Leath v. Collins: Title VII Hostile Work Environment Requires But-For Race/Sex Evidence Beyond Workplace Friction; Constructive Discharge Demands Record-Supported Intolerability

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Date: January 28, 2026
Disposition: Affirmed summary judgment for the Department of Veterans Affairs (not recommended for publication)

Introduction

In Dena Leath v. Douglas A. Collins, Secretary of the United States Department of Veterans Affairs, Dena Leath—a Black woman and experienced law-enforcement veteran—challenged her workplace experience at the VA Police Services unit in Ann Arbor, Michigan. After approximately three years marked by interpersonal conflict with several coworkers, Leath resigned and sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging a hostile work environment, race and gender discrimination, and constructive discharge.

The central issues on appeal were whether the record could support (1) a Title VII hostile-work-environment claim—particularly whether the alleged conduct was because of race or sex and sufficiently “severe or pervasive,” and whether the VA responded reasonably—and (2) a Title VII discrimination claim premised on constructive discharge as the adverse employment action.

Context: The record included three factfinding investigations that consistently found “tension and division” in the unit but did not substantiate actionable harassment; the VA also issued targeted managerial responses (e.g., instruction to use titles; counseling statements after a mailbox incident).

Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the VA on all claims. For hostile work environment, the court held Leath failed to produce evidence that the alleged harassment occurred because of her race or sex, and independently failed to show conduct sufficiently “severe or pervasive.” The court further held the VA’s responses—including multiple investigations and remedial measures—were reasonable as a matter of law.

For discrimination, the court analyzed constructive discharge as the asserted adverse employment action and held Leath failed to provide record-supported facts showing conditions were so intolerable that a reasonable person would have felt compelled to resign. The court also held Leath forfeited any appellate argument that constructive discharge is a freestanding cause of action by failing to develop it.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Summary judgment standards and evidentiary rigor

  • Smith v. P.A.M. Transp., Inc., 154 F.4th 375 (6th Cir. 2025): Provided the de novo standard of review for summary judgment.
  • Alexander v. CareSource, 576 F.3d 551 (6th Cir. 2009): Reinforced that “conclusory statements unadorned with supporting facts” cannot create a genuine dispute.
  • Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 517 F.3d 321 (6th Cir. 2008) and Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986): Supplied the core “sufficient disagreement” vs. “one-sided” evidentiary framing; the court used these to reject disputes resting on subjective interpretation without record support.
  • Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007): Cited for the boundary of “reasonable inferences”; unsupported inferences do not defeat summary judgment.

2) Hostile work environment framework and “because of” causation

  • Waldo v. Consumers Energy Co., 726 F.3d 802 (6th Cir. 2013): Supplied the Sixth Circuit’s five-element hostile-work-environment test and the employer-liability standard for coworker harassment (reasonable response, not indifference).
  • Eng. v. Gen. Dynamics Info. Tech. Co., 536 F. App'x 537 (6th Cir. 2013): Used to emphasize that failure on any one required element defeats the claim, permitting the court to affirm based on a single dispositive deficiency.
  • Williams v. CSX Transp. Co., 643 F.3d 502 (6th Cir. 2011): Provided the “based on” requirement articulated as a but-for inquiry and explained the use of direct or comparative evidence to prove discriminatory harassment.
  • Strickland v. City of Detroit, 995 F.3d 495 (6th Cir. 2021): Supported the proposition that facially neutral language can, in context, carry racial meaning (e.g., “boy”), but also underscored that context matters—an idea the court applied to discount “purse” and “nappy” as used here.
  • Schlosser v. VRHabilis, LLC, 113 F.4th 674 (6th Cir. 2024): Reiterated Title VII is not a “general civility code,” and described acceptable methods of proving sex-based hostility (general hostility toward women or comparative evidence).
  • Viet v. Le, 951 F.3d 818 (6th Cir. 2020): Reinforced that a plaintiff’s belief of discriminatory motivation must be supported by specific facts; generalized testimony is insufficient.

3) “Severe or pervasive” benchmarking

  • Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993): Anchored the “abusive working environment” standard.
  • Clay v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 501 F.3d 695 (6th Cir. 2007): Provided a frequency comparator—fifteen incidents over two years held not pervasive—used to characterize Leath’s alleged fourteen incidents over three years as “relatively infrequent.”
  • Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., 13 F.4th 493 (6th Cir. 2021): Served as a contrast case where constant, daily harassment (including explicit sexual demands infused with racial references) met the standard for frequency and severity.
  • Khalaf v. Ford Motor Co., 973 F.3d 469 (6th Cir. 2020): Supported the line between interpersonal conflict/mere disrespect and actionable harassment.
  • Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553 (6th Cir. 1999): Addressed the “cumulative effect” principle; the court used it to rebut the argument that the district court improperly disaggregated incidents.

4) Employer response to coworker harassment

  • Doe v. City of Detroit, Michigan, 3 F.4th 294 (6th Cir. 2021): Cited for the general proposition that prompt investigation is often a sufficient response, and for collecting relevant authority.

5) Discrimination and constructive discharge within McDonnell Douglas

  • McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973): Provided the three-step burden-shifting framework for circumstantial-evidence discrimination claims.
  • Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981): Clarified burdens of production and persuasion within the McDonnell Douglas structure.
  • Chen v. Dow Chem. Co., 580 F.3d 394 (6th Cir. 2009): Cited for the plaintiff’s obligation at step three to show the employer’s reason is fabricated to conceal illegal motive (though the panel resolved the case at the prima facie stage).
  • Thompson v. Fresh Prods., LLC, 985 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2021): Provided the panel’s articulation of the prima facie elements for discrimination, including the “replaced by a person outside the protected class” formulation used here.
  • Logan v. Denny's, Inc., 259 F.3d 558 (6th Cir. 2001): Recognized constructive discharge as an adverse employment action and included a subjective-intent formulation the panel flagged as potentially in tension with later Supreme Court law.
  • Green v. Brennan, 578 U.S. 547 (2016): Supplied the operative constructive-discharge standard applied: whether working conditions were so intolerable that a reasonable person would feel compelled to resign; the panel also noted Green’s statement that proof of employer intent to force quitting is not required.
  • Tchankpa v. Ascena Retail Grp., Inc., 951 F.3d 805 (6th Cir. 2020): Cited to acknowledge an unresolved doctrinal question: the Sixth Circuit’s continued use of Logan’s subjective-intent requirement “arguably conflicts” with Green.
  • McDaniel v. Wilkie, No. 19-3304, 2020 WL 1066007 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2020): Used by the district court (and discussed by the panel) as implicitly treating constructive discharge as a claim that can fail when premised on an unproven hostile work environment.

6) Appellate forfeiture

  • Buetenmiller v. Macomb Cnty. Jail, 53 F.4th 939 (6th Cir. 2022): Supported the holding that perfunctory or undeveloped arguments are forfeited on appeal—applied to Leath’s failure to develop a freestanding constructive-discharge theory.

Legal Reasoning

A) Hostile Work Environment: “Because of” race/sex as a gatekeeping element

The panel treated the “based on” element (Waldo’s third factor) as dispositive: Title VII targets discrimination because of protected traits, not general workplace conflict. Applying Williams v. CSX Transp. Co. and Schlosser v. VRHabilis, LLC, the court required evidence that the challenged conduct would not have occurred but for race or sex.

On this record, the court found:

  • Many incidents reflected friction tied to “external hire” resentment or personality conflict—motives not protected by Title VII.
  • Isolated disparate treatment (e.g., omission of title in a report) did not, without additional circumstantial evidence, support a but-for inference of sex discrimination.
  • The “purse” allegation and the “nappy” comment were contextualized as non-discriminatory in these circumstances; the court used Strickland v. City of Detroit to show that context can create connotation, but also to justify rejecting connotation where context points away from discriminatory meaning.
  • Subjective perceptions (feeling ostracized, male “demeanor,” “eye rolls,” “budd[ying] up”) lacked “specific facts” as required by Viet v. Le and could not defeat summary judgment under Alexander v. CareSource.

B) Hostile Work Environment: Severity/pervasiveness measured against circuit comparators

Even assuming protected-class causation, the court held the conduct was not “severe or pervasive” under Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc. The panel explicitly benchmarked frequency and severity against circuit precedent:

  • Frequency: approximately fourteen incidents over three years were “relatively infrequent,” aligning with Clay v. United Parcel Serv., Inc. (fifteen incidents over two years not pervasive) and contrasting with Schlosser and Johnson v. Ford Motor Co. (daily harassment).
  • Severity: the conduct resembled “simple teasing” or “mere disrespect,” echoing Johnson and Khalaf v. Ford Motor Co., and fell far short of the explicit sexual/racial degradation in Johnson.

Responding to Leath’s “cumulative effect” argument, the panel relied on Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp. to recognize aggregation as a concept, but concluded the district court did not improperly “disaggregate” the evidence; rather, it permissibly used analogies to define Title VII’s “relatively high bar.”

C) Employer liability: the VA’s investigations and remedial steps were reasonable

For coworker harassment, Waldo v. Consumers Energy Co. requires proof the employer responded with indifference or unreasonableness. Here, the VA conducted multiple factfinding inquiries and took targeted steps (e.g., directive to use titles; counseling after the mailbox incident). Citing Doe v. City of Detroit, Michigan, the panel treated prompt investigations as strong evidence of reasonableness and held Leath could not meet the employer-knowledge/response element.

D) Discrimination: constructive discharge failed as the adverse-action predicate

The panel addressed Leath’s discrimination claim through the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green framework, but resolved the case at the prima facie stage because Leath could not establish an “adverse employment decision.” She relied on constructive discharge to satisfy that element, invoking Logan v. Denny's, Inc. and, most importantly, Green v. Brennan.

Applying Green, the court required record-supported evidence that conditions were so intolerable a reasonable person would feel compelled to resign. The panel rejected Leath’s request to infer a campaign to force her departure because:

  • She did not cite particular record materials showing intolerable discrimination as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).
  • The proposed inference was not “reasonable” within the meaning of Scott v. Harris.

The court also highlighted (without deciding) a continuing doctrinal tension flagged in Tchankpa v. Ascena Retail Grp., Inc.: the Sixth Circuit has sometimes required a showing of employer subjective intent to force resignation (Logan), which “arguably conflicts” with Green. The panel declined to resolve that question because the government did not press it on appeal and Leath did not brief it.

E) Constructive discharge as a freestanding claim: forfeiture on appeal

The district court rejected a standalone constructive discharge theory and alternatively reasoned that if constructive discharge depended on a hostile work environment, it failed along with that claim, citing McDaniel v. Wilkie. On appeal, Leath did not meaningfully challenge this legal framing; the panel held the issue forfeited under Buetenmiller v. Macomb Cnty. Jail.

Impact

Although unpublished and “not recommended for publication,” the opinion is practically instructive in several ways:

  • Reinforces a stringent “because of” evidentiary requirement: Plaintiffs must connect hostility to race/sex with concrete direct or comparative evidence, not generalized perceptions of exclusion or unfairness.
  • Confirms that “external hire” resentment and interpersonal conflict often fall outside Title VII: The panel treated non-protected motivations (outsider status, personality conflicts, chain-of-command disputes) as insufficient even when the workplace is undeniably tense.
  • Shows the protective value of documented investigations for employers: Multiple factfinding investigations and discrete corrective actions were central to defeating the employer-liability element under Waldo.
  • Elevates the importance of Rule 56 record citations: The court’s refusal to draw inferences absent pinpoint record support underscores that summary judgment is won or lost on admissible evidence, not narrative plausibility.
  • Signals (without resolving) the post-Green constructive-discharge debate: By citing Tchankpa and juxtaposing Logan with Green, the panel highlights an unresolved doctrinal seam that future litigants may tee up when properly preserved and briefed.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Hostile work environment (Title VII): Not just a rude or stressful workplace. The plaintiff must show unwelcome harassment because of a protected trait (race/sex, etc.) that is so “severe or pervasive” it changes the conditions of employment.
  • “Because of” / but-for causation: The court asks whether the conduct would have happened but for the plaintiff’s protected status. If the same conflict would likely have occurred for non-protected reasons (e.g., personality clash, “external hire” resentment), Title VII is not satisfied.
  • Severe or pervasive: A frequency-and-gravity threshold. Sporadic slights over years typically do not qualify; daily, explicit, degrading conduct may.
  • Employer liability for coworker harassment: Employers are generally liable only if they knew or should have known and responded unreasonably. Prompt investigations and corrective steps often defeat this element.
  • Constructive discharge: A resignation treated like a firing only if working conditions became so intolerable that a reasonable person would feel forced to quit.
  • McDonnell Douglas burden shifting: A common method for proving discrimination with circumstantial evidence: (1) plaintiff makes a basic prima facie showing; (2) employer gives a legitimate reason; (3) plaintiff proves that reason is pretext for discrimination.
  • Forfeiture on appeal: If a party does not develop an argument in its appellate brief, the court may treat it as abandoned and refuse to decide it.

Conclusion

Leath v. Collins underscores that Title VII is not a remedy for persistent workplace friction unless the plaintiff can tie the mistreatment to protected characteristics with concrete evidence and meet the high “severe or pervasive” threshold. The decision also demonstrates the evidentiary demands of constructive discharge: resignation alone, even after multiple conflicts and investigations, is not enough without record-supported proof of objectively intolerable discriminatory conditions. Finally, the opinion highlights the continuing, unresolved tension in Sixth Circuit doctrine over whether constructive discharge requires employer subjective intent after Green v. Brennan—a question left for a future case where it is preserved and fully briefed.