Keenan v. O’Reilly: Internally Contradictory Deposition Testimony Cannot Establish Premises-Owner Notice to Defeat Summary Judgment

1. Introduction

In Bernard Keenan v. O'Reilly Auto Enterprises (6th Cir. May 11, 2026) (unpublished), the Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for a premises owner in a Michigan slip-and-fall case arising from an alleged oil spill in a store parking lot. Plaintiff Bernard Keenan, an invitee, claimed he slipped on oil outside an O’Reilly Auto Parts store and suffered injuries. The pivotal issue was not whether an oil spill existed, but whether O’Reilly had actual or constructive notice of the hazard before the fall—an essential element of Michigan premises-liability law.

The case turned largely on Keenan’s deposition testimony: at points he said he told employees there was “oil” in the parking lot; later he stated he did not, “to [his] knowledge,” say anything about oil in the parking lot. The majority treated these statements as internally contradictory and insufficient, standing alone, to create a triable issue on notice. Judge Griffin dissented, arguing the record—viewed favorably to Keenan—could permit a jury to find notice.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The court affirmed summary judgment for O’Reilly because Keenan failed to present evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that O’Reilly had notice of the oil spill before he fell.

  • Actual notice: No evidence showed employees knew of the spill before the fall; Keenan’s testimony about telling them was deemed self-contradictory and thus not enough.
  • Constructive notice: Keenan did not meaningfully challenge the district court’s finding of no constructive notice, forfeiting the argument; the record also suggested the spill was “fresh[]” and possibly present for “an hour” or less—insufficient to impute discovery.
  • “Mess” statements: Apologizing for a “mess” on the store’s tile/rug at most implicated an indoor condition, not a parking-lot hazard.

Judge Griffin dissented, emphasizing that summary judgment requires construing the evidence in the nonmovant’s favor and arguing Keenan’s testimony—while imprecise—was not the kind of logically self-negating account that should be disregarded.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

Michigan premises-liability duty and notice

  • Kandil-Elsayed v. F & E Oil, Inc., 1 N.W.3d 44 (Mich. 2023): Cited for the baseline duty that landowners owe invitees “reasonable care” against unreasonable risks posed by dangerous land conditions. The Sixth Circuit used it as the doctrinal entry point, but the dispositive question became notice rather than the contours of “reasonable care.”
  • Lowrey v. LMPS & LMPJ, Inc., 890 N.W.2d 344 (Mich. 2016): The opinion’s central Michigan authority. It supplies the rule that breach generally requires actual or constructive notice of the hazardous condition. The court relied on Lowrey’s definitions: actual notice as direct knowledge; constructive notice when a condition is of such character or duration that a reasonable premises possessor would have discovered it.
  • Bragg v. Daimler Chrysler, No. 290371, 2010 WL 3604428 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 16, 2010) (per curiam): Cited as an example in the constructive-notice discussion, supporting the common Michigan approach requiring evidence about the duration/visibility of the hazard to infer constructive notice.
  • Hampton v. Waste Mgmt. of Mich., Inc., 601 N.W.2d 172 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (per curiam): Cited in the dissent for the proposition that showing notice is sufficient to survive summary judgment where it is a material factual dispute. It frames the dissent’s view that the record permitted an inference of notice through Keenan’s statements and conduct.

Federal summary judgment standards

  • Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986): The majority invoked the “record as a whole” standard—whether a rational trier of fact could find for the nonmovant. This supplied the lens through which Keenan’s notice proof was tested.
  • Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986): Used by both the majority (via Penny) and the dissent (directly) for the “light most favorable to the non-moving party” and “all justifiable inferences” principle—illustrating that the dispute is not the formal standard, but how to apply it to this deposition record.
  • Codrington v. Dolak, 142 F.4th 884 (6th Cir. 2025): Cited by the dissent as a contemporary Sixth Circuit reminder of the proper summary judgment posture.
  • Briggs v. Potter, 463 F.3d 507 (6th Cir. 2006): Cited by the dissent to criticize the majority’s approach as inconsistent with viewing evidence favorably to the plaintiff.

“Self-contradictory testimony” and the inability to create a genuine fact issue

  • Plant v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 212 F.3d 929 (6th Cir. 2000): A key majority authority for disregarding “self-contradictory testimony” as insufficient to create a genuine dispute. The court analogized Keenan’s shifting account of whether he told employees about oil to testimony that cannot support a jury finding on an essential element.
  • Bush v. Compass Grp. USA, Inc., 683 F. App'x 440 (6th Cir. 2017): Reinforced the principle that internally contradictory testimony cannot, by itself, create a genuine dispute of material fact, quoting Jeffreys v. City of New York, 426 F.3d 549 (2d Cir. 2005) for the “suspension of disbelief” formulation.
  • Campbell v. Grand Trunk W. R.R. Co., 238 F.3d 772 (6th Cir. 2001) and Doe v. Sullivan County, 956 F.2d 545 (6th Cir. 1992): Additional Sixth Circuit support for refusing to treat conflicting statements as creating a triable issue.
  • Gearhart v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 833 F. App'x 416 (6th Cir. 2020) and Hayes v. Norfolk S. Corp., 25 F. App'x 308 (6th Cir. 2001): Further citations underscoring that contradiction on a relevant point is not enough to establish an element of a claim.
  • Penny v. United Parcel Serv., 128 F.3d 408 (6th Cir. 1997): Used to characterize “inherently contradictory” statements as lacking the “significant probative evidence” necessary to avoid summary judgment (quoting Anderson).

Deposition objections and waiver

  • Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(d)(3)(B): The majority relied on this rule to explain why Keenan’s appellate challenge to the admissibility of one deposition answer did not cure the problem—especially where other damaging answers went unchallenged.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

The majority’s reasoning proceeds in two steps: (1) identify notice as a required element under Michigan law (Lowrey v. LMPS & LMPJ, Inc.); (2) test whether Keenan produced admissible evidence that could allow a reasonable jury to find notice under federal summary judgment standards (Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.).

Actual notice. The court rejected actual notice through three factual pathways: (a) no proof O’Reilly created the spill; (b) no proof employees independently discovered it before the fall; (c) no reliable proof Keenan warned them. On (c), the court treated Keenan’s deposition as fatal: his early “I told them there was oil” was later retracted or disclaimed (“I don’t remember”; “Not to my knowledge”). Applying Plant v. Morton Int'l, Inc. and Bush v. Compass Grp. USA, Inc., the court held that self-contradictory testimony, without more, cannot create a genuine issue of material fact.

The court also addressed Keenan’s fallback that he apologized for a “mess.” It parsed the deposition context: Keenan connected the “mess” to slipping slightly on the indoor tile and wiping his shoe on an entry rug. The court concluded this, at most, put employees on notice of a potential indoor condition—not an oil pool in the parking lot.

Constructive notice. The majority held Keenan forfeited any constructive-notice argument by failing to develop it on appeal. It then added an alternative merits holding: the evidence suggested the spill was “fresh[]” and possibly present for “an hour” or less, without proof of duration sufficient to impute knowledge. The reference to Bragg v. Daimler Chrysler reflects Michigan courts’ insistence on evidence about the time the hazard existed or other circumstances showing the owner should have discovered it.

Dissent’s methodology. Judge Griffin accepted that internally contradictory testimony may be disregarded in appropriate cases (Plant v. Morton Int'l, Inc.; Bush v. Compass Grp. USA, Inc.), but argued Keenan’s testimony was not logically self-negating in the way those cases were. In the dissent’s view, Keenan consistently conveyed that he alerted employees to a hazardous condition (even if he used varied terms such as “oil” or “mess”), and a jury could treat that as notice triggering a duty to respond.

3.3. Impact

Although unpublished and “NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION,” the decision is likely to be cited for two practical propositions in Sixth Circuit diversity premises cases (and beyond):

  • Notice proof must be stable and specific. Where notice depends primarily on a plaintiff’s own deposition, internal contradictions can be outcome-determinative at summary judgment.
  • Location specificity matters. Statements that arguably indicate a problem “in here” (store floor) may not support notice of an “out there” hazard (parking lot) unless the plaintiff clearly links the two.

The opinion also illustrates an increasingly common litigation dynamic: plaintiffs often have limited evidence about the origin and duration of transient hazards (like oil), making actual-notice via contemporaneous warning the easiest path—yet also the most vulnerable to deposition imprecision. Defense counsel will likely use this case to argue that equivocation (“I don’t remember,” “not to my knowledge”) collapses notice where there is no corroboration (e.g., incident reports, surveillance footage, third-party witnesses).

Conversely, the dissent provides a roadmap for plaintiffs to argue that “contradiction” should not be overread: deposition narratives can be nonlinear, especially for elderly or injured witnesses, and “mess” language can reasonably be interpreted as referencing the outdoor substance tracked inside—issues typically suited for a jury.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Invitee: A customer is an “invitee”—someone on the property for the owner’s commercial benefit. Owners owe invitees a duty of reasonable care.
  • Premises liability: A negligence claim focused on unsafe property conditions (e.g., spills, ice, broken pavement).
  • Actual notice vs. constructive notice:
    • Actual notice means the owner/employee actually knew about the hazard.
    • Constructive notice means the hazard existed long enough or was obvious enough that the owner should have found it through reasonable inspection.
  • Summary judgment: A pretrial ruling that ends a case when no reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party on the evidence. Courts must view facts and inferences in the nonmovant’s favor, but the nonmovant still must produce evidence that is sufficiently reliable and non-speculative.
  • “Self-contradictory testimony”: When a witness offers materially conflicting statements on the key fact needed to prove the claim. The Sixth Circuit line of cases cited here treats certain internal contradictions as insufficient, by themselves, to create a genuine issue for trial.
  • Forfeiture on appeal: If a party does not meaningfully develop an argument in its appellate brief, the court may deem it forfeited and decline to consider it.

5. Conclusion

Bernard Keenan v. O'Reilly Auto Enterprises reinforces that, under Michigan premises-liability law, proof of a transient hazard is not enough; the plaintiff must also show the premises owner had actual or constructive notice in time to act. The Sixth Circuit held Keenan failed to create a triable issue on notice because his only pro-notice evidence—his own deposition statements that he told employees about oil—was materially undercut by later deposition answers denying, “to [his] knowledge,” that he said anything about oil in the parking lot. The dissent would have left the notice question to a jury under the “light most favorable” summary judgment standard.

Practically, the case highlights the evidentiary fragility of premises claims built primarily on a plaintiff’s uncorroborated recollection and underscores the litigation importance of consistent, location-specific notice testimony (or, better yet, corroborating evidence) when the hazard is fleeting and its duration cannot be shown.