Date: Sep 15, 2026

No Implicit Seventh Amendment Jury Waiver from Participation in Rule 65(a)(2)-Style Proceedings Amid Court-Created Confusion

1. Introduction

Case: Linardon v. Walsh, No. 25-1541 (1st Cir. Sept. 11, 2026) (per curiam).
Parties: Kelechi Linardon (pro se plaintiff/appellant) sued state and transit-related defendants, including Kate Walsh and the Executive Office of Health and Human Services (EOHHS), and also the Montachusett Regional Transit Authority (MART) and MART official Jerry McDonald.
Core allegations: disability discrimination affecting access to and use of transportation services.
Relief sought: preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and compensatory damages.
Key procedural event: Linardon demanded a jury “as to all issues so triable,” but after dismissal of the EOHHS/Walsh claims, the district court conducted hearings it ultimately treated as a bench trial (seemingly under Rule 65(a)(2)), entered findings, and entered judgment against Linardon on the remaining claims.

Central issues on appeal: (i) whether dismissal of claims against EOHHS and Kate Walsh was proper under Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6); and (ii) whether the district court violated the Seventh Amendment by resolving claims for compensatory damages through jury-free proceedings without a valid waiver, particularly where the plaintiff repeatedly invoked the right to a jury and appeared confused by the court’s characterizations of the proceedings.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of claims against EOHHS and Kate Walsh, finding no reversible error under the plausibility standard applicable to Rule 12(b)(6).

The court vacated and remanded in part as to the district court’s disposition of claims against MART and Jerry McDonald to the extent the district court resolved claims seeking compensatory damages through a bench-trial-like process despite an unwithdrawn jury demand. The First Circuit held that, on this record, Linardon did not expressly or implicitly waive her jury-trial right, given repeated jury invocations and substantial confusion generated by contradictory or opaque statements about whether proceedings were limited to injunction issues or would resolve the merits of remaining claims.

The court did not disturb the denial of preliminary injunctive relief, denied reassignment to a different judge, expressed no view on the merits, and emphasized the district court may still resolve the case without a jury if appropriate (e.g., on summary judgment).

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

Douglas v. Hirshon, 63 F.4th 49 (1st Cir. 2023): The court relied on Douglas for the standard of review governing dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) and for framing the plausibility inquiry. This supported the affirmance of dismissal as to EOHHS and Walsh, separating pleading sufficiency issues from the later Seventh Amendment problem.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009): Cited through Douglas to anchor the plausibility pleading standard. The citation reinforces that the EOHHS/Walsh dismissal turned on conventional pleading doctrine rather than trial-right questions.
Full Spectrum Software, Inc. v. Forte Automation Sys., Inc., 858 F.3d 666 (1st Cir. 2017): Full Spectrum supplied the Seventh Amendment framework and, importantly, the legal/equitable distinction. The First Circuit used it to (i) restate the Jury Trial Clause’s application to “Suits at common law,” and (ii) explain why the court would not disturb denial of preliminary injunctive relief (an equitable remedy typically tried to the court). The opinion thus uses Full Spectrum to draw a clean line: equitable preliminary relief may proceed without a jury, but claims for compensatory damages implicate the Seventh Amendment.
Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974): Quoted within Full Spectrum for the proposition that the Seventh Amendment extends to statutory causes of action when the statute creates legal rights and remedies enforceable in actions for damages. This matters because Linardon pleaded a mix of statutory and common-law theories but sought compensatory damages; the opinion treats that combination as sufficient to trigger jury-trial protections.
Lamex Foods, Inc. v. Audeliz Lebron Corp., 646 F.3d 100 (1st Cir. 2011): This is the opinion’s principal procedural analogue and the core authority on waiver. The court imported Lamex’s rule that a proper jury demand “must be honored” unless (a) expressly withdrawn with consent or (b) waived by express or implicit agreement to a bench trial. The First Circuit then applied Lamex’s litigation-conduct inquiry and held there was no implicit waiver because the record was riddled with contradictory statements and “indicia of confusion.” The court expressly described the resemblance to Lamex as “strong” and used it to justify vacatur and remand.
Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935): Quoted (through Lamex) for the admonition that any “seeming curtailment” of the jury-trial right must be scrutinized with “utmost care.” The quotation functions as a presumption against casual erosion of jury rights, heightening the need for clarity before finding waiver—especially in a record like this.
Singh v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 308 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2002): Cited to clarify that preserving the jury-trial right does not guarantee a jury trial. If no triable issue exists, summary judgment “does no violence” to the Seventh Amendment. This frames remand as a procedural reset, not a merits ruling or automatic jury entitlement.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

Seventh Amendment is triggered by legal claims seeking damages. The court emphasized that Linardon sought compensatory damages on a mix of theories. Under the Seventh Amendment, claims that are legal in nature—especially claims for damages— preserve the right to a jury trial. The court treated this as the constitutional baseline once a proper jury demand is made.
A valid jury demand must be honored absent withdrawal or waiver. Linardon demanded a jury in the complaint and reiterated the demand. The First Circuit applied Lamex Foods, Inc. v. Audeliz Lebron Corp. to hold that the demand remained effective unless expressly withdrawn with consent or waived (expressly or implicitly) by conduct demonstrating agreement to a bench trial.
Rule 65(a)(2) cannot be used to bypass the jury. While the district court “seemingly proceeded under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a)(2),” the First Circuit underscored that the Rule itself requires the court to “preserve any party’s right to a jury trial.” Consolidation of preliminary injunction proceedings with a trial on the merits is therefore constrained where legal claims with damages are in play and a jury is demanded.
No implicit waiver where the record shows confusion and contradictory signals. The opinion’s key move is its refusal to infer waiver from Linardon’s continued participation. The First Circuit closely reviewed transcript exchanges where: the plaintiff asked about a jury; the court responded that “you don’t have a jury” because “all you want is an injunction”; and yet the proceedings were also presented as potentially dispositive of what “remained of the case.” Under Lamex, implied waiver depends on what the party understood the proceeding to be. Here, the First Circuit found “too many contradictory statements” and “too many indicia of confusion” to conclude Linardon knowingly agreed to a bench trial on all remaining legal issues.
Tailored remedy: partial vacatur focused on damages disposition. The court vacated and remanded “insofar as” the district court’s disposition of compensatory-damages claims against MART and McDonald was concerned, while leaving intact: (i) the Rule 12 dismissal as to EOHHS/Walsh, and (ii) the denial of preliminary injunctive relief. This tailoring reflects the legal/equitable division: equitable preliminary relief can remain bench-decided; legal damages claims require Seventh Amendment-compliant procedure unless properly resolved pretrial or validly waived.
Remand is a reset, not a command to hold a jury trial. Invoking Singh v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., the First Circuit stressed that the district court may resolve the case without any trial if the rules allow it (e.g., summary judgment). The constitutional error was not “failure to seat a jury immediately,” but rather entering merits judgment on legal claims through a bench-trial mechanism without a valid waiver.

3.3 Impact

Heightened procedural clarity when Rule 65(a)(2) is in the background. The decision signals that district courts must be explicit about whether proceedings are limited to preliminary injunctive relief or are intended to adjudicate merits of legal claims. Ambiguity can defeat any later argument of implied waiver.
Implied waiver will not be lightly found—especially with pro se litigants and mixed remedies. Without creating a special pro se rule, the opinion shows that courts will scrutinize transcript-level confusion and contradictory judicial statements when determining whether a party “understood” they were consenting to a bench trial. This makes implied waiver harder to establish when the record reflects uncertainty about scope and consequences.
Reinforces remedy-sensitive Seventh Amendment practice. By leaving the denial of preliminary injunctive relief undisturbed while vacating damages-related dispositions, the opinion reinforces a practical template: equitable preliminary rulings may proceed promptly, but adjudication of damages claims must preserve jury rights unless disposed of by motion practice or properly waived.
Guidance for litigants: preserve objections and clarify scope. Parties (and judges) are put on notice that “continuing to participate” may not equal consent if a party has demanded a jury and the court’s statements obscure whether the bench proceeding is dispositive of damages claims.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Seventh Amendment / “Suits at common law”: The constitutional right to a jury applies not just to old common-law claims from 1791, but also to modern statutory claims when the remedy is like traditional legal relief—most notably, money damages.
Legal vs. equitable relief: Legal relief typically means money damages and is usually tried to a jury if demanded. Equitable relief (like an injunction ordering someone to do or stop doing something) is typically decided by a judge.
Preliminary injunction: A fast, temporary court order intended to preserve the status quo while the case is litigated. Because it is equitable, it is usually decided by the judge.
Rule 65(a)(2) consolidation: A procedure that can combine a preliminary injunction hearing with a “trial on the merits.” But the Rule expressly requires that the court preserve the right to a jury trial.
Bench trial: A trial decided by the judge (the judge acts as factfinder), not by a jury.
Waiver of jury trial (express vs. implied): Express waiver is a clear statement giving up the jury right. Implied waiver can occur through conduct (such as proceeding to a bench trial) only if the record shows the party understood and agreed to that course. Confusion and contradictory signals can defeat implied waiver.
Rule 12(b)(6) and plausibility (Iqbal): A motion-to-dismiss standard asking whether the complaint pleads enough factual content to make the claim plausible, not merely possible.
Summary judgment: A way to resolve a case without trial when there is no genuine dispute of material fact for a jury (or judge) to decide.

5. Conclusion

Linardon v. Walsh reinforces a procedural safeguard with constitutional force: when a party properly demands a jury on claims seeking compensatory damages, a district court may not effectively adjudicate those legal claims through bench-trial proceedings—whether styled as consolidated injunction/merits hearings or otherwise—unless the record shows a valid withdrawal or waiver of the jury right. Drawing heavily on Lamex Foods, Inc. v. Audeliz Lebron Corp. and the Seventh Amendment principles articulated in Full Spectrum Software, Inc. v. Forte Automation Sys., Inc., the First Circuit held that confusion and contradictory messaging about the scope of proceedings preclude a finding of implied waiver. The result is a targeted vacatur and remand restoring the case to a posture immediately after the motion-to-dismiss stage, preserving the district court’s ability to resolve the matter through appropriate motion practice—while insisting that any eventual adjudication of damages claims respect the jury-trial right unless clearly and validly waived.