Jury Determinations Required for Unjust Enrichment “Rent,” Pritchard Setoff, and Reasonable Rental Value on Remand (Taylor v. Taylor)

Introduction

Case: Taylor v. Taylor, 2026 MT 223N (Mont. Sept. 15, 2026) (memorandum opinion; noncitable).
Parties: Gary Taylor (father; plaintiff/appellant) vs. George Anthony “Tony” Taylor and Anne Marie Taylor (son and daughter-in-law; defendants/appellees).
Dispute: A family property conflict following Gary’s 2013 conveyance of Parcel B-1 to Tony via quitclaim deed, Gary’s continued occupancy, later demands for “rent,” and claims tied to improvements (notably a private road) and alleged unpaid rental value.

This is the second appeal. In the first appeal, Taylor v. Taylor, No. DA 23-0554, 2024 MT 297N, 2024 Mont. LEXIS 1362 (“Taylor I”), the Montana Supreme Court affirmed quiet title and possession for the Taylors but reversed and remanded on damages (contract/unjust enrichment) and potential offsets under Pritchard Petroleum Co. v. Farmers Coop. Oil & Supply Co..

On remand, the District Court (Jefferson County) held the alleged oral rent contract unenforceable under the statute of frauds, then awarded the Taylors $60,000 on unjust enrichment (using a $2,000/month figure) and allowed only a $6,100 offset for the road. The Supreme Court reversed again, holding that disputed factual issues required jury resolution and that the District Court misapplied the remand directives and governing standards.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court reversed the District Court’s remand orders awarding unjust enrichment damages and limiting offset. The Court held that:

  • Determining whether Gary was a good-faith or bad-faith trespasser—and when any status changed—presents disputed factual issues unsuitable for summary judgment and requiring a jury.
  • The District Court erred by arbitrarily limiting potential Pritchard setoff to the road cost rather than considering Gary’s claimed “improvements” and whether they enhanced value, as Taylor I directed.
  • The $2,000/month figure from Tony’s demand letter was not established as the property’s reasonable rental value; without evidentiary support, the amount is a jury question.
  • The Court admonished counsel for citing unpublished opinions and corrected briefing errors about standards of review; it also criticized the District Court’s reliance on text that was not from the Court’s opinion but rather generated by LexisNexis.

The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these holdings.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Taylor v. Taylor, No. DA 23-0554, 2024 MT 297N, 2024 Mont. LEXIS 1362 (“Taylor I”)

Taylor I framed the remand: if contract damages failed, the District Court had to make findings on unjust enrichment and address potential offsets under Pritchard. In the present appeal, the Court treated Taylor I as controlling on the scope of remand—especially the directive to consider “improvements” and enhanced value, and to develop findings and conclusions based on existing and/or additional evidence.

The District Court’s narrow view—treating only the road as offset-eligible and using the demanded “rent” as the unjust enrichment measure—conflicted with Taylor I’s explicit instructions. This mismatch drove the reversal.

Pritchard Petroleum Co. v. Farmers Coop. Oil & Supply Co., 121 Mont. 1, 190 P.2d 55 (1948)

Pritchard provides two critical principles the Court applied:

  • A good faith trespasser who makes permanent improvements may seek an equitable setoff to “recoup the value of the improvements” to the extent they “enhanced the value of the land.”
  • “The value of the use is the value to the owner of the property, not its value to the wrongdoer,” anchoring damages to reasonable rental value rather than unilateral demands.

The Court used Pritchard as the doctrinal bridge between (a) wrongful occupancy damages and (b) offsets for improvements. Importantly, Pritchard makes the trespasser’s good faith status pivotal—turning the remand into a fact-intensive inquiry unsuitable for summary resolution on this record.

Davis v. Westphal, 2017 MT 276, 389 Mont. 251, 405 P.3d 73

Davis was cited for two related points:

  • Summary judgment conclusions (genuine issue/entitlement as a matter of law) are reviewed de novo.
  • It reiterated Pritchard’s setoff rule: a good faith trespasser’s equitable recoupment for improvements enhancing land value.

The Court invoked Davis to reinforce that the District Court’s decisions were legal determinations subject to fresh review, and to re-anchor the setoff doctrine the District Court had narrowed.

Volk v. Goeser, 2016 MT 61, 382 Mont. 382, 367 P.3d 378, and Albert v. City of Billings, 2012 MT 159, 365 Mont. 454, 282 P.3d 704

These cases supplied the modern Rule 56 framework: summary judgment is proper only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The Court used them to critique the District Court’s effective “fact-finding” on disputed matters—trespasser status, reasonable rental value, and improvements—without a trial.

Missoula Cnty. v. State, 2024 MT 98, 416 Mont. 340, 547 P.3d 1268

Missoula Cnty. was used to restate the three elements of unjust enrichment and the principle that unjust enrichment is an equitable claim available in the absence of an enforceable contract. This supported the District Court’s threshold move away from contract—but not its later damage and offset methodology.

Goodover v. Lindey's, Inc., 255 Mont. 430, 843 P.2d 765 (1992)

Goodover supplied the proposition that reasonable rental value can be a proper estimation of the value of use of property. The Court relied on Goodover to reject the idea that a demanded rent amount is automatically the “reasonable rental value,” particularly where the alleged contract was found unenforceable and the record lacked independent support for the figure.

State v. Oie, 2007 MT 328, 340 Mont. 205, 174 P.3d 937, and State v. Ferre, 2014 MT 96, 374 Mont. 428, 322 P.3d 1047

These cases were cited to enforce the rule against citing unpublished Montana Supreme Court opinions as precedent and to admonish counsel. Although the decision itself is a memorandum opinion, it emphasizes professional and procedural discipline: unpublished decisions are nonprecedential and are to be given no regard when improperly cited.

Legal Reasoning

1) Remand did not authorize renewed summary “fact-finding” on disputed issues

The Supreme Court treated the remand instructions from Taylor I as requiring a developed factual record and findings on unjust enrichment and setoff. Once the District Court concluded the oral contract was barred by the statute of frauds, the unjust enrichment pathway required determinations that are inherently fact-bound:

  • Whether Gary’s occupancy was wrongful and, if so, when it became wrongful.
  • Whether Gary was a good faith or bad faith trespasser, and whether/when that changed.
  • What constituted compensable “improvements,” whether they were permanent, and whether they enhanced value.
  • What the reasonable rental value actually was.

By selecting a rent number from a demand letter, setting a fixed multi-month damage total, and narrowing offsets to one line item (the road), the District Court necessarily resolved contested matters. Under the Rule 56 framework, that was error.

2) The good-faith/bad-faith trespasser distinction is outcome-determinative under Pritchard

The Court emphasized that once wrongful occupancy damages are contemplated, Pritchard requires asking whether the occupant is a “good faith trespasser” for purposes of equitable recoupment. That inquiry is not a label; it is a factual conclusion informed by knowledge, intent, notice, and the timing of events (e.g., when demand was made, when possession was refused, what each party reasonably believed about rights to occupy).

Because the Taylors argued “bad faith trespasser” and Gary argued for offsets (implying good faith), the Court held the record contained disputed issues for a jury.

3) “Reasonable rental value” requires evidence, not a unilateral number

The District Court used Tony’s $2,000/month demand as the rental-value proxy. The Supreme Court rejected this because:

  • the figure originated in an alleged contract the court deemed unenforceable; and
  • the record lacked independent documentation establishing that $2,000 was the market-based reasonable rental value of Parcel B-1.

Under Goodover and Pritchard, reasonable rental value is a proper measure, but it must be proved. The Court therefore treated valuation as a fact question.

4) Scope of improvements and enhancement-of-value cannot be reduced to one receipt

The remand contemplated “improvements” broadly and required an enhancement-of-value analysis. Gary submitted a declaration listing multiple claimed expenditures (road, well, water shed, roof repairs, taxes/insurance, and alleged personal property losses). The Taylors disputed several items and argued most were outside remand. The Supreme Court rejected that narrow framing as contrary to Taylor I and as an improper resolution of disputed facts.

5) Procedural integrity: misquoting and use of non-opinion text

The Court specifically noted that the District Court’s June 20, 2025 order quoted a “Court Rationale” that was not from the Court’s Taylor I opinion but rather language generated by LexisNexis as part of a “Case Summary.” While the Court did not build a standalone rule around this, the criticism underscores a fundamental requirement: trial courts must rely on the actual holdings and language of appellate decisions, not editorial summaries.

Impact

Although designated nonprecedential (“shall not be cited and does not serve as precedent”), the opinion is instructive in several practical ways for Montana litigators and trial courts:

  • Unjust enrichment “rent” disputes often become valuation trials. Where there is no enforceable lease, parties should expect to prove reasonable rental value with competent evidence (comparables, appraisals, expert testimony, rental history), not with demand letters.
  • Pritchard setoff remains robust and turns on good faith and enhancement of value—both typically fact-intensive. Trial courts should be cautious about truncating the inquiry at summary judgment when improvements and state of mind are disputed.
  • Remand compliance matters. A remand to “develop findings and conclusions” does not authorize resolving contested facts by order when the record is incomplete or conflicting.
  • Appellate hygiene: counsel must not cite unpublished Montana Supreme Court opinions, and courts should avoid treating third-party editorial summaries as authoritative statements of law.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Memorandum opinion / noncitable: The Court decided the case under internal rules for nonprecedential dispositions. It resolves the parties’ dispute but cannot be cited as binding authority in later cases.
  • Statute of frauds: Certain agreements (including many involving interests in land or long-term obligations) must be in writing to be enforceable; the District Court ruled the alleged oral rent contract unenforceable on this basis.
  • Unjust enrichment: An equitable remedy preventing one party from unfairly benefiting at another’s expense when no enforceable contract governs. The elements (from Missoula Cnty.) require a conferred benefit, knowledge/appreciation, and inequitable retention.
  • Summary judgment (Rule 56): A pretrial ruling appropriate only when material facts are undisputed. If key facts are contested—like value, intent, or timing—summary judgment is improper.
  • Reasonable rental value: A market-based estimate of what the property’s use is worth to the owner, typically proved with evidence (comparables/appraisal), not simply asserted.
  • Pritchard setoff (equitable recoupment): A potential credit against occupancy damages for a good faith trespasser’s permanent improvements, measured by how much they increased the land’s value (often capped so the occupant does not profit beyond offsetting liability).
  • Good faith vs. bad faith trespasser: A factual classification tied to what the occupant reasonably believed about their right to be there and what they knew/ignored. It affects whether equity will allow offsets for improvements.

Conclusion

Taylor v. Taylor reverses a remand order that converted contested property-occupancy issues into fixed unjust enrichment “rent” damages and a narrowly confined offset. Applying settled Montana law, the Court held that (1) good-faith trespass status and timing, (2) the scope and value-enhancing nature of improvements for Pritchard setoff, and (3) reasonable rental value are fact-dependent questions not properly resolved on this summary judgment record. The decision also reinforces procedural discipline: unpublished opinions are not citable, and editorial case summaries are not judicial reasoning.