Late “Certification” as Sham Affidavit: Fabrication-of-Evidence and Malicious-Prosecution Claims Fail Absent Persuasive Proof and Probable Cause

1. Introduction

Case: Aakash Dalal v. John Molinelli, No. 24-2649 (3d Cir. Mar. 2, 2026) (not precedential).
Parties: Aakash Dalal (plaintiff/appellant) sued federal and New Jersey state investigators/prosecutors and Bergen County (defendants/appellees).
Background: The civil case arises from Dalal’s prosecution for a 2011–2012 spree of anti-Semitic attacks on synagogues and a Jewish community center in Bergen County, New Jersey (described in State v. Dalal). While Dalal was jailed pretrial, an immigrant detainee (Whendel Stewart) claimed Dalal discussed bombing federal buildings and seeking a firearm to harm officials, including Assistant Prosecutor Martin Delaney. Those allegations led to new state charges (terroristic threats and conspiracy counts), additional bail, and a search of Dalal’s cell that yielded writings referencing violence against “the state,” lists of “enemies,” and repeated references to Delaney.

Key issues on appeal: (i) whether Dalal produced sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on a Fourteenth Amendment fabrication-of-evidence theory; (ii) whether his malicious-prosecution claims failed for lack of favorable-termination elements and, critically, for the presence of probable cause (assessed charge-by-charge); and (iii) whether a late-filed “certification” raising new factual assertions could be disregarded as a sham affidavit.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment for defendants. It held that Dalal’s last-minute “certification”—first asserting that seized jail-cell documents were fabricated and that detectives admitted the Delaney-related allegations were false—was properly disregarded as a sham affidavit because it contradicted his deposition posture, arrived after discovery, lacked independent record support, and came without a satisfactory explanation.

On the merits, the Court concluded Dalal failed to clear the “notable bar” for fabrication claims under Halsey v. Pfeiffer and Black v. Montgomery Cnty., particularly in light of extensive jail-cell writings corroborating Stewart’s narrative and the recorded conversations showing Dalal discussing obtaining a handgun and contemplating kidnapping/torture of perceived adversaries.

The Court also held probable cause supported the initial Delaney-related state charges, defeating malicious-prosecution claims under Johnson v. Knorr. Applying Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, it assessed probable cause “charge by charge” and found the “not a high bar” standard from Kaley v. United States easily met. Without an underlying constitutional violation, Dalal’s § 1983 conspiracy claim failed under Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale and Harvard v. Cesnalis, and defendants were entitled to qualified immunity under Bennett v. Murphy.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

  • State v. Dalal: Provided the broader factual backdrop of the synagogue/JCC attacks and Dalal’s underlying prosecution. The Third Circuit treated it as contextual history rather than a controlling rule source.
  • Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist. and Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.: Anchored the de novo summary-judgment review and the “genuine dispute of material fact” standard.
  • Halsey v. Pfeiffer and Black v. Montgomery Cnty.: Supplied the Third Circuit’s modern fabrication-of-evidence framework. The panel emphasized: (i) due process forbids using falsified evidence to initiate prosecution; (ii) mere inaccuracy or dispute is not “fabrication” without persuasive proof of bad faith; and (iii) the fabricated evidence must be significant enough to affect the outcome. The Court treated these cases as setting a deliberately high threshold and characterized Dalal’s record as far short of it.
  • Jiminez v. All Am. Rathskeller, Inc., Baer v. Chase, and Daubert v. NRA Grp., LLC: Controlled the “sham affidavit” doctrine. The Court applied Jiminez to disregard Dalal’s late “certification,” stressing that a contradictory affidavit cannot manufacture a fact issue unless (a) independently bolstered by the record or (b) accompanied by a satisfactory explanation for inconsistencies (as described in Baer and reiterated in Daubert).
  • Johnson v. Knorr: Provided the Third Circuit’s elements for malicious prosecution, including lack of probable cause and a deprivation of liberty consistent with seizure.
  • Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon: Required probable cause to be evaluated “charge by charge,” preventing a blanket approach that would allow probable cause for one count to immunize unsupported counts.
  • Kaley v. United States, Florida v. Harris, and Illinois v. Gates: Reinforced that probable cause is a low threshold and is tested via “fair probability” under the totality-of-the-circumstances approach. The Court used these authorities to justify that Stewart’s letter, interviews, notes, and recordings sufficed for warrants and charges even accounting for informant credibility concerns.
  • Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale and Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.: Framed § 1983 conspiracy: plaintiff must show defendants “reached an understanding” to violate a constitutional right.
  • Harvard v. Cesnalis: Supplied the critical linkage rule: without an underlying constitutional violation, a § 1983 conspiracy claim fails.
  • Bennett v. Murphy: Used for the proposition that absent a constitutional violation, qualified immunity applies.
  • Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics: Mentioned to note that Dalal’s Bivens claims were dismissed and not appealed; it did not influence the merits analysis on fabrication/probable cause.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Fabrication of Evidence: high evidentiary bar plus corroborating physical evidence

The panel treated the fabrication claim as the keystone; if it failed, Dalal’s downstream malicious-prosecution and conspiracy theories largely collapsed. Relying on Halsey v. Pfeiffer and Black v. Montgomery Cnty., the Court emphasized two gates: (1) proof of deliberate/bad-faith falsification (not mere dispute), and (2) significance—fabrication must be so consequential it could affect the outcome.

The Court found Dalal’s proof deficient because the record contained strong corroboration of Stewart’s account from sources other than Stewart:

  • Jail-cell documents: Writings stating “DEAD PROSECUTORS = FREEDOM,” listing “BCPO” as “Necessary Targets,” repeatedly naming “Delaney,” and contemplating “Operation Booming Bees” (vehicle/structure detonation using “C4”). These documents undercut Dalal’s assertion that Stewart’s narrative was concocted and supported the inference that the incriminating notes Stewart provided were consistent with Dalal’s own authorship and themes.
  • Recorded conversations: Dalal discussed obtaining a handgun and paying Stewart’s sister, and used language about “kidnap” and “torture” of perceived enemies. Even if Dalal did not expressly mention Delaney on tape, the Court deemed it unreasonable to treat the absence of a specific name over a two-day recording window as exculpatory proof that prior conversations never occurred.

The panel also rejected Dalal’s argument that Coleman's partial transcription was “falsified” because it omitted less troubling portions: the omitted parts were not exculpatory, and selection does not equal fabrication absent bad-faith distortion.

B. Sham affidavit: litigation timing and contradiction mattered

A major procedural holding was that Dalal’s late “certification” could be disregarded under Jiminez v. All Am. Rathskeller, Inc.. The Court stressed: (i) Dalal had long-known the asserted “admission” during interrogation (so delay was unjustified); (ii) he had long-known and previously litigated the seized papers (even calling them his “personal papers and writings” in suppression litigation); (iii) at deposition he could not identify fabricated items and gave only vague “the record” responses; (iv) he offered no satisfactory explanation for the shift and no independent corroboration.

Doctrinally, the opinion reinforces that the sham-affidavit rule is not confined to direct verbal contradictions; it applies when a party’s late sworn statement is strategically “sandbagging” after discovery in a way that no reasonable jury should credit without corroboration.

C. Malicious prosecution: probable cause defeated the claim (charge-by-charge)

Applying Johnson v. Knorr and the charge-by-charge requirement of Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, the Court held probable cause supported each initial charge: conspiracy to commit murder, conspiracy to possess a firearm for unlawful use, and terroristic threats. Probable cause rested on Stewart’s letter and statements, the handwritten notes (Delaney’s name/title and the email address), and the recorded conversations about obtaining a handgun.

The Court accepted that informant credibility issues (criminal history, incentives, immigration posture) were relevant, and endorsed the District Court’s approach of “reconstructing” the warrant affidavit to include such reliability information—yet found probable cause remained. Invoking Florida v. Harris and Illinois v. Gates, it reasoned that the totality still showed a “fair probability” of criminal conduct; under Kaley v. United States, this “not a high bar” was met.

The opinion also noted that subsequent grand-jury proceedings were supported by even more evidence (including additional documents seized from the cell), further weakening any argument that prosecution was baseless.

D. § 1983 conspiracy: no underlying violation, no conspiracy liability

Under Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.), Dalal needed evidence of an “understanding” to violate a constitutional right. But Harvard v. Cesnalis supplied the decisive rule: without an “actual underlying constitutional violation,” the conspiracy claim fails. Once fabrication and malicious prosecution failed, the alleged conspiracy necessarily fell with them.

E. Qualified immunity

Citing Bennett v. Murphy, the Court concluded that with no constitutional violation shown, defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.

3.3. Impact

Although designated “NOT PRECEDENTIAL,” the opinion is consequential in three practical ways:

  • Strengthening the “sham affidavit” checkpoint at summary judgment: The decision illustrates how courts may disregard late-breaking factual narratives that could and should have been disclosed in pleadings, discovery responses, or deposition—particularly where the party had personal knowledge years earlier and offers no corroboration.
  • Operationalizing the Third Circuit’s high bar for fabrication claims: By juxtaposing broad allegations of fabrication with corroborating recordings and contemporaneous writings, the panel underscores that fabrication claims require concrete proof of falsity and bad faith—not inferential attacks on informant motives alone.
  • Reaffirming robust probable-cause deference despite informant “liabilities”: The Court’s totality-of-circumstances approach—especially after “reconstructing” the affidavit to include impeachment facts—signals that probable cause can remain intact when key elements are corroborated (here, by recordings and seized writings), limiting malicious-prosecution exposure.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Fabrication of evidence (due process): Not every mistake or contested statement is “fabrication.” A plaintiff must show officials knowingly (or in bad faith) used false evidence, and that it mattered in a way that could change the case’s trajectory.
  • Sham affidavit: A late sworn statement that contradicts earlier testimony (or strategically fills gaps after discovery) cannot create a “real” factual dispute unless the speaker explains the inconsistency or the record independently corroborates the new account.
  • Probable cause: A low standard requiring only a “fair probability,” assessed from the whole picture. Courts can consider corroboration and do not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
  • Malicious prosecution: A civil claim that a person was wrongfully prosecuted. If probable cause existed for a charge, the claim fails for that charge—even if the case ends later or charges are dismissed.
  • § 1983 conspiracy: Claiming defendants “conspired” is not enough; the plaintiff must still prove an actual constitutional violation occurred.

5. Conclusion

The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment because Dalal could not substantiate fabrication with “persuasive evidence” under Halsey v. Pfeiffer and Black v. Montgomery Cnty., and because his late “certification” was disregarded as a sham affidavit under Jiminez v. All Am. Rathskeller, Inc.. Independent corroboration—recordings and seized writings—undermined claims that informant-supplied evidence was invented. Probable cause, assessed charge-by-charge as required by Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, defeated malicious-prosecution theories, and without an underlying constitutional violation, the § 1983 conspiracy claim failed under Harvard v. Cesnalis. The opinion’s lasting significance lies in its disciplined insistence on evidentiary rigor at summary judgment: serious constitutional labels cannot substitute for timely, specific, and corroborated proof.