“Just Cause” Under Code § 63.2-1202(H) Is a Discretionary, Totality-of-Circumstances Standard (Not a Per Se Rule) Even When a No-Contact Order Exists

I. Introduction

In Perkins v. Howington (Va. Mar. 12, 2026), the Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed a stepparent adoption granted without the biological mother’s consent under Code § 63.2-1202(H). The child, J.H., had been living with the father and stepmother after a series of juvenile court child protective orders restricted—and at times prohibited—the mother’s contact due to abuse/neglect findings tied to substance use.

The central issue was whether the mother’s lack of visitation or contact during the six months immediately preceding the adoption petition was “without just cause,” particularly where a no-contact order was in place and the mother claimed she pursued lawful avenues to restore contact.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Court affirmed the adoption. It held that:

  • The six-month “neither visited nor contacted” element in Code § 63.2-1202(H) is an objective, binary inquiry limited to the six months immediately preceding the petition.
  • The “just cause” component is a legal standard (not a rigid rule), requiring consideration of all relevant circumstances and conferring discretion on the circuit court; appellate review is for abuse of discretion.
  • Although the Court of Appeals erred by effectively adopting a per se rule that lack of contact under a no-contact order is always “without just cause,” the circuit court’s conclusion in this case was still within its discretion because the no-contact order stemmed from the mother’s own conduct and the record supported findings of insufficient diligence and continuing substance-abuse-related concerns.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Adoption as statutory and reviewed de novo for statutory meaning

  • Fletcher v. Flanary, 185 Va. 409 (1946): Cited for the foundational proposition that “the entire field of adoption is covered by statute.” The Court relied on this to frame adoption as a statutory domain where courts must hew closely to legislative text.
  • Berry v. Barnes, 72 Va. App. 281 (2020): Used to reinforce that adoption is “solely a creature of statute” and to support de novo review of statutory interpretation questions.

2. Deference to circuit court factfinding and discretionary determinations

  • Geouge v. Traylor, 68 Va. App. 343 (2017): Central to the Court’s allocation of decision-making authority in adoption matters to the circuit court, emphasizing its “closest contact” with the parties and the child. Also supplies the formulation of abuse of discretion (whether “reasonable jurists” could disagree).
  • Dyer v. Howell, 212 Va. 453 (1971): Cited for the “plainly wrong or without evidence to support” standard applied to circuit court factual findings.
  • T.S.G. v. B.A.S., 52 Va. App. 583 (2008): Cited alongside Dyer to reinforce appellate deference in adoption-related fact determinations.
  • Hamad v. Hamad, 61 Va. App. 593 (2013): Quoted (via Geouge) for the abuse-of-discretion articulation.

3. Code § 63.2-1202(H): the binary six-month element and the “just cause” element

  • Copeland v. Todd, 282 Va. 183 (2011): The Court’s anchor for interpreting the “neither visited nor contacted” component as a limited, objective inquiry, forbidding courts from evaluating the “quality and value” of contact and restricting the temporal focus to the six months immediately preceding the petition. The Court also noted the 2012 amendment adding “immediately” confirmed Copeland’s reading.
  • Welsh v. Commonwealth, 304 Va. 118 (2025): Used conceptually to distinguish rules (objective, straightforward application) from standards (context-dependent, judgment-laden). The Court used this framework to explain why “just cause” cannot be reduced to a mechanical test.
  • Wynnycky v. Kozel, 71 Va. App. 177 (2019): Cited for the proposition that standards “are not amenable to the creation of hard and fast rules,” supporting the Supreme Court’s rejection of the Court of Appeals’ attempted bright-line approach.

4. The Court’s treatment of the intermediate appellate decision

  • Perkins v. Howington, 82 Va. App. 1 (2024): The Supreme Court accepted the Court of Appeals’ observation that “just cause” is hard to define precisely, but rejected the Court of Appeals’ movement toward a rigid approach—while ultimately affirming the judgment on the circuit court’s discretionary, fact-intensive reasoning.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The six-month “visit or contact” requirement is a rule (binary and time-boxed)

The Court reaffirmed Copeland v. Todd and treated the first statutory element as a “classic legal rule”: did the birth parent visit or contact the child in the six months immediately prior to filing? Here, the petition was filed April 13, 2021; the relevant period ran back to October 13, 2020. It was undisputed the mother had neither visited nor contacted the child during that window (indeed, since the July 14, 2020 no-contact order). That ended the first element.

2. “Just cause” is a standard (contextual, discretionary, and reviewed for abuse of discretion)

The Court’s key doctrinal move is its explicit classification of “just cause” as a standard rather than a rule. That classification drives two consequences:

  • Scope of relevance: unlike the six-month element, the “just cause” inquiry may require facts before the six-month period (to understand why noncontact occurred) and may even consider later facts for context (not as causal proof, but to understand the relationship and circumstances).
  • Standard of review: because standards require judgment, the circuit court has a “measure of discretion,” and the Supreme Court will reverse only for abuse of discretion.

3. No-contact orders do not create an automatic “just cause” safe harbor, but they matter

The mother argued that compliance with a no-contact order is the clearest possible “just cause,” especially where she pursued court remedies to lift the order. The Supreme Court agreed the existence of the order is “part of the story,” and criticized the Court of Appeals for effectively adopting a per se rule that noncontact under a no-contact order is always “without just cause.”

But the Court held the circuit court properly looked beyond the order’s existence to the surrounding circumstances, including:

  • The no-contact order arose from findings of abuse/neglect linked to the mother’s substance use; thus, the mother’s misconduct was an ultimate cause of the restriction.
  • The mother did not promptly seek modification when the no-contact order was reviewed (Aug. 18, 2020), and later failed to comply with a JDR directive to file a bill of particulars.
  • The record (viewed favorably to the petitioners) supported continued substance-abuse concerns and missed/failed screens—relevant because the original order’s rationale centered on drug-related risk.

Given those facts, the Supreme Court concluded “reasonable jurists” could agree the lack of contact was “without just cause,” so there was no abuse of discretion.

4. A notable procedural posture: affirmance despite flawed intermediate reasoning

The Supreme Court’s decision is also a reminder that an appellate court may affirm a correct result even if part of the lower appellate reasoning was wrong. The Court expressly rejected the Court of Appeals’ effort to “engraft a bright-line rule” onto a standard, but held the circuit court’s totality-based approach supported the judgment.

C. Impact

  • Clarifies Virginia law on “just cause” under Code § 63.2-1202(H): “just cause” is a discretionary, fact-intensive standard, not a definition susceptible to rigid categorical rules.
  • Constrains future litigants and courts from per se arguments: neither side can rely on a single fact—such as the mere presence of a no-contact order—to automatically win the “just cause” inquiry.
  • Elevates the importance of diligence and compliance evidence: birth parents opposing adoption will likely need to document prompt, sustained efforts to restore contact (and compliance with the underlying safety conditions), while petitioners will emphasize that restrictions stemmed from the birth parent’s conduct and persisted due to ongoing risk factors.
  • Appellate posture: by placing “just cause” within the circuit court’s discretionary sphere, the decision makes reversals rarer absent clear misapplication, ignored factors, or unsupported factfinding.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Code § 63.2-1202(H): allows adoption without a birth parent’s consent if (i) no visit/contact in the immediately preceding six months, and (ii) that lack of contact was “without just cause,” proven by clear and convincing evidence.
  • Clear and convincing evidence: a higher burden than “more likely than not,” requiring a firm belief or conviction in the truth of the allegations.
  • Rule vs. standard: a rule is applied mechanically (e.g., “any contact in six months: yes/no”); a standard requires judgment based on context (e.g., whether reasons for noncontact are justified).
  • Abuse of discretion: an appellate court will not overturn a discretionary decision unless it is outside the range of reasonable outcomes.
  • Ore tenus: evidence presented live in court; appellate courts typically defer to the trial judge’s ability to weigh credibility.
  • Guardian ad litem (GAL): an attorney appointed to represent the child’s best interests in the proceeding.

V. Conclusion

Perkins v. Howington establishes a key interpretive and review framework for Code § 63.2-1202(H): the six-month contact element is a strict, binary rule, but “just cause” is a discretionary, totality-of-circumstances standard. The Supreme Court rejected a bright-line approach that would mechanically decide “just cause” based solely on the existence of a no-contact order, while affirming that a circuit court may find noncontact “without just cause” when the order arose from the birth parent’s own misconduct and the record shows insufficient diligence or continuing conditions that justified the restriction.