Jurisdictional Limits on Reviewing Discretionary Cancellation Denials: “Questions of Law” vs. Unreviewable Reweighing and Permissible Record-Based Fact Discussion

Introduction

In Asiman Sadigov v. Attorney General United States of America (3d Cir. Mar. 23, 2026) (non-precedential), the Third Circuit addressed the scope of its jurisdiction to review a denial of cancellation of removal for lawful permanent residents under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) when the agency’s denial rests on discretionary balancing of equities and adverse factors.

The petitioner, Asiman Mansim Oglu Sadigov, a lawful permanent resident originally from Azerbaijan, was convicted in Pennsylvania of unlawful contact with a minor and indecent assault against a person less than sixteen years of age. DHS charged removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) (crime of domestic violence/stalking/child abuse, neglect, or abandonment) and under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (aggravated felony), but the Immigration Judge sustained removability only under § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i). Although the parties and IJ agreed Sadigov was statutorily eligible for cancellation, the IJ denied relief as a matter of discretion, and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed.

On petition for review, the Government moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The core issues were whether Sadigov’s challenges were (i) reviewable “constitutional claims or questions of law” under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), or instead (ii) non-reviewable attempts to relitigate the agency’s discretionary weighing of facts and equities, barred by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i).

Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit dismissed the petition in part for lack of jurisdiction and denied it in part. It reiterated that courts generally may not review the discretionary denial of cancellation of removal, but retain jurisdiction over colorable constitutional claims or questions of law.

  • The court rejected Sadigov’s claim that the Board applied a wrong legal standard by considering a conviction not tied to the aggravated-felony charge, explaining the agency may consider overall criminal history in discretionary balancing.
  • The court rejected the argument that the Board engaged in impermissible factfinding; it merely discussed a fact from a police criminal complaint already in the record.
  • The court held it lacked jurisdiction over arguments that the Board failed to give sufficient weight to hardship, rehabilitation, remorse, and mitigating circumstances—these were quintessential reweighing challenges.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) The jurisdictional bar and its “questions of law” exception

  • Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209, 225 n.4 (2024) and Patel v. Garland, 596 U.S. 328, 347 (2022) anchored the court’s threshold rule: discretionary denial of cancellation is generally not reviewable under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). The panel repeatedly invoked these decisions to classify Sadigov’s arguments as either (i) reviewable legal questions or (ii) non-reviewable disagreements with discretionary weighing.
  • Pareja v. Att'y Gen., 615 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 2010) supplied the anti-relabeling principle: litigants cannot “dress up” discretionary complaints as legal issues to create jurisdiction. This framing was crucial because Sadigov characterized multiple arguments as legal-standard or burden-of-proof errors, while the court treated them as substance-over-label challenges to weighing and seriousness assessments.
  • Roye v. Att'y Gen., 693 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2012) identified reviewable “questions of law,” including whether the Board used the correct standard of review or burden of proof, and stated those issues are reviewed de novo. The panel relied on Roye to acknowledge jurisdiction in principle over a claim that the Board violated its clear-error review limits—even though it ultimately found no violation on the merits.
  • Jarbough v. Att'y Gen., 483 F.3d 184, 189 (3d Cir. 2007) was used to reject “weight-of-the-evidence” claims dressed as legal error: arguments that the Board “incorrectly weighed evidence” or “improperly weighed equitable factors” are not questions of law.
  • Cospito v. Att'y Gen., 539 F.3d 166, 170 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam) reinforced that jurisdiction cannot be manufactured by labeling a claim “legal” when it is functionally discretionary reweighing.

2) The Board’s discretion in what adverse factors it may consider

  • Solano-Chicas v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 1050, 1055 (8th Cir. 2006) supported the proposition that discretionary balancing is not limited to the precise ground of removability sustained; the agency may consider broader criminal history and character evidence.
  • In re C-V-T-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 7, 11 (BIA 1998) supplied the Board’s own discretionary framework: adverse factors include “the existence of a criminal record and, if so, its nature, recency, and seriousness,” plus other bad-character evidence. The Third Circuit cited this to validate the Board’s attention to the seriousness of Sadigov’s criminal conduct during cancellation balancing.

3) Clear-error review and “impermissible factfinding” claims

  • Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 126 F.4th 363, 367 (5th Cir. 2025) was cited for the proposition that whether the Board violated its regulations by impermissibly finding facts is a question of law.
  • Adeyanju v. Garland, 27 F.4th 25, 49 (1st Cir. 2022) and Hammerschmidt v. Garland, 54 F.4th 282, 290 (5th Cir. 2022) were used to distinguish permissible record-based discussion from impermissible fact development: the Board may review undisputed facts in the record and does not impermissibly factfind unless it develops new facts, gathers new information, or resolves disputed factual contests itself.

4) “Ignoring evidence” as a potential legal error

  • Iglesias v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 528, 531 (7th Cir. 2008) and Contreras v. Bondi, 134 F.4th 12, 20 (1st Cir. 2025) were cited for the idea that a decision that completely ignores evidence may raise a question of law. The Third Circuit then found the Board did not ignore hardship evidence; it acknowledged it but weighed it against negative factors—placing the claim back in the non-reviewable category.

5) Distinguishing “particularly serious crime” analysis from cancellation discretion

  • Amos v. Att'y Gen., 157 F.4th 313, 327-28 (3d Cir. 2025) was invoked because Sadigov attempted to import the “particularly serious crime” factor analysis (used in asylum/withholding contexts) into the cancellation-of-removal discretionary calculus. The court deemed that inquiry inapplicable here.

Legal Reasoning

  1. Step 1: Identify the jurisdictional posture.
    Because cancellation was denied in discretion, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) presumptively barred review. The court’s role was limited to deciding whether Sadigov raised colorable constitutional claims or questions of law under § 1252(a)(2)(D).
  2. Step 2: Separate genuine legal questions from reweighing.
    Applying Pareja v. Att'y Gen. and Jarbough v. Att'y Gen., the court looked past Sadigov’s labels and asked whether each argument truly alleged a legal defect (wrong standard, wrong review, forbidden factfinding, complete evidentiary disregard) or instead sought a different discretionary balance.
  3. Step 3: “Wrong standard” claim rejected—Board may consider overall criminal history.
    Sadigov argued the Board should not have treated his unlawful-contact-with-a-minor conviction as aggravating because the IJ did not sustain removability under § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). The court gave two answers: (i) the IJ actually treated both convictions as categorically fitting the sustained child-abuse ground under § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i); and (ii) regardless, discretionary cancellation balancing is not confined to the sustained removal ground—consistent with Solano-Chicas v. Gonzales and In re C-V-T-.
  4. Step 4: “Mitigating factors / seriousness” arguments treated as non-reviewable discretion.
    The court rejected Sadigov’s attempt to require the Board to apply the “particularly serious crime” mitigating-factor analysis drawn from Amos v. Att'y Gen., emphasizing that asylum/withholding bars are a different doctrinal inquiry. Once recharacterized as an argument that the Board “overstated” seriousness, the claim became a non-reviewable disagreement with discretionary weighing under Wilkinson v. Garland.
  5. Step 5: “Impermissible factfinding” claim fails on the merits.
    Although the court recognized (with Roye v. Att'y Gen. and Santos-Zacaria v. Garland) that impermissible factfinding can be a reviewable legal issue, it found no violation: the Board referenced a fact contained in the police criminal complaint already in the administrative record and considered by the IJ. Citing Adeyanju v. Garland and Hammerschmidt v. Garland, the court treated this as permissible record-based discussion rather than new fact development or resolution of disputed facts.
  6. Step 6: Hardship and “impossible evidentiary burden” arguments rejected as reweighing.
    The court acknowledged that completely ignoring evidence can raise a legal question (per Iglesias v. Mukasey and Contreras v. Bondi), but found the Board expressly acknowledged family hardship (including medical issues). The remaining complaint—insufficient weight—was barred by Jarbough v. Att'y Gen.. Likewise, the “impossible evidentiary burden” characterization was treated as a request to reweigh rehabilitation and remorse, barred by Wilkinson v. Garland and consistent with Cospito v. Att'y Gen..

Impact

Although designated “NOT PRECEDENTIAL,” the opinion illustrates (and in practice may guide litigants on) how the Third Circuit is likely to triage cancellation-of-removal petitions:

  • Jurisdiction will turn on substance. Challenges framed as “wrong standard” or “burden” will be dismissed if they functionally seek reweighing of seriousness, hardship, rehabilitation, or equities.
  • Impermissible factfinding claims remain viable—but narrow. Petitioners must show the Board actually developed new facts or chose between disputed facts, not merely that it highlighted unfavorable details already present in the record.
  • The agency’s discretionary lens is broad. The Board may consider overall criminal history and character evidence beyond the formal ground(s) of removability sustained.
  • “Ignored evidence” is a high bar. Explicit acknowledgment of hardship tends to convert the dispute into unreviewable weighing.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Cancellation of removal (LPR cancellation) (8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)): A form of discretionary relief that can allow certain lawful permanent residents to remain in the United States despite being removable. Even if a person is eligible, the IJ/BIA may deny it based on negative factors (often criminal history).
  • “Discretionary denial”: The agency agrees the person meets threshold eligibility but decides, after balancing positives and negatives, that relief is not warranted. Courts generally cannot second-guess that balancing.
  • Jurisdiction-stripping (8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)) and the exception (8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D)): Congress barred judicial review of certain discretionary decisions, but courts may still review genuine constitutional claims or legal questions.
  • “Colorable” legal claim: A claim that plausibly alleges a legal error; merely labeling a disagreement as “legal” is insufficient.
  • Clear-error review and impermissible factfinding (8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i), (iv)): On appeal, the Board generally reviews an IJ’s factual findings for clear error and should not make new factual findings. But it may discuss and rely on facts already in the record without “finding” new facts.
  • “Particularly serious crime”: A distinct concept used to bar asylum/withholding in certain contexts; it does not control how seriousness is weighed in cancellation discretion.

Conclusion

The Third Circuit’s decision reinforces a strict line between reviewable legal-process errors and unreviewable discretionary balancing in cancellation-of-removal cases. The court permitted jurisdictional consideration of claims like impermissible factfinding in principle, but rejected the petitioner’s arguments because the Board relied on record materials, acknowledged hardship evidence, and ultimately made a discretionary judgment that the courts are not empowered to reweigh. In practical terms, the opinion underscores that cancellation petitions succeed on review only when they identify a genuine legal defect—not when they seek a different balance of equities.