King v. Davis: Video-Controlled Excessive-Force Summary Judgment and Reviving NY Negligence Claims Amid Unsettled “Negligent Assault” Doctrine

1. Introduction

In King v. Davis (2d Cir. Mar. 18, 2026) (summary order), Plaintiff-Appellant Brian King sued multiple City of Potsdam Police Department officers and the Village of Potsdam arising from a DWI arrest in which officers removed him from his vehicle. King asserted (i) Fourth Amendment excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and (ii) related state-law battery and state-law negligence claims. Separately, the district court sanctioned King’s counsel, Woodruff Lee Carroll, for repeated violations of court orders and defective filings.

The appeal presented three core issues: (1) whether body-worn camera footage eliminated any genuine dispute on excessive force; (2) whether New York law permits a negligence claim alongside intentional tort theories in an arrest-force context; and (3) whether sanctions against counsel were a permissible exercise of inherent authority.

2. Summary of the Opinion

  • Excessive force (§ 1983): Affirmed summary judgment for defendants; video evidence rendered King’s contrary account “blatantly contradicted.”
  • State-law battery: Affirmed; same operative reasonableness analysis as the federal excessive-force claim.
  • State-law negligence: Vacated and remanded; the district court erred in treating negligence as categorically unavailable and failed to address fact-dependent applicability of New York authority and whether to retain supplemental jurisdiction over an unsettled state-law question.
  • Sanctions: Affirmed $1,000 sanction against counsel; misconduct warranted sanctions even absent an explicit bad-faith finding. Counsel also referred to the Second Circuit’s grievance process under Local Rule 46.2.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and How They Drove the Result)

1) Summary judgment framework and video evidence

  • Covington Specialty Ins. Co. v. Indian Lookout Country Club, Inc., 62 F.4th 748 (2d Cir. 2023): supplied the de novo review standard and instruction to view facts favorably to the nonmovant—subject to the video-evidence constraint below.
  • Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007): provided the controlling principle that courts need not adopt a nonmovant’s story when it is “blatantly contradicted” by video evidence. This was central: the panel treated the bodycam footage as dispositive of key factual disputes (noncompliance, reaching into a jacket/pocket, and officer safety concerns).

2) Excessive force doctrine under the Fourth Amendment

  • Davis v. Rodriguez, 364 F.3d 424 (2d Cir. 2004): restated the “objectively unreasonable” standard for excessive force.
  • Cugini v. City of New York, 941 F.3d 604 (2d Cir. 2019), quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989): supplied the balancing test and the three “Graham factors” (severity, threat, resistance/flight), and emphasized the prohibition on using hindsight and subjective intent.
  • Sullivan v. Gagnier, 225 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2000): reinforced that resistance can justify some force but not “force without limit,” framing the ceiling on permissible escalation.
  • Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983): supported the court’s deference to officer-safety judgments during vehicle stops, described as “especially fraught with danger.”
  • Elias Bochner, 287 7th Ave. Realty LLC v. City of New York, 118 F.4th 505 (2d Cir. 2024): cited to reject treating defense counsel’s oral-argument “concession” (that visible hands would defeat summary judgment) as binding, because the issue was one of law.

3) State tort alignment and divergence (battery vs. negligence)

  • Tardif v. City of New York, 991 F.3d 394 (2d Cir. 2021): applied to affirm dismissal of the battery claim because New York battery (in this context) tracks the excessive-force reasonableness analysis.
  • Benbow v. City of New York, No. 17-CV-6457, 2024 WL 5165073 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2024): exemplified district-court reasoning that arrest-force allegations “only consistent with intentional or reckless conduct” sound in intentional tort, not negligence; the panel declined to accept this as a categorical bar.
  • Henry v. Daytop Vill., Inc., 42 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 1994): reinforced the permissibility of alternative and even inconsistent theories (especially where intent is complex), used to fault the district court’s apparent incompatibility rationale at the summary judgment stage.
  • Johnson v. City of New York, 50 N.Y.S.3d 461 (2d Dep’t 2017) vs. McCummings v. New York City Transit Auth., 81 N.Y.2d 923 (1993): highlighted an unsettled New York landscape—“no negligent assault” statements contrasted with a Court of Appeals decision sustaining a negligence verdict in a police-shooting context. This tension drove the vacatur and remand.
  • Brocklesby Transp., A Div. of Kingsway Transports, Ltd. v. E. States Escort Servs., 904 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1990): justified remand because McCummings’s applicability “turns in part on factual questions not addressed by the district court.”

4) Supplemental jurisdiction over unsettled state-law questions

  • Kolari v. New-York Presbyterian Hosp., 455 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2006), and Valencia ex rel. Franco v. Lee, 316 F.3d 299 (2d Cir. 2003): emphasized that federal courts are repeatedly discouraged from retaining state-law claims presenting unsettled issues once federal claims are gone—even after discovery and summary judgment briefing.
  • Nowak v. Ironworkers Loc. 6 Pension Fund, 81 F.3d 1182 (2d Cir. 1996): provided the governing factors for whether to retain supplemental jurisdiction—“judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity”—which the panel instructed the district court to evaluate first on remand.

5) Inherent-power sanctions and the “bad faith” distinction

  • Huebner v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 897 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2018): set the abuse-of-discretion standard for reviewing sanctions.
  • Ransmeier v. Mariani, 718 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2013): stated the baseline inherent-power sanction authority for bad-faith, vexatious, or oppressive conduct.
  • United States v. Seltzer, 227 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 2000): supplied the key doctrinal move—an explicit bad-faith finding is required when sanctioning conduct undertaken for the client’s benefit, but is not required when counsel negligently or recklessly fails in duties as an officer of the court (including violating court orders). This distinction sustained the sanction here.
  • Wolters Kluwer Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Scivantage, 564 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2009): supported “more exacting” appellate review when the judge is “accuser, fact finder and sentencing judge all in one,” which the panel applied while still affirming the sanction.
  • Rose v. City of Utica, 777 F. App’x 575 (2d Cir. 2019): invoked to show counsel had been warned before about copying/pasting text (including headnotes) into filings, making repeat misconduct more serious.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Excessive force: the video fixed the operative facts

Applying Graham v. Connor through Cugini v. City of New York, the panel held no rational jury could find objective unreasonableness given the bodycam footage: King appeared intoxicated, repeatedly refused directives, and reached into his jacket/pocket for an unknown object during the removal/arrest sequence. Even though the court corrected the district court on a narrow factual point (both hands visible at the instant of extraction), it found the officers reasonably inferred a safety risk based on the immediately preceding reaching and continued movement toward the pocket. Scott v. Harris foreclosed King’s contrary narrative.

2) Battery: coextensive with the excessive-force reasonableness inquiry

Citing Tardif v. City of New York, the panel treated the state battery claim as turning on the same “reasonableness” assessment and therefore affirmed dismissal once the force was deemed reasonable.

3) Negligence: alternative pleading allowed; New York law not treated as settled

The panel identified two independent errors in the district court’s approach. First, to the extent the district court viewed negligence and intentional tort as mutually exclusive theories that could not coexist, Federal Rule pleading principles permit alternatives even at summary judgment (Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d); Henry v. Daytop Vill., Inc.). Second, to the extent the district court concluded New York categorically bars negligence in an arrest-force setting, the panel held the rule is “unsettled” in light of the tension between Johnson v. City of New York and McCummings v. New York City Transit Auth.. Because whether McCummings meaningfully fits this record could depend on facts the district court had not analyzed, the panel remanded under Brocklesby Transp., A Div. of Kingsway Transports, Ltd. v. E. States Escort Servs..

4) Supplemental jurisdiction: comity concerns elevated by an unsettled state-law question

Recognizing that the federal claims were affirmed as dismissed, the panel flagged a recurring Second Circuit concern: federal retention of leftover state claims presenting unsettled legal issues. It instructed the district court to first decide whether to retain supplemental jurisdiction under Nowak v. Ironworkers Loc. 6 Pension Fund, mindful of the discouragement expressed in Kolari v. New-York Presbyterian Hosp. and Valencia ex rel. Franco v. Lee.

5) Sanctions: competence and compliance as officer-of-the-court obligations

The panel affirmed sanctions by applying United States v. Seltzer: even without an explicit bad-faith finding, sanctions may issue for negligent or reckless failure to perform responsibilities as an officer of the court, including violating court orders and filing noncompliant, incoherent materials. The court detailed pervasive defects (missing/unintelligible citations, placeholder cites, grammar/spelling issues, copy/paste headnotes, and rule noncompliance), rejected counsel’s health-related excuses as inadequate given the persistent pattern, and emphasized counsel’s ethical duty to withdraw if materially impaired (citing Am. Bar Ass'n Model Rules of Pro. Conduct 1.16(a)(2)). The court also referred counsel to the grievance process under 2d Cir. R. 46.2.

C. Impact

  • Video-evidence litigation: The decision reinforces that bodycam footage can crystallize facts at summary judgment under Scott v. Harris, narrowing a plaintiff’s ability to survive on testimonial disputes where video “blatantly contradicts” the account.
  • New York arrest-force negligence claims: The vacatur signals that district courts should not treat “negligent assault/battery” language as automatically foreclosing negligence theories where New York’s own precedents (e.g., McCummings v. New York City Transit Auth.) complicate categorical rules. Practically, litigants can expect closer scrutiny of whether the alleged wrong can be characterized as a breach of a duty of reasonable care distinct from an intentional use of force—and whether the claim is simply a repackaged intentional tort.
  • Supplemental jurisdiction discipline: The explicit instruction to consider comity and unsettled state-law questions may prompt more remands/dismissals without prejudice of residual state claims after federal claims are resolved, even late in litigation.
  • Attorney sanctions and appellate practice: The opinion underscores that repeated noncompliance, incoherent briefs, and rule violations can trigger inherent-power sanctions and professional discipline referrals, with Seltzer providing the doctrinal basis to proceed without a bad-faith finding where the core problem is incompetent performance of officer-of-the-court duties.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Objectively unreasonable” (excessive force): The court asks whether a reasonable officer on the scene would think the amount of force was appropriate, considering the crime, threats, and resistance—without using hindsight or the officer’s subjective motives.
  • “Blatantly contradicted” by video: If a recording clearly disproves a party’s version of events, the court can reject that version at summary judgment (Scott v. Harris), even though courts normally credit the nonmovant’s evidence.
  • Alternative pleading: A plaintiff may argue “it was intentional” and “if not intentional, it was negligent” in the same case (Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)), especially where the factfinder might view the actor’s state of mind differently.
  • Supplemental jurisdiction: Federal courts can hear state-law claims tied to the same facts as a federal claim, but once the federal claim disappears, the court must decide whether to keep the state claims based on efficiency and fairness versus state-court primacy (“comity”).
  • Inherent-power sanctions and “bad faith”: Courts can sanction attorneys for litigation abuse. When the sanction targets conduct done to help the client, courts often require a bad-faith finding; but when the conduct is a failure of basic professional obligations to the court—like ignoring orders or filing unusable papers—sanctions can be imposed for reckless/negligent dereliction (United States v. Seltzer).

5. Conclusion

King v. Davis delivers three practical lessons. First, bodycam footage can decisively shape Fourth Amendment excessive-force outcomes at summary judgment under Scott v. Harris. Second, New York’s treatment of negligence theories in police-force incidents remains sufficiently contested—given the pull between Johnson v. City of New York and McCummings v. New York City Transit Auth.—that district courts should avoid categorical dismissals without careful, fact-sensitive analysis (and should re-evaluate supplemental jurisdiction where only unsettled state law remains). Third, the opinion forcefully reiterates that sustained incompetence and noncompliance in filings can justify sanctions and disciplinary referral, even without an explicit finding of bad faith, because attorneys owe baseline competence and adherence to rules as officers of the court.