Date: Apr 16, 2026

License-Withdrawal Denials Are Not UAPA-Appealable “Contested Cases” Absent a Statutory Hearing Right (and Declaratory-Ruling Theories Can Be Waived)

I. Introduction

In Clearview Electric, Inc. v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (Conn. Apr. 14, 2026), the Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed the dismissal of an administrative appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiff, Clearview Electric, Inc. (an electric supplier), sought judicial review of PURA’s denial—“without prejudice”—of its motion to withdraw its electric supplier license.

The dispute arose after PURA issued a separate final decision in a billing-redesign docket allocating redesign costs among licensed suppliers and ordering Clearview to pay an assessment of approximately $179,000. Clearview then moved in its licensing docket to withdraw its license, asserting it had no outstanding obligations. PURA denied withdrawal until the assessment was paid.

The key jurisdictional issues were whether PURA’s withdrawal denial was (1) a final decision in a contested case appealable under General Statutes § 4-183 (a), or (2) an appealable declaratory ruling under § 4-176 (h).

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Court held that Clearview waived its appellate claim that PURA issued a declaratory ruling, because Clearview had pleaded and argued the opposite in the trial court (invited-error/waiver principles).
The Court held that PURA’s denial of the motion to withdraw the license was not a final decision in a contested case, because no statute or regulation required PURA to determine Clearview’s withdrawal request after an opportunity for a hearing.
The Court rejected attempts to bootstrap contested-case status from: (a) the fact the motion was filed in a licensing docket; (b) hearing provisions tied to civil penalties, suspensions, or revocations; or (c) the characterization of a cost assessment as a “penalty.”

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Issue preservation, waiver, and invited error

Blumberg Associates Worldwide, Inc. v. Brown & Brown of Connecticut, Inc.: Reinforced that appellate courts generally do not consider claims not raised and decided below except in “most exceptional circumstances.” The Court used this to frame why Clearview could not pivot on appeal to a new declaratory-ruling theory.
Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of America v. Netherlands Ins. Co.: Supplied the policy rationale against “trial by ambuscade.” The Court applied this fairness principle to reject a newly minted appellate position.
Konigsberg v. Board of Aldermen and Reardon v. Windswept Farm, LLC: Supported the proposition that a party may not pursue one course at trial and then, on appeal, seek the benefit of a path it rejected.
Independent Party of CT—State Central v. Merrill: Provided the doctrinal vocabulary (“induced error,” “invited error,” “waiver”) and the practical result: the claim becomes unreviewable. The Court treated Clearview’s trial-level assertion—“PURA did not issue a declaratory ruling”—as foreclosing the opposite claim on appeal.
Benjamin v. Corasaniti: Cited to reject arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief, underscoring disciplined appellate practice in administrative cases as well.

2. Contested case doctrine and statutory-hearing requirement

High Watch Recovery Center, Inc. v. Dept. of Public Health: Reaffirmed that administrative appeals exist only by statute and that delineating contested-case categories is a legislative policy choice. The Court relied on it to emphasize that courts cannot expand appealability beyond the UAPA’s statutory design.
Middlebury v. Dept. of Environmental Protection: Central to the Court’s reasoning. It supplied two key rules: (i) a gratuitous hearing does not create a contested case where no hearing is statutorily required; and (ii) even if an agency policy contemplates a hearing, contested-case status depends on a legislative (statutory/regulatory) mandate to determine legal rights after an opportunity for hearing.
Summit Hydropower Partnership v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection: Supported the structural point that the legislature—not agencies and not docket-management choices—decides which proceedings receive the “full panoply” of contested-case protections and judicial review.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Declaratory ruling: waiver by contrary trial position

Clearview attempted on appeal to characterize PURA’s withdrawal denial as a declaratory ruling under § 4-176 (h) (which is appealable as a final decision). The Court did not reach the merits because Clearview had alleged and argued in the trial court that PURA did not issue a declaratory ruling and instead sought a declaratory judgment theory premised on that non-issuance. Under Practice Book § 60-5 and invited-error/waiver doctrine, Clearview could not reverse course on appeal.

2. Contested case: no statutory hearing right for voluntary license withdrawal

The Court applied the UAPA definitions: a “final decision” is “the agency determination in a contested case” (§ 4-166 (5) (A)), and a “contested case” requires that legal rights “are required by state statute or regulation to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for hearing” (§ 4-166 (4)). The dispositive question was therefore not whether the dispute was important, nor whether a hearing might be helpful, but whether a statute or regulation required a hearing on Clearview’s motion to withdraw its license.

3. Why the statutes invoked by Clearview did not create contested-case status

General Statutes § 16-245 (f) (hearings on license applications): The Court accepted that this provision can require a hearing on an application upon request, but held its text does not extend to a later request to withdraw the license. The Court also rejected the notion that merely filing the motion in the same docket number as the original licensing application transforms the matter into a contested case.
General Statutes §§ 16-41 and 16-245 (k) (civil penalties; suspension/revocation after contested-case hearing): Those hearing rights attach when PURA imposes civil penalties (including suspension or revocation) for statutory violations. Clearview argued that its settlement agreement effectively required license withdrawal and thus functioned like a revocation. The Court read the settlement as requiring only withdrawal from the market (ceasing to serve customers) for six years, not withdrawal of the license. Because the proceeding was not a § 16-245 (k) revocation/suspension penalty proceeding, the contested-case hearing mandate in those penalty statutes did not apply.
Cost assessment vs. penalty: The Court distinguished PURA’s cost allocation (imposed pursuant to §§ 16-244i (c) and 16-245d (b)) from a § 16-41 civil penalty. Clearview’s obligation to pay the assessment originated in the separate allocation decision; the denial of withdrawal did not newly “penalize” Clearview, it simply insisted on compliance with an existing cost-allocation order. A later notice of violation for nonpayment could trigger § 16-41 hearing rights, but that would be a different proceeding from the license-withdrawal request.

C. Impact

Clear line between “licensing” and “contested case”: Even if an issue is processed within a licensing docket, the right to UAPA judicial review hinges on whether a statute/regulation requires an opportunity for hearing for that specific agency determination.
Limits on strategic docketing and relabeling: Parties cannot manufacture appealability by filing a request under a docket associated with hearings (e.g., a licensing application docket). Agencies likewise cannot unintentionally expand contested-case categories by administrative labeling.
Compliance obligations can survive settlement-based market exits: A voluntary withdrawal from serving customers (market participation) does not necessarily equate to license revocation, and does not automatically invoke penalty-hearing procedures tied to revocation/suspension.
Assessment enforcement will proceed through penalty channels: If nonpayment becomes a violation, § 16-41 supplies process (notice and hearing) for penalties; that procedural protection does not retroactively convert the underlying cost allocation or a withdrawal denial into a contested case.
Appellate discipline in administrative law: The decision underscores that litigants must choose and preserve their jurisdictional theory early—especially between § 4-176 declaratory-ruling review and § 4-183 contested-case review—and cannot take inconsistent positions across trial and appeal.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

“Contested case” (UAPA § 4-166 (4)): A proceeding is a contested case only if some statute or regulation requires the agency to decide a party’s legal rights/duties/privileges after giving an opportunity for a hearing (or if a hearing is in fact held, but only where the statute/regulation requires the determination to be made after an opportunity for hearing). Not every agency dispute qualifies.
“Final decision” (UAPA § 4-166 (5) (A)): For purposes of § 4-183 appeals, a final decision is the agency’s determination in a contested case. If there is no contested case, there is no § 4-183 appeal.
Declaratory ruling (§ 4-176 (h)): A formal agency ruling that has the same binding effect as an order in a contested case and is appealable under § 4-183. But whether something is a declaratory ruling matters procedurally, and litigants must preserve the theory consistently.
Subject matter jurisdiction: The court’s authority to hear the case. In administrative appeals, jurisdiction is strictly statutory; if the agency action is not appealable by statute, the court must dismiss.
Civil penalty vs. cost allocation: A cost allocation assigns costs under utility statutes; a civil penalty punishes a violation and triggers specific notice-and-hearing protections under § 16-41. Confusing the two can lead to incorrect assumptions about hearing rights and appealability.
Waiver / invited error: If a party affirmatively takes a position in the trial court (e.g., “there was no declaratory ruling”), it generally cannot claim the opposite on appeal.

V. Conclusion

Clearview Electric, Inc. v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority tightens two important administrative-law boundaries. First, a denial of a motion to withdraw an electric supplier license is not appealable under § 4-183 (a) unless a statute or regulation specifically requires an opportunity for a hearing on that withdrawal determination—docket labels and licensing context are not enough. Second, litigants cannot preserve jurisdiction by contradiction: a declaratory-ruling appeal theory is unavailable where the party previously pleaded and argued that no declaratory ruling was issued.

The decision reinforces a legislature-centered model of administrative procedure: contested-case protections and appellate review attach only when the legislature has clearly required them, and parties must carefully align their procedural posture with the statutory path they invoke.