Date: Apr 3, 2026

Larson v. Stucker: COA Denied Under AEDPA Where Claims Rely on Speculative Alternate-Suspect Proof, Proper Fifth Amendment Invocation, and “Novel” Alleyne-Based Plea-Sentencing Theory

I. Introduction

In Larson v. Stucker (10th Cir. Mar. 30, 2026), Kevin A. Larson, a Colorado prisoner, sought a certificate of appealability (“COA”) to challenge the federal district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. The Tenth Circuit denied a COA, concluding that no claim met the threshold showing that “reasonable jurists could debate” the district court’s resolution, particularly given the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) deference owed to Colorado’s merits adjudications.

The case arose from Larson’s 2014 prosecution for multiple sexual abuse/exploitation offenses. After initially entering a plea agreement in which he maintained innocence under North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), Larson withdrew his plea after the prosecution noticed potential aggravating evidence affecting sentencing. He proceeded to trial, was convicted on all charged crimes, and received an indeterminate sentence of 36 years to life. Colorado appellate courts affirmed his conviction and later rejected post-conviction claims in People v. Larson (Larson I) and People v. Larson (Larson II).

The COA application centered on three alleged constitutional violations: (1) exclusion of alternate-suspect evidence (right to present a complete defense), (2) restriction on examining the victim’s mother after she invoked the Fifth Amendment (confrontation/presenting exculpatory evidence), and (3) ineffective assistance during plea withdrawal based on an Alleyne-related sentencing theory. Larson also disputed the district court’s refusal to appoint habeas counsel.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit denied a COA on all habeas claims, holding that the district court’s rejection of those claims was not reasonably debatable under Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000), especially in light of AEDPA’s constraints. Specifically:

Alternate-suspect evidence: The state courts’ determination that Larson’s proffer was speculative and insufficiently connected to the charged crimes was a reasonable application of Supreme Court law (notably Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006)).
Victim’s mother’s Fifth Amendment invocation: The state courts reasonably found a “real and appreciable” risk of self-incrimination; limiting her testimony was consistent with federal standards including Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951) and Tenth Circuit precedent such as United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302 (10th Cir. 1987).
Ineffective assistance: Counsel was not constitutionally deficient for failing to advise Larson to keep the plea and pursue an Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013)-based objection to Colorado’s aggravated indeterminate sentencing minimum, where Colorado law (including Vensor v. People, 151 P.3d 1274 (Colo. 2007)) remained controlling and such an argument would have been “novel.”

Separately, the court held Larson did not need a COA to appeal denial of appointed counsel (Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180 (2009)), but affirmed the denial under the abuse-of-discretion standard.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. COA threshold and AEDPA overlay

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000): Supplies the COA test—whether “reasonable jurists could debate” the disposition or whether the issues deserve encouragement to proceed. The panel applied Slack as the gatekeeping mechanism and then effectively assessed debatability through AEDPA’s lens.
Pacheco v. Habti, 62 F.4th 1233 (10th Cir. 2023) and Meek v. Martin, 74 F.4th 1223 (10th Cir. 2023): Reinforce that COA review in § 2254 cases is inseparable from AEDPA deference to state merits decisions.
Klein v. Martin, 146 S. Ct. 589 (2026): The panel used Klein’s “benefit of the doubt” and “every fairminded jurist would disagree” framing to emphasize AEDPA’s demanding standard—more than “clear error” is required. This citation underscores a modern Supreme Court articulation of AEDPA’s high bar.
Martinez v. Quick, 134 F.4th 1046 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 385 (2025): Central to the panel’s methodology: “clearly established Federal law” must come from Supreme Court holdings, not dicta, and generalized formulations of rights often cannot satisfy § 2254(d)(1).
Davis v. Workman, 695 F.3d 1060 (10th Cir. 2012): Used to dispose of Larson’s reliance on Colorado evidentiary rules/cases; state-law error is not itself cognizable under § 2254.
Yang v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925 (10th Cir. 2008): Notes liberal construction of pro se filings but no advocacy by the court—setting expectations for how deficiencies in legal identification (e.g., missing Supreme Court authority) will be treated.

2. Right to present a defense and alternate-suspect evidence

Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006): The key Supreme Court anchor for excluding third-party guilt evidence when it is speculative, remote, or insufficiently connected. The district court and Tenth Circuit relied on Holmes’s explicit endorsement of excluding alternate-suspect evidence that does not “sufficiently connect” the other person to the crime.
People v. Larson (Larson I), No. 17CA0774, 2018 WL 11714832 (Colo. App. Aug. 30, 2018) (unpublished): The operative state merits decision. Larson I’s “non-speculative connection” requirement (as applied to gifts/attention, “acting out,” and prior charges absent demonstrated similarity) became the factual-legal predicate to which AEDPA deference attached.

3. Fifth Amendment privilege vs. confrontation/presenting evidence

Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951): The canonical “perfectly clear” standard—courts may compel testimony only if it is perfectly clear answers cannot possibly incriminate.
United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302 (10th Cir. 1987): Tenth Circuit adoption and application of Hoffman; the panel used Chalan to show the Colorado Court of Appeals’ rule tracked established federal law.
People v. Blackwell, 251 P.3d 468 (Colo. App. 2010): The state-law articulation of the Hoffman principle; cited to show Colorado applied a standard consistent with federal constitutional doctrine.
United States v. Rivas-Macias, 537 F.3d 1271 (10th Cir. 2008): Supports the rule that parties may not call a witness simply to force invocation of the Fifth Amendment in front of the jury—a practical safeguard against unfair inferences.
People v. Larson (Larson I) again: Provides the state courts’ factual findings that federal officials wished to prosecute the mother and that her testimony could expose her to “pimping” or similar charges, justifying the privilege.

4. Ineffective assistance, “novel” claims, and Alleyne in Colorado’s indeterminate scheme

Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013): Larson’s centerpiece—facts increasing a mandatory minimum must be found by a jury. The panel treated Alleyne as factually and structurally distinct from Colorado’s discretionary aggravated-range mechanism tied to an indeterminate “life max” sex-offense sentence.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984): Supplies the clearly established law for the ineffective assistance claim (performance + prejudice).
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011), Dunn v. Reeves, 594 U.S. 731 (2021), and Shinn v. Kayer, 592 U.S. 111 (2020): Build the “double deference” framework—deference to counsel’s choices under Strickland and deference to the state court’s application under AEDPA; also note that general standards enlarge state-court latitude.
People v. Larson (Larson II), No. 22CA1105, 2023 WL 12061341 (Colo. App. Oct. 19, 2023) (unpublished): The state merits decision rejecting ineffective assistance. Larson II’s key move was characterizing the proposed Alleyne challenge as “novel” in light of controlling Colorado authority.
Vensor v. People, 151 P.3d 1274 (Colo. 2007): Colorado Supreme Court authority upholding judicial fact-finding for increasing the minimum term within an indeterminate sex-offense sentence whose maximum is natural life; Vensor supplied the “dispositive authority” making counsel’s failure to press an Alleyne extension appear non-deficient.
Lopez v. People, 113 P.3d 713 (Colo. 2005): Used by the Tenth Circuit to emphasize that Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(6) is framed as discretionary (“may impose”), not as a mandatory minimum increase triggered by judicial fact-finding—distinguishing the statute from Alleyne’s paradigm.
United States v. Babcock, 40 F.4th 1172 (10th Cir. 2022) and Scott v. Hepp, 62 F.4th 343 (7th Cir. 2023): Cited to support the principle that counsel is not ineffective for failing to anticipate unsettled legal developments or raise every potentially winning novel theory.
House v. Hatch, 527 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 2008): Appears in a footnote to clarify an analytical route under § 2254(d)(1) (“unreasonable refusal to extend”), while explaining why that route did not control because Larson’s claim sounded in Strickland rather than direct Alleyne error.

5. Ancillary issues: briefing rules and counsel appointment

Rocky Mountain Wild v. Dallas, 98 F.4th 1263 (10th Cir. 2024): Used to reject incorporation-by-reference in appellate briefing; the case underscores that a COA applicant must present arguments within the appellate submission itself.
Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180 (2009): Establishes that a COA is not required to appeal denial of appointed counsel in post-conviction proceedings.
Rachel v. Troutt, 820 F.3d 390 (10th Cir. 2016): Supplies the abuse-of-discretion standard and factors relevant to appointing counsel in habeas matters.
United States v. Richardson, 136 F.4th 1261 (10th Cir. 2025): Supports judicial notice of the district court’s order denying appointed counsel even though it was not included in the appellate record.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The “COA + AEDPA” bottleneck

The opinion is best understood as a layered screening decision. First, Larson had to satisfy the COA standard under Slack v. McDaniel. Second, because the Colorado courts adjudicated each claim on the merits, the COA inquiry was effectively constrained by AEDPA: to be “debatable,” Larson needed a plausible argument that the state decisions were unreasonable under § 2254(d)(1) or § 2254(d)(2), not merely incorrect. The panel’s repeated emphasis—via Klein v. Martin and Meek v. Martin—that AEDPA requires more than “clear error” frames the denial: even a strong disagreement with the state courts would not suffice unless the result fell outside what “fairminded jurists” could accept.

2. Claim One: alternate-suspect evidence and constitutional “completeness” of the defense

Larson cast a state evidentiary ruling (excluding third-party guilt evidence) as a federal constitutional violation. The state court’s key determination in Larson I was that the proffer did not create a “non-speculative connection” between the proposed alternate suspects and the charged conduct.

The Tenth Circuit treated Holmes v. South Carolina as dispositive of the governing principle: defendants may present third-party guilt evidence, but states may exclude it when speculative or insufficiently connected. Because Holmes itself approves exclusion under those conditions, Larson’s claim lacked a viable “clearly established” Supreme Court hook showing unreasonableness. The opinion also illustrates a common AEDPA pitfall: reliance on state rules and state cases can at most show state-law error, which is not a basis for federal habeas relief (Davis v. Workman).

Notably, the panel addressed a purported “scrivener’s error” in the district court order (a mistaken phrase suggesting the CCA found “abuse” of discretion) and treated it as non-substantive because the district court’s actual reasoning and quotations clearly reflected the correct state holding.

3. Claim Two: Fifth Amendment privilege of a key witness vs. Sixth Amendment confrontation

Larson argued his confrontation and defense rights were violated when the victim’s mother was effectively unavailable due to her Fifth Amendment privilege. The state trial court held two hearings and found a genuine risk of incrimination based on potential charges (described as “pimping” or similar) arising from the same investigation.

The CCA (in Larson I) applied a “perfectly clear” standard—compulsion is permissible only if testimony “cannot possibly” incriminate—tracking Hoffman v. United States and United States v. Chalan. This alignment with settled federal doctrine was central: under AEDPA, when the state court uses a standard consistent with Supreme Court holdings, it is difficult to characterize the decision as “contrary to” or an “unreasonable application” of clearly established law.

The panel also endorsed the district court’s reliance on United States v. Rivas-Macias to reject Larson’s suggestion that the witness should be forced to invoke the privilege on the stand in response to questions. That rule reflects the systemic concern that calling a witness solely to have them plead the Fifth invites improper inferences and distorts factfinding—an especially acute risk in cases involving emotionally charged allegations.

4. Claim Three: ineffective assistance tied to Alleyne and Colorado indeterminate sex-offense sentencing

This claim attempted to reframe Larson’s plea-withdrawal decision as a product of deficient advice: counsel should have advised him to keep the plea and object under Alleyne v. United States to any increase in the plea’s anticipated minimum term based on judicial findings of “extraordinary aggravating circumstances.”

The state post-conviction decision in Larson II rejected deficiency on a straightforward Strickland ground: given Vensor v. People—which upheld judicial aggravation of the minimum term within an indeterminate sex-offense sentence whose maximum is natural life—an Alleyne-based objection would have been a “novel claim.” Larson II relied on the familiar Strickland principle that attorneys need not anticipate changes or argue for extensions of controlling precedent.

The Tenth Circuit strengthened that conclusion in two steps:

No clearly established Alleyne extension: The panel reasoned that Alleyne addressed mandatory minimums that raise the “floor” of a sentencing range by operation of statute, while Colorado’s scheme, as described, involves an indeterminate “life max” sentence and a discretionary ability under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(6) to sentence above the presumptive range (“may impose”), a distinction bolstered by Lopez v. People. Thus, even if Larson’s proposed rule was a “logical extension,” AEDPA does not permit relief based on extrapolations from factually distinct contexts.
Double deference under Strickland + AEDPA: Because the claim is ineffective assistance, the controlling “clearly established” law is Strickland v. Washington, applied through the highly deferential lens described in Harrington v. Richter, Dunn v. Reeves, and Shinn v. Kayer. Under that framework, it was enough that there was “any reasonable argument” that counsel performed within Strickland’s broad range of professional reasonableness—especially where counsel acted consistently with the controlling state high court decision (Vensor), and where Larson could not identify authority showing Vensor had been abrogated or undermined at the relevant time.

The opinion also clarifies a doctrinal subtlety: a petitioner might argue under House v. Hatch that a state court unreasonably refused to extend a Supreme Court principle (an AEDPA “unreasonable application” strand). But the panel noted Larson’s pleaded claim was not “sentenced in violation of Alleyne”; it was “ineffective assistance” for not making an Alleyne-based argument. That distinction matters because Strickland tolerates more uncertainty and strategy, and AEDPA further amplifies that tolerance.

5. Denial of appointed counsel

The court treated the counsel issue as appealable without a COA under Harbison v. Bell, reviewed only for abuse of discretion (Rachel v. Troutt), and affirmed. Procedurally, it also relied on United States v. Richardson to take judicial notice of the district court’s counsel-denial order.

C. Impact

Although the order is expressly “not binding precedent” (except under law-of-the-case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel), it is instructive in several recurring § 2254 contexts:

COA denials will often turn on AEDPA’s “fairminded jurist” tolerance: The opinion illustrates that COA “debatability” is frequently inseparable from whether the petitioner can identify a Supreme Court holding clearly establishing the rule and show the state court’s decision was objectively unreasonable—not merely arguably wrong.
Alternate-suspect evidence claims face a high federal hurdle: Holmes v. South Carolina gives states significant room to exclude speculative third-party guilt evidence. Absent a strong, case-linked proffer, federal habeas review will rarely provide an avenue for relief.
Fifth Amendment privilege rulings are insulated when courts build a record: The state court held hearings and made findings about real exposure to prosecution. Such record development makes it especially difficult to show an unreasonable factual determination under § 2254(d)(2).
Ineffective assistance claims premised on “extensions” of constitutional doctrine are especially difficult: This decision underscores that counsel is typically not deficient for declining to press unsettled arguments, particularly where controlling state precedent points the other way. For Colorado sex-offense indeterminate sentencing, the order signals there remains no clearly established Supreme Court rule (as of this decision) compelling jury findings for the type of discretionary aggravated minimum described.
Practical takeaway for habeas litigants: The court repeatedly returned to a basic AEDPA requirement—identify the Supreme Court holding allegedly misapplied, and explain why the state court’s application was not just incorrect but unreasonable. Generalized invocations of “fairness,” “due process,” or broad rights-to-defense language are unlikely to suffice.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Certificate of Appealability (COA): A threshold permission slip to appeal a federal habeas denial. Under Slack v. McDaniel, the petitioner must show the issues are reasonably debatable among jurists.
AEDPA deference (§ 2254(d)): Federal courts cannot grant relief just because they disagree. They may grant relief only if the state court decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law (§ 2254(d)(1)), or rested on an unreasonable factual determination (§ 2254(d)(2)).
“Clearly established Federal law”: The rule must come from the Supreme Court’s holdings (not lower courts, not dicta). The opinion relies on Martinez v. Quick for this limitation.
Alternate-suspect (third-party guilt) evidence: Evidence suggesting someone else committed the crime. Under Holmes v. South Carolina, courts may exclude such evidence if it is speculative or too weakly connected to the charged offense.
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination: A witness may refuse to answer questions that could expose them to criminal liability. Courts may compel answers only when it is “perfectly clear” the testimony cannot incriminate, per Hoffman v. United States.
Indeterminate sentencing (e.g., “36 years to life”): A sentence with a minimum term and a maximum (here, life). Colorado’s sex-offense scheme requires a life maximum, while the minimum term may vary within statutory bounds.
Ineffective assistance of counsel (Strickland): To win, a defendant must show (1) deficient performance and (2) prejudice. In habeas cases, courts apply “double deference” (to counsel’s choices and to the state court’s Strickland ruling), as emphasized by Harrington v. Richter and Dunn v. Reeves.

V. Conclusion

Larson v. Stucker is a textbook AEDPA-era COA denial: each claim failed not because the petitioner raised trivial issues, but because he could not show that Colorado’s merits adjudications were objectively unreasonable in light of Supreme Court holdings. The order reinforces several durable lessons: (1) speculative alternate-suspect evidence may be excluded without violating the Constitution (Holmes v. South Carolina); (2) well-supported Fifth Amendment invocations can legitimately restrict examination of key witnesses without triggering habeas relief (Hoffman v. United States; United States v. Chalan); and (3) Strickland does not typically require counsel to pursue untested extensions of constitutional doctrine, especially where controlling state precedent points the other way (Strickland v. Washington; Vensor v. People).