Khanimova v. Samuels: Unilateral Private Placement Reimbursement Requires Proof of Delivered Services and Objective Progress Evidence

Introduction

Khanimova v. Samuels (2d Cir. Feb. 18, 2026) arises under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) and concerns a parent’s request for retroactive tuition reimbursement after unilaterally placing her child in a private school. Plaintiff-Appellant Svetlana Khanimova, mother of R.N., a severely disabled child, challenged the New York City Department of Education’s (“DOE”) recommended public placement for the 2022–2023 school year. She reenrolled R.N. at iBrain (International Institute for the Brain), a private school, without DOE consent, and sought reimbursement.

The core issue on appeal was not whether DOE offered a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”)—DOE’s failure was treated as conceded for purposes of the dispute—but whether Khanimova carried her separate burden to prove iBrain was an appropriate unilateral placement for 2022–2023, given evidence that iBrain did not deliver the level of related services it itself recommended and given the limited, non-objective evidence of R.N.’s progress.

Note: The decision is a “SUMMARY ORDER” and explicitly “DO[ES] NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT,” though it reflects the Second Circuit’s application of established IDEA reimbursement principles.

Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment upholding the State Review Officer (“SRO”), who had denied reimbursement. The court held that the SRO’s decision merited deference because it was sufficiently supported by the administrative record.

The court emphasized two principal record-based shortcomings in the parent’s case:

  • Service-delivery gap: iBrain recommended intensive related services for R.N. (including five 60-minute sessions weekly of OT/PT/speech), yet testimony showed R.N. typically received only “two to three times per week” per discipline due to staffing shortages.
  • Lack of objective progress evidence: The record lacked quarterly progress reports, weekly provider notes, test scores, grades, or similar documentation for 2022–2023; testimony and ambiguous, unsigned affidavits did not substitute for objective proof.

Because Khanimova failed to prove iBrain’s appropriateness, the court did not reach equitable considerations and affirmed complete denial of reimbursement for the school year.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The order is largely an application of existing Second Circuit reimbursement doctrine, using prior cases to frame (1) the standard of review/deference and (2) the parent’s burden to show appropriateness of a unilateral placement.

1) Standard of review and deference to administrative IDEA decisions

  • C.L. v. Scarsdale Union Free Sch. Dist., 744 F.3d 826 (2014): Cited for de novo review of the district court’s IDEA summary-judgment disposition, while recognizing IDEA “summary judgment” operates as record-based appellate review of administrative determinations.
  • Bd. of Educ. of Yorktown Cent. Sch. Dist. v. C.S., 990 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2021): Provided the procedural lens—district courts conduct an independent review based on a preponderance of the evidence but must give “due weight” to state administrative proceedings because courts lack specialized expertise in educational policy.
  • W.A. v. Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., 927 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 2019): Reinforced that “de novo review” in IDEA cases is constrained by deference; also supported “special deference” where the district court relied solely on the administrative record. The court later relied on W.A. for affirmance where the SRO opinion is “sufficiently reasoned and adequately supported.”
  • Hardison v. Bd. of Educ. of the Oneonta City Sch. Dist., 773 F.3d 372 (2d Cir. 2014): Used repeatedly as the key comparator for (a) deference to an SRO where supported by the record and (b) the need for “objective evidence” of progress and meaningful proof that instruction and services were specially designed to meet the student’s needs.

2) Substantive reimbursement framework: parent’s burden and what “appropriate” means

  • Gagliardo v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 489 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2007): Supplied the foundational warning that parents who unilaterally place their child and seek retroactive reimbursement do so “at their own financial risk.” The court invoked this to reject the parent’s argument that total denial was “harsh and punitive.”
  • Frank G. v. Bd. of Educ. of Hyde Park, 459 F.3d 356 (2d Cir. 2006): Provided the canonical definition of an appropriate private placement: “educational instruction specially designed to meet the unique needs” of the child, supported by “services as are necessary to permit the child to benefit from instruction.” The court used this language to treat iBrain’s service failures as directly relevant to appropriateness.
  • T.K. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 810 F.3d 869 (2d Cir. 2016): Cited for the “totality of the evidence” approach and for the caution that a private placement is not automatically inappropriate merely because it failed to include multiple recommended services. The court nonetheless distinguished this case on the magnitude and importance of the missed services and on the thin showing of progress.

3) Evidence of progress and documentary corroboration

  • R.H. v. Bd. of Educ. Saugerties Cent. Sch. Dist., 776 F. App'x 719 (2d Cir. 2019): Used to illustrate what the record lacked here—test scores, grades, behavioral plans, or other progress reports—despite anecdotal testimony.
  • M.S. ex rel. S.S. v. Bd. of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of Yonkers, 231 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 2000), abrogated in part on other grounds, Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49 (2005): Cited to confirm that administrative officers may consider post-enrollment evidence of progress (or lack of progress) when evaluating appropriateness, and that regression/limited progress can support denial.
  • Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49 (2005): Mentioned only to note partial abrogation of M.S. on other grounds; it does not drive the reasoning here.

4) Distinguishing DOE’s FAPE failure from the parent’s burden

  • Cruz v. Banks, 134 F.4th 687 (2d Cir. 2025): Cited in connection with DOE’s conceded failure to offer a FAPE; the panel clarified that this concession does not reduce or alter the parent’s separate burden to prove the unilateral placement’s appropriateness.
  • D. D-S. v. Southold Union Free Sch. Dist., 506 F. App'x 80 (2d Cir. 2012): Reinforced the same point as W.A.: even where the district does not contest FAPE failure, reimbursement can still be denied if the private placement is not proven appropriate.

5) “Speculation” and implementation feasibility

  • M.O. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 793 F.3d 236 (2d Cir. 2015): Used by analogy to address the parent’s argument that the SRO speculated about iBrain’s ability to deliver services. The court accepted as non-speculative the inference that, given the timeline and unresolved shortages, it was unlikely the school could make up the missed sessions and—more fundamentally—recognized the concern that the child lacked consistent delivery of services deemed necessary for progress.

Legal Reasoning

  1. Deference framework: The court reiterated that IDEA review is record-based and requires “due weight” to state administrative proceedings. Because the SRO issued a reasoned decision supported by the record, deference was warranted.
  2. Parent’s burden on appropriateness: Under C.L. v. Scarsdale Union Free Sch. Dist. and Frank G. v. Bd. of Educ. of Hyde Park, Khanimova had to prove iBrain was reasonably calculated to provide educational benefits and that it delivered specialized instruction plus necessary services.
  3. Service-delivery shortfalls mattered here: Although T.K. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ. warns that missing recommended services does not automatically defeat appropriateness, the panel credited the SRO’s concern that iBrain’s own plan stressed that daily/consistent therapies were necessary to avoid decline and enable progress—yet staffing shortages meant those services were not delivered at the stated levels.
  4. Progress proof was insufficient and non-objective: The court treated objective evidence as “preferable” under Hardison v. Bd. of Educ. of the Oneonta City Sch. Dist.. Here, missing progress reports/provider notes, combined with limited-value testimony (including from a witness who did not oversee services or track goal-by-goal progress), supported the SRO’s conclusion that the parent failed to carry her burden.
  5. “After-the-fact” evidence is part of the “totality”: Rejecting the parent’s proposed time-of-enrollment-only lens, the court emphasized (via T.K. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ. and M.S. ex rel. S.S. v. Bd. of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of Yonkers) that post-enrollment evidence—including delivered services and progress—may be considered when deciding whether the placement was likely to produce progress during the relevant year.
  6. FAPE concession does not “carry” appropriateness: Even if DOE failed to provide a FAPE, reimbursement still requires proof that the unilateral placement was appropriate; the panel applied W.A. v. Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. and D. D-S. v. Southold Union Free Sch. Dist..
  7. No equities analysis without appropriateness: Following W.A. v. Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., the court declined to weigh equities because the parent failed at the threshold appropriateness step.

Impact

Although nonprecedential, the order has practical significance for IDEA reimbursement litigation in the Second Circuit:

  • Service delivery is evidence of appropriateness, not a technicality: Where a private school’s actual delivery materially deviates from its own prescribed intensive service model—especially when that model is described as necessary to prevent regression—parents should expect heightened scrutiny.
  • Objective documentation can be outcome-determinative: The decision underscores that progress reports and provider notes are not mere “nice-to-have” exhibits; their absence can undermine the parent’s proof even when witnesses offer generalized statements of improvement.
  • DOE’s FAPE failure does not relax the parent’s proof burden: The court reaffirmed the structural separation between (a) the district’s failure and (b) the parent’s affirmative showing that the private placement delivered an educational program likely to produce progress.
  • All-or-nothing reimbursement risk remains central: By invoking Gagliardo v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. and Hardison v. Bd. of Educ. of the Oneonta City Sch. Dist., the court reinforced that parents bear substantial financial risk when proceeding unilaterally without building a robust evidentiary record.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • IDEA: A federal law requiring public schools to provide eligible students with disabilities a tailored educational program and related services.
  • FAPE (Free Appropriate Public Education): The baseline legal entitlement under IDEA—special education and related services designed to meet a child’s unique needs at no cost to the family.
  • IEP (Individualized Education Program): The written plan that sets the student’s educational goals, placement, and required services (e.g., speech therapy, occupational therapy).
  • Unilateral private placement: When parents enroll a child in private school without the district’s agreement and later seek reimbursement. Reimbursement is possible but not guaranteed.
  • IHO / SRO: In New York’s IDEA system, an Impartial Hearing Officer conducts the initial due-process hearing; a State Review Officer reviews appeals from the IHO decision.
  • “Due weight” / deference: Courts independently review the record but generally defer to well-reasoned administrative educational judgments supported by evidence.
  • Objective evidence of progress: Documents like progress reports, data, grades, test scores, provider logs, or written plans—materials that corroborate testimony with contemporaneous records.
  • Equities: A final step (only reached if the private placement is appropriate) assessing fairness factors—e.g., parental cooperation, notice to the district, and reasonableness of actions.

Conclusion

Khanimova v. Samuels reaffirms a core IDEA reimbursement rule in practical terms: even when a school district fails to provide a FAPE, parents must still prove their unilateral private placement was appropriate as actually delivered. Here, substantial gaps between iBrain’s recommended related services and the services provided—combined with the absence of objective progress documentation—supported the SRO’s conclusion that the parent did not carry her burden. The decision highlights the evidentiary discipline required in reimbursement cases: service-delivery records and progress reporting are often decisive.