K-9 Deployment During In-Home Warrant Arrest Is Objectively Reasonable When Officers Give Repeated Warnings, Face Prolonged Noncompliance, and Release the Dog Promptly After Handcuffing

1. Introduction

This appeal arose from a late-night effort by Gwinnett County Sheriff’s Office deputies to execute two outstanding arrest warrants for aggravated stalking and violating felony probation at Nickolas Ewing’s home. Deputies attempted for nearly an hour to secure Ewing’s surrender—knocking, ringing the doorbell, calling his phone, and loudly announcing their presence. After repeated warnings that they would enter with a K-9, deputies forced entry and conducted a dimly lit search. A police dog located Ewing in a closet, bit his ankle, and maintained the bite until deputies handcuffed him; the dog was released seconds after handcuffing.

Ewing sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging: (i) excessive force against the K-9 handler (Deputy Cole), (ii) failure to intervene against other deputies, and (iii) supervisory and failure-to-train liability against the sheriff. The district court reviewed body-camera footage and granted judgment on the pleadings. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the K-9 use was objectively reasonable and, without an underlying constitutional violation, the derivative claims necessarily failed.

2. Summary of the Opinion

Applying the Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard, the court concluded that deploying the K-9 and maintaining the bite until Ewing was handcuffed was reasonable in light of: (1) the seriousness of the crimes reflected in the warrants and Ewing’s violent history, (2) the deputies’ reasonable perception of threat given prolonged noncompliance in a dark, unfamiliar house, (3) Ewing’s evasion by refusing to respond for almost an hour, (4) the need for some force to effectuate the arrest, (5) proportionality—particularly repeated warnings and prompt release after restraint, and (6) although Ewing alleged continuing pain/numbness, injury severity alone did not render the force unreasonable.

The court also rejected Ewing’s procedural argument that body-camera video could not be considered at the pleadings stage, holding that where video is referenced in the complaint, central to the claims, and undisputed as to authenticity/relevance, the court may consider it. Finally, because no constitutional violation was pleaded, the failure-to-intervene, supervisory, and failure-to-train claims failed as a matter of law.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

A. Pleadings-stage review and use of video evidence

• Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Winder Lab'ys, LLC, 73 F.4th 934, 940 (11th Cir. 2023) (quoting Cannon v. City of W. Palm Beach, 250 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001)): supplied the Rule 12(c) framework—accept pleaded facts as true, view them favorably to the nonmovant, and grant judgment when no material dispute exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
• Baker v. City of Madison, Ala., 67 F. 4th 1268, 1276 927 (11th Cir. 2000): used for the proposition that courts may consider body-camera videos referenced in the complaint when central to the claim and undisputed. This was pivotal because the district court relied on footage to evaluate the timing of warnings, entry, the bite, and the release.
• Swinford v. Santos, 121 F.4th 179, 188 (11th Cir. 2024): reinforced that video can “clearly show unedited footage” relevant to the excessive-force event even if it does not capture every angle or all prior hours; the court analogized Swinford to reject Ewing’s argument that missing pre-arrest “planning” footage undermined the record.

B. The governing excessive-force standard and balancing factors

• Crenshaw v. Lister, 556 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1347 (11th Cir. 2002)): anchored the Fourth Amendment inquiry in objective reasonableness “in light of the facts confronting the officer.” Crenshaw was also used substantively to validate K-9 use during a suspect search/arrest where the suspect has not shown an intent to surrender and to endorse waiting to remove the dog until the suspect is restrained.
• Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989): supplied the core rule—reasonableness is judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on scene, not hindsight—and the principle that some degree of coercion may be used to effect an arrest.
• Jones v. Fransen, 857 F.3d 843, 853 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Crenshaw): provided the balancing formulation weighing the intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests against countervailing government interests.
• Hinson v. Bias, 927 F.3d 1103, 1117 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Crenshaw): supplied the Eleventh Circuit’s multi-factor test (severity of crime, threat, resistance/evasion, need for force, proportionality, injury). The court marched through these factors to sustain the K-9 deployment.
• Rodriguez v. Farrell, 280 F.3d 1341, 1351 (11th Cir. 2002): cited to emphasize that typical arrests can involve some force and some injury without becoming unconstitutional.
• Mobley v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff Dep't, 783 F.3d 1347, 1356 (11th Cir. 2015): used to rebut the argument that injury severity alone dictates unreasonableness.

C. K-9 bite duration: constitutional vs. unconstitutional lines

• Edwards v. Shanley, 666 F.3d 1289, 1295–96 (11th Cir. 2012): used both to highlight that, before surrender, deployment may be reasonable, and to provide a contrast case where a bite lasting five to seven minutes after surrender was unconstitutional.
• Priester v. City of Riviera Beach, Fla., 208 F.3d 919, 927 (11th Cir. 2000): provided another contrast—unconstitutional force where a compliant suspect was subjected to a dog bite for about two minutes.
• Crenshaw v. Lister, 556 F.3d at 1293: applied directly to approve the practice of waiting until the suspect is secured before calling off the dog, including where the suspect may not be actively resisting at that moment.

D. Rejecting “least intrusive alternative” hindsight arguments

• Garczynski v. Bradshaw, 573 F.3d 1158, 1167 (11th Cir. 2009): framed the court’s refusal to second-guess alternative tactics (e.g., “wait until morning”) and reinforced that the sole inquiry is objective reasonableness at the time.
• Menuel v. City of Atlanta, 25 F.3d 990, 996-97 (11th Cir. 1994): reiterated that the Fourth Amendment does not require the least intrusive alternative.
• Davis v. Waller, 44 F.4th 1305, 1316 (11th Cir. 2022): underscored that there is no circuit precedent requiring officers to use all feasible alternatives to avoid a situation leading to justified force.

E. Derivative liability (failure to intervene, supervision, training) requires an underlying violation

• Crenshaw v. Lister, 556 F.3d at 1294: cited for the requirement of an underlying constitutional violation for failure-to-intervene liability.
• Am. Fed'n of Lab. & Cong. of Indus. Orgs. v. City of Miami, 637 F.3d 1178, 1190 (11th Cir. 2011): cited to confirm that supervisory liability depends on a constitutional violation.
• Baxter v. Santiago-Miranda, 121 F.4th 873, 892 (11th Cir. 2024): invoked for the proposition that failure-to-train claims require an underlying constitutional violation.
• Andre v. Clayton Cnty., 148 F.4th 1282, 1306 (11th Cir. 2025): cited for municipal-entity liability requiring a predicate violation; while this case involved a sheriff and deputies, the court used Andre to underscore the general predicate-violation requirement for entity-type claims.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning is best understood as a tightly fact-bound application of Graham/Crenshaw/Hinson to a K-9 search in a home after prolonged refusal to surrender. Several features did the heaviest work:

• Extended, documented warnings and opportunities to surrender: The deputies announced themselves every three to five minutes for almost an hour, explicitly warning that they would enter with a dog. They repeated warnings immediately before entry and again three times after forcing the door but before crossing the threshold. These warnings supported the inference that Ewing knowingly refused to comply and that the dog bite risk was avoidable through surrender.
• Reasonable perception of threat in an uncertain environment: The deputies were executing warrants related to serious conduct, in a dark and unfamiliar house, after a long period of silence and apparent movement seen through a window. This combination supported the government interest in using a K-9 to locate and “neutralize any threat” during the search.
• Temporal limitation of force: Once the dog located Ewing, the bite was maintained while deputies approached and handcuffed him. Handcuffing took just over thirty seconds, and the dog was released seconds later. By contrasting Edwards and Priester, the court effectively treated prompt release after restraint as a constitutional dividing line in this scenario.
• Injury does not control the analysis: The court credited Ewing’s allegation of ongoing pain and numbness but treated this as one factor that could not, standing alone, overcome the other reasonableness indicators (especially warnings, evasion, and rapid disengagement).
• Procedural gatekeeping via video at Rule 12(c): The court approved consideration of body-camera footage to evaluate what happened before/during/after the bite, thereby narrowing the space for a plausible excessive-force claim based on characterizations contradicted by the videos.

Having found no Fourth Amendment violation by the K-9 handler, the court disposed of the remaining claims through a straightforward predicate-violation principle: failure-to-intervene, supervisory liability, and failure-to-train claims cannot proceed in the absence of an underlying constitutional wrong.

3.3 Impact

Although “NOT FOR PUBLICATION,” the opinion consolidates several recurring themes in Eleventh Circuit force jurisprudence: (1) courts will not impose a “least intrusive alternative” requirement (e.g., “wait until morning”); (2) bite duration and the timing of surrender/restraint matter greatly—rapid disengagement after handcuffing remains a key factor separating permissible K-9 use from Edwards/Priester-type violations; and (3) body-camera footage can be outcome-determinative even at the pleadings stage when incorporated by reference and central to the claim.

For future litigation, plaintiffs challenging K-9 deployments will likely focus on (a) absence or inadequacy of warnings, (b) evidence of actual surrender or compliance before the bite or while it continued, (c) prolonged bite duration after restraint, or (d) deployment where the threat and evasion indicators are weak. Defendants, conversely, will point to this case to argue that documented warnings, uncertainty in building searches, and quick release post-handcuffing satisfy objective reasonableness as a matter of law—potentially even on Rule 12(c) where video is available.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Objective reasonableness” (Fourth Amendment): The question is not whether force seems excessive in hindsight, but whether a reasonable officer, with the information available at the time, could think the force used was appropriate.
• Rule 12(c) “judgment on the pleadings”: A case can be decided early when, taking the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true, the law still favors the defendant. If a central, undisputed video is incorporated by the complaint, the court may consider it in assessing what the pleadings plausibly show.
• “Failure to intervene”: Officers who do not personally use force can be liable if they observe an unconstitutional use of force and have a realistic opportunity to stop it. If the force is constitutional, there is nothing to “intervene” against.
• “Supervisory liability” and “failure to train”: Claims against leadership (like a sheriff) typically require proof that a constitutional violation occurred and that the supervisor’s actions/policies (or lack of training) caused it. No underlying violation usually ends these claims.
• K-9 “bite-and-hold” and duration: Courts scrutinize how long a dog is permitted to maintain a bite, especially after a suspect has surrendered or is restrained. The opinion treats “seconds after handcuffing” as materially different from minutes after compliance.

5. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed judgment on the pleadings because the deputies’ K-9 deployment—preceded by repeated warnings and followed by prompt release after handcuffing—was objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment given the seriousness of the warrants, the prolonged nonresponse, and the risks inherent in searching a dark home for a non-surrendering suspect. The court’s no-violation finding also extinguished derivative failure-to-intervene and supervisory/failure-to-train theories. Even as an unpublished decision, the opinion crystallizes a fact pattern in which K-9 force is likely to be upheld: ample warnings, evident evasion, controlled deployment, and rapid disengagement once the suspect is secured.