Leaving-the-Scene (Death/SBI) Remains Strict Liability; Prior Habitual-Criminal Scheme Upheld with Harmless-Error Review

I. Introduction

In Brown, Jason v. People, 2026 CO 51 (June 23, 2026), the Colorado Supreme Court addressed two recurring and high-stakes issues: (1) whether Colorado’s leaving-the-scene felonies—leaving the scene of an accident resulting in death (“LTS (death)”) and leaving the scene of an accident resulting in serious bodily injury (“LTS (SBI)”) under section 42-4-1601—require proof of a culpable mental state; and (2) whether Colorado’s prior habitual-criminal sentencing scheme (sections 18-1.3-801 to -804, C.R.S. (2017)) is unconstitutional because it contemplated judicial factfinding that increases punishment.

The petitioner, Jason P. Brown, was convicted after a 2017 incident in which he drove into an alley and ran over two people sleeping under a white blanket. One victim survived with serious injuries; the other died. Witnesses confronted Brown immediately; he denied running anyone over and drove away. Brown was later located at home and appeared intoxicated. The trial court instructed the jury on LTS (death) and LTS (SBI) without any mens rea element, and later adjudicated Brown a habitual offender without submitting habitual-criminal fact questions to the jury. He received an aggregate sentence of sixty years.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Court affirmed the court of appeals and held:

  1. People v. Manzo, 144 P.3d 551 (Colo. 2006) “remains good law,” so LTS (death) and LTS (SBI) are strict-liability offenses and do not require proof that the defendant acted “knowingly” (or with any culpable mental state).
  2. The prior habitual-criminal scheme is not facially unconstitutional under People v. Gregg, 2025 CO 57, 576 P.3d 725. Even if the trial court erred by not having a jury decide fact issues relevant to habitual-criminal counts, the error was nonstructural and harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given overwhelming proof of Brown’s prior convictions and their separateness.

III. Analysis

A. Standards of Review Driving the Outcome

  • Jury instructions are reviewed de novo for whether they correctly state the governing law: Roberts v. People, 2017 CO 76.
  • Constitutionality of statutes (facial and as-applied) is reviewed de novo: Dean v. People, 2016 CO 14.
  • Preserved constitutional errors are reviewed for constitutional harmless error, requiring reversal unless harmless beyond a reasonable doubt: Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63.

B. Leaving-the-Scene Felonies: Reaffirming Strict Liability Under People v. Manzo

1. Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Holding)

  • People v. Manzo, 144 P.3d 551 (Colo. 2006): The controlling Colorado precedent holding that LTS offenses under section 42-4-1601 are strict liability. The Court treated Manzo as binding and found no adequate basis to overrule it.
  • Rehaif v. United States, 588 U.S. 225 (2019): Brown argued Rehaif undermined Manzo by reinforcing a presumption that mens rea applies to statutory elements. The Court rejected the argument, characterizing Rehaif as addressing how an expressly included “knowingly” term applies in a federal statute—rather than whether to imply a mens rea into a statute silent on mental state—and treated Rehaif’s discussion of public-welfare offenses as non-controlling in this context.
  • Love v. Klosky, 2018 CO 20: Provided the Court’s stare decisis framework: departure from precedent requires conviction that (1) the rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound and (2) more good than harm would come from departing.
  • Griego v. People, 19 P.3d 1 (Colo. 2001) and People v. Swain, 959 P.2d 426 (Colo. 1998): Supported the Court’s inference that legislative amendments to section 42-4-1601, without adding mens rea, indicate legislative acceptance/ratification of Manzo’s construction.
  • Authorities invoked to reject a “partial mens rea” approach: section 18-1-503(4), People v. Coleby, 34 P.3d 422 (Colo. 2001), and People v. Trevino, 826 P.2d 399 (Colo. App. 1991). These were used to emphasize that when mens rea applies, it typically applies to all elements unless the statute clearly indicates otherwise—undercutting Brown’s fallback position that knowledge might attach only to the “accident” element.
  • Out-of-state cases cited (but not adopted) to show other jurisdictions sometimes require knowledge of involvement in an accident: State v. Al-Naseer, 734 N.W.2d 679 (Minn. 2007) and Clancy v. State, 313 P.3d 226 (Nev. 2013). The Court acknowledged them but held Colorado’s statutory text and legislative intent controlled.

2. Legal Reasoning

The Court’s LTS analysis rests on three pillars:

  1. Stare decisis and statutory silence: Section 42-4-1601 does not include an express culpable mental state for LTS (death) or LTS (SBI). Under Manzo, that silence means the offenses are strict liability. Applying Love v. Klosky, the Court saw no “sound reasons” to depart from that settled construction.
  2. Rehaif does not compel implying mens rea: The Court distinguished Rehaif as a case interpreting how an explicit “knowingly” requirement applies across elements in a federal statute, not a case requiring courts to read mens rea into statutes that omit it entirely. It also treated Rehaif’s discussion of public-welfare/minor penalties as non-dispositive here.
  3. Legislative amendments as ratification and policy coherence: The Court emphasized that after Manzo, the General Assembly amended section 42-4-1601 multiple times and increased penalties (including elevating LTS (death) to a class 3 felony and LTS (SBI) to a class 4 felony) without adding a mens rea requirement. Citing Griego v. People and People v. Swain, the Court presumed the legislature acted with awareness of Manzo and accepted it. The Court also relied heavily on legislative history indicating a policy goal of removing incentives for intoxicated drivers to flee the scene to avoid more severe DUI-related charges.

The Court therefore held that the trial court did not err in giving LTS elemental instructions that omitted any culpable mental state and did not violate due process by allowing conviction without proof of “knowingly.”

3. Impact

  • Charging and proof in Colorado LTS cases: Prosecutors need not prove that a defendant knew they were involved in an accident for LTS (death) or LTS (SBI) convictions; the focus remains on involvement in an accident with the prohibited result and failure to perform statutory duties.
  • Limits on Rehaif-based challenges in state strict-liability contexts: The opinion signals that Rehaif will not readily be used to unsettle Colorado strict-liability interpretations where the state statute lacks an express mens rea and there is Colorado precedent plus legislative inaction/amendment history.
  • Increased pressure for legislative—not judicial—revision: The Court explicitly stated that concerns about inequity are for the General Assembly, inviting reform efforts to shift from litigation strategy to statutory amendment.
  • Notable internal fault line: Justice Samour’s concurrence (in part) sharply criticized Manzo, warned of morally blameless defendants, and argued modern U.S. Supreme Court mens rea jurisprudence points away from strict liability. Although not controlling, this concurrence may become a roadmap for future challenges and legislative testimony.

C. Habitual-Criminal Sentencing: Constitutionality Under People v. Gregg and Harmless-Error Review

1. Precedents Cited (and Their Role)

  • People v. Gregg, 2025 CO 57, 576 P.3d 725: The cornerstone precedent rejecting a facial constitutional challenge to a substantively identical habitual-criminal scheme. The Court applied Gregg to hold the statute is not facially unconstitutional because it can be implemented in a manner that allows jury findings on “separate and distinct criminal episodes,” followed by judicial sufficiency review.
  • People v. Crabtree, 2024 CO 40M, 550 P.3d 656: Controlled the remedy framework: omission of an element (or failure to submit a sentencing factor) to the jury is nonstructural error, reviewed for harmlessness when preserved.
  • Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212 (2006) and Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999): Federal authority supporting that failure to submit an element/sentencing factor to the jury is not structural error and is subject to harmless-error analysis.
  • Bartley v. People, 817 P.2d 1029 (Colo. 1991): Supplied the Colorado articulation that constitutional error is harmless where properly admitted evidence is “so overwhelming” that the violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
  • Brown v. People, 238 P.2d 847 (Colo. 1951), section 18-1.3-802, and CRE 901(b)(8): Supported authenticity and admissibility of records proving prior convictions through triple-certified (or dual-certified) court files.

2. Legal Reasoning

The Court’s habitual-criminal analysis proceeds in two steps:

  1. Facial constitutionality: Applying People v. Gregg, the Court held the prior scheme was not facially unconstitutional because it did not “explicitly prohibit” jury determinations on certain predicate factual issues (notably whether convictions were from “separate and distinct criminal episodes”), even though it directed judges to determine whether the defendant “has been previously convicted as alleged.”
  2. Assuming error, harmless beyond a reasonable doubt: Under People v. Crabtree and Hagos v. People, any preserved error in failing to submit the habitual-criminal factfinding to the jury is nonstructural and is reviewed for harmlessness. The Court held any error harmless because the People presented overwhelming documentary proof of multiple prior felony convictions from different jurisdictions with different plea/conviction/sentencing dates, demonstrating separate episodes, and strong identity evidence (certified records, consistent identifiers, fingerprints, photos).

3. Impact

  • Appellate posture of habitual-criminal jury-trial claims: Even where a defendant was sentenced under the prior scheme without jury findings, relief will often turn on harmless error—placing heavy weight on the strength of documentary proof of identity and separateness.
  • Document authentication is outcome-determinative: The Court’s reliance on triple-certified/dual-certified records, section 18-1.3-802’s prima facie evidentiary rule, and CRE 901(b)(8) underscores that habitual-criminal litigation will be won or lost on record integrity and linkage to the defendant.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Mens rea / culpable mental state
The mental element of a crime (e.g., “knowingly”). Brown argued the prosecution should have to prove he was aware of his involvement in the accident; the Court held no such mental element is required for LTS (death/SBI).
Strict liability offense
A crime requiring proof of the prohibited act (and often a result), but not a culpable mental state. Under this decision, LTS (death) and LTS (SBI) remain strict liability in Colorado.
Stare decisis
The principle that courts follow prior precedent. The Court applied Love v. Klosky and declined to overrule People v. Manzo.
Facial unconstitutionality
A claim that a statute is unconstitutional in all its applications. The Court rejected a facial challenge to the prior habitual-criminal scheme under People v. Gregg.
Structural vs. nonstructural error
Structural errors require automatic reversal; nonstructural errors can be affirmed if harmless. Under People v. Crabtree, failing to submit an element/sentencing factor to the jury is nonstructural and reviewed for harmlessness.
Harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
The People must show there is no reasonable possibility the error contributed to the outcome (Hagos v. People). Here, the Court held overwhelming evidence made any habitual-criminal jury-trial error harmless.
Triple-certified records
Court records accompanied by layered certifications and seals to establish authenticity. The Court relied on such records (and on Brown v. People (1951), section 18-1.3-802, and CRE 901(b)(8)) to uphold proof of prior convictions.

V. Conclusion

2026 CO 51 solidifies two consequential Colorado rules. First, it reaffirms People v. Manzo: leaving-the-scene felonies for death or serious bodily injury under section 42-4-1601 remain strict liability crimes, and Rehaif v. United States does not compel reading a “knowingly” requirement into the statute. Second, relying on People v. Gregg and People v. Crabtree, the Court holds the prior habitual-criminal scheme is not facially unconstitutional and that any jury-trial deprivation in habitual adjudication can be affirmed under harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt review where the documentary proof is overwhelming.

The decision’s practical message is clear: challenges to LTS convictions in Colorado cannot succeed by recasting these offenses as mens rea crimes absent legislative change, while challenges to habitual-criminal adjudications under the prior scheme will frequently rise or fall on the harmless-error record—especially the completeness, certification, and linkage of prior-conviction documentation.