Explicit Findings Sustain Upward Child-Support Deviations and the Mandate Rule Limits Remand Re-Litigation

1. Introduction

Case: Kingstone v. Tedrow Kingstone, 2026 ND 29 (N.D. Feb. 12, 2026).
Parties: Brett Michael Kingstone (father; obligor; appellant) and Trisa Ranae Tedrow Kingstone (mother; obligee; appellee).
Posture: Second appeal following a remand in which the Supreme Court previously reversed an upward deviation in child support for insufficient findings and directed reconsideration of the amount of a life-insurance requirement because it was tied to the child-support amount. See Kingstone v. Tedrow Kingstone, 2025 ND 40.

Core issues on this appeal:

  • Whether the district court’s post-remand findings were sufficiently explicit to justify (1) an upward deviation from the presumptive guideline amount under N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-04.1-09(2) and (2) the amount of that deviation.
  • Whether the district court erred by reinstating a $750,000 life-insurance policy requirement—especially in light of other asserted financial vehicles (a 529 plan and a UTMA account)—or whether the mandate rule foreclosed relitigation of that issue.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the post-remand order. The Court held:

  • The district court made findings “explicit enough” to support that an upward deviation was in the child’s best interest and to support the deviation’s two components: $750/month for increased needs tied to disabling conditions/chronic illness (N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-04.1-09(2)(b), (d)) and $750/month to maintain a comparable standard of living given the obligor’s resources (N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-04.1-09(2)(h)).
  • The district court properly reinstated the $750,000 life-insurance requirement because the remand was limited to reconsidering the amount only if child support changed; child support did not change; and the mandate rule barred relitigation of arguments previously rejected.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Standards of review and the “clearly erroneous” framework

The Court reaffirmed the multi-layered review typical of child-support appeals: questions of law (de novo), findings of fact (clearly erroneous), and limited discretionary areas (abuse of discretion). It quoted Williams v. Williams, 2023 ND 240, ¶ 14, 999 N.W.2d 192, as it had in the earlier appeal: a finding is clearly erroneous if induced by an erroneous view of law, unsupported by evidence, or leaves the appellate court with a definite and firm conviction of mistake.

2) What “explicit enough” findings look like

The Court anchored “adequate findings” to intelligibility and reviewability, citing:

  • L.C.V. v. D.E.G., 2005 ND 180, ¶ 11, 705 N.W.2d 257 (error when required findings are “not intelligible”).
  • Wolf v. Wolf, 474 N.W.2d 257, 258 (N.D. 1991) (findings adequate if they allow understanding of the factual basis for the determination).

These cases supplied the measuring stick the Court used to decide that, unlike the initial order reversed in 2025, the post-remand findings were sufficiently specific.

3) Upward deviations: “more expansive needs” and lifestyle-based support

The central comparator was Nuveen v. Nuveen, 2012 ND 260, 825 N.W.2d 863. In Nuveen, the Court upheld an upward deviation where the district court explained: (i) the children had “more expansive needs,” (ii) they would miss out on trips, camps, and comforts enjoyed pre-divorce, and (iii) there was a disparity in the parents’ entertainment budgets.

Here, the Court treated Nuveen as a template: the district court’s best-interest explanation—meeting substantial medical/developmental needs and preserving comparable pre-divorce lifestyle—was “similar” in kind and sufficiently explicit. The Court also used Nuveen as a rough proportionality reference point (income levels and deviation size), emphasizing that Brett Kingstone’s income and assets were substantially larger.

The opinion reinforced the broader policy that children are not limited to “subsistence level” support where parents can afford more, citing:

  • Montgomery v. Montgomery, 481 N.W.2d 234, 236 (N.D. 1992).
  • Bernhardt v. Bernhardt, 1997 ND 80, ¶ 12, 561 N.W.2d 656 (implicitly recognizing a child’s interest in a post-divorce standard of living comparable to that enjoyed while the family was intact when resources are sufficient).

4) Quantification and the “no line-by-line accounting” principle

A key post-remand question was whether the district court sufficiently explained why $750 for needs and why $750 for lifestyle. The Court relied on two related lines of authority:

  • Shae v. Shae, 2014 ND 149, ¶ 8, 849 N.W.2d 173 (recognizing, referencing Nuveen, that a line-by-line accounting is unnecessary and that “needs” are more expansive in high-income families due to their lifestyle).
  • Entzie v. Entzie, 2010 ND 194, ¶ 27, 789 N.W.2d 550 (increased needs for a child with disabling conditions or chronic illness can include reasonable costs of supplemental education—used here to validate the district court’s view of travel and program-related costs).

For lifestyle deviation under subsection (2)(h), the Court emphasized that the focus includes the obligor’s ability to secure additional income from assets, citing Thompson v. Johnson, 2018 ND 142, ¶ 19, 912 N.W.2d 315 (quoting Entzie v. Entzie, 2010 ND 194, ¶ 22).

5) The mandate rule and the limits of remand

The life-insurance dispute was resolved principally through appellate procedure, not fresh merits analysis. The Court invoked:

  • Walstad v. Walstad, 2013 ND 176, ¶ 9, 837 N.W.2d 911 (district courts must follow the mandate rule on remand).
  • State ex rel. N.D. Dep't of Labor v. Riemers, 2010 ND 43, ¶ 11, 779 N.W.2d 649 (issues resolved in a first appeal cannot be relitigated in a second appeal).
  • Carlson v. Workforce Safety & Ins., 2012 ND 203, ¶ 16, 821 N.W.2d 760 (when facts remain the same, trial courts must follow appellate pronouncements and carry the mandate into effect).

Because the first appeal (Kingstone v. Tedrow Kingstone, 2025 ND 40) had already upheld the existence of a life-insurance obligation and remanded only to reconsider its amount if support changed, the district court acted within the mandate by reinstating the same $750,000 figure when child support remained unchanged.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) The governing rule for deviation: best interest + enumerated criteria

The Court restated the structure of N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-04.1-09(2): an upward deviation from the presumptive guideline amount is permissible only if (i) it is in the child’s best interest and (ii) one or more listed criteria apply.

The district court, post-remand, supported deviation under two pathways:

  • Needs-based deviation under § 75-02-04.1-09(2)(b) (increased ability when net income exceeds $25,000/month) and § 75-02-04.1-09(2)(d) (increased needs of a child with disabling conditions/chronic illness), with an express best-interest finding tied to meeting lifelong genetic health conditions.
  • Lifestyle/asset-based deviation under § 75-02-04.1-09(2)(h) (ability to secure additional income from assets), with an express best-interest finding tied to comparable pre-divorce standard of living.

2) Why the “best interest” finding was sufficient

Brett Kingstone argued the best-interest finding was not explicit enough. The Supreme Court rejected that argument because the district court articulated two intelligible rationales: (1) meeting documented disability-related needs, and (2) preserving a standard of living comparable to what the child enjoyed pre-divorce.

The Court deemed this comparable to Nuveen v. Nuveen, where best interest was supported by references to “more expansive needs” and foregone experiences/comforts absent deviation. The Court’s reasoning is functional: findings need not be exhaustive; they must be clear enough to permit appellate review under L.C.V. v. D.E.G. and Wolf v. Wolf.

3) Why $750 for disability-related needs was sufficiently supported

The first appeal criticized reliance on a generalized $2,000/month expense figure without explanation of how the court arrived at the deviation amount. On remand, the district court tied its $750 figure to concrete, recurring costs not otherwise captured by Brett Kingstone’s medical-expense obligations: frequent long-distance travel for multiple therapies and services, with reference to mileage reimbursement rates and related trip costs (maintenance, meals).

The Supreme Court accepted this as “some evidence” supporting the quantification and reiterated—via Shae v. Shae—that a line-by-line accounting is not required. By citing Entzie v. Entzie, the Court also signaled that “increased needs” can include supportive and educational interventions and their reasonable incidentals.

4) Why $750 for standard-of-living preservation was sufficiently supported

For § 75-02-04.1-09(2)(h), the district court identified lifestyle markers from the intact-family period (luxury home in Colorado, additional home in Florida, housekeeper/tutors/extensive travel enjoyed by other children, and the mother’s former ability as a stay-at-home parent to meet needs). The Supreme Court treated those details as at least as explicit as the “trips, camps, and comforts” rationale upheld in Nuveen v. Nuveen.

The Court also emphasized the obligor’s extraordinary income/asset picture, noting both the magnitude of Brett Kingstone’s monthly income (near/above $120,000) and the earlier affirmed finding that he has the ability to secure additional income from significant assets. Coupled with Montgomery v. Montgomery and Bernhardt v. Bernhardt, the Court’s reasoning reflects a consistent theme: where resources allow, child support may reflect more than bare necessities and may aim to preserve a child’s pre-divorce economic experience.

5) Life insurance: mandate rule controls the second appeal

The Supreme Court did not revisit whether life insurance was appropriate on the merits, because it already decided that question in Kingstone v. Tedrow Kingstone, 2025 ND 40, ¶ 50 (abuse-of-discretion review) and remanded only to reconsider the amount if child support changed. Since child support did not change, reinstatement of the $750,000 requirement followed the mandate.

The Court’s reliance on Walstad v. Walstad, State ex rel. N.D. Dep't of Labor v. Riemers, and Carlson v. Workforce Safety & Ins. clarifies a practical boundary for litigants: remand is not an opportunity to repackage previously rejected arguments (such as reliance on a 529 plan or UTMA account) unless the mandate authorizes reopening that subject.

C. Impact

  • More concrete guidance on remand compliance: When an appellate court reverses for insufficient findings, a district court can cure the defect by adding specific, reviewable details tying the deviation to the child’s needs and/or lifestyle factors—without producing a forensic budget.
  • Reinforcement of lifestyle-based deviations in high-resource cases: The opinion strengthens the proposition (already present in Montgomery v. Montgomery, Bernhardt v. Bernhardt, and Nuveen v. Nuveen) that child support may validly preserve aspects of an affluent pre-divorce standard of living when the obligor’s income/assets support it.
  • Quantification standard remains “some evidence,” not mathematical precision: The Court signaled that “some evidence” connecting costs to the deviation amount can suffice, especially where costs are recurring and plausibly substantial (e.g., frequent therapy-related travel).
  • Procedural discipline via the mandate rule: The life-insurance portion underscores that appellate mandates constrain what can be re-argued, promoting finality and preventing serial relitigation in family-law disputes.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Presumptive guideline child support: The default amount produced by North Dakota’s child-support guidelines; courts generally start here.
  • Upward deviation: A court-ordered increase above the guideline amount, permitted only if it is in the child’s best interest and a listed guideline factor applies (here, high obligor income/assets and the child’s increased needs).
  • “Best interests” finding: A required explanation of why the deviation benefits the child. It does not require exhaustive detail, but it must be clear enough for appellate review (intelligible and tied to evidence).
  • Clearly erroneous: The appellate court will not overturn a factual finding if there is evidence supporting it and the court is not firmly convinced a mistake was made.
  • Mandate rule: After an appeal, the trial court must do what the appellate court directed—no more, no less. Issues already decided generally cannot be re-litigated.
  • 529 plan and UTMA account: Common child-benefit savings vehicles. In this litigation, they did not displace life insurance, and the attempt to revisit them was barred because that debate was resolved in the first appeal and not reopened by the limited remand.

5. Conclusion

Kingstone v. Tedrow Kingstone, 2026 ND 29, solidifies two practical rules in North Dakota family law: (1) on remand, a district court can sustain an upward deviation by making findings that are specific enough to explain both why deviation serves the child’s best interests and why the chosen amount is reasonable—without a strict line-by-line budget; and (2) the mandate rule meaningfully constrains post-remand litigation, particularly where the appellate court’s prior decision already resolved the merits and remanded only for a conditional recalculation.