Introduction
This order concerns whether a proposed local initiative regulating data centers should remain eligible for certification while its proponents appeal an adverse district-court ruling. The proponents, 406 People First and Denise Kelly, submitted more than the required number of signatures after relying on a deadline supplied by Butte-Silver Bow’s election administrator. The administrator later concluded that a newly enacted statute imposed an earlier deadline.
The initiative, designated Petition Number 00-02, would define “data center” in the Butte-Silver Bow Municipal Code and require approval by two-thirds of all registered voters before the City-County could authorize, license, permit, or otherwise approve construction or expansion of a data center.
The central question at this stage was not whether the initiative ultimately complied with Montana law. Rather, it was whether the Montana Supreme Court should preserve its ballot eligibility pending appellate review. The Court granted an injunction, holding that the risk of permanently losing the November election outweighed the risk of temporarily allowing the measure to proceed.
Summary of the Opinion
The Supreme Court granted an injunction under § 3-2-205(1), MCA, which authorizes it to issue an injunction while an appeal from the refusal or dissolution of an injunction is pending. The Court applied the four preliminary-injunction factors found in § 27-19-201(1), MCA:
- Likelihood of success on the merits;
- Likelihood of irreparable harm without relief;
- Whether the balance of equities favors the applicant; and
- Whether relief serves the public interest.
Each factor favored temporary relief. The Court therefore enjoined the City-County and its election administrator from denying certification of Initiative 00-02 on the ground that its signatures were submitted after the deadline in § 13-28-206, MCA. The injunction remains effective until the appeal is decided.
Importantly, the Court did not finally decide whether equitable estoppel applies, whether § 13-28-206 is unconstitutional as applied, or whether the initiative must ultimately be certified. Its determination was expressly preliminary.
Analysis
1. Authority to Grant an Injunction Pending Appeal
The proponents argued that the District Court’s earlier temporary restraining order effectively constituted a preliminary injunction that should be reinstated. The Supreme Court declined to resolve that characterization. It instead relied directly on § 3-2-205(1), MCA, as an independent source of authority to preserve the status quo during the appeal.
This approach is procedurally significant. It confirms that the Supreme Court may grant affirmative interim relief even when the district court has refused—or has not timely ruled upon—a comparable request, provided the governing injunction standards are satisfied.
2. Likelihood of Success
The Court concluded that the proponents had made the necessary prima facie showing. They argued that the District Court had overlooked the purpose of § 13-28-206: giving election officials adequate time to process signatures and determine whether an initiative qualified for the ballot. Because the proponents submitted sheets weekly and the administrator had already processed and accepted 3,850 signatures, that administrative purpose arguably had been fulfilled.
The Court did not hold that statutory purpose overrides clear statutory text. Nor did it rule that reliance on the administrator’s incorrect deadline conclusively excuses noncompliance. It held only that these circumstances presented a sufficiently serious merits question to justify preserving the initiative while the appeal proceeded.
3. Irreparable Harm
The Court found irreparable harm unquestionable. If the initiative were excluded from the November ballot and that exclusion were later found erroneous, no appellate judgment could recreate the lost election. Monetary damages or delayed relief would not restore the voters’ opportunity to decide the proposal at the scheduled election.
The time-sensitive nature of elections was therefore decisive: once the ballot deadline and election passed, the injury could not be fully repaired.
4. Balance of Equities
The Court balanced the proponents’ interest in ballot access after obtaining enough signatures against the government’s interest in enforcing a duly enacted deadline. Several facts shifted the balance toward the proponents:
- They obtained more valid signatures than legally required.
- They followed the election administrator’s stated deadline.
- They submitted signatures weekly with the administrator’s approval.
- The administrative processing purpose of the deadline appeared to have been satisfied.
- The statutory deadline was newly enacted in 2025 rather than a longstanding and settled requirement.
- The City-County did not oppose interim relief.
The Court also compared the consequences of each possible error. If the initiative appeared on the ballot but was later found invalid, it could potentially be invalidated. If it were excluded and that exclusion were later found unlawful, the electorate’s lost voting opportunity could not be recovered. The Court characterized the latter outcome as the “greater evil.”
5. Public Interest
Article XI, Section 8, of the Montana Constitution requires the Legislature to extend initiative and referendum powers to qualified local electors. Because more than the required 3,652 voters had signed the petition, the Court found a strong public interest in allowing the initiative process to continue while the legal dispute was resolved.
The ruling treats initiative rights as more than the private interest of the petition’s sponsors. Ballot exclusion also affects signers and the broader electorate, whose constitutional opportunity to consider a qualifying proposal may be lost.
Precedents Cited
Lopez v. Heckler
This decision supplied the procedural analogy that an injunction pending appeal should be assessed under the same standards governing a preliminary injunction. The Court used that principle to connect its authority under § 3-2-205(1), MCA, with the four statutory factors in § 27-19-201(1), MCA.
Planned Parenthood of Mont. v. State
The Court relied on this case for the proposition that “likelihood of success on the merits” requires only a prima facie showing at the preliminary stage. An applicant need not prove final entitlement to judgment before obtaining temporary protection.
Driscoll V. Stapleton
This precedent explained that “prima facie” means a showing sufficient “at first sight,” subject to further evidence. It also supported a sliding-scale approach: when the balance of equities tips sharply toward the applicant, serious questions going to the merits may suffice.
Davis v. Stapleton
Quoted through Driscoll V. Stapleton, this case provided the formulation that a party facing strongly favorable equities need show only “serious questions going to the merits.” That standard allowed the Court to preserve the initiative without prejudging the appeal.
Kalarchik v. State
This case established that balancing the equities requires weighing the parties’ competing interests from the existing record without finally resolving the underlying constitutional questions. It supported the Court’s careful separation between interim relief and a final merits decision.
All Earns. Healthcare v. State
The Court cited this decision for the rule that preventing constitutional injury is always in the public interest. Here, the potential constitutional injury involved the local electorate’s initiative power under Article XI, Section 8.