LMRA § 301 Complete Preemption of State Tort Claims That Require CBA Interpretation (Including “Publication” for Defamation and “Outrageousness” for IIED)

1. Introduction

Case: Pete Szmurlo v. TK Elevator Corporation (Seventh Circuit, July 14, 2026) is a nonprecedential disposition affirming (1) removal of Illinois tort claims to federal court and (2) dismissal on the pleadings.

Parties: Pete R. Szmurlo (former apprentice elevator mechanic) sued his former employer, TK Elevator Corporation, and his union (International Union of Elevator Constructors Local 2), among others.

Background: Szmurlo alleged TK Elevator defamed him and intentionally inflicted emotional distress by circulating negative performance statements: (a) to the union in connection with discipline/termination steps contemplated by the collective-bargaining agreement (CBA), (b) at a union hearing, (c) to co-workers, and (d) to OSHA in response to an investigation stemming from Szmurlo’s safety complaint.

Key issues:

  • Whether the state-law tort claims were completely preempted by LMRA § 301 because they required interpretation of the CBA (supporting removal and federal jurisdiction).
  • Whether the complaint stated viable tort claims given limitations rules and privilege doctrines (and whether the alleged conduct met Illinois’s “extreme and outrageous” standard for IIED).
  • Whether repetitive filings warranted a sanctions warning at the appellate level.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Seventh Circuit affirmed in full. It held that Szmurlo’s Illinois defamation and IIED claims were preempted by LMRA § 301 because adjudicating them would be “substantially dependent” on analyzing the CBA—particularly whether the CBA required TK Elevator to provide certain performance/disciplinary communications to the union, and whether conduct authorized or contemplated by the CBA could be deemed “extreme and outrageous.”

On the merits, the court agreed with dismissal because: (1) most statements were time-barred under Illinois’s one-year defamation limitations period, (2) TK Elevator’s statement to OSHA was absolutely privileged as part of a quasi-judicial investigation, and (3) the alleged conduct did not plausibly rise to the “extreme and outrageous” level required for IIED.

The court also warned that further repetitive, frivolous appellate filings could lead to sanctions, including filing restrictions.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Pleading and documents considered on a motion to dismiss

  • Mack v. Resurgent Cap. Servs., L.P., 70 F.4th 395, 405 (7th Cir. 2023)
    Used for the standard Rule 12(b)(6) posture: courts accept well-pleaded facts as true and draw reasonable inferences for the plaintiff. The panel used this to credit the complaint’s allegations while also considering attached exhibits (warning/termination letters).
  • Dean v. Nat'l Prod. Workers Union Severance Tr. Plan, 46 F.4th 535, 543 (7th Cir. 2022)
    Cited to justify considering documents referenced in the complaint and central to the claim (here, the CBA), without converting a motion to dismiss into summary judgment. This matters because § 301 preemption analysis often turns on whether the claim can be resolved without interpreting CBA provisions.

2) Removal and LMRA § 301 complete preemption

  • Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63-64 (1987)
    The court invoked the “complete preemption” doctrine: for certain areas Congress intended to be exclusively federal, a complaint styled as state-law is treated as federal in character for jurisdiction/removal purposes. The Seventh Circuit used this to reject Szmurlo’s argument that “no federal claim” appeared on the face of his complaint.
  • Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851, 852-53 (1987)
    Supplies the controlling § 301 test quoted by the panel: when resolving a state-law claim is “substantially dependent upon analysis” of a labor contract’s terms, the claim is preempted. The panel applied this framework to both defamation and IIED theories.

3) Illinois elements/standards integrated into the § 301 analysis

  • Green v. Rogers, 917 N.E.2d 450, 459 (Ill. 2009)
    Cited for the Illinois defamation element of “publication to a third party.” The panel’s key move: whether TK Elevator’s communication to the union counts as actionable “publication” cannot be assessed without determining whether the CBA required or authorized that communication—an interpretive CBA question that triggers § 301 preemption.
  • Schweihs v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 77 N.E.3d 50, 62-63 (Ill. 2016)
    Cited for the “truly extreme and outrageous” standard for IIED under Illinois law. The panel agreed with the district court that the “outrageousness” inquiry would require comparing TK Elevator’s conduct with what the CBA permitted in discipline/termination communications—again pulling the claim into § 301 territory.
  • Chapple v. Nat'l Starch & Chem. Co. & Oil, 178 F.3d 501, 508 (7th Cir. 1999)
    Cited to support the proposition that determining whether employer conduct is “extreme and outrageous” may depend on the CBA’s meaning, reinforcing § 301 preemption in the IIED context.

4) Merits dismissal: limitations and privilege

  • Ciolino v. Simon, 192 N.E.3d 579, 583 (Ill. 2021)
    Cited for the Illinois one-year statute of limitations for defamation and the rule that the limitations period runs from the time of publication. This supported dismissal of most defamation allegations as untimely on the face of the complaint and exhibits.
  • Razavi v. Sch. of the Art Inst. of Chi., 122 N.E.3d 361, 368-69 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018)
    Cited for absolute privilege protecting statements made in quasi-judicial proceedings. The panel treated TK Elevator’s statement to OSHA—made during an OSHA investigation into retaliation—as absolutely privileged, defeating the remaining timely defamation allegation.

5) Litigation control and sanctions

  • Szmurlo v. TK Elevator Corp., No. 25 C 07099, 2025 WL 2467498, at *3-4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 2025)
    The panel referenced a prior injunction barring Szmurlo from filing further discharge-related suits against these defendants—context supporting the appellate warning.
  • Support Sys. Int'l, Inc. v. Mack, 45 F.3d 185, 186 (7th Cir. 1995)
    Cited for the Seventh Circuit’s authority to impose sanctions and even bar filings for repetitive frivolous litigation, signaling that the court would escalate if needed.

B. Legal Reasoning

  1. Complete preemption supplied federal jurisdiction, defeating remand.
    Szmurlo framed his case purely as Illinois defamation and IIED. But the panel applied the complete-preemption doctrine (via Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor) and § 301’s “substantial dependence” test (via Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO v. Hechler), concluding the claims could not be resolved without interpreting the CBA.
  2. Defamation required CBA analysis because “publication” depended on whether the CBA mandated union notice.
    Illinois requires a publication to a third party (Green v. Rogers). Here, a central alleged publication was TK Elevator’s communication to the union. But whether that communication was required (or otherwise structured) by the CBA is not a purely factual question—it is a contractual interpretation question. Because the defamation theory hinged on that interpretive issue, § 301 preempted it.
  3. IIED required CBA analysis because “outrageousness” had to be evaluated against the labor-contract framework.
    Under Illinois law, IIED requires “truly extreme and outrageous” conduct (Schweihs v. Chase Home Fin., LLC). The panel accepted the district court’s view that determining outrageousness in a unionized disciplinary context calls for comparing the employer’s conduct to what the CBA allows or contemplates, consistent with Chapple v. Nat'l Starch & Chem. Co. & Oil. That comparison again makes the claim “substantially dependent” on CBA interpretation.
  4. Even aside from preemption, the complaint failed under Illinois tort doctrines apparent from the pleadings.
    The panel affirmed dismissal because many statements fell outside the one-year limitations period for defamation (Ciolino v. Simon), the OSHA-related statement was absolutely privileged (Razavi v. Sch. of the Art Inst. of Chi.), and the alleged conduct did not plausibly meet Illinois’s high IIED threshold (Schweihs).
  5. The court used an appellate sanctions warning to deter repetitive litigation.
    With the prior filing injunction as backdrop (Szmurlo v. TK Elevator Corp.), the panel warned that more frivolous, repetitive filings could trigger sanctions including filing bars, invoking Support Sys. Int'l, Inc. v. Mack.

C. Impact

Although nonprecedential, the order reinforces practical rules that frequently control removed employment-tort cases in unionized settings:

  • Jurisdictional impact: Plaintiffs cannot avoid federal court by pleading only state tort labels when the claim’s elements require a court to interpret a CBA (a classic § 301 removal pathway).
  • Substantive impact: In disputes arising from discipline and discharge under a CBA, defamation and IIED theories are especially vulnerable where the alleged “publication” or “outrageousness” is intertwined with CBA-required communications and procedures.
  • Administrative-proceeding impact: Employer responses to investigatory bodies like OSHA may enjoy robust privilege protection, substantially narrowing defamation exposure for statements made within that quasi-judicial process.
  • Litigation-management impact: The sanctions warning illustrates the Seventh Circuit’s willingness to escalate restrictions against repetitive litigants, including circuitwide filing limitations for unpaid sanctions.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • LMRA § 301 preemption: A federal rule that prevents state law from being used to decide disputes that really turn on what a union contract (CBA) means. If a judge must interpret the CBA to decide the claim, the claim is treated as federal and is often removable to federal court.
  • Complete vs. ordinary preemption: “Ordinary” preemption is a defense that usually doesn’t create federal jurisdiction. “Complete preemption” is different: it recharacterizes certain state-law claims as federal from the start, allowing removal (the concept drawn from Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor).
  • “Publication” in defamation: In Illinois, the defamatory statement must be communicated to someone other than the plaintiff. If the communication occurs because a CBA requires notice to the union, deciding whether and how that element is satisfied can require interpreting the CBA.
  • IIED “extreme and outrageous”: Illinois sets a very high bar; mere unfairness or harsh employment actions typically do not qualify. In unionized employment, assessing “outrageousness” may depend on whether the employer acted within contractual disciplinary procedures.
  • Absolute privilege / quasi-judicial proceeding: Some statements made during proceedings that resemble court processes—like certain administrative investigations— cannot support a defamation claim, even if false, because the law prioritizes candid participation in those proceedings.
  • Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal: The court may dismiss at the pleading stage if, taking the alleged facts as true, the law still provides no plausible claim (including when time limits or privileges defeat the claim on the face of the complaint).

5. Conclusion

Szmurlo v. TK Elevator Corporation illustrates how § 301 of the LMRA can convert state tort pleadings into a federal case when the claims cannot be resolved without interpreting a CBA—here, where defamation “publication” and IIED “outrageousness” were intertwined with CBA-mandated union communications and disciplinary norms. The decision also highlights two frequent, independent barriers to employment-based defamation suits: tight limitations periods and absolute privilege for statements made in quasi-judicial administrative investigations (such as OSHA proceedings). Finally, the order underscores the Seventh Circuit’s readiness to deter repetitive litigation through escalating sanctions and potential filing restrictions.