Limitations Accrue on Receipt of UM/UIM Stacking-Rejection Policy Documents; Later Litigation Disclosures Do Not Equitably Toll Absent Particularized Fraudulent Concealment

A. Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Decision)

1) Pleading standards and dismissal posture

• Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009): Supplied the baseline that courts accept well-pleaded facts, not legal conclusions, and require facial plausibility—important because Hollis’s tolling and concealment theories were framed largely as legal characterizations rather than particularized factual allegations.
• Silver v. City of Albuquerque, 134 F.4th 1130 (10th Cir. 2025): Reinforced de novo review of Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals.
• Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007): Supported the proposition that dismissal is appropriate when the complaint itself establishes a limitations bar.
• Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198 (2006), and Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091 (10th Cir. 2009): Validated the district court’s sua sponte raising of limitations and invitation for supplemental briefing.
• GFF Corp. v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 130 F.3d 1381 (10th Cir. 1997): Justified considering the 2013 policy documents under incorporation-by-reference because they were central and authentic—crucial to anchoring accrual in 2013.

2) Choice of law and state-law prediction methodology

• Allen v. Env't Restoration, LLC, 32 F.4th 1239 (10th Cir. 2022): Directed applying the forum state’s (New Mexico’s) limitations law.
• Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225 (1991): Confirmed de novo review of state-law determinations.
• Wade v. EMASCO Ins. Co., 483 F.3d 657 (10th Cir. 2007): Framed how the Tenth Circuit consults intermediate state appellate decisions and federal district court interpretations when direct state supreme court authority is absent.
• Taylor v. Phelan, 9 F.3d 882 (10th Cir. 1993): Animated the court’s caution against expanding state law without clear guidance—used to reject Hollis’s proposed tolling rule effectively delaying accrual until legal understanding crystallizes.

3) New Mexico accrual and discovery rule

• Roberts v. Sw. Cmty. Health Servs., 837 P.2d 442 (N.M. 1992): Provided the New Mexico discovery-rule formulation—accrual when the plaintiff discovers or with reasonable diligence should discover that a claim exists.
• Snow v. Warren Power & Mach., Inc., 354 P.3d 1285 (N.M. 2015): Explained the policy balance of limitations (plaintiff’s time to sue vs. defendant’s repose), and was also cited in the equitable-tolling discussion.
• Gerke v. Romero, 237 P.3d 111 (N.M. Ct. App. 2010): Confirmed that lack of knowledge of the full extent of injury does not toll accrual.
• Coslett v. Third St. Grocery, 876 P.2d 656 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994), quoting Allen v. State, 826 P.2d 200 (Wash. 1992): Supplied the opinion’s central limiting principle: discovery rule is “factual, not legal”; accrual is not postponed until the plaintiff consults an attorney.
• Maestas v. Zager, 152 P.3d 141 (N.M. 2007): Reinforced the same “facts-not-law” accrual approach.

4) Equitable tolling standards

• Ocana v. Am. Furniture Co., 91 P.3d 58 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004): Defined equitable tolling in New Mexico as relief when extraordinary events beyond the plaintiff’s control prevent timely filing; also characterized tolling as suspending the limitations period.
• Credit Suisse Sec. (USA), LLC v. Simmonds, 566 U.S. 221 (2012): Provided the two-part diligence/extraordinary-circumstances test the panel applied to Hollis’s “learned it in later litigation” theory.

5) Fraudulent concealment doctrine

• Roberts v. Barreras, 484 F.3d 1236 (10th Cir. 2007): Recognized fraudulent concealment as an “extraordinary event” that can toll limitations when the defendant’s conduct causes the plaintiff to refrain from timely filing.
• Cont'l Potash, Inc. v. Freeport- McMoran, Inc., 858 P.2d 66 (N.M. 1993): Supplied the controlling three elements (fraudulent means; successful concealment; inability to discover with reasonable diligence) and the requirement to plead the circumstances with particularity; also warned that bald allegations are insufficient.
• Anderson Living Trust v. WPX Energy Prod., LLC, 27 F. Supp. 3d 1188 (D.N.M. 2014): Offered additional discussion of the doctrine’s contours, supporting the panel’s structured element-by-element evaluation.

6) Waiver and procedural limitations on appellate argument

• Burke v. Regalado, 935 F.3d 960 (10th Cir. 2019): Supported waiver of undeveloped or unraised arguments, including the continuing wrong theory not properly pursued on appeal.
• Servants of the Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005 (10th Cir. 2000): Supported the rejection of raising new arguments/authorities via a motion to alter or amend when they could have been presented earlier.

7) Insurance-law merits cases invoked by Hollis (but deemed inapposite to limitations)

• Montano v. Allstate Ins. Indem. Co., 92 P.3d 1255 (N.M. 2004): Cited by Hollis for written rejection of stacking and disclosure, but not used by the panel to alter accrual/tolling.
• Crutcher v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 501 P.3d 433 (N.M. 2022), and Smith v. Interinsurance Exch. of Auto. Club, 563 P.3d 868 (N.M. 2024): Relied on by Hollis to argue “illusory coverage without disclosure” principles should toll limitations; the panel responded that none addressed limitations and rejected a tolling rule based on later legal recognition of deficiencies.
• Progressive Nw. Ins. Co. v. Weed Warrior, 245 P.3d 1209 (N.M. 2010), and Romero v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 803 P.2d 243 (N.M. 1990): Similarly invoked by Hollis, but the panel found no limitations guidance in them.
• Hawley v. Farm Bureau Prop. & Cas. Co., 840 F. App'x 354 (10th Cir. 2021): Noted as related background, but not central to the accrual/tolling holding.
• Morro v. Farmer's Ins. Grp., 748 P.2d 512 (N.M. 1988): Provided a definition of “stacking.”
• Gaston v. Hartzell, 549 P.2d 632 (N.M. Ct. App. 1976): Cited by Hollis for New Mexico-law application principles, but did not change the analysis.

8) Limitations-dismissal effect

• Rodriguez v. Colorado, 521 F. App'x 670 (10th Cir. 2013), citing Gocolay v. N.M. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 968 F.2d 1017 (10th Cir. 1992): Clarified that a limitations dismissal, though styled “without prejudice,” is effectively with prejudice.

9) Statutory reference

• N.M. Stat. Ann. 66-5-301(C) (2025): Supported the conclusion that New Mexico does not require a new stacking rejection at each renewal; the 2013 rejection could remain operative.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The pleadings and incorporated documents fixed the factual timeline. The court treated the 2013 UM/UIM selection/rejection form and declarations structure as central. Under GFF Corp. v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., those documents could be considered at the motion-to-dismiss stage, enabling the court to determine accrual without discovery.
2. Accrual turned on factual notice, not later legal insight. Using Roberts v. Sw. Cmty. Health Servs., Coslett v. Third St. Grocery, and Maestas v. Zager, the panel held that limitations begin when the insured knows or should know the relevant facts (receipt of policy documents showing stacking rejection and UM/UIM coverages), not when counsel later identifies a potentially “illusory coverage” theory.
3. Equitable tolling required “extraordinary circumstances” preventing diligent filing. Under Snow v. Warren Power & Mach., Inc., Ocana v. Am. Furniture Co., and Credit Suisse Sec. (USA), LLC v. Simmonds, Hollis’s reliance on later depositions failed because:
   • 2022 information was, at most, “certain details” about pricing mechanics, not a barrier to pursuing claims based on 2013 documents;
   • 2024 depositions and rulings occurred after the lawsuit was filed and therefore could not have prevented filing;
   • Hollis did not amend to plead these facts as tolling events, reinforcing the mismatch between the complaint’s allegations and the tolling theory.
4. Fraudulent concealment demanded particularized facts for each element. Applying Cont'l Potash, Inc. v. Freeport- McMoran, Inc., the court found Hollis did not plead:
   • Fraudulent means beyond the asserted inadequacy/ambiguity of forms;
   • Successful concealment given that the forms expressly said “stacking rejected” and explained stacking, while declarations listed UM and UIM coverages and limits;
   • Inability to discover with reasonable diligence, because the factual basis was available from the 2013 documents.
   The court emphasized Cont'l Potash’s admonition that “[b]ald allegations of concealment are not sufficient.”
5. The panel rejected an insurance-specific tolling exception. Hollis’s attempt to leverage Crutcher v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. and Smith v. Interinsurance Exch. of Auto. Club into a tolling rule was declined: those cases addressed substantive insurance duties and retroactivity, not limitations. The panel also refused to “postpone accrual” until an attorney confirms a viable legal claim, quoting Coslett v. Third St. Grocery.
6. Procedural discipline constrained the appellate presentation. New theories raised on appeal after the district court invited supplemental limitations briefing were not entertained, and authorities deployed belatedly via a motion to alter or amend were discounted under Servants of the Paraclete v. Does.

C. Impact

• Earlier accrual in premium/stacking disputes: For New Mexico insureds challenging UM/UIM premium structures or stacking rejections, the decision signals that accrual likely begins when policy documents and rejection forms are received—especially where those documents disclose the core facts (rejection language, coverages, limits).
• Limits on “we learned it in discovery elsewhere” tolling: The opinion is skeptical that later litigation revelations about insurer pricing, actuarial methods, or internal practices qualify as “extraordinary circumstances” for equitable tolling when the claim can be framed from the face of the insured’s own policy materials.
• Higher bar for fraudulent concealment pleadings: Plaintiffs must plead with particularity what was done to conceal, why it worked, and why reasonable diligence could not uncover the claim; characterizing coverage as “illusory” is not enough.
• Nonprecedential but persuasive: While labeled nonbinding, the reasoning is likely to be cited in future Tenth Circuit and District of New Mexico briefing as persuasive authority on accrual/tolling in insurance class actions.
• Practical consequence for class claims: Class actions premised on longstanding premium practices may face early dismissal if named plaintiffs’ documents show the alleged defect existed—and was knowable—years earlier.