Last Chance Agreements and Retaliation: Conditioning Continued Employment on Dropping an EEOC Charge Does Not Show Pretext When Termination Is for Post-Agreement Misconduct

1. Introduction

In Jessica Guasto v. The City of Miami Beach, Florida, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the City on retaliation claims under Title VII and the Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA). The appeal centered on whether the City’s decision to terminate the plaintiff—after she had previously filed an EEOC charge and later signed a “Last Chance Agreement” (LCA)—could reasonably be inferred to be retaliatory.

The key disputes were (i) whether the City’s stated reasons for termination were pretext for retaliation, and (ii) whether the record presented a “convincing mosaic” of circumstantial evidence of retaliatory animus sufficient to reach a jury. The City also argued the plaintiff had forfeited certain appellate positions by not raising them below.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The court held that the plaintiff failed to produce record evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer retaliation. Although the plaintiff emphasized that the City conditioned continued employment on an LCA that required dismissal of her EEOC charge, the court found that argument incomplete without the context leading to the LCA: the plaintiff had admitted misconduct that triggered an internal affairs investigation and could have resulted in termination.

Critically, the court distinguished Knox v. Roper Pump Co.: unlike Knox, the plaintiff here was not fired for refusing to sign the LCA; she signed it, returned to work as an at-will employee, and was then terminated for alleged post-LCA workplace policy violations. The plaintiff’s theory that a “misinformation campaign” or retaliatory intent drove the termination was deemed speculative and unsupported by the record. Summary judgment was therefore affirmed.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

  • Ismael v. Roundtree, 161 F.4th 752 (11th Cir. 2025)
    Used for the governing de novo standard of review on summary judgment, the requirement of a genuine dispute of material fact, and the proposition that once an employer articulates a legitimate reason, the analysis turns to whether the record supports an inference of unlawful motive (including via a “convincing mosaic”).
  • Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)
    Anchors the summary judgment standard the court applied to the evidentiary record.
  • Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573 (11th Cir. 1990)
    Cited to emphasize that a nonmovant cannot rely on “mere allegations or denials” but must produce “specific facts” to survive summary judgment—an evidentiary demand the court later used to characterize the plaintiff’s theory as unsupported.
  • Berry v. Crestwood Healthcare LP, 84 F.4th 1300 (11th Cir. 2023)
    Supplies two critical guardrails: (i) inferences must be evidence-based rather than speculative, and (ii) outlines the “convincing mosaic” approach and its typical indicia (suspicious timing, ambiguous statements, comparator evidence, pretext).
  • Knox v. Roper Pump Co., 957 F.3d 1237 (11th Cir. 2020)
    The plaintiff’s principal authority. The panel limited Knox to its factual scenario: an employer conditions continued employment on a release and then terminates the employee for rejecting the release. Here, the plaintiff signed the LCA and was terminated later for alleged policy violations, so Knox did not supply pretext.
  • Schoenfeld v. Babbitt, 168 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 1999)
    Cited for using the McDonnell Douglas framework when claims are proven with circumstantial evidence.
  • McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)
    The classic burden-shifting structure for circumstantial evidence cases: prima facie case, employer’s legitimate reason, and plaintiff’s showing of pretext.
  • St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993)
    Quoted (via Ismael) for the idea that once a legitimate reason is produced, the burden-shifting framework “drops out,” leaving the ultimate question of whether the evidence permits an inference of intentional retaliation.
  • Morrison v. Booth, 763 F.2d 1366 (11th Cir. 1985)
    Recognizes that pretext can be shown by departures from normal procedures—relevant to the plaintiff’s effort to portray the LCA and subsequent termination as irregular, though the court found insufficient proof.
  • Johnson v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 948 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 2020) (per curiam)
    Confirms that courts apply Title VII standards to the FCRA because the FCRA is based on Title VII, simplifying the analytical pathway: one set of retaliation standards governs both claims.
  • Gould v. Interface, Inc., 153 F.4th 1346 (11th Cir. 2025) and McCreight v. AuburnBank, 117 F.4th 1322 (11th Cir. 2024)
    Used to resolve forfeiture: parties forfeit “issues,” not “arguments,” and appellants are not limited to the precise arguments made below if the issue was raised. The panel held the plaintiff did not forfeit her theory regarding the Chief’s conduct and the LCA/EEOC-charge context.
  • Cordoba v. Dillard’s, Inc., 419 F.3d 1169 (11th Cir. 2005)
    Cited for the proposition that speculation cannot establish pretext or defeat summary judgment—central to the panel’s rejection of the plaintiff’s mosaic theory.

B. Legal Reasoning

  1. Summary judgment and evidence quality
    The panel emphasized that the nonmovant must present concrete evidence, not conjecture. By invoking Berry and Cordoba, the court framed the plaintiff’s narrative—particularly about retaliatory motivations after the LCA—as resting on “pure speculation.”
  2. Retaliation framework and the “convincing mosaic” endpoint
    The opinion recited the prima facie elements from Knox (protected activity, adverse action, causal connection) and explained that retaliation may be shown through McDonnell Douglas or through the “convincing mosaic” approach (with Ismael describing the point at which the burden-shifting “drops out” and the court assesses the total circumstantial record).
  3. Forfeiture doctrine applied narrowly
    The City argued the plaintiff forfeited certain appellate positions. The panel rejected that, applying Gould and McCreight: because the retaliation issue and the relevant factual content were raised below, the plaintiff could refine the characterization on appeal (e.g., calling the conduct a “misinformation campaign”).
  4. Why the LCA did not establish pretext here
    The core doctrinal move is the limitation of Knox. The panel acknowledged Knox supports causation/pretext where (a) an employer demands a release in response to protected activity and (b) fires the employee for rejecting the release. But the panel found the factual predicate missing: the plaintiff accepted the LCA, returned to work, and was terminated for alleged post-LCA misconduct and policy violations. The LCA therefore did not, by itself, show the later termination was retaliatory.
  5. Contextualizing the LCA as a non-retaliatory employment decision
    The panel stressed that the LCA followed admitted misconduct and an internal affairs investigation that could have resulted in termination. It also highlighted that the plaintiff had representation (two attorneys and a union representative) when signing. These contextual facts functioned as a rebuttal to any inference that the LCA was inherently retaliatory or coercive in a legally meaningful way for purposes of proving retaliatory termination.
  6. Failure of the “convincing mosaic” showing
    Even under the mosaic approach (suspicious timing, statements, comparators, pretext), the plaintiff did not provide record evidence supporting an inference of retaliatory animus. The court pointed to the stated policy-violation basis for termination and found the plaintiff’s challenges did not rise above speculation.

C. Impact

  • Narrowing the practical reach of Knox v. Roper Pump Co.
    The decision clarifies that Knox is most powerful when the adverse action is the refusal-to-release termination itself. Where the employee signs the agreement and termination occurs later for asserted misconduct, the LCA’s release condition alone will not carry the plaintiff past summary judgment without additional evidence linking the later termination to retaliatory animus.
  • Reinforcing the evidentiary bar against speculation
    By leaning on Berry and Cordoba, the opinion underscores that plaintiffs must produce admissible, record-supported facts for pretext or mosaic inferences—particularly in cases alleging retaliatory motive around discipline and internal investigations.
  • Signaling a context-driven approach to LCAs
    The panel treated the LCA as an employment instrument that may legitimately arise from prior misconduct and investigations. Future litigants should expect courts to examine (i) what precipitated the LCA, (ii) whether the employee accepted it, and (iii) whether the later termination is independently supported by policy-violation evidence.
  • Appellate preservation: “issue” vs. “argument”
    The forfeiture discussion provides a practical reminder: preserve the issue in district court; appellate counsel may refine the framing and supporting arguments later. This portion may be cited in future Eleventh Circuit briefing to resist overly aggressive forfeiture claims.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Retaliation (Title VII / FCRA): Punishing an employee because they engaged in protected activity (like filing an EEOC charge). The FCRA uses the same basic standards as Title VII in Eleventh Circuit practice.
  • Prima facie case: An initial, minimal showing—protected activity, adverse action, and a causal connection—that allows the claim to proceed unless the employer supplies a legitimate reason.
  • McDonnell Douglas framework: A common method for proving discrimination/retaliation with circumstantial evidence. After the employer articulates a legitimate reason, the plaintiff must show that reason is a cover (pretext) for retaliation.
  • Pretext: Evidence that the employer’s stated reason is not the true reason—because it is false, inconsistent, selectively applied, procedurally irregular, or otherwise unworthy of belief—allowing an inference of retaliation.
  • Convincing mosaic: A way to prove intent by combining circumstantial pieces (timing, statements, comparators, procedural deviations, weak explanations) that together allow a reasonable inference of retaliation even if no single piece is decisive.
  • Last Chance Agreement (LCA): An agreement typically offered in lieu of termination after serious misconduct, often setting strict conditions for continued employment and sometimes altering job protections (here, moving to at-will status).
  • Summary judgment: A pretrial ruling for the movant when no genuine dispute of material fact exists and the law entitles the movant to judgment; speculation or conclusory assertions do not suffice to create a triable issue.
  • Forfeiture on appeal: Generally, failing to raise an issue in the district court can bar it on appeal. But refining or adding arguments supporting a preserved issue is often permitted.

5. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision affirms a disciplined, evidence-centered approach to retaliation claims at summary judgment. The opinion’s central practical rule is that conditioning continued employment on an LCA tied to an EEOC charge does not, by itself, prove retaliatory termination where the employee signs the agreement and is later terminated for alleged post-agreement misconduct. The court’s distinction of Knox v. Roper Pump Co., combined with its insistence that inferences must be grounded in record evidence rather than speculation, signals that plaintiffs must tightly connect the protected activity to the challenged termination decision—especially when intervening disciplinary events and policy violations are documented.