United States, 593 U.S. 420 (2021) (plurality opinion)
    Role: Supplied the central mens rea limitation: offenses that can be committed recklessly do not satisfy the “use of force” definition under similarly worded federal force clauses. Lanaute’s theory depended on expanding Louisiana armed robbery to reckless conduct; the court treated Borden as a constraint but held Lanaute failed to establish that Louisiana armed robbery actually reaches recklessness.
  • Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (2007)
    Role: Delivered the realistic-probability requirement: it is not enough to propose an imaginative interpretation of a statute; the defendant must show actual state application to nongeneric conduct—typically by pointing to cases. This became the decisive burden Lanaute could not satisfy.
  • United States v. Burris, 920 F.3d 942 (5th Cir. 2019), vacated on other grounds, 141 S. Ct. 2781 (2021)
    Role: Cited for applying Duenas-Alvarez’s realistic-probability principle in force-clause analysis (even though later vacated on other grounds), supporting the panel’s insistence on actual state cases showing reckless armed robbery.
  • United States v. Sereal, 153 F.4th 493 (5th Cir. 2025)
    Role: Strengthened the Fifth Circuit’s requirement that the defendant produce an “actual case” demonstrating the challenged breadth in force-clause litigation, not merely abstract possibilities.
  • United States v. Russell, 136 F.4th 606 (5th Cir. 2025)
    Role: Rejected “plausible interpretations made in a vacuum” and reinforced the practical evidentiary burden that the defendant must meet under the categorical approach when alleging overbreadth.
  • United States v. James, 950 F.3d 289 (5th Cir. 2020)
    Role: Used as a reference point for Louisiana armed robbery’s statutory formulation and prior Fifth Circuit discussion of the offense. It contextualized the statute and indicated the court’s familiarity with § 14:64 as a violence predicate.
  • United States v. King, 155 F.4th 341 (5th Cir. 2025) (citing United States v. Porterie, No. 22-30457, 2025 WL 457999 (5th Cir. Feb. 11, 2025))
    Role: Supplied the critical intermediate premise: many Louisiana crimes are “general intent” crimes, but that label does not itself prove recklessness. King also specifically rejected the notion that State v. Smith establishes reckless armed robbery, and emphasized the need for Louisiana cases upholding convictions based on reckless/negligent conduct.
  • State v. Smith, 23 So. 3d 291 (La. 2009)
    Role: Confirmed armed robbery is a general intent offense after the legislature replaced “theft” with “taking.” However, Lanaute’s reliance on Smith backfired: the Fifth Circuit read Smith as addressing accomplice liability, not the permissibility of reckless threats/force, and cited King for the proposition that Smith does not “confirm” reckless commission.
  • State v. Davis, 111 So. 3d 100 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2012); State v. Johnson, 60 So. 3d 43 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2011); State v. Robinson, 713 So. 2d 828 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1998)
    Role: Lanaute cited these as examples where intimidation might be “unintentional.” The Fifth Circuit disagreed, explaining the issue in those cases was whether force/intimidation existed at all (theft vs. robbery), not whether any force/intimidation that occurred was reckless rather than intentional. The court also stressed the obvious deliberateness of grabbing money or violently assaulting persons during a taking.
  • State v. Humphrey, 412 So. 2d 507 (La. 1981)
    Role: Demonstrated that some Louisiana general-intent crimes (e.g., simple battery) are nonetheless defined as involving “intentional” force, supporting the broader point that “general intent” does not equal “recklessness.”
  • State v. Florant, 602 So. 2d 338 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1992) (quoting State v. Leblanc, 506 So. 2d 1197 (La. 1987))
    Role: Provided Louisiana robbery jurisprudence indicating robbery inherently contemplates deliberate exertion of force/effort to overcome resistance, buttressing the inference that the statute is not applied to accidental or merely reckless force.
  • State v. Clarke, 345 So. 3d 1015 (La. 2022)
    Role: Cited for the proposition that the criminal intent for armed robbery is “apparent in the criminal acts themselves,” reinforcing the Fifth Circuit’s view that the offense’s structure and state-law understanding point to intentional conduct.

B. Legal Reasoning

  1. Framework: force clause vs. enumerated offense clause.
    The court began with U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a), which defines “crime of violence” through two paths:
    • Force clause (§ 4B1.2(a)(1)): requires an element of “use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.”
    • Enumerated offense clause (§ 4B1.2(a)(2)): lists certain crimes, including “robbery.”
    The panel decided the case under the force clause and therefore avoided the enumerated-offense and statutory-authority disputes.
  2. Categorical approach, plus a practical burden of proof.
    Under United States v. Garner and Descamps v. United States, the court compared the elements of La. Rev. Stat. § 14:64(A)—taking “by use of force or intimidation, while armed with a dangerous weapon”—to the force clause’s demand for intentional use/threatened use of physical force.

    Critically, the panel treated Lanaute’s “recklessness” contention as an overbreadth argument that triggers Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez: he had to show a realistic probability that Louisiana actually applies § 14:64 to reckless/negligent threats or force. Fifth Circuit cases—United States v. Russell and United States v. Sereal—tightened this into an “actual case” expectation.
  3. “General intent” does not automatically mean “recklessness.”
    Lanaute’s core move was to equate Louisiana’s “general intent” category with the federal concept of recklessness. The panel rejected that equation. Relying on United States v. King, the court emphasized:
    • Louisiana labels many crimes “general intent,” yet some still require intentional force (illustrated via State v. Humphrey).
    • Whether a specific offense reaches recklessness is an application question answered by Louisiana case law, not by labels alone.
  4. Lanaute’s cited Louisiana robbery cases did not show reckless intimidation.
    The court analyzed State v. Davis, State v. Johnson, and State v. Robinson and found none involved a conviction resting on accidental or reckless threats. Instead, they were sufficiency disputes about whether the conduct amounted to robbery (force/intimidation) versus theft. On the facts described, the panel concluded the conduct was plainly deliberate (e.g., grabbing money from a victim’s hand, violent assault during the taking).
  5. State v. Smith did not establish reckless armed robbery.
    The court treated State v. Smith as an accomplice-liability decision and reiterated (citing United States v. King) that Smith “never confirms” reckless or negligent armed robbery. Thus, Smith could not satisfy Duenas-Alvarez’s realistic-probability requirement.
  6. Supportive Louisiana jurisprudence points toward intentional force.
    The panel noted Louisiana decisions suggesting robbery entails purposeful exertion of force to overcome a victim’s will or resistance (State v. Florant quoting State v. Leblanc) and that armed robbery intent is “apparent” from the acts themselves (State v. Clarke). While not framed as a holding on mens rea, these authorities reinforced the court’s conclusion that § 14:64 is not realistically applied to reckless/negligent threats or force.

C. Impact

  • Career-offender predicates in the Fifth Circuit.
    The decision strengthens the position that Louisiana armed robbery (and, by extension in many cases, attempted armed robbery) will qualify under the Guidelines’ force clause, limiting post-Borden challenges based solely on Louisiana’s “general intent” taxonomy.
  • Heavier emphasis on “realistic probability” evidence.
    Lanaute underscores that defendants must come with state-law examples—not theoretical arguments—to show that a statute is applied to reckless conduct. This amplifies the practical importance of Duenas-Alvarez, as refined by United States v. Russell and United States v. Sereal.
  • Strategic narrowing: avoiding the enumerated-offense clause.
    By resolving the case under § 4B1.2(a)(1), the court left unresolved questions about the enumerated-offense clause’s scope and Lanaute’s statutory-authority argument. Future litigation may continue to focus on force-clause mens rea rather than enumerated-offense disputes—especially where a court can decide the case on the force clause alone.
  • Signal for district courts at sentencing.
    District courts in the Fifth Circuit are likely to treat Louisiana armed robbery as a stable “crime of violence” predicate unless defendants can produce Louisiana decisions explicitly sustaining armed robbery convictions based on reckless or negligent force/intimidation.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Career-offender enhancement (U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1)
A Guidelines provision that substantially increases the sentencing range if the defendant has (among other requirements) at least two prior felony convictions that qualify as “crimes of violence” (or controlled-substance offenses).
Force clause vs. enumerated offense clause (U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a))
The “force clause” asks whether the statute’s elements require using, attempting, or threatening violent physical force against another person. The “enumerated offense clause” lists certain crimes (like “robbery”) that count if the state offense matches the generic definition of the listed crime.
Categorical approach
A method that looks only at the legal elements of the prior conviction’s statute, not the facts of what the defendant actually did. If the statute covers both qualifying and non-qualifying conduct, it generally cannot be used as a predicate.
“General intent” vs. “specific intent” (Louisiana)
“Specific intent” means the offender actively desired the criminal consequence. “General intent” includes specific intent, but can also be satisfied when the offender must have been aware the result was reasonably certain to follow. Crucially, in this opinion, “general intent” did not automatically equate to federal “recklessness.”
Recklessness and Borden
Under Borden v. United States, an offense that can be committed with mere recklessness does not qualify under similarly worded federal force clauses, because the clause requires purposeful/knowing force directed “against” another person.
Realistic probability requirement
Under Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, it is not enough to imagine that a state statute could be applied broadly; the defendant must show the state actually does apply it that way—typically by citing state cases.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Lanaute cements a practical rule for Fifth Circuit sentencing: labeling Louisiana armed robbery as a “general intent” crime does not, without more, establish that it can be committed recklessly for force-clause purposes. To defeat “crime of violence” status under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1), a defendant must satisfy Duenas-Alvarez by pointing to Louisiana decisions that actually uphold armed robbery convictions on reckless or negligent use/threat of force. Absent that showing, Louisiana armed robbery remains a force-clause predicate, supporting career-offender enhancements under § 4B1.1.