Jurisdictional Attacks on the Underlying Civil Case Do Not Defeat an Appellate Waiver in a Separate Criminal-Contempt Judgment

1. Introduction

In re: Contempt Proceedings Against Carpenter (10th Cir. Mar. 27, 2026) arose from a district court’s order requiring Daniel E. Carpenter to show cause why he should not be held in criminal contempt for violating a court order that prohibited him from interfering with certain assets connected to a civil-litigation matter. Carpenter ultimately pleaded guilty to criminal contempt under 18 U.S.C. § 401(3) pursuant to a plea agreement containing a broad appellate waiver.

The district court sentenced Carpenter to zero months’ imprisonment, five years of supervised release, and imposed a $100,000 fine. Carpenter then (1) sought to appeal his conviction and sentence, and (2) separately appealed the district court’s dismissal (for lack of jurisdiction) of his motion to correct sentence under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(a). The government moved to enforce the appellate waiver.

The central issues on appeal were whether Carpenter could avoid the waiver by arguing (a) breach of the plea agreement, (b) “jurisdictional” defects, (c) lack of a knowing and voluntary waiver, or (d) “miscarriage of justice” under the Tenth Circuit’s waiver-enforcement framework.

2. Summary of the Opinion

Applying United States v. Hahn, the Tenth Circuit enforced Carpenter’s appeal waiver and dismissed both appeals. The court held, in substance, that:

  • The district court cannot “breach” a plea agreement because it is not a party to it.
  • Carpenter’s “jurisdictional” arguments attacked jurisdiction over the underlying civil suit, not the district court’s separate authority to adjudicate criminal contempt; thus they did not defeat the waiver.
  • The waiver was knowing and voluntary in light of the waiver’s text and an extensive Rule 11 colloquy confirming Carpenter understood the possible fine (including the court’s statement that there was “no statutory limit”) and a supervised release term “not to exceed five years.”
  • Enforcement did not produce a miscarriage of justice: criminal contempt under 18 U.S.C. § 401 has no statutory maximum punishment, and a five-year supervised release term is authorized for a Class A felony under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(1); Carpenter’s remaining arguments attacked the sentence/conviction rather than the waiver’s legality.

The decision is designated as nonbinding precedent (an “Order and Judgment”), but it remains citable for persuasive value.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

United States v. Hahn

United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315 (10th Cir. 2004), supplied the controlling test for enforcing appellate waivers. The panel followed Hahn’s three-part inquiry: (1) scope of the waiver, (2) knowing and voluntary nature of the waiver, and (3) miscarriage of justice. Carpenter did not contest scope, so the opinion focused on the latter two factors—especially “knowing and voluntary” and “miscarriage of justice.”

United States v. Porter

Citing United States v. Porter, 405 F.3d 1136 (10th Cir. 2005), the court treated the “scope” Hahn factor as effectively conceded because Carpenter did not dispute it. Porter supports the pragmatic approach that uncontested Hahn elements need not be addressed.

United States v. Luna-Acosta

United States v. Luna-Acosta, 715 F.3d 860 (10th Cir. 2013), stands for the important limit that appellate waivers do not bar challenges asserting the judgment was entered without jurisdiction. The panel accepted that principle but distinguished it: Carpenter’s arguments went to jurisdiction in the underlying civil case, not the criminal contempt case.

United States v. Straub

The court relied on United States v. Straub, 508 F.3d 1003 (11th Cir. 2007), to articulate the separation between (a) jurisdiction over an underlying dispute and (b) the authority to adjudicate criminal contempt. Straub’s quoted reasoning—criminal contempt adjudication does not require assessing the merits of the underlying controversy—was used to reject Carpenter’s attempt to turn alleged civil-case jurisdictional defects into a waiver-defeating criminal-case jurisdictional attack.

United States v. Tanner

United States v. Tanner, 721 F.3d 1231 (10th Cir. 2013), placed the burden on the defendant to show a waiver was not knowing and voluntary. This burden allocation mattered because Carpenter’s argument was essentially that he did not “agree” to a specific fine or term of supervised release, rather than identifying a defect in the waiver’s formation.

United States v. Sandoval

United States v. Sandoval, 477 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 2007), supplied the core principle that a waiver may be knowing and voluntary even if the defendant does not know the precise consequences in advance. The opinion used Sandoval to reject Carpenter’s claim that the waiver failed because he did not anticipate a $100,000 fine or five years of supervised release—particularly where the plea colloquy confirmed he understood the court’s discretion.

United States v. Green

United States v. Green, 405 F.3d 1180 (10th Cir. 2005), defined “statutory maximum” for Hahn’s miscarriage-of-justice exception as the legislatively specified upper limit for the offense of conviction. This framing narrowed Carpenter’s “statutory maximum” argument and directed the analysis to what Congress authorized for § 401 contempt and for supervised release under § 3583.

United States v. Bowers

United States v. Bowers, 847 F.3d 1280 (10th Cir. 2017), was cited for the proposition that 18 U.S.C. § 401 “carries no statutorily authorized maximum punishment.” This was pivotal to rejecting Carpenter’s claim that the fine exceeded a statutory maximum. Once the court treated § 401 as lacking a statutory ceiling, Carpenter’s fine-based “maximum” argument could not satisfy Hahn’s miscarriage-of-justice prong.

United States v. Smith

United States v. Smith, 500 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2007), reinforced that Hahn’s “otherwise unlawful” miscarriage-of-justice exception focuses on whether the waiver is unlawful—not whether the sentence or conviction might be erroneous. The panel used Smith to reject Carpenter’s attempt to repackage merits arguments (about contempt validity, order ambiguity, etc.) as waiver-defeating unlawfulness.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(a) “Breach” of the plea agreement

Carpenter argued the plea agreement was breached because the district court imposed supervised release and a $100,000 fine. The panel’s response was structural: the district court is not a party to the plea agreement, so it cannot be the breaching actor. Because Carpenter identified no government action that violated the agreement, the breach theory failed at the threshold.

(b) Jurisdiction as a waiver “escape hatch”

While acknowledging (via United States v. Luna-Acosta) that jurisdictional defects cannot be waived, the panel held Carpenter’s “jurisdictional” claims were misdirected: they contested jurisdiction over the underlying civil litigation, not the court’s power to enter a criminal-contempt judgment. Citing United States v. Straub, the court emphasized criminal contempt is adjudicated without re-litigating the merits (or even necessarily the jurisdictional merits) of the underlying controversy. Therefore, alleged defects in the civil case did not undermine the contempt judgment’s jurisdictional foundation and did not defeat the waiver.

(c) Knowing and voluntary waiver

Applying United States v. Hahn, the court evaluated (i) the waiver text and (ii) the Rule 11 colloquy. The plea agreement expressly waived appeal of the conviction; waived appeal of the sentence (including fines) if the sentence was zero months’ imprisonment; and waived appeal of the length/conditions of supervised release.

The Rule 11 colloquy reinforced the breadth of the waiver and Carpenter’s understanding of sentencing exposure, including the court’s statement that there was “no statutory limit for a fine” and that supervised release could be imposed “not to exceed five years.” Under United States v. Sandoval, Carpenter did not need to know the exact fine or the exact supervised release term for the waiver to be valid; he needed to understand the rights being relinquished and the general consequences. Under United States v. Tanner, Carpenter bore the burden to show otherwise and did not meet it.

(d) Miscarriage of justice

Under Hahn, miscarriage of justice exists only in four enumerated situations: impermissible factor (e.g., race), ineffective assistance in negotiating the waiver, a sentence exceeding the statutory maximum, or a waiver that is otherwise unlawful. Carpenter relied mainly on the “statutory maximum” and “otherwise unlawful” theories.

On “statutory maximum,” the panel reasoned (with United States v. Green and United States v. Bowers) that § 401 has no congressionally specified maximum punishment, defeating his fine-based ceiling argument. As to supervised release, the court treated Carpenter’s conviction as subject to statutory supervised-release limits and held that five years was within 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(1).

On “otherwise unlawful,” the court (with United States v. Smith and Sandoval) held Carpenter’s contentions attacked the conviction/sentence on the merits (e.g., whether the injunction was ambiguous; whether his acts constituted contempt), not the legality of the waiver itself. That mismatch foreclosed relief.

3.3 Impact

Although nonprecedential, the decision is a useful, citable illustration of several practical points likely to recur:

  • Criminal contempt as “jurisdictionally separate”: litigants cannot necessarily sidestep appellate waivers by recharacterizing disputes about the underlying civil case as jurisdictional defects in the contempt prosecution.
  • Waiver breadth matters in zero-imprisonment sentences: where an agreement expressly waives appeals of “any fines” and supervised release, defendants face substantial barriers to later challenging those components, even if they view them as unexpectedly harsh.
  • Rule 11 colloquy as litigation-proofing: a careful colloquy—especially explicit discussion of waiver terms and maximum exposure—remains central to enforcing waivers and defeating later claims of surprise or misunderstanding.
  • § 401 contempt and “statutory maximum” arguments: by invoking Bowers, the panel signaled that statutory-maximum challenges to contempt penalties are difficult where Congress did not set a punishment ceiling in § 401, shifting disputes toward reasonableness or constitutional constraints—which waivers may bar.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Criminal contempt (18 U.S.C. § 401(3)): punishment for willfully disobeying a federal court order. It is a separate criminal judgment, even if it arose out of a civil case.
  • Appeal waiver: a plea-agreement promise not to appeal specified issues. Courts generally enforce it if it is clear, knowing/voluntary, and enforcement would not create a Hahn “miscarriage of justice.”
  • Rule 11 colloquy: the in-court questioning where the judge confirms the defendant understands the plea, rights being waived, and potential penalties. A detailed colloquy makes later “I didn’t understand” claims much harder.
  • Supervised release: a period of court supervision after sentencing (often after imprisonment, but legally analyzed by reference to statutory authorization). Here, the court focused on whether the term imposed fit within 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(1).
  • “Statutory maximum” (Hahn context): the highest punishment Congress expressly allows for the offense. If Congress sets no cap (as recognized for § 401), a “statutory maximum” argument is harder to sustain.
  • “Otherwise unlawful” waiver: under United States v. Smith, this means the waiver itself is invalid (e.g., defective procedure or no lawful waiver), not that the sentence might be wrong.
  • Rule 35(a) motion: a narrow mechanism to correct certain clear sentencing errors shortly after sentencing; if the district court lacks jurisdiction to act, an appeal waiver may still independently bar appellate review of the dismissal.

5. Conclusion

The Tenth Circuit’s disposition in In re: Contempt Proceedings Against Carpenter underscores a practical rule of waiver enforcement in the criminal-contempt setting: arguments about jurisdiction in an underlying civil dispute do not necessarily undermine a separate criminal-contempt judgment, and thus do not automatically defeat an appellate waiver. The opinion also reiterates that (1) only the government can breach a plea agreement, (2) waivers remain “knowing and voluntary” without foresight into exact sentencing outcomes, and (3) Hahn’s miscarriage-of-justice exceptions are narrow—focused on waiver validity and congressionally set maxima, not general sentencing disagreement.