Jurisdiction Must Be Pleaded—and Jurisdictional Dismissals Must Be Without Prejudice

Introduction

In Sungsuk Kim v. Unlimited Settlement Services (3d Cir. Apr. 16, 2026) (not precedential), the Third Circuit reviewed the dismissal of a sprawling, 1327-page pro se federal filing arising out of years of Pennsylvania state-court litigation concerning a mortgage foreclosure, a 2017 fire loss, insurance proceeds, a settlement involving sale of the property, and subsequent collateral suits.

The appellant, Sungsuk Kim, named 11 defendants spanning multiple groups: settlement-service actors, insurer and counsel, mortgage servicers and counsel, a neighbor (alleged tortfeasor) and his insurer/counsel, and a former attorney of Kim’s. The central federal-court problem, however, was not the merits of these disputes but the absence of a properly pleaded basis for federal subject-matter jurisdiction.

The key issues on appeal were: (1) whether the District Court correctly dismissed the complaint on Rooker-Feldman grounds; (2) whether dismissal was required because Kim did not allege any basis for federal jurisdiction; and (3) whether the dismissal could be “with prejudice.”

Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal but on a different jurisdictional ground than the District Court relied upon. While the District Court dismissed “with prejudice” based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the Third Circuit held the complaint should be dismissed because Kim failed to invoke federal jurisdiction at all (i.e., she did not satisfy Rule 8(a)(1)’s requirement to plead the grounds for subject-matter jurisdiction).

Critically, the Third Circuit modified the judgment to reflect that the dismissal is without prejudice, because dismissals for lack of jurisdiction cannot adjudicate the merits. The Court also affirmed the refusal to appoint counsel because Kim did not show a potentially meritorious claim within federal jurisdiction.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

  • Lincoln Benefit Life Co. v. AEI Life, LLC, 800 F.3d 99 (3d Cir. 2015)
    Cited for the proposition that diversity jurisdiction requires allegations regarding the parties’ citizenship. The panel used it to underscore the pleading deficiency: Kim did not allege defendants’ citizenship and left jurisdictional portions of a form complaint blank. Even if she claimed Kansas citizenship, that alone did not establish complete diversity.
  • In re Adams, 151 F.4th 144 (3d Cir. 2025)
    Provided the modern Third Circuit framework for applying Rooker-Feldman, including the distinction between claims that seek appellate-like review of state judgments (potentially barred by Rooker-Feldman) and claims that merely overlap factually with state litigation (typically governed by preclusion principles).
  • Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005)
    Central to narrowing Rooker-Feldman. The opinion used Exxon Mobil to emphasize that Rooker-Feldman does not substitute for ordinary preclusion law and does not apply simply because state and federal matters overlap. The Court also invoked Exxon Mobil to justify resolving the appeal on a more basic threshold point: the plaintiff never invoked federal jurisdiction in the first place.
  • Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2010)
    Reinforced that many post-state-court disputes—especially those alleging misconduct by lawyers/parties during state litigation—are ordinarily analyzed under preclusion doctrines rather than Rooker-Feldman. The panel used this to suggest the District Court’s “all claims are barred” approach was overbroad.
  • In re Knapper, 407 F.3d 573 (3d Cir. 2005)
    Referenced as part of the District Court’s reasoning on “inextricably intertwined.” The Third Circuit noted that current doctrine focuses on whether the federal claim invites review of a final state-court decision, not on an expansive “intertwined” test divorced from that inquiry.
  • In re Johnson & Johnson Talcum Powder Prods. Mktg., Sales Pracs. & Liab. Litig., 903 F.3d 278 (3d Cir. 2018)
    Quoted for the presumption against federal jurisdiction: federal courts “presume” jurisdiction is lacking unless it affirmatively appears in the record. This framed the burden on Kim to plead jurisdiction and supported dismissal under Rule 8(a)(1).
  • Aldossari ex rel. Aldossari v. Ripp, 49 F.4th 236 (3d Cir. 2022)
    Supplied the key rule that a plaintiff bears the burden of alleging a legal basis for federal jurisdiction; failure to do so requires dismissal. The panel also used Aldossari to support declining remand for yet another attempt given Kim had already been warned and still did not allege jurisdiction.
  • Cook v. GameStop, Inc., 148 F.4th 153 (3d Cir. 2025)
    The linchpin for the remedial modification: dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction must be without prejudice to the merits. This is the opinion’s most concrete “rule of decision” effect: even when dismissal is proper, “with prejudice” is the wrong disposition when jurisdiction is absent.
  • Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 1993)
    Cited for the standard governing appointment of counsel in civil cases. The panel affirmed denial of counsel because Kim did not show a potentially meritorious claim over which the federal court might have jurisdiction—an implicit reminder that jurisdictional plausibility is a predicate to discretionary counsel appointment.
  • Behrens v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 96 F.4th 202 (2d Cir. 2024); Hartig Drug Co. v. Senju Pharm. Co., 836 F.3d 261 (3d Cir. 2016); Potter v. Cozen & O'Connor, 46 F.4th 148 (3d Cir. 2022); Guerra v. Consol. Rail Corp., 936 F.3d 124 (3d Cir. 2019)
    These cases addressed an appellate nuance: whether a party can forfeit arguments about jurisdictional labels and the court’s independent obligation to police subject-matter jurisdiction. While the panel noted the issue, it did not decide it because dismissal was warranted on the more fundamental ground that jurisdiction had never been pleaded.

Legal Reasoning

The Third Circuit’s reasoning proceeded in three steps:

  1. Appellate posture and forfeiture: The Court observed Kim did not meaningfully challenge the District Court’s dismissal rationale and appeared to concede the federal filing was “incorrect.” Although the panel discussed waiver/forfeiture complexities in jurisdictional contexts, it ultimately resolved the case on an independent jurisdictional ground.
  2. Rooker-Feldman was not the best analytic fit for the entire complaint: The panel indicated that Rooker-Feldman can apply insofar as a plaintiff explicitly seeks review of state-court judgments, but that reasserted claims or new claims related to the same underlying events are typically handled through preclusion, not Rooker-Feldman. The District Court’s reliance on “inextricably intertwined” reasoning risked overextension.
  3. Threshold defect—failure to invoke federal jurisdiction: Independently of Rooker-Feldman, Kim did not allege any basis for federal jurisdiction as required by Rule 8(a)(1). The panel emphasized that federal jurisdiction is presumed absent and the burden rests on the party invoking it. The Court found no reason to remand because Kim had been explicitly instructed in a prior federal case to plead jurisdiction and still left the relevant portions blank, and she did not respond to jurisdictional arguments raised in a motion to dismiss.

Having affirmed dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, the Third Circuit corrected the form of the judgment: a jurisdictional dismissal cannot be “with prejudice” because it does not reach the merits. Thus, the panel modified the dismissal to be without prejudice.

Impact

Although designated “not precedential,” the decision is a clear, practice-oriented reminder of several points likely to influence how district courts and litigants handle similar filings:

  • Rule 8(a)(1) is not optional: Even voluminous submissions and detailed factual histories do not substitute for pleading a concrete jurisdictional basis (federal question or diversity with complete diversity and appropriate allegations).
  • Courts may (and should) resolve on the simplest jurisdictional ground: Rather than over-litigating Rooker-Feldman, courts can dismiss where jurisdiction is not invoked at all.
  • Rooker-Feldman remains narrow: The opinion reinforces the post-Exxon Mobil approach: preclusion, not Rooker-Feldman, often supplies the correct analysis for claims adjacent to state litigation.
  • Disposition matters: “without prejudice” is mandatory for jurisdictional dismissals: The modification grounded in Cook v. GameStop, Inc. is the opinion’s most concrete doctrinal takeaway and affects judgment drafting and litigants’ future options (even if practical barriers like preclusion or filing restrictions may remain).
  • Counsel appointment depends on jurisdictionally viable merit: Under Tabron v. Grace, a court is not expected to appoint counsel where the pleadings do not even establish a potentially meritorious claim within the court’s power to hear.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Subject-matter jurisdiction: The federal court’s legal authority to hear a type of dispute. If it is missing, the court must dismiss, no matter how compelling the facts may be.
  • Rule 8(a)(1): Requires a complaint to include “a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction.” A plaintiff must identify a federal statute/constitutional basis (federal question) or plead complete diversity of citizenship and the amount in controversy (diversity).
  • Rooker-Feldman doctrine: A narrow rule preventing lower federal courts from acting as appellate courts over state-court judgments. It does not automatically bar all federal litigation related to a state-court dispute.
  • Preclusion (claim/issue preclusion): Rules that can bar re-litigation of claims or issues already resolved (or that should have been raised) in prior litigation—often the correct doctrine when a plaintiff repeats state-court claims in federal court.
  • With prejudice vs. without prejudice: “With prejudice” is a merits-ending disposition that prevents refiling. “Without prejudice” means the court did not decide the merits; the plaintiff may refile if a valid jurisdictional basis exists (though other doctrines like preclusion may still block recovery).

Conclusion

Sungsuk Kim v. Unlimited Settlement Services underscores a foundational rule of federal litigation: a plaintiff must affirmatively plead a basis for federal subject-matter jurisdiction, and failure to do so requires dismissal. Even where a district court invokes Rooker-Feldman, appellate review may affirm on the more basic ground that jurisdiction was never invoked. Finally, the decision reinforces that jurisdictional dismissals must be entered without prejudice, as they do not adjudicate the merits—an important corrective with practical consequences for judgment form and future litigation posture.