Due Diligence Is Jurisdictional for Wyoming Nonresident Motorist Service; Nonjurisdictional Due Process Service Objections Are Waived; Appellate Review Is Limited to Orders Named in the Notice of Appeal

1. Introduction

Case: William L. Lopez v. Samantha Ritter, 2026 WY 89 (Wyo. Aug. 10, 2026).
Court: Supreme Court of Wyoming.
Background: Years after a January 2015 automobile accident in Gillette, Wyoming, Samantha Ritter sued William Lopez in 2019. After unsuccessful attempts at personal service at the accident-report address (later believed vacant), Ms. Ritter served Mr. Lopez through Wyoming’s nonresident motorist statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-6-301, by serving the Secretary of State and mailing the summons and complaint to Mr. Lopez’s last known address. Mr. Lopez did not appear, default was entered, the case was later dismissed for failure to prosecute, reinstated via Ms. Ritter’s Rule 60 motion, and ultimately proceeded to a default judgment for $154,661.25. Mr. Lopez then sought Rule 60 relief from that judgment and appealed after the district court denied his motion.

Core issues on appeal concerned (1) whether service challenges were preserved or waived; (2) whether Ms. Ritter exercised “due diligence” sufficient to invoke substituted service under § 1-6-301; (3) whether personal jurisdiction existed for entry of default judgment; (4) whether the Supreme Court could review the reinstatement order when it was not designated in the notice of appeal; and (5) whether denying Mr. Lopez’s Rule 60 motion was an abuse of discretion.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed. It held:

  • Mr. Lopez waived his standalone argument that service violated due process by mailing to a vacant address because he did not raise it in the district court; it was neither jurisdictional nor so fundamental as to compel review.
  • The question whether Ms. Ritter exercised the diligence required to perfect service under § 1-6-301 is jurisdictional and thus reviewable, but the Court concluded Ms. Ritter did exercise sufficient due diligence based on the settled record under W.R.A.P. 3.03.
  • Because service was valid, the district court had personal jurisdiction when it entered default judgment.
  • The Court lacked appellate jurisdiction to review the order reinstating the case after dismissal because Mr. Lopez’s notice of appeal identified only the order denying his post-judgment Rule 60 motion, not the reinstatement order.
  • The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Lopez’s Rule 60 motion where his arguments largely depended on an incorrect premise (invalid service) and general appeals to the preference for merits adjudication.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The Opinion is precedent-driven in three main clusters: (A) issue preservation/waiver; (B) substituted service and jurisdiction; and (C) appellate jurisdiction and Rule 60/default standards.

A. Waiver and issue preservation on appeal

The Court relied on a consistent Wyoming line holding that issues not raised below are not considered on appeal:

  • Borja v. State and Rogers v. State — reaffirming the general no-new-issues-on-appeal rule.
  • Davis v. State (quoting Crofts v. State ex rel. Dep't of Game & Fish) — applying the rule to “legal theories or issues never formally raised.”
  • Miller v. Beyer (via Rogers v. State) — emphasizing that reversal on unpresented grounds is inappropriate.
  • Kessel v. State — synthesizing the doctrine and anchoring the Court’s approach in the present case.

The Court then recognized limited exceptions—jurisdictional and “fundamental nature” issues—citing State v. Cole, Stevens v. Governing Body of Town of Saratoga, and Crofts v. State ex rel. Dep't of Game & Fish.

Importantly, the Court treated “due diligence” under substituted service as jurisdictional (thus reviewable), but treated the “mailing to a vacant address is constitutionally unfair” due process theory as nonjurisdictional and therefore waived when not raised, citing waiver examples including Ropken v. YJ Constr., Inc., Crofts v. State ex rel. Dep't of Game & Fish, and In re Guardianship of Lankford.

B. Substituted service, due diligence, and personal jurisdiction

The Court framed service as the gateway to personal jurisdiction:

  • Midway Oil Corp. v. Guess — “service of process is the basis upon which jurisdiction is obtained” and requires strict compliance in substituted-service contexts.
  • Pease Bros. v. Am. Pipe & Supply Co. — a judgment without proper service/appearance is “a nullity and void.”
  • Hopeful v. Etchepare, LLC — ineffective substituted service defeats personal jurisdiction; proper service is necessary to acquire personal jurisdiction under federal and Wyoming due process.

On the statute itself, the Court relied heavily on its substituted-service case law:

  • Dirks v. Jimenez — de novo review of adequate service when facts are undisputed; plaintiff bears the duty to show compliance.
  • Gookin v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. — quoted in Dirks v. Jimenez for the plaintiff’s burden to show compliance with substituted service statutes.
  • Colley v. Dyer — the key “due diligence” articulation: diligence is “reasonable under the circumstances,” not “all possible diligence,” and must not stop just short of where an address might be found; diligence must be tailored to the case.
  • Carlson v. Bos — a Utah authority quoted in Colley v. Dyer, used to give content to “due diligence.”
  • Estrada v. Bukaty — an example of factors considered in assessing diligence (friends/family, investigators, internet searches, prior counsel, documents), while stressing these are not mandatory in every case.

These cases collectively shaped the Court’s two-step inquiry: (1) Is § 1-6-301 available (i.e., has plaintiff shown reasonable diligence)? If yes, (2) strict compliance with the statute’s mechanics supports valid service, which in turn supports personal jurisdiction.

C. Appellate jurisdiction (notice of appeal specificity)

The Court treated notice-of-appeal designation requirements as jurisdictional and enforced them strictly:

  • EOG Res. Inc., v. JJLM Land, LLC — a notice of appeal only perfects an appeal of orders identified in the notice; unidentified orders are beyond the Court’s jurisdiction.
  • Painovich v. Painovich and Evans v. Moyer — cited within EOG Res. Inc., v. JJLM Land, LLC and applied as part of the jurisdictional analysis.
  • Am. Collection Sys., Inc. v. Judkins — directly applied: when an appellant appeals only a post-judgment order, the Court lacks jurisdiction to review issues tied to an underlying order not designated.
  • Woodward v. Valvoda — reinforcing that the notice must identify the order for appellate jurisdiction to exist.

This cluster controlled the reinstatement/savings-statute dispute: regardless of whether the reinstatement was correct, it was not within the Supreme Court’s appellate power to review because it was not designated in the notice of appeal and not raised in Mr. Lopez’s Rule 60 motion.

D. Defaults and Rule 60 relief

The Court’s abuse-of-discretion review and “good cause” framework relied on:

  • Rosty v. Skaj — Rule 60(b) grounds inform the “good cause” inquiry under Rule 55(c).
  • Vanasse v. Ramsay and M & A Constr. Corp. v. Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc. — if Rule 60(b) cannot be substantiated, good cause to set aside entry of default does not exist.
  • Fluor Daniel (NPOSR), Inc. v. Seward — default and default-judgment decisions are discretionary.
  • Moran v. Meadowlark Acad. Inc. and RDG Oil & Gas, LLC v. Jayne Morton Living Tr. — confirming abuse-of-discretion review for denial of set-aside motions.
  • Lykins v. Habitat for Human. — no abuse of discretion where defendants fail to prove defective service.
  • McGarvin-Moberly Constr. Co. v. Welden (quoting Cessna Fin. Corp. v. Bielenberg Masonry Contracting, Inc.) and referencing Claassen v. Nord — acknowledging the preference for merits decisions but emphasizing diligence and procedural compliance; default remains a legitimate incentive mechanism.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. The Court separated “jurisdictional” service validity from nonjurisdictional fairness arguments

The Opinion draws a practical line: if the challenge goes to whether statutory prerequisites to substituted service were met (notably due diligence), it is jurisdictional because defective service means the court never acquired personal jurisdiction. But if the argument assumes statutory compliance and instead asserts “constitutional unfairness” in the manner of notice (here, mailing to a purportedly vacant address), that is treated as a standard constitutional claim subject to ordinary preservation rules.

This distinction mattered because Mr. Lopez did not litigate a due diligence defect or due process defect in his own Rule 60 set-aside proceedings. The Court nonetheless reached diligence (as jurisdictional) and declined to reach the standalone due process theory (as waived).

B. Due diligence was evaluated on the “settled record,” and the Court treated that record as binding on appeal

Because the Rule 60 hearings were unrecorded, the case turned on a W.R.A.P. 3.03 settled statement. The district court adopted Ms. Ritter’s version as consistent with its recollection. That settled statement supplied key pre-service diligence facts not fully set out in counsel’s earlier affidavits (which the district court itself characterized as not “comprehensive”).

Using those settled facts, the Court held Ms. Ritter’s efforts were reasonable under the circumstances—multiple attempted sheriff’s services; inability to obtain forwarding information from the USPS; unsuccessful attempts to obtain a current address from Mr. Lopez’s insurer; unreturned calls to Mr. Lopez’s last known number; and use of a person-search service (which produced a false match).

The Court emphasized that diligence is fact-specific and does not require every conceivable step (investigator, family contacts, etc.) in every case—consistent with Colley v. Dyer and Dirks v. Jimenez.

C. Valid service resolved personal jurisdiction and undermined Rule 60(b)(1) and (6) claims

Once the Court concluded service was properly perfected under § 1-6-301, Mr. Lopez’s “no notice / not served” narrative lost legal force. The Court therefore held the district court had personal jurisdiction to enter default judgment, and it rejected Mr. Lopez’s attempt to repackage the service challenge as “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect” under W.R.C.P. 60(b)(1) or as “any other reason” under W.R.C.P. 60(b)(6).

The Court also rejected two broader themes: (1) that a mere general preference for merits adjudication compels setting aside defaults, and (2) that the district court should have granted Mr. Lopez’s Rule 60 motion because it had granted Ms. Ritter’s earlier Rule 60 motion. Neither proposition supplies the kind of Rule 60(b) grounds required by Rosty v. Skaj and its supporting authorities.

D. Appellate jurisdiction: the Court refused to reach the savings-statute/reinstatement dispute

Mr. Lopez argued that reinstating the dismissed case was an “end run” around the savings statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-118. The Supreme Court did not decide whether that argument was correct on the merits. Instead, it enforced W.R.A.P. 2.07’s jurisdictional notice requirements: because Mr. Lopez appealed only the order denying his own Rule 60 motion and did not designate the reinstatement order, the Court lacked jurisdiction to review reinstatement.

This portion of the Opinion illustrates a critical appellate practice point: substantive arguments—even potentially dispositive ones—cannot be reached if the notice of appeal does not confer jurisdiction over the relevant order.

3.3 Impact

  • Service litigation under § 1-6-301: The Opinion reinforces that “due diligence” is an implicit prerequisite to § 1-6-301 and is jurisdictional. Plaintiffs should be prepared to prove diligence beyond conclusory affidavits, and defendants should raise diligence/service challenges promptly in the district court to avoid waiver (and to create an adequate record).
  • Record-making matters: The case demonstrates how a W.R.A.P. 3.03 settled statement can become decisive when hearings are unrecorded. Parties who anticipate appellate review should prioritize recording or ensuring a robust, uncontested reconstruction of the evidence.
  • Waiver of constitutional theories: The Court’s refusal to address the standalone due process mailing-to-vacant-address argument signals that constitutional “fairness” objections to service methods must be litigated in the trial court or they will likely be lost on appeal.
  • Notice of appeal discipline: The Opinion is a pointed reminder that appellate jurisdiction is order-specific. Litigants must designate each order they want reviewed—especially when challenging reinstatement, dismissal, or other procedural rulings that may be analytically distinct from a later Rule 60 denial.
  • Defaults and Rule 60: The decision underscores that Rule 60(b)(1) and (6) relief will not be granted where the asserted “surprise” or “excusable neglect” is essentially a rejected service argument, and that general preferences for merits determinations do not substitute for Rule 60(b) grounds.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

4.1 “Nonresident motorist statute” service (Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-6-301)

Wyoming treats driving on its roads as impliedly appointing the Secretary of State as an agent for service when the defendant cannot be served in Wyoming personally or through a resident agent. The plaintiff must (1) serve/file process with the Secretary of State and (2) within ten days send notice and a copy of the process to the defendant personally or by certified mail to the last known address, then (3) file an affidavit of compliance.

4.2 “Due diligence”

“Due diligence” is not “do everything imaginable.” It means taking reasonable, case-appropriate steps that are reasonably calculated to find the defendant’s location before resorting to substituted service. In this case, repeated sheriff attempts, inquiries about forwarding information, insurer inquiries, phone outreach, and a search service were enough.

4.3 “Jurisdictional” vs. “waivable” issues

A jurisdictional issue affects the court’s power to act at all (e.g., defective service can prevent personal jurisdiction). Those issues may be reviewed even if not raised below. Other issues—including many constitutional arguments—are generally waived if not raised in the trial court.

4.4 Default vs. default judgment; Rule 55(c) and Rule 60(b)

An entry of default is a procedural notation that the defendant failed to respond. A default judgment is the final judgment entered thereafter. Under Rule 55(c), an entry of default can be set aside for “good cause,” and a default judgment can be set aside only under Rule 60(b)’s specific grounds (mistake/excusable neglect; fraud; void judgment; etc.). Courts review these decisions for abuse of discretion.

4.5 Appellate jurisdiction and the notice of appeal

The Supreme Court can only review orders that are properly identified in a timely notice of appeal. If an order (like reinstatement) is not designated, the Court treats itself as lacking power to decide it—no matter how strong the argument may be.

5. Conclusion

Lopez v. Ritter is a procedural decision with significant practical force. It confirms that reasonable due diligence is a jurisdictional prerequisite to substituted service under Wyoming’s nonresident motorist statute, and it illustrates what kinds of steps can satisfy that requirement. It also draws a consequential preservation line: a standalone due process challenge to the fairness of notice (as opposed to statutory compliance) is waivable if not raised in the district court. Finally, it reinforces that appellate jurisdiction is strictly limited to orders identified in the notice of appeal, preventing review of reinstatement/savings-statute disputes where the appellant fails to designate the relevant order.