Later Scientific Evidence Alone Does Not Establish Fraud Justifying Reopening a Class Settlement

Case: In re: E. Palestine Train Derailment, No. 26-3499
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Decided: November 10, 2026
Opinion: Judge Thapar, joined by Judges Readler and Hermandorfer; recommended for publication.

1. Introduction

This decision addresses when scientific uncertainty and alleged nondisclosure justify reopening an approved class-action settlement. Following the East Palestine train derailment and resulting chemical releases, residents obtained a $600 million settlement from Norfolk Southern. Some class members also accepted additional compensation in exchange for releasing their individual personal-injury claims. Subsequently, 196 residents who signed those releases sought relief from the judgment approving the settlement.

The movants alleged that class counsel understated long-term health risks, concealed unfavorable scientific information, and failed to disclose other significant facts. They also accused Norfolk Southern of manipulating environmental testing and settlement arrangements. The district court denied relief without an evidentiary hearing, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed.

The opinion’s central distinction is between uncertainty about the underlying science and evidence of fraud in obtaining judicial approval. Later evidence supporting a more pessimistic scientific assessment does not, standing alone, establish that counsel or an opposing party previously deceived the court or settlement participants.

2. Background and Summary of the Decision

The settlement and earlier proceedings

The derailment generated litigation involving nearly half a million class members. Despite extensive environmental testing, millions of produced documents, and numerous experts, the parties could not conclusively determine the exposure’s long-term consequences.

The settlement offered three relevant forms of compensation:

  • Direct payments available to class members who submitted claims;
  • Optional additional payments in exchange for releasing individual personal-injury claims; and
  • Individualized consideration of claims involving extraordinary loss or injury.

The district court approved the settlement after a fairness hearing. An earlier appeal challenged, among other matters, class counsel’s treatment of expert evidence about long-term exposure risks. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting both the objectors’ failure to pay their appeal bond and the unlikelihood that their substantive objections would succeed.

The present challenge

The 196 movants sought postjudgment relief through three routes: fraud on the court under the authority preserved by Rule 60(d)(3), opposing-party fraud or misconduct under Rule 60(b)(3), and extraordinary relief under Rule 60(b)(6). They also argued that the district court should have conducted an evidentiary hearing.

The court rejected every ground. It found no qualifying misrepresentation, no established duty requiring the disputed disclosures, no extraordinary circumstances, and no evidentiary showing requiring a hearing. The settlement-approval judgment therefore remained undisturbed.

Importantly, the court did not decide that the chemicals were harmless or that one scientific position was ultimately correct. It decided whether the asserted misconduct justified setting aside a final judgment.

3. Analysis: Governing Legal Standards

Final judgments carry substantial reliance interests. Accordingly, the opinion applies stringent limits to Rule 60 relief, requires clear and convincing evidence of the relevant prerequisites, and reviews the denial of relief for abuse of discretion.

Ground for relief Relevant requirements Application here
Fraud on the court An officer of the court must direct intentionally false, willfully blind, or reckless conduct toward the judicial machinery; the conduct must involve a misrepresentation or duty-breaching omission and deceive the court. The allegations against class counsel failed to establish these elements.
Rule 60(b)(3) An opposing party must commit qualifying fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct. The fraud theories presented required a material misrepresentation or concealment despite a duty to disclose, inducing detrimental action. The allegations against Norfolk Southern established neither actionable deception nor the required causal connection.
Rule 60(b)(6) Relief requires exceptional or extraordinary circumstances. Repackaging the same unsuccessful allegations did not establish extraordinary circumstances.

Two procedural qualifications

First, the court did not hold that Rule 60(d)(3) independently authorizes a motion. It recognized that the provision is a saving clause preserving avenues for addressing fraud on the court. Because the parties presented their arguments under that label without disputing the procedural vehicle, the court addressed those arguments without resolving the limits of alternative methods of obtaining relief.

Second, the court did not conclusively decide whether class counsel can qualify as an “opposing party” under Rule 60(b)(3). The district court held that counsel could not, and the movants did not appeal that determination. The Sixth Circuit therefore assumed that conclusion for this appeal.

4. Analysis: The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. The Carson video did not establish fraud on the court

Class counsel showed class members a video in which Dr. Carson estimated relatively low long-term health risks. Counsel introduced him as “completely independent” and later told the court that counsel had not retained him.

The latter statement was undisputedly accurate: counsel had neither retained nor paid Carson. The broader independence description was made to class members, rather than directed to the court. Moreover, viewers could see that counsel had arranged the presentation, so the description did not conceal that involvement.

A subsequently discovered email showed that RebuttalPR supplied counsel with an edited version of the video. But editing, without evidence of deceptive alteration or concealed authorship, did not establish fraud. The record did not show that counsel or the public-relations firm fabricated Carson’s views and presented them under his name.

The court also rejected the contention that counsel had to disclose the firm’s involvement. Rule 23(g)(4) imposes fiduciary obligations to class members, but that obligation did not itself establish the asserted disclosure duty to the court. Nor did counsel’s professional-conduct obligations require disclosure of these background facts in the circumstances presented.

B. Class counsel’s fiduciary obligations are substantial but not unlimited

The court distinguished information material to informed settlement decisions from ordinary litigation-management choices. Counsel must fairly and adequately represent the class, and important settlement terms can require disclosure. But counsel need not report every operational decision, such as selecting a public-relations firm, unless withholding that information would mislead class members.

This distinction prevents the decision from becoming a general exemption from transparency. Its reasoning depends on the finding that the undisclosed public-relations involvement was not misleading. A materially deceptive omission would present a different question.

The Ohio professional-conduct rules likewise did not establish the claimed duty. As applied here, the provisions addressing false statements, false evidence, and undisclosed legal authority did not require disclosure of the firm’s background involvement. Rules concerning disclosure necessary to prevent client crime or fraud were also inapplicable: no one alleged that counsel withheld the information to facilitate wrongdoing by the class members.

C. The Petty evidence reflected a scientific dispute, not concealed judicial information

Stephen Petty, an expert retained by class counsel, believed the long-term risks could substantially exceed Carson’s estimates. He questioned EPA testing methods and favored measurements by third-party tester Scott Smith.

Petty’s opinions nevertheless reached the district court through a third-party declaration. Consequently, counsel could not have deceived the court by keeping those opinions entirely hidden. Counsel’s description of Petty as one voice among numerous experts was also literally true.

The movants additionally complained that underlying data had not been disclosed. Petty had declined to provide those data because of a protective order. Although the movants argued that counsel should have sought modification, objectors had already requested such relief unsuccessfully. Failure to make an apparently doomed motion did not demonstrate fraudulent concealment.

D. Ambiguous statements did not satisfy the heightened evidentiary burden

Counsel stated at the fairness hearing, “We didn’t rely on EPA data.” The movants argued that this was false because Dr. Schuhmann used EPA background measurements. However, Schuhmann independently measured post-derailment conditions and used EPA information for comparison with background levels.

Read with counsel’s immediately following explanation about independent testing, the statement could refer specifically to post-derailment measurements rather than every component of the analysis. The court did not declare the wording exemplary or conclusively accurate. It held that the contextual ambiguity defeated clear and convincing proof of intentional or reckless falsity.

E. Later scientific findings did not establish earlier fraud

The movants offered internal government correspondence expressing serious toxicity concerns, additional soil testing, and a later academic study. These materials could bear on the scientific assessment of the derailment. They did not, without more, show that counsel had lied when seeking settlement approval.

The opinion’s central insight is that settling litigation does not settle science. The parties knowingly compromised while scientific uncertainty remained. Residents exchanged the possibility of a more precise future assessment for earlier compensation and reduced litigation burdens.

The relevant postjudgment question was therefore not which expert ultimately proved correct. It was whether qualifying deception produced the judgment. Later discoveries might matter if they demonstrated earlier fraud, but merely strengthening one side of an existing scientific debate did not supply that connection.

F. An individual diagnosis was consistent with the settlement’s design

Before the fairness hearing, Austin Druckenbrod submitted an extraordinary-injury claim reporting a diagnosis of Reactive Airways Dysfunction Syndrome attributed to the derailment. Counsel knew of the claim but did not separately disclose it to the court.

The court found no inconsistency between this diagnosis and counsel’s representations. Counsel had not claimed that the derailment caused no injuries. Instead, counsel expressly described the settlement’s mechanism for enhanced consideration of extraordinary injuries. Druckenbrod’s claim illustrated that mechanism rather than contradicting it.

Without a false statement or an identified duty requiring separate disclosure of this diagnosis to the court, the omission did not establish fraud on the court.

G. The allegations against Norfolk Southern lacked deception, duty, or causation

Testing representations. The allegedly misleading statements identified by the movants appeared in Norfolk Southern’s briefing opposing the Rule 60 motion. Because those statements postdated the settlement, they could not have induced the movants to accept it.

Changes to the EPA testing list. The movants also challenged Norfolk Southern’s request to remove five chemicals from a testing list. They identified no duty prohibiting the request or requiring its disclosure to them. Moreover, the EPA explained that the removed chemicals had not appeared on its original list of potentially concerning chemicals. The record therefore supported administrative reconciliation, not the alleged cover-up.

Settlement timing. Reaching agreement six days before the expert-designation deadline, while discovery remained open, did not establish misconduct. Avoiding further expense, delay, and uncertainty is an ordinary purpose of settlement. The possibility that forthcoming expert reports might favor the class did not make an earlier compromise fraudulent.

H. Confidential termination thresholds did not constitute actionable concealment

The settlement allowed Norfolk Southern to terminate the agreement if opt-outs reached specified thresholds. The public agreement disclosed that this arrangement existed but placed the numerical thresholds in a confidential Supplemental Termination Agreement, which class counsel reviewed and executed.

The court emphasized both the disclosed existence of the confidential terms and the absence of an identified duty requiring Norfolk Southern to reveal the thresholds directly to every class member. Such confidentiality also serves a recognized purpose: preventing outsiders from calculating exactly how many opt-outs would disrupt a settlement.

The holding is therefore narrower than a general authorization to hide material settlement terms. It concerns disclosed confidentiality surrounding termination thresholds, known to class counsel, under circumstances in which the asserted disclosure duty was not established.

I. Neither a different Rule 60 label nor an evidentiary hearing changed the result

The Rule 60(b)(6) arguments relied on the same evidence and alleged fiduciary breaches. Although that provision does not require misconduct directed at the court, it requires extraordinary circumstances. The unsuccessful allegations did not become extraordinary merely by changing their procedural label.

The district court also acted within its discretion in declining an evidentiary hearing. The movants had not made an evidentiary showing of fraud, and the court did not need to resolve contested scientific facts against them. Even assuming a continuing scientific disagreement, that disagreement did not establish the alleged fraud. Extensive briefing, the earlier fairness hearing, and documentary submissions provided an adequate basis for decision.

5. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Finality, burdens, and the procedural vehicle

  • King v. United States, 143 F.4th 705 (6th Cir. 2025), supplies the opinion’s finality framework: Rule 60 relief faces stringent limits, and denial is reviewed for abuse of discretion. This directs appellate review toward whether the district court permissibly rejected reopening, rather than whether the appellate judges would negotiate the same settlement.

  • West v. United States, 187 F.4th 441 (6th Cir. 2026), supplies the clear-and-convincing evidentiary burden. That burden is especially important to the treatment of ambiguous statements and circumstantial allegations that did not reliably establish deception.

  • Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc. v. Burton Tr. for Vista-Pro Auto., LLC, 607 U.S. 155 (2026), explains that Rule 60(d)(3) preserves methods of relief outside a Rule 60(b) motion rather than necessarily creating an independent motion procedure. The panel followed its caution by declining to resolve procedural distinctions the parties had not presented.

  • Tyler v. Anderson, 749 F.3d 499 (6th Cir. 2014), and Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005), support the prohibition on using Rule 60 to relitigate a judgment’s merits. They explain why renewed objections to expert selection and scientific assessment required proof of an independent postjudgment ground, not merely disagreement with settlement approval.

  • In re E. Palestine Train Derailment, 158 F.4th 704 (6th Cir. 2025), provides the immediate litigation history. Its recognition of conflicting scientific evidence and an already extensive record undermined the suggestion that additional declarations necessarily would have made the settlement improper. The current opinion carefully treats the new appeal as a challenge to denial of reopening, not another direct fairness appeal.

Fraud on the court and disclosure obligations

  • Carter v. Anderson, 585 F.3d 1007 (6th Cir. 2009), supplies the five-part fraud-on-the-court test. Its requirements of court-directed conduct, culpable falsity, an actionable representation or omission, and actual judicial deception structure nearly every rejection of the allegations against class counsel.

  • Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944), provides the principal contrast. There, a lawyer secretly authored an apparently independent expert article and used it before the Patent Office and a court. Here, evidence that a public-relations firm edited a video did not show fabricated authorship, deceptive editing, or comparable manipulation of apparent expert independence.

  • Bowles v. Sabree, 121 F.4th 539 (6th Cir. 2024), establishes class counsel’s fiduciary status. The court acknowledged that responsibility while distinguishing a duty owed to class members from the particular court-directed disclosure duty required by the movants’ fraud theory.

  • In re Dry Max Pampers Litig., 724 F.3d 713 (6th Cir. 2013), requires careful scrutiny of counsel’s fidelity to the class and rejects preferential treatment of named plaintiffs or lawyers. It confirms that finality does not displace judicial supervision of class representation, although no comparable breach was established here.

  • Vassalle v. Midland Funding LLC, 708 F.3d 747 (6th Cir. 2013), illustrates that fiduciary responsibilities can require disclosure of important settlement information. The panel used it to distinguish meaningful settlement disclosures from nonmisleading omissions about routine litigation management.

Opposing-party fraud and settlement practices

  • Giasson Aerospace Sci., Inc. v. RCO Eng'g Inc., 872 F.3d 336 (6th Cir. 2017), supplies the materiality, disclosure-duty, and detrimental-inducement requirements applied to Norfolk Southern. Its causation component defeats reliance on statements made only after the movants had already accepted the settlement.

  • Latshaw v. Trainer Wortham & Co., 452 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2006), supported the district court’s conclusion that class counsel was not an opposing party under Rule 60(b)(3). Because that ruling was not challenged on appeal, the Sixth Circuit assumed its correctness without independently adopting a categorical rule.

  • Info-Hold, Inc. v. Sound Merch., Inc., 538 F.3d 448 (6th Cir. 2008), appears in the movants’ argument that withholding the termination thresholds concealed a material fact despite a duty to disclose. The argument failed because the existence of confidential terms was disclosed and the asserted duty to reveal their details was not established.

  • In re HealthSouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 334 F. App'x 248 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam), explains that opt-out termination thresholds are commonly confidential to prevent strategic disruption. The panel used that practical explanation to support its rejection of the claim that confidentiality itself demonstrated misconduct.

  • Ohio Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 188 F.4th 900 (2026) (Thapar, J., concurring), supports the policy discussion of settlement’s benefits. Because the cited reasoning comes from a concurrence, its role is explanatory and persuasive, rather than supplying the controlling fraud standard.

Extraordinary relief and evidentiary hearings

  • McCurry ex rel. Turner v. Adventist Health Sys./Sunbelt, Inc., 298 F.3d 586 (6th Cir. 2002), limits Rule 60(b)(6) to exceptional or extraordinary circumstances. It prevents that provision from becoming a general escape route when the more specific fraud arguments fail.

  • Hemwall v. Douglas, 183 F.4th 469 (6th Cir. 2026), supports abuse-of-discretion review of the denial of an evidentiary hearing. The absence of a rule automatically requiring such hearings leaves district courts substantial procedural discretion.

  • Jones v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 617 F.3d 843 (6th Cir. 2010), permits courts to require an evidentiary showing of fraud before reopening discovery or recalling parties and witnesses. It supports refusing a hearing sought without an adequate preliminary foundation.

  • Gonzalez v. Galvin, 151 F.3d 526 (6th Cir. 1998), recognizes that competing expert opinions can be evaluated reliably on a paper record. That principle was particularly persuasive because the district court already had extensive submissions and a prior fairness hearing.

The court also relied on nonjudicial sources. Newberg & Rubenstein on Class Actions corroborated the established practice of confidential termination provisions, while Charlotte S. Alexander and coauthors’ No Adjudication supported the observation that settlement commonly occurs before summary judgment or trial. These authorities supplied context, not substitutes for the governing Rule 60 requirements.

6. Potential Impact and Limits

Environmental and latent-injury settlements

The decision strengthens finality where parties knowingly settle before science can establish long-term risks conclusively. Otherwise, every later study could become a renewed challenge to approval. Its practical importance is greatest in disputes involving evolving exposure evidence and injuries that may emerge only after substantial delay.

That protection is not immunity for fraud. Newly discovered evidence could still matter if it establishes an earlier material falsehood, actionable concealment, or deception of the court. The missing link here was proof connecting later scientific information to qualifying misconduct during settlement approval.

Class counsel’s communications

The opinion distinguishes fiduciary disclosure obligations from a requirement to disclose every litigation decision. Nevertheless, descriptions of expert independence and scientific methodology remain consequential. The result depended on the absence of deceptive editing, the disclosure of contrary expert views to the court, and the inability to prove intentional or reckless falsity.

Confidential settlement arrangements

The decision supports maintaining confidential opt-out thresholds when their existence is disclosed and class counsel knows the terms. It should not be read as approving undisclosed substantive obligations generally or dispensing with judicial scrutiny of settlement fairness.

Postjudgment procedure

Future movants must identify the alleged wrongdoer, the relevant recipient of deception, the precise falsehood or disclosure duty, and any required causal connection. A request for a hearing cannot substitute for an evidentiary foundation.

The broader tension is between protecting absent class members and preserving an effective compromise. The court resolves that tension here through demanding, element-specific scrutiny of fraud allegations—not by treating either scientific uncertainty or settlement finality as categorically decisive.

7. Complex Concepts Simplified

Rule 60 relief
A limited means of obtaining relief from an existing judgment, not an ordinary opportunity to argue the case again.
Fraud on the court
Serious deception affecting the judicial process itself. It requires more than a party’s dissatisfaction with information received outside court.
Clear and convincing evidence
Highly persuasive proof, stronger than merely showing that an allegation is more likely true than not.
Duty to disclose
A legal obligation to reveal information. Silence is not automatically fraud; the asserted obligation must be identified and shown to apply.
Fiduciary duty
An obligation to act loyally and adequately for another’s interests. Class counsel owes such responsibilities to the class.
Abuse of discretion
A review standard giving the district court a permissible range of choices, rather than allowing reversal simply because appellate judges might choose differently.
Opt-out termination threshold
A contractual participation limit allowing a defendant to abandon the settlement if too many class members choose exclusion.

8. Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed because the movants established neither actionable fraud nor extraordinary circumstances warranting reopening, and the district court reasonably declined another hearing. The opinion’s significance lies in separating evolving scientific knowledge from proof of misconduct: a settlement may resolve litigation amid uncertainty without guaranteeing that later science will confirm the assumptions underlying the compromise.