Knowledge of a Minor’s Age in Attempted § 2422(b) and § 1591 Offenses May Be Proven by Texts, Circumstantial Consciousness-of-Guilt Evidence, and Post-Arrest Admissions

1. Introduction

In United States v. Daniel Puff (4th Cir. Mar. 17, 2025) (unpublished), the Fourth Circuit affirmed a jury’s convictions for attempted coercion and enticement of a minor under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (Count 1) and attempted sex trafficking of a minor under 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1) (Count 2), along with convictions for obstruction-type and false-statement offenses (Counts 3–4, not challenged on appeal). The appeal focused on a single sufficiency issue: whether the Government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Puff knew he had agreed to pay for sex acts with a minor (specifically, a purported 13-year-old) in an FBI undercover sting using an online prostitution advertisement and text-message communications.

The Fourth Circuit’s decision is principally about how “knowledge” can be established in attempt cases involving online communications: the court held that the record contained substantial evidence of knowledge based on (i) the text exchanges themselves, (ii) circumstantial “consciousness of guilt” behavior (countersurveillance, deletion of an app, false statements), and (iii) the defendant’s post-arrest admissions.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The court affirmed the denial of Puff’s Rule 29 motion and sustained the jury’s verdicts on Counts 1 and 2. Applying the substantial-evidence standard, the panel concluded that a reasonable juror could find Puff knew the purported prostitute was 13 years old and nevertheless sought to engage in commercial sexual activity.

Key evidentiary pillars included: repeated communications in which the undercover agent conveyed the age as 13; Puff’s continued pursuit of a meeting and proposed sex acts after age disclosure; Puff’s law-enforcement “check” questions; countersurveillance at the meeting location; payment and confirmation of desired sex acts; deletion of the TextNow application and an initial lie about deleting it; and post-arrest statements explicitly acknowledging the age and describing the act as “something different,” coupled with admissions that the age made him nervous.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

  • United States v. Savage, 885 F.3d 212 (4th Cir. 2018)
    Role in the opinion: Provided the governing sufficiency framework for Rule 29 review: de novo appellate review of the denial; evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the Government; and the appellant’s “heavy burden” in overturning a jury verdict. The Puff panel repeatedly leaned on Savage’s articulation of “substantial evidence” and the deference owed to a verdict-supported record.
  • United States v. Wolf, 860 F.3d 175 (4th Cir. 2017)
    Role in the opinion: Reinforced the institutional restraint applied to sufficiency challenges by emphasizing that reversal is reserved for the “rare case” where the prosecution’s failure is clear. This framing set a high bar for Puff’s attempt to re-cast the evidence as consistent with innocence.
  • United States v. Engle, 676 F.3d 405 (4th Cir. 2012)
    Role in the opinion: Did the substantive doctrinal work for Count 1 and for attempt generally. Engle supplied: (i) the elements of § 2422(b) (use of interstate facility; knowingly persuade/induce/entice/coerce or attempt; minor; illegal sexual activity), (ii) the clarification that § 2422(b) focuses on the defendant’s effort to persuade a minor rather than consummation, and (iii) the attempt standard—culpable intent plus a “substantial step” strongly corroborating intent. Puff used Engle’s attempt framework to evaluate whether Puff’s conduct and communications corroborated the requisite mens rea.
  • United States v. Haas, 986 F.3d 467 (4th Cir. 2021)
    Role in the opinion: Provided the elements for an attempted violation of § 1591(a)(1) (Count 2), including knowledge or reckless disregard of the victim’s minority and that the person will be caused to engage in a commercial sex act, plus the interstate commerce nexus. Haas anchored the court’s analysis that Puff’s evidence of knowledge/recklessness was sufficient for attempt liability under the sex trafficking statute.
  • United States v. Devine, 40 F.4th 139 (4th Cir. 2022) and United States v. Dennis, 19 F.4th 656 (4th Cir. 2021)
    Role in the opinion: These cases supported the court’s refusal to revisit witness credibility and the jury’s rejection of Puff’s alternative account (e.g., his claim that he did not see the “13 years old” message). They functioned as doctrinal guardrails preventing sufficiency review from becoming an appellate re-trial.
  • United States v. Ath, 951 F.3d 179 (4th Cir. 2020)
    Role in the opinion: Supplied the “false exculpatory statements” principle: juries may treat lies to law enforcement as evidence of consciousness of guilt relevant to knowledge. The Puff panel used Ath to treat Puff’s initial lie about deleting TextNow as probative of knowing wrongdoing—supporting the contested knowledge element.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(a) Framing the question narrowly: knowledge of age, not general intent.
Puff did not broadly dispute the attempt framework or the commerce elements; he made a single sufficiency attack: that the Government failed to prove he knew he had agreed to pay for sex acts with a minor. The court therefore asked whether, viewing the record most favorably to the Government, a reasonable juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Puff knew the purported prostitute was 13.

(b) Text-message evidence as direct proof of knowledge.
The panel treated the communications as the primary evidence. Puff contacted an ad that signaled “youth” (including an obviously fake “96 years old” marker) and received an explicit message that the girl was 13. Even though Puff testified he did not see that message, he admitted post-arrest that he read part of the text containing the age. The jury was entitled to reject Puff’s contrary trial testimony, and the appellate court would not reweigh that credibility determination.

(c) The “apology” and immediate re-engagement: inference of consciousness and continuity.
Puff briefly expressed reluctance after the “13 years old” disclosure, but then quickly returned to the TextNow chat—where age had already been stated—and resumed arranging sexual activity, proposing specific acts (masturbation viewing and oral sex). The court accepted the inference that Puff’s temporary pullback was not genuine withdrawal based on age, but rather a reaction to realizing he was communicating from his personal number; his rapid re-engagement supported knowledge and intent.

(d) Circumstantial “consciousness of guilt” evidence corroborated knowledge.
The court emphasized multiple circumstantial indicators consistent with awareness of illegality tied to the victim’s age: repeated “are you law enforcement?” questioning; countersurveillance near the hotel; paying $60 and confirming the requested act; deleting TextNow after arrest (and initially lying about it). Under Ath, such false exculpatory conduct could be treated by the jury as evidence of consciousness of guilt, which in turn “bears on the issue of knowledge.”

(e) Post-arrest admissions “closed the loop” on knowledge.
The opinion treats Puff’s own statements as especially powerful: he admitted knowing she was 13, described the prospect as “something different,” and acknowledged increased nervousness because of her age—contrasted with prior encounters with adult prostitutes. The jury could credit these admissions over Puff’s claim he was “zoned out” or that the statements were misunderstood.

(f) Attempt liability satisfied without completion.
Citing Engle, the court reaffirmed that for both charged attempt offenses, the Government needed culpable intent and a substantial step strongly corroborating intent. The arranged meeting, presence at the hotel area, countersurveillance, payment, and confirmation of desired sex act served as substantial steps corroborating that Puff was attempting to complete commercial sex activity with the person he understood to be 13.

3.3. Impact

Although unpublished and “not binding precedent,” the decision is a useful signal of how the Fourth Circuit is likely to assess sufficiency challenges in online child-exploitation sting cases:

  • Knowledge can be proven holistically. The court endorsed a cumulative evidentiary approach: direct communications, behavioral indicators (countersurveillance, deletion of apps), and post-arrest admissions can collectively satisfy knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt even when the defendant offers an alternative narrative.
  • Defendants face steep odds on sufficiency appeals where credibility is central. By leaning on Devine and Dennis, the panel reinforced that a defendant’s “I didn’t see that message” defense often collapses on appeal once the jury has rejected it.
  • Digital “anonymity tools” may become consciousness-of-guilt evidence. The court did not treat use of TextNow as dispositive, but the deletion of the application and initial lie about deletion were treated as probative. Future litigants should expect app deletion, device manipulation, and related deception to be argued as knowledge/culpability evidence.
  • Age disclosure and continued engagement matter more than brief hesitation. The opinion suggests that transient reluctance after an age statement will not negate knowledge if the defendant promptly continues planning or takes steps toward consummation.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Rule 29 motion (judgment of acquittal): A request for the judge to throw out a charge because the evidence is legally insufficient for any reasonable jury to convict.
  • De novo review: The appellate court evaluates the legal sufficiency question anew, but still applies strong deference to the jury’s verdict by viewing evidence in the Government’s favor.
  • “Substantial evidence”: Not “most persuasive” evidence; rather, enough evidence that a reasonable juror could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
  • Attempt (intent + substantial step): The Government must prove the defendant intended the crime and took a concrete action that strongly confirms that intent (e.g., arranging a meeting, traveling to the location, paying money).
  • “Consciousness of guilt” / false exculpatory statements: If a defendant lies or hides evidence (like deleting an app and denying it), a jury can infer the defendant knew he was doing something illegal—supporting elements like knowledge.
  • Interstate commerce “facility”: Phones, the internet, and messaging applications typically qualify; using them satisfies the statute’s jurisdictional hook.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Daniel Puff affirms that, in attempt prosecutions under § 2422(b) and § 1591(a)(1), the Government may prove knowledge of minority through a combination of explicit age disclosures in communications, corroborative conduct demonstrating consciousness of guilt, and post-arrest admissions—while appellate review will not re-litigate credibility choices the jury already made. The opinion’s practical significance lies in its evidentiary roadmap: in online sting cases, sufficiency often turns on the totality of digital messages, preparatory acts, and post-arrest behavior rather than any single “smoking gun” fact.