Lincoln Hearing Confidentiality: A Child’s Stated Preferences Must Not Be Disclosed in Written Custody Orders

Case: Matter of Esther J. v Christopher K., 2026 NY Slip Op 02176 (3d Dept Apr. 9, 2026)

Court: Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, New York, Third Department

1. Introduction

This custody-modification appeal arises from competing Family Court Act article 6 petitions filed by Esther J. (mother) and Christopher K. (father) concerning their child (born 2015). The parties had been operating under consent custody orders providing joint legal and joint physical custody with a rotating schedule, later adjusted by temporary order to weekly exchanges.

In June 2023, the mother sought modification to obtain primary physical custody and final decision-making authority over medical decisions and extracurricular activities; the father cross-petitioned for primary physical custody. After fact-finding and a Lincoln hearing, Family Court continued joint physical custody on the weekly schedule, continued joint legal custody, but split discrete decision-making: (i) father received sole authority over school and extracurricular activities, and (ii) mother received sole authority to schedule routine medical appointments. The father appealed.

The Third Department affirmed, holding that the record supported continuing joint physical custody despite strained communication, and issued a pointed reminder: although a court may consider a child’s Lincoln hearing statements, it must not disclose the child’s preferences in a written order because confidentiality is paramount.

2. Summary of the Opinion

  • Change in circumstances: Not disputed on appeal; the court agreed there was a communication breakdown affecting the child’s medical needs and social relationships.
  • Best interests determination affirmed: The Third Department deferred to Family Court’s credibility findings and held there was a sound and substantial basis to continue joint physical custody on a weekly exchange schedule.
  • Targeted allocation of authority upheld: Keeping joint legal custody while granting father sole authority over school/extracurricular enrollment and mother sole authority over scheduling routine medical appointments was affirmed as a practical response to the parties’ specific conflict areas.
  • Lincoln hearing confidentiality admonition: Family Court erred by referencing the child’s stated preferences from the Lincoln hearing in its written order; such considerations “must remain silent” to preserve confidentiality.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

A. Change in circumstances based on parental communication breakdown

The court relied on prior Third Department decisions recognizing that a breakdown in communication—particularly where it affects a child’s needs—can constitute the requisite change in circumstances to revisit custody:

  • Matter of Sheena PP. v Edward QQ., 238 AD3d 1417 (3d Dept 2025): cited for the proposition that communication failures impacting the child can support a change in circumstances.
  • Matter of Patricia Y. v Justin X., 219 AD3d 1586 (3d Dept 2023): similarly cited to ground the “change in circumstances” finding in communication breakdowns affecting the child.

B. Best interests framework and joint custody despite disagreements

The court anchored its best-interests analysis in established doctrine and emphasized that disagreements do not automatically render joint custody unworkable:

  • Matter of Michael YY. v Teresa ZZ., 242 AD3d 1343 (3d Dept 2025): quoted for best-interests factors, including home environments, parental capacity to meet the child’s needs, and willingness to foster the other parent’s relationship with the child.
  • Matter of Joseph L. v Heather K., 214 AD3d 1041 (3d Dept 2023): quoted for the principle that joint custody may remain appropriate where disagreements exist but the relationship is not so acrimonious as to make joint custody unworkable.
  • Matter of Michelle EE. v John EE., 235 AD3d 1121 (3d Dept 2025); Matter of Steven OO. v Amber PP., 227 AD3d 1154 (3d Dept 2024): cited in support of the same proposition that joint custody can endure despite conflict when workable in practice.

C. Appellate deference: “sound and substantial basis”

The court emphasized the deferential standard of review in custody determinations:

  • Matter of Brooke PP. v Joshua QQ., 240 AD3d 1047 (3d Dept 2025): quoted for deference to Family Court’s credibility assessments and the “sound and substantial basis” standard.
  • Matter of Henry CC. v Antoinette DD., 222 AD3d 1231 (3d Dept 2023): cited for the same appellate deference principles.

D. When conflict makes joint custody “unworkable”

  • Matter of Christie BB. v Isaiah CC., 194 AD3d 1130 (3d Dept 2021): cited to support the conclusion that, although communication had degraded enough to trigger a best-interests analysis, it was not so severe as to render joint physical custody unworkable.

E. Additional support for affirmance of continued joint custody

  • Matter of Sheena PP. v Edward QQ., 238 AD3d at 1420: cited again as support for affirmance on the record.
  • Matter of Joseph E. v Crystal G., 233 AD3d 1285 (3d Dept 2024): cited, including a note that the appellate attorney for the child aligned with father on appeal (though the court stated this was not dispositive).
  • Matter of Paluba v Paluba, 152 AD3d 887 (3d Dept 2017); Matter of Bailey v Blair, 127 AD3d 1274 (3d Dept 2015): cited for further support that the joint-custody continuation had a sound and substantial basis.

F. Lincoln hearing confidentiality—“must remain silent”

The opinion’s clearest “rule-like” guidance concerns Lincoln hearing confidentiality:

  • Matter of Jeffrey SS. v Myah TT., 243 AD3d 1156 (3d Dept 2025): cited for Family Court’s “paramount obligation” to protect a child’s confidentiality in the Lincoln hearing context.
  • Matter of C.M. v Z.N., 230 AD3d 1409 (3d Dept 2024): quoted for the principle that while the court may consider Lincoln hearing information, those considerations “must remain silent” to protect confidentiality—meaning the child’s preferences should not be revealed in the written order.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Two-step modification structure: threshold change, then best interests

The Third Department followed the conventional two-step approach in custody modification: (1) determine whether a change in circumstances exists, and if so, (2) decide what arrangement serves the child’s best interests. Here, the “change” was the parties’ communication breakdown affecting the child’s ADHD-related needs and the child’s social relationships.

B. Workability of joint custody evaluated in practice, not rhetoric

Despite both parents testifying they could not co-parent with the other and describing failures to respond on co-parenting apps and via text, the court focused on practical function:

  • The parties had complied with weekly exchanges since the temporary modification.
  • They had been able to communicate successfully about administering the child’s ADHD medication once prescribed.

This operational evidence supported the conclusion that conflict had not risen to the level that made joint physical custody “unworkable.”

C. Tailored “issue-specific” decision-making as a stability tool

Family Court’s solution—continuing joint legal custody but assigning sole decision-making authority on discrete topics—was treated as a reasoned method to reduce friction in the areas where conflict was most acute:

  • Father: sole decision-making authority for enrolling the child in school and extracurricular activities/events, addressing concerns of alleged overenrollment and related public disputes.
  • Mother: sole decision-making authority to schedule routine medical care appointments, addressing medical coordination issues.

The Third Department implicitly endorsed this structure as consistent with best interests where the record shows joint custody remains workable but discrete impasses threaten the child’s routines and the parents’ ability to function.

D. Appellate posture: deference to Family Court’s credibility and Lincoln hearing review

The court reiterated that Family Court is in the “superior position” to evaluate witnesses and make credibility determinations. After reviewing the fact-finding record and the Lincoln hearing testimony, the Third Department found a sound and substantial basis for the outcome and therefore declined to substitute its own factual judgments.

E. Confidentiality breach identified, but not outcome-dispositive

Although the order was affirmed, the Third Department issued a corrective admonition: Family Court described the Lincoln hearing as private yet “impermissibly referenced” the child’s preferences in its written order. The appellate court clarified the proper boundary: the judge may consider the information internally, but must not expose the child’s statements through written findings that could be shared with parents or others.

3.3. Impact

  • Strengthened practice rule on Lincoln hearings: The decision reinforces a clear operational mandate: courts must not reference a child’s Lincoln hearing preferences in written custody orders, even while relying on that information in reaching the result. This guidance can shape drafting practices and reduce the risk that children face retaliation, guilt, or pressure after disclosures.
  • Support for “split authority” within joint legal custody: The affirmance signals that, when communication problems are real but not fatal, Family Court may keep joint custody frameworks intact while allocating sole decision-making on targeted domains to prevent recurring conflict from harming the child.
  • Joint physical custody remains viable despite strain: The decision underscores that the question is not whether parents argue, but whether the conflict makes the arrangement unworkable in practice—particularly where parents can still execute exchanges and cooperate on core matters like medication administration.
  • Standard-of-review reminder: Litigants seeking reversal face the “sound and substantial basis” hurdle; absent a clear mismatch between findings and record evidence, custody determinations will often be affirmed.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Change in circumstances”: A required threshold showing that something significant has altered since the prior custody order—enough to justify reopening custody. Here, the change was a communication breakdown affecting the child’s needs.
  • “Best interests of the child”: The overarching standard focused on what arrangement most benefits the child’s welfare, considering factors like stability, parental fitness, meeting developmental needs, and supporting the child’s relationship with the other parent.
  • Joint physical vs. joint legal custody:
    • Physical custody concerns where the child lives and the parenting-time schedule.
    • Legal custody concerns decision-making authority (education, medical, activities, etc.).
  • Sole decision-making authority within joint legal custody: Courts may keep “joint legal custody” in name or structure but allocate final authority on specific issues to one parent to break ties and reduce conflict.
  • Lincoln hearing: A private, in-camera interview of the child by the judge (typically without parents present) to hear the child’s views in a protected setting.
  • Confidentiality—“must remain silent”: The court may consider what the child says, but should not reveal the child’s statements—especially preferences—in a written order that parents may read.
  • “Sound and substantial basis in the record”: A deferential appellate standard: if the trial court’s custody decision is supported by adequate evidence, the appellate court will not disturb it.

5. Conclusion

Matter of Esther J. v Christopher K. affirms a pragmatic custody-modification outcome: joint physical custody can remain appropriate even amid serious communication problems when the arrangement is still workable, and conflict can be reduced by assigning issue-specific final authority while preserving joint legal custody.

The opinion’s most consequential guidance is procedural and protective: a court’s “paramount obligation” to preserve Lincoln hearing confidentiality prohibits referencing the child’s expressed preferences in a written order. Going forward, the decision should influence how Family Courts both structure shared-custody governance (through targeted decision-making allocations) and draft orders that rely on Lincoln hearing information without exposing the child.