Loper Bright Does Not Displace Prior Chevron-Based Circuit Immigration Precedent; Fact-Weighing in Cancellation Denials Remains Largely Unreviewable

1. Introduction

Hinds v. Bondi (2d Cir. Jan. 16, 2026) is a nonprecedential summary order reviewing a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) that (1) sustained removability and (2) affirmed the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) discretionary denial of cancellation of removal.

The petitioner, Devon Alexander Hinds, a lawful permanent resident and native and citizen of Barbados, pleaded guilty on July 15, 2021 to New York Penal Law § 260.10(1) (endangering the welfare of a child). DHS charged him as removable for a “crime of child abuse” under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i). The IJ ordered removal and denied cancellation of removal as a matter of discretion; the BIA affirmed.

The petition raised two core issues: (1) whether the child-endangerment conviction categorically fits the immigration “crime of child abuse” ground—especially after Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo ended Chevron deference; and (2) whether the agency committed reviewable legal error in denying cancellation, given its credibility and evidentiary findings.

2. Summary of the Opinion

  • Removability: The Second Circuit denied review. It held that it remains bound by prior circuit precedent treating New York Penal Law § 260.10(1) as categorically matching the BIA’s child-abuse definition, and that Loper Bright does not permit a panel to disregard those precedents. The court also noted an independent procedural barrier: Hinds did not raise his removability challenge to the BIA.
  • Cancellation of removal: The Second Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that Hinds’s arguments attacked factfinding and the weighing of evidence—matters largely insulated from review by statute—rather than presenting a constitutional claim or colorable question of law.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Child-abuse removability and post-Loper Bright stare decisis

  • Matthews v. Barr, 927 F.3d 606 (2d Cir. 2019): The court treated Matthews as controlling authority that a conviction under New York’s child-endangerment statute is a categorical match to the BIA’s definition of “child abuse.” Matthews also supplied the panel-rule framework: panels are bound by prior panels unless overruled en banc or by the Supreme Court.
  • Florez v. Holder, 779 F.3d 207 (2d Cir. 2015): Florez is the earlier decision adopting the BIA’s child-abuse definition in the context of New York Penal Law § 260.10(1), at least in part within a Chevron-deference framework. Hinds relied on Florez’s observation that it was “unlikely” the court would have adopted the BIA’s definition absent deference.
  • Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024): The petitioner argued that because Loper Bright overruled Chevron, the circuit should stop deferring to the BIA’s definition and revisit Florez/Matthews. The panel rejected that move, emphasizing Loper Bright’s statement that it did “not call into question prior cases that relied on the Chevron framework.”
  • Garcia Pinach v. Bondi, 147 F.4th 117 (2d Cir. 2025): The opinion treated Garcia Pinach as the circuit’s post-Loper Bright instruction that “Loper Bright provides no basis for us to disregard” earlier Chevron-reliant circuit precedent. This case is the immediate bridge from Loper Bright’s general statement to the Second Circuit’s operational rule of adherence.
  • Ud Din v. Garland, 72 F.4th 411 (2d Cir. 2023): Cited for the issue-exhaustion principle—courts generally do not review issues not first presented to the agency. The panel used Ud Din to underscore that Hinds did not challenge removability before the BIA.

2) Cancellation-of-removal review limits and the law/fact line

  • Rodriguez v. Gonzales, 451 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2006): Used to frame the two-step structure of cancellation of removal: (i) statutory eligibility and (ii) discretionary decision whether relief is warranted.
  • Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209 (2024): Central to jurisdiction and standards. The court cited Wilkinson both for the proposition that review is limited to constitutional claims and questions of law, and for its taxonomy distinguishing reviewable “application of a statutory legal standard … to an established set of facts” from unreviewable factfinding like credibility determinations.
  • Barco-Sandoval v. Gonzales, 516 F.3d 35 (2d Cir. 2007): Cited for the idea that use of an “incorrect legal standard” can supply a reviewable question of law in cancellation cases.
  • Mendez v. Holder, 566 F.3d 316 (2d Cir. 2009): Cited for the principle that “ignoring or seriously mischaracteriz[ing]” important facts can present a reviewable legal error.
  • Penaranda Arevalo v. Bondi, 130 F.4th 325 (2d Cir. 2025): The court relied on Penaranda Arevalo to draw the jurisdictional line: it lacks jurisdiction to review “the agency’s weighing of the evidence, or the logic it employed in drawing inferences from it.”

3) Use of police reports/complaints and agency fact roles

  • Padmore v. Holder, 609 F.3d 62 (2d Cir. 2010): Invoked by Hinds to challenge reliance on a police report. The panel distinguished Padmore as a case about impermissible BIA fact-finding (not the IJ’s factfinding role).
  • In re Arreguin De Rodriguez, 21 I. & N. Dec. 38 (B.I.A. 1995): Cited by Hinds to argue arrest reports deserve little weight. The panel distinguished it: there, prosecution was declined and wrongdoing was denied; here, there was a conviction and not a complete denial.
  • Carcamo v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 498 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2007): The panel treated Carcamo as affirming that “police reports and complaints, even if containing hearsay and not a part of the formal record of conviction,” may be admitted for discretionary-relief determinations.
  • Argueta v. Holder, 617 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting In re C-V-T, 22 I. & N. Dec. 7 (B.I.A 1998)): Cited for the proposition that “proof of genuine rehabilitation” is a relevant discretionary factor in the overall balancing test.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Removability: exhaustion + binding precedent after Loper Bright

The court’s removability analysis proceeds on two reinforcing tracks.

  1. Agency exhaustion: Because Hinds did not challenge removability in his BIA appeal, the court invoked Ud Din v. Garland for the general rule against reviewing issues not presented to the agency. The panel noted this as a threshold obstacle, though it also addressed the merits in the alternative (“assuming arguendo”).
  2. Stare decisis despite Chevron’s demise: On the merits, the panel treated Florez v. Holder and Matthews v. Barr as binding circuit precedent establishing that New York Penal Law § 260.10(1) qualifies under the BIA’s “crime of child abuse” definition. Although Hinds argued Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo undermined those decisions by eliminating Chevron deference, the panel applied the circuit’s post-Loper Bright approach from Garcia Pinach v. Bondi: Loper Bright expressly disclaimed disturbing prior Chevron-based outcomes, so it does not provide an “intervening Supreme Court decision” sufficient to permit a panel to overrule prior circuit authority.

In practical terms, the decision announces a stability rule: in this circuit, the end of Chevron does not automatically reopen settled circuit constructions in immigration cases where the circuit previously deferred to the agency, absent a more specific Supreme Court signal or en banc reconsideration.

2) Cancellation of removal: jurisdictional limits and deference to IJ factfinding

For cancellation, the panel emphasized the statutory jurisdictional bar in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), with the savings clause for constitutional and legal questions in § 1252(a)(2)(D). Citing Wilkinson v. Garland and Penaranda Arevalo v. Bondi, the panel treated credibility determinations, evidentiary weight, and inferential reasoning as unreviewable factual matters.

The panel then mapped Hinds’s arguments onto that law/fact line:

  • Credibility and the incident facts: The IJ found Hinds generally credible but not credible about the incident underlying the conviction, because his testimony conflicted with the victim’s sworn statement and other record evidence (including an order of protection). The court characterized this as classic IJ factfinding under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(B), not legal error.
  • Police report reliance: The panel relied on Carcamo v. U.S. Dep't of Just. to conclude that police materials can be used in discretionary-relief adjudication. It also rejected the claim that the BIA engaged in improper factfinding, pointing to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i) (BIA reviews IJ factfinding only for clear error). Padmore v. Holder was distinguished on this basis.
  • Rehabilitation evidence: The IJ considered Hinds’s failure to complete sex offender counseling (even if not court-ordered) as part of the discretionary assessment, supported by Argueta v. Holder and In re C-V-T. The panel treated Hinds’s objections as disagreement with weighing and inference, not a legal-standard error under Barco-Sandoval v. Gonzales or a serious mischaracterization under Mendez v. Holder.

Because Hinds did not identify a legal-standard mistake, a constitutionally cognizable defect, or a serious record distortion, the court held it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed that portion of the petition.

C. Impact

  • Post-Loper Bright continuity in the Second Circuit: Even after Chevron’s overruling, litigants challenging long-settled circuit outcomes that incorporated Chevron deference face a steep barrier. This order—tracking Garcia Pinach v. Bondi—signals that only an en banc decision or a more directly on-point Supreme Court ruling is likely to dislodge existing circuit immigration precedent.
  • Strategic premium on agency issue preservation: The court’s reliance on Ud Din v. Garland reinforces that arguments (including new legal theories prompted by intervening Supreme Court decisions) should be raised to the BIA to avoid forfeiture/exhaustion problems.
  • Narrow channel for cancellation-of-removal appellate review: The decision exemplifies the constrained review permitted by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) and (D) after Wilkinson v. Garland: framing disputes as “legal questions” will fail if the substance is disagreement with credibility calls, evidentiary weight, or inferences.
  • Use of police statements in discretionary relief: By leaning on Carcamo v. U.S. Dep't of Just., the order underscores that sworn victim statements and police documents can significantly influence discretionary relief outcomes even if they include hearsay—so long as used for discretionary assessment rather than categorical removability.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Categorical match”: A method of deciding whether a state conviction fits a federal immigration removal category by looking at the statute’s elements (what the law requires for conviction), not the person’s specific conduct. Here, prior cases held New York Penal Law § 260.10(1) matches the BIA’s “child abuse” concept.
  • Chevron deference and Loper Bright: Chevron required courts (in many circumstances) to defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes. Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo ended that doctrine going forward, but—crucially for this case—the Supreme Court said it was not reopening past cases that used Chevron. The Second Circuit treats that as a reason to keep following its earlier decisions unless an en banc court or the Supreme Court specifically changes the rule.
  • Issue exhaustion: Generally, you must present an argument to the agency (here, the BIA) before asking a federal court to review it. The court cited this as a reason it “generally” will not review removability arguments not raised before the BIA.
  • Discretionary relief vs. eligibility: Even if someone is legally eligible for cancellation of removal, the IJ can still deny it as a matter of discretion after weighing positive and negative factors (rehabilitation, seriousness of conduct, family ties, etc.).
  • Jurisdiction limits and “questions of law”: Congress largely barred courts from second-guessing discretionary denials like cancellation, except for constitutional claims and legal questions. Courts may review legal-standard mistakes, but not ordinary fact disputes like who is more credible or how much weight to give a police statement.
  • IJ vs. BIA fact roles: The IJ is the factfinder. The BIA generally may not find new facts; it reviews the IJ’s factfinding for “clear error.” That distinction is why Padmore v. Holder (BIA factfinding) did not help Hinds where the IJ made the factual determinations.

5. Conclusion

The Second Circuit’s disposition in Hinds v. Bondi reinforces two practical rules in immigration litigation. First, within the circuit, Loper Bright does not authorize panels to depart from prior Chevron-influenced circuit holdings such as Florez v. Holder and Matthews v. Barr; absent en banc or Supreme Court overruling, those decisions continue to govern. Second, challenges to the discretionary denial of cancellation of removal must identify a genuine legal or constitutional defect; disputes over credibility, evidentiary weight, and factual inferences—like the agency’s reliance on a victim’s sworn police statement—are typically outside the court’s jurisdiction.