Date: Jul 18, 2026

Life-Threatening Medical Risk as “Extraordinary Circumstances” Warranting Mapp Bail for ICE Detainees Pending Habeas Appeal

1. Introduction

In Fulton v. Mullin (2d Cir. July 13, 2026), the Second Circuit granted immigration detainee Raheem Delano Fulton release on bail pending appeal of the dismissal of his habeas petition. Fulton, detained by ICE and subject to a final order of removal, suffers from End Stage Renal Disease requiring frequent dialysis and alleges that the government’s failure to provide adequate medical-discharge planning places him at grave risk.

The core issue on this motion was not the ultimate legality of his removal or the merits of his medical-planning claims, but whether Fulton satisfied the Second Circuit’s stringent standard (derived from Mapp v. Reno, 241 F.3d 221 (2d Cir. 2001)) for bail pending a habeas appeal: (1) substantial claims, and (2) extraordinary circumstances making bail necessary to render the habeas remedy effective.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The court (per curiam) granted bail pending appeal, holding that Fulton met both prongs of the Mapp v. Reno test:

Substantial claims: A prior panel’s stay order had already found Fulton made “a strong showing” of likely success regarding improper dismissal of his medical-discharge-planning request.
Extraordinary circumstances: The government did not dispute that inadequate medical care could result in Fulton’s “near certain death.” The court also emphasized record evidence of a prior life-threatening incident after a missed dialysis appointment and ICE’s refusal to facilitate a transplant evaluation process.

The panel directed the parties to confer about conditions of release and return to the merits panel if they could not agree.

Judge Menashi dissented, arguing that (i) Fulton prolonged his detention by litigating removal, (ii) Fulton receives dialysis in custody and Jamaica has provided assurances, (iii) “extraordinary circumstances” were not shown, and (iv) the underlying habeas theory may be improper because Fulton seeks affirmative planning/injunctive relief rather than release.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

Mapp v. Reno, 241 F.3d 221 (2d Cir. 2001) (controlling standard)

The majority applied Mapp v. Reno as the governing framework for bail in habeas-related immigration detention matters. Mapp requires (1) “substantial claims” and (2) “extraordinary circumstances” making bail “necessary to make the habeas remedy effective.”

The dissent also relied on Mapp but emphasized its “difficult” and “limited” nature, framing the majority’s decision as diluting guardrails.

Vacchio v. Ashcroft, 404 F.3d 663 (2d Cir. 2005) (extraordinary circumstances and risk assessment)

The majority cited Vacchio v. Ashcroft to support the proposition that extraordinary circumstances can justify bail where there is acute risk of deterioration and where the government does not suggest “risk to the community” or “flight risk.” Vacchio is used here less as a rigid checklist and more as reinforcement that equitable bail determinations consider practical risk and the purpose of interim relief.

Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 591 U.S. 1 (2020) (jurisdiction and § 1252(g))

The majority quoted Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. for its rejection of an expansive reading of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) as covering “all claims arising from deportation proceedings.” This matters because Fulton’s substantial claim includes that the district court improperly dismissed his request for medical-discharge planning—i.e., the court signaled that jurisdictional bars should not be reflexively extended to foreclose such claims.

Black v. Almodovar, 156 F.4th 171 (2d Cir. 2025) (the “keys in his pocket” refrain)

The dissent invoked Black v. Almodovar (Menashi, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) to argue Fulton “has the keys in his pocket” because he can end detention by ceasing litigation and accepting removal. The majority rejected that framing as inapt on Fulton’s record—emphasizing that removal without adequate dialysis planning would be effectively fatal and that Fulton cannot secure post-removal care arrangements while detained.

DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103 (2020) (habeas scope and “release in the cabin of a plane”)

The dissent quoted DHS v. Thuraissigiam to argue that the government is willing to “release” Fulton, but only onto a flight to Jamaica, and further used Thuraissigiam (later in the dissent) to challenge whether Fulton’s claim fits habeas at all. This sets up a central fault line: whether Fulton’s underlying petition is truly habeas (detention/release) or impermissible injunctive/mandamus-like control of removal logistics and foreign medical care.

Doherty v. Thornburgh, 943 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1991) and INS v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. 444 (1985) (delay attributable to petitioner)

The dissent relied on Doherty v. Thornburgh (quoting INS v. Rios-Pineda) to argue that a detainee cannot prolong proceedings through litigation and then claim unconstitutional prolongation. These cases function as an anti-gamesmanship principle in removal and detention contexts.

The majority did not directly contest Doherty’s general proposition; instead it distinguished Fulton on the practical reality that the “keys” concept breaks down where the alternative is potentially lethal due to medical-care discontinuity—recasting the delay as inseparable from preserving life and the meaningfulness of judicial review.

Grune v. Coughlin, 913 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1990) and Baker v. Sard, 420 F.2d 1342 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (heightened/exceptional standard)

The dissent invoked Grune v. Coughlin (as quoted by Mapp) and referenced Baker v. Sard to underscore that bail in habeas is exceptional and demands a heightened showing—supporting the dissent’s view that the majority moved too quickly from serious illness to “extraordinary circumstances” without a tight necessity analysis.

Other cited authorities (illustrating broader doctrinal tensions)

Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009) (cited in dissent via the prior stay order) — demonstrates that Fulton already obtained some interim protection (a stay), raising the dissent’s argument that bail is not “necessary” to make the remedy effective.
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (cited in dissent as part of Fulton’s arguments) — frames limits on post-removal-order detention where removal is not reasonably foreseeable; dissent stresses removability is foreseeable absent Fulton’s litigation.
Avendaño Hernandez v. Decker, 450 F. Supp. 3d 443 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) and United States v. Lopez (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2023) (cited by dissent) — used to distinguish cases where custody conditions or medical neglect justify release, versus Fulton’s asserted adequacy of dialysis in custody.
Margolin v. Nat’l Ass’n of Immigr. Judges, 146 S. Ct. 1285 (2026), United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371 (2020), and United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229 (1992) (cited by dissent) — deployed to criticize the majority for allegedly departing from “party presentation” by supplying arguments not made by Fulton.
Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674 (2008), Miguel v. McCarl, 291 U.S. 442 (1934), Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005), Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), and Thuraissigiam again (cited by dissent) — marshaled to argue Fulton’s requested relief is not “core habeas” (release) but coercive planning/injunction affecting transfer/removal, potentially placing the petition outside habeas.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(a) Substantial claims

The majority’s “substantial claims” analysis was anchored to a prior panel’s stay of removal, which had already stated Fulton made a “strong showing” of likely success. The majority also cited Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. to counter broad jurisdiction-stripping arguments (implicitly, to keep medical-discharge-planning claims within judicial cognizance).

(b) Extraordinary circumstances and necessity

The majority’s decisive move was to treat Fulton’s medical peril as an “extraordinary circumstance” that makes bail necessary to ensure habeas review remains meaningful. Two record-based points were emphasized:

Fulton’s dependency on uninterrupted dialysis and prior near-fatal event after a missed treatment while in ICE custody.
A transplant evaluation referral and ICE’s refusal to facilitate transplant pursuit—framed as materially worsening his long-term prognosis and ability to access optimal treatment while detained.

The majority also rejected the dissent’s “keys in pocket” argument as unrealistic on this record, because deportation without a workable dialysis plan is portrayed as a life-ending choice rather than a genuine avenue to liberty.

(c) The dissent’s competing necessity theory

Judge Menashi’s dissent reframed “necessity” more narrowly: because Fulton currently receives dialysis in custody and already obtained a stay of removal, bail is not necessary to make any eventual relief effective. The dissent further argued that Fulton’s detention duration is self-inflicted (litigation delay), invoking Doherty v. Thornburgh and INS v. Rios-Pineda, and that the majority improperly supplied new factual/legal arguments (party-presentation critique).

3.3. Impact

This decision’s practical and doctrinal significance lies in how it operationalizes “extraordinary circumstances” under Mapp v. Reno in a medically urgent immigration-detention setting:

Medical jeopardy can independently satisfy “extraordinary circumstances” even where the government asserts ongoing treatment, if the record supports that custody conditions create an acute risk (e.g., missed dialysis incident) or foreclose clinically superior options (e.g., transplant pathway).
The “keys in pocket” concept is not absolute: the majority signals skepticism where the “choice” to accept removal plausibly entails catastrophic medical consequences or where the detainee cannot meaningfully arrange continuity of care.
Incentives and delay doctrine: the dissent warns that granting bail where detention is extended by petitioner-initiated litigation may encourage strategic delay; the majority implicitly counters that life-threatening medical contexts justify different weighting.
Future litigation posture: parties are likely to litigate (i) what level of medical risk and documentation is required, (ii) how “necessity to make the habeas remedy effective” is proven when a stay is already in place, and (iii) whether the underlying claim is properly “habeas” under DHS v. Thuraissigiam and Munaf v. Geren.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Habeas corpus: A lawsuit used to challenge unlawful detention. Traditionally, the main remedy is release from custody.
Bail pending habeas appeal (the Mapp standard): Temporary release while an appeal is pending. Under Mapp v. Reno, it requires both substantial legal claims and extraordinary circumstances making release necessary so the court’s eventual decision is not rendered meaningless in practice.
Extraordinary circumstances: An exceptional situation beyond ordinary hardship of detention—here, the majority treated a near-certain risk of death from disrupted life-sustaining care (and related medical barriers) as extraordinary.
“Keys in his pocket”: A metaphor used in prolonged-detention cases: a detainee can end detention by accepting removal. The majority rejected its usefulness where “accepting removal” may be tantamount to accepting fatal medical discontinuity.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(g): A jurisdictional provision sometimes invoked to limit court review of certain removal-related decisions. The majority cited Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. to resist overly broad readings that would bar all claims “arising from deportation proceedings.”
Medical discharge planning: Planning for continuity of medical treatment when a person leaves custody—here, planning for dialysis continuity and related care in connection with deportation to Jamaica.

5. Conclusion

Fulton v. Mullin strengthens the practical reach of Mapp v. Reno by treating a documented, life-threatening medical scenario as an “extraordinary circumstance” justifying bail pending a habeas appeal—particularly where the record suggests that continued detention threatens the meaningfulness of judicial review.

The dissent highlights enduring counterpressures: courts’ reluctance to reward litigation-driven delay, concerns about expanding habeas beyond its traditional release-focused core, and a stricter view that a stay of removal plus adequate in-custody treatment undercuts “necessity.” The resulting split frames the next battleground in this area: how to define “necessity” and “extraordinary circumstances” when the asserted harm is not only detention itself, but the medical consequences that detention (and removal logistics) may entail.