Jurisdictional Bar to Reweighing Evidence in I-751 Good-Faith Marriage Waiver Denials; Statutory “Reasonable Opportunity” Requires Prejudice

I. Introduction

In Thanh Thao Le Nguyen v. Todd W. Blanche (7th Cir. July 6, 2026) (nonprecedential), the Seventh Circuit reviewed a petition arising from the termination of Thanh Thao Le Nguyen’s conditional lawful permanent resident status and the denial of her request for a discretionary waiver of the joint-filing requirement to remove conditions on residence.

The case centers on the “good faith marriage” waiver under 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(B), which allows an immigrant to seek removal of conditions without the citizen spouse’s joint participation when the immigrant proves the marriage was entered in good faith. USCIS denied Nguyen’s waiver application, an Immigration Judge agreed, and the Board of Immigration Appeals summarily affirmed.

Nguyen presented two principal issues to the court of appeals: (1) whether the Immigration Judge effectively imposed an improperly heightened burden in evaluating good faith; and (2) whether the Immigration Judge denied her a fair hearing by declining to hear testimony from a corroborating witness (her friend, Lan Luong).

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Seventh Circuit dismissed in part and denied in part the petition for review.

  • Dismissed (lack of jurisdiction): To the extent Nguyen sought reconsideration of the Immigration Judge’s credibility determination or a reweighing of the evidence supporting the discretionary waiver denial.
  • Denied (on the merits of reviewable claims): The court held the Immigration Judge applied the correct legal standard (preponderance of the evidence) and rejected Nguyen’s statutory “reasonable opportunity” argument because she failed to show prejudice from the exclusion of the corroborating witness testimony.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

The disposition is anchored in a familiar Seventh Circuit framework for reviewing denials of discretionary relief—especially where Congress has limited judicial review and reserved key evidentiary assessments to the agency.

1. Jurisdictional limits and reviewable issues

  • Omorhienrhien v. Barr, 952 F.3d 906 (7th Cir. 2020): The court relied on this decision for two linked propositions: (i) the “good faith” waiver decision is discretionary and thus largely insulated from judicial review; and (ii) the court retains only “narrow jurisdiction” over legal and constitutional challenges under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). The panel also used Omorhienrhien to distinguish cases where the record is one-sided from those where the government presents conflicting evidence.
  • Adebowale v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 893 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Huang v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 618 (2008)): These cases support the line between a legal question and an unreviewable request to reweigh evidence. A petitioner’s disagreement with the weight the Immigration Judge assigned to evidence is not a “question of law.”
  • Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209 (2024): Cited for the proposition that credibility determinations are findings of fact, reinforcing the jurisdictional bar where the petition effectively challenges factual determinations.

2. “Elevated burden” arguments and the role of conflicting evidence

  • Lara v. Lynch, 789 F.3d 800 (7th Cir. 2015): Nguyen invoked Lara to argue the agency heightened the burden. The panel distinguished Lara on its facts: in Lara, the Board credited all testimony and the government offered no contrary evidence, so denial was logically inconsistent with the accepted record. Here, by contrast, the Immigration Judge made an adverse credibility finding and the government presented evidence (including the spouse’s letter and records) that contradicted Nguyen’s narrative, making the case one of weighing conflicting evidence—an area largely beyond the court’s jurisdiction.
  • Omorhienrhien v. Barr, 952 F.3d 906 (7th Cir. 2020): Used again to emphasize that where government evidence conflicts with the applicant’s account, the agency’s resolution of those conflicts is part of discretionary evaluation.

3. Constitutional and statutory hearing-rights arguments

  • Boadi v. Holder, 706 F.3d 854 (7th Cir. 2013): The panel used this case to reject the constitutional due process theory, stating that discretionary waivers “are not liberty interests and do not implicate the Constitution.” The court also drew on Boadi for the prejudice requirement: it is not enough to assert generally that additional evidence would have helped; the petitioner must show the outcome likely would have differed.
  • Apouviepseakoda v. Gonzales, 475 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Rehman v. Gonzales, 441 F.3d 506 (2006)): These cases establish the statutory framework under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B): the immigrant must show both (i) denial of a “reasonable opportunity” to present evidence and (ii) resulting prejudice.
  • Kerciku v. INS, 314 F.3d 913 (7th Cir. 2003): Quoted (through Apouviepseakoda) for when exclusion of corroborating testimony can be problematic—particularly if it reflects that the Immigration Judge “has made up his mind” and is unwilling to hear material testimony.
  • Delgado v. Holder, 674 F.3d 759 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Apouviepseakoda): Applied for the principle that limiting witnesses to avoid cumulative evidence may be permissible, especially where counsel does not object and the petitioner otherwise has ample opportunity to present her case.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The court’s jurisdictional sorting: what is reviewable vs. unreviewable

The opinion’s structure reflects a threshold inquiry: whether Nguyen’s arguments were, in substance, (i) legal challenges within the narrow carve-out of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) or (ii) attempts to relitigate facts, credibility, and evidentiary weight, which are insulated by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) when the underlying decision is discretionary.

The panel treated Nguyen’s “elevated burden” argument as potentially reviewable only to the extent it alleged misapplication of the legal standard. But once the court concluded the Immigration Judge stated and applied the correct burden (preponderance of the evidence), the remaining complaints—claimed “improper focus,” “inconsistencies,” and credibility— became classic unreviewable reweighing challenges.

2. Correct legal standard applied to the I-751 good-faith waiver

Under 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(B) and related authorities, an applicant must show she entered the marriage “in good faith.” The panel emphasized that the Immigration Judge repeatedly articulated the correct standard—good faith proven by a preponderance—and then evaluated the total record.

Critically, the court treated the Immigration Judge’s reliance on post-marriage conduct as legally proper. The panel cited 8 C.F.R. § 216.5(e)(2), which expressly contemplates evidence such as commingled finances, cohabitation, and other “pertinent” conduct bearing on “commitment . . . to the marital relationship.” The court rejected any suggestion that the inquiry must be limited to evidence preceding the marriage ceremony.

3. Exclusion of corroborating witness testimony: statutory right and prejudice

While the court dismissed the constitutional due process claim (no protected liberty interest in discretionary waivers), it addressed the statutory contention under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B). The panel’s analysis turned on two themes: cumulative evidence and prejudice.

  • Cumulative evidence rationale: The Immigration Judge explained she expected Lan Luong’s testimony to match Luong’s letter and Nguyen’s account. The panel viewed this as a case-management decision aimed at avoiding cumulative testimony, not a sign the judge had “made up [her] mind.”
  • Lack of objection: The court emphasized that Nguyen’s counsel did not object to the decision to forgo live testimony, which undermined any claim that the excluded evidence was obviously critical.
  • No prejudice shown: The panel found Nguyen’s proffer too general. Luong’s letter already covered the key social event (a child’s birthday party), and cohabitation was not the main dispute; rather, the Immigration Judge’s concern was that Nguyen and Hon were often not in the same place at the same time, alongside other inconsistencies. On that record, the court deemed it unlikely that Luong’s live testimony would have changed the outcome.

C. Impact

Although labeled a NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION, the decision illustrates—and reinforces in practice—several durable principles that will shape litigation strategy in conditional-residence waiver cases:

  • Framing is outcome-determinative in court of appeals: Petitioners must convert disagreements about the record into genuinely legal issues (e.g., wrong burden, wrong legal test, categorical exclusion of relevant evidence). Arguments that essentially challenge credibility or evidentiary weight risk dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
  • “Good faith” is assessed through the lived reality of the marriage: The court’s approval of post-marriage evidence analysis underscores that continued conduct (travel, cohabitation patterns, commingled finances, social presentation, consistency of accounts) is central to evaluating intent and commitment.
  • Hearing-error claims require a concrete prejudice proffer: To challenge excluded witness testimony, counsel should (i) object on the record, (ii) make a clear offer of proof identifying new, non-cumulative facts, and (iii) connect those facts to the dispositive concerns identified by the Immigration Judge.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Conditional lawful permanent resident: A spouse-based green card granted initially for two years. After two years, the couple must typically file together to “remove conditions.”
  • Joint petition / interview requirement: The normal process requiring both spouses to file and appear so the government can confirm the marriage was real.
  • Good-faith marriage waiver (I-751 waiver conceptually): A request to skip the joint filing when the marriage ended (e.g., divorce), provided the immigrant proves the marriage was entered in good faith.
  • Preponderance of the evidence: The applicant must show the claim is more likely true than not (just over 50%).
  • Adverse credibility finding: The Immigration Judge concluded the applicant’s testimony was not reliable due to inconsistencies and omissions; courts generally treat this as a factual matter.
  • Jurisdictional bar to review: Congress limited courts’ ability to review certain discretionary immigration decisions; courts may review only legal or constitutional questions, not ordinary factual disputes or reweighing of evidence.
  • Statutory “reasonable opportunity” and prejudice: Even if a procedural misstep occurs (like excluding a witness), the petitioner must show it likely mattered to the outcome.

V. Conclusion

Thanh Thao Le Nguyen v. Todd W. Blanche crystallizes two practical rules for conditional-residence waiver litigation in the Seventh Circuit: (1) appellate courts will dismiss challenges that, in substance, ask them to revisit credibility and reweigh evidence in discretionary waiver denials; and (2) statutory claims about curtailed evidence presentation require a specific showing of prejudice—especially when excluded testimony is cumulative and counsel did not object.

The decision’s broader significance lies less in creating new doctrine than in demonstrating how jurisdictional limits and prejudice requirements operate together to narrow the path for successful petitions for review in I-751 good-faith waiver disputes.